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Abstract
The emergence in 1886-87 of the political conflict 
between freetrade and protection marked the beginning of a 
period of far-reaching change in the politics of New South 
Wales. The basic change that was initiated was the transit­
ion from unprincipled personal factions to modern principled 
political parties. Although this transition had not been 
completed by the end of 1891? the five years after 1886 wit­
nessed steady progress in the gradual evolution of the char­
acteristics of modern political parties. Sophisticated 
party structures were constructed; modern methods of elect­
oral management were formulated and put into operation; and 
the basic elements of the ’caucus system’ of party discipline 
were introduced into the political system. Underlying all 
these developments was a new concern for political philos­
ophy and principle as the chief determinant of political act­
ion and behaviour, rep3.acing the ’old order’ standards of 
personal prejudice and unprincipled opportunism.
Political change, however, was neither smooth nor 
swift, and the residual strength and influence of ’old order' 
values and politicians acted to slow down the rate of change 
and to undermine its consolidation. Many of the changes and 
developments effected prior to 1892 proved insubstantial and 
short-lived. The most basic reason for this was the pres­
ence of deep-seated * principled disunity and doctrinal diss­
ension within each fiscal 'party*. Not until these destruct­
ive internal 'party' conflicts had been eradicated could pol­
itical change proceed smoothly and be permanently consolid­
ated. The creation of that principled cohesion basic to a 
true political party also depended upon the eradication of 
internal tension and disunity. At the end of 1891> this was 
still to be achieved.
iv
CONTENTS
Volume I
Acknowledgements vi
Abbreviations vii
Introduction ix
1. THE »FLAG CF FREE TRADE» AND THE «CREATURE
CALLED PROTECTION«: Parkes, Reform and the
Fiscal Issue, 1878-1887. 1
2. FACTIONS AND FRICTIONS, PRINCIPLES AND 
PROGRAMMES, 1887-1891.
I o  Fiscal Conflict, Liberalism and the
Parliamentary Freetraders. 43
3. FACTIONS AND FRICTIONS, PRINCIPLES AND 
PROGRAMMES, 1887-1891.
II. The Parliamentary Freetraders (continued). 78
4. FACTIONS AND FRICTIONS, PRINCIPLES AND 
PROGRAMMES, 1887-1891.
III. The Parliamentary Protectionists
and Some Conclusions. 108
3. MERCHANTS AND MANUFACTURERS:
Extra-Parliamentary Fiscal Organisations.
I. Development, 1885-1889* 142
6. CONSTANCY AND CONSCIENCE, DISCIPLINE AND
DISOBEDIENCE: Parliamentary and Ministerial
Independence and Discipline, 1887-1891. 179
7. ELECTIONS AND ENDORSEMENTS: Parliamentary
Electoral Organisation and Discipline.
I. 1889. 208
8. MERCHANTS AND MANUFACTURERS:
Extra-Parliamentary Fiscal Organisations.
II. Zenith and Nadir, 1889-1891. 238
V9 . ELECTIONS AND ENDORSEMENTS:
P a r l i a m e n t a r y  E l e c t o r a l  O r g a n i s a t i o n  
and D i s c i p i i n e  .
I I .  18 9 1 . 275
CONCLUSION 306
Volume I I
A b b r e v i a t i o n s  i i i
APPENDICES 313
NOTES 362
BIBLIOGRAPHY 340
Ac kn owl 6 d g e me n t s
I wish to thank Dr J.J.Eddy, Mrs B.R.Penny,
Mr J.A.Ryan, the Sydney Chamber of Commerce, and 
all members of the staff of the Australian Dict­
ionary of Biography project for access to material 
in their possession*
A number of people listened to me patiently 
and sympathetically and others helped by reading 
carefully and critically my early drafts. I am 
especially grateful to Mrs M» Campbell, Professor 
L.F.Crisp, Dr B. de Garis, Mr J.Gibbney, Dr J.A. 
Merritt, Dr J.Molony, and Dr J.Ritchie.
I owe two particular debts. My supervisor,
Mr N.B.Nairn, gave me access to material that I 
would not otherwise have been able to use, and 
was at all times most willing to share with me 
his extensive knowledge of New South Wales polit­
ics. I also wish to thank my wife, Pamela. She 
gave me regular encouragement and sound advice, 
corrected and polished an untidy draft, under­
took its typing .and proof-read the finished cop­
ies. In the latter task, she was assisted by Mr 
R.Gengos, to whom I also proffer my thanks.
vii
A b b r e v i a t i o n s  used in Text
CM Chamber of Manufactures of New South Wales.
I)A Democratic Alliance.
FT A New South Wales Free Trade Association.
FTFC Freetrade and Federation Committee, June 1891»
FTLA Free trade and Liberal Association of New South Wales.
FTLREC Freetrade and Land Reform Electoral Committee, 1893-94.
FTLRL Freetrade, Land and Reform League, 1894.
Herald The Sydney Morning Herald.
LECI League for the Encouragement of Colonial Industries.
LEL Labor Electoral League of New South Wales.
LIA Land and Industrial Alliance.
LODL Land Owners' Defence League of New South Wales.
LPA Liberal and Political Association of New South Wales.
M(s)LA Member(s) of the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales
M(s)LC Member(s) of the Legislative Council of New South Wales.
NA National Association of New South Wales.
NPA1 National Protection Association, September-November 1886
NPA2 National Protection Association, October-November 188?.
NPA3 National Protection Association, January-March 1889-
NPA4 National Protection Association of New South Wales, 
October, 1889.
NPA5 National Protection Association of New South Wales, 
June-November 1890.
NC National Club.
NPPEC National Protection Party Elections Committee, June 1891
PPRL Protection and Political Reform League.
PRA Political Reform Association.
PRL New South Wales Political Reform League.
viii
PRU Political Reform Union.
PU Protection Union of New South Wales.
see Sydney Chamber of Commerce.
STL Single Tax League of New South Wales.
Telegraph Daily Telegraph, Sydney.
TLC Trades and Labour Council of New South Wales
WMDA Working Men's Defence Association.
Star The Australian Star, Sydney.
These abbreviations are also used in 
the Appendices and Notes in volume II. 
For other abbreviations used in the 
Appendices, Notes and Bibliography, 
see the beginning of volume II.
ix
INTRODUCTION*
The politics of New South Wales between 1887 and 1891 
have been the subject of considerable debate and difference of 
opinion among historians and political scientists. The major 
participants in this debate, however, seem to agree that after 
1886 the political system of New South Wales underwent basic 
and far-reaching change. A.W.Martin represents the politics 
of the late 1880s as "a kind of transitional phase" between 
an outmoded faction system and a new party system of which thepLabor party of 1891 was the most highly developed expression.
For this reason, he and his co-author, P.Loveday, regard the
political forms of the late 1880s as "an amalgam of the old 
2and the new". Similarly,N.B.Nairn concedes that during the 
late 1880s new political forms "were being spawned in the vast 
sweep of the changing colonial political tide",^in which the
Ll.old political system "was subjected to great stress". '
Despite this fundamental agreement about the presence
of stress and change in the political system, the disputants
in the debate arrive at different conclusions about the stage
reached in the transition from factions to parties prior to
1891« Martin argues for the emergence prior to 1891 of "rud-
imentary, but coherent and organized, political parties".
These, he argues, were the "prototype of the modern political
party, based on a set of defined principles, and with a perm-
6anent organizational structure"; "a power-struggle between
* Notes are located at the end of the Introduction.
X7two groups which can only be called parties of principle”,g
resulted, thereby creating "a well-knit two party system”.
These changes, Loveday and Martin conclude, constituted ”a
Qrevolution in terms of political conflict in the colony”."
N.B.Nairn, on the other hand, argues that the changes 
wrought prior to 1891 created "no real parties”, only "slight­
ly improved models of the factions, replete with old order
i 0leaders and methods". As a result, he concludes that the 
changes in the political system prior to 1891 were embryonic,^ 
and that "The major changes in the parliamentary system were 
begun in 1891 by the Labor Party”.
One important aspect of this conflict concerns the
nature of the two fiscal parties between 1887 and 1891* Both,
argue Loveday and Martin, were true political parties v/ith] 3basic principled cohesion and ’’agreed aims”, '' based on new 
policies to meet the ’’demands arising from a changed social 
and economic order” and ’’shaped into a coherent whole around 
some central principle” Nairn, however, maintains that the 
fiscal groups were not principled parties, but rather refurb­
ished factions. He claims that they ’’did not have comprehens­
ive and continuing [policy] programmes” that were directed at15’’fundamental political, social and economic reforms”.
One major implication of this difference of opinion 
relates to the existence after 1886 of a new basis of polit­
ical conflict between the rival groups within the political 
system. Loveday and Martin argue that the existence of rival- 
parties of principle automatically created a ’party system' 
in which the rival parties vied for power on the basis of 
’’competing sets of political principles”.^B.E.Mansfield
agrees that the two parties were ’’divided on an issue of real 
17importance”. The fiscal issue, according to this view, was 
relevant and important to the welfare of the colony and in­
volved a conflict of principles. Those who regard fiscal pol­
itics between 1887 and 1891 as little more than refurbished 
factionalism, however, argue that the fiscal conflict involved 
neither principle nor substance. Nairn, for instance, points
xi.
18to the ’’total unreality of the fiscal division”,"' and J.A.Ryan
i 9refers to the ’’unnatural issue of fiscalism". Ryan concludes 
by arguing that there remained between 1887 and 1891 an "ab- 
sence of any political division based on deeper social and 
economic issues,
Other differences concern the organisation, control and
activities of the fiscal parties. Although Loveday and Martin
2 1detect a "lack of discipline”, "they argue that party members
22were pledged to the party platform, thus creating a degree of 
party control and discipline; Nairn, however, detects no eff­
ective pledge and no "integrated and operative disciplinary
23system complete with sanctions". Loveday and Martin argue for 
the existence of "a unified party structure”, with powerful 
links between the parliamentary party and a central extra-parl­
iamentary organisation, which had established local branches 
throughout the colony.^Nairn, however, regards these links as
only loose, and ’’not comparable with the firm links between the
25Parliamentary Labor Party and the Trades and Labor Council”.
On the subject of electoral organisation there are further diff­
erences. Loveday and Martin argue that the general election of 
1889 was fought between "two well organized and consolidated 
party machines" which did their work of canvassing the elect­
orate, selecting candidates and controlling the campaign with
2 fefficiency, zeal and effeetiveness,c'°thus presenting a "picture
27of an electoral system in process of transformation". Nairn, 
however, regards this electoral activity as fictional, stress­
ing its "publicity value" rather than its real effectiveness.
He claims that the fiscalists' electoral organisations were 
similar to other "ephemeral groups superimposed on ... the
o Q’Faction System”', ~°and specifically characterises their work
29of selecting and endorsing candidates as "abortive".
A detailed analysis of the stresses and pressure for 
change to which the political system was subject after 1886 re­
veals, however, that a basic transormation from factions to 
parties had begun. But the transformation was not quickly con­
cluded, and by 1891 it was far from complete. The dynamic pro­
cess of this change indicates that, whilst strong forces demanded
xii
and pursued change, even stronger forces prevailed to provide
resistance. What changes were evident by 1391 were achieved
slowly and painfully; but enough change was accomplished to
support Martin’s call for some revision of Labor’s ’’messianic
function as the bringer of order and meaning to faction-ridden
30colonial politics”."The transformation of the political system 
of New South Wales that had taken place by 1891 was somewhat 
less comprehensive than Loveday and Martin suggest, but rather 
mere so than conceded by Nairn, By 1891, the free trade and 
protectionist parties had not evolved into truly cohesive 
principled political parties, but they were certainly more than 
mere refurbished factions,
Martin has argued, however, that the transformation 
from the outmoded faction system towards the politics of princ­
ipled parties, begun in 1886, reached its climax in 1889 and 
thereafter went into a decline, failing to re-appear until 1894.
During the years 1889-94> he argues, there were powerful forces
31at work which ’’broke up the new political parties”. He points 
to the apparent lack of effective fiscal electoral organisation 
during the general election of 1891 as evidence in support of 
his argument. Close analysis, however, would suggest that fis­
cal electoral management in 1891 was a distinct improvement 
upon that which was displayed during the general election of 
l889j which was, in turn, well in advance of electoral organis­
ation in 1887. This steady progress in electoral organisation 
throughout the period 1887 to 1891 was merely symptomatic of the 
steady and consistent process of fundamental change that grad­
ually altered all aspects of the political system after 1886.
The transition from unprincipled factions to principled part­
ies, begun in 1886, progressed steadily throughout the five 
years to the end of i891. Some apparent regression after 1889 
was no more than a brief interregnum in which the difficulties 
of effecting swift and permanent change were revealed. Generally, 
however, the years 1390-91 were as much an integral part of the 
steady transition towards permanent principled political parties 
as the years 1887-89.
The transition, however, had not been completed by the
XlilL
end of 1391j and further changes were required after 1891 to 
produce the first truly principled non-Labor political party - 
G.H.Reid’s freetrade party of 1895* The process of change and 
development after 189-1 to produce this party has been well
32described and analysed in the work of A.W.Martin and e.A.Ryan. 
The stage in the transition reached by the end of 1391? as 
analysed hereafter, marks the stage at which they take up and 
complete the story.
Central to any meaningful discussion of the process of 
political transformation should be a clear working definition 
of a ’political party’. With one proviso, I have adopted the 
definition suggested by Martin when he writes ”... for one to 
talk legitimately of a ’political party’, it has to be shown 
that the body concerned consisted of a parliamentary group, 
co-ordinated with an organisation designed to mobilise the el­
ectorate, and united by a desire to promote a political prin-
~z~zciple, or set of principles”. "'This definition requires qual­
ification in one important aspect: the desire to promote a 
political principle may create a superficial unity among a 
group of men, but it is their common adherence to a defined 
principle or set of principles that acts as the most meaning­
ful bond between the members of a. political group. Concern 
for principle within the fiscal groupings distinguished them
from the factions wrhich ’’were without coherent and distinct
34bodies of doctrine, principle or belief But, only the
collective and common allegiance of all its members to a co­
herent and defined body of doctrine or set of principles could 
guarantee a political grouping the cohesion and unity essential 
to its acceptance as a true political party.
It has unfortunately, although perhaps inevitably, been
impossible to discuss the politics of the years 1887 to 1891
and use the word ’party’ only when a political group strictly
adheres to the criteria I have outlined above. V/ithin the
thesis, I use the word 'party' loosely, in conformity with the
Herald's use of the term as "one of convenience rather than of
3 5accuracy".  ^I have, nevertheless, striven to make quite plain 
those occasions on which I am referring to a ’true political 
party ’.
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CHAPTER 1
THE ’FLAG OF FREE TRADE' AND THE ’CREATURE 
CALLED PROTECTION’: Parkes, Reform and the 
Fiscal Issue, 1878 - 1887.
"Sir Patrick Jennings: ..., I am 
bound to say that if he is go­
ing to the country, he must do 
so on the question of free-trade 
or protection.
Sir Henry Parkes: Hear, hear. We
shall do that, never fear!"
(NSWPP, vol. XXIV, p.45, 20 January 1887)
I
The fiscal issue had been raised several times between 
1856 and 1886, and always for the same reason. During periods 
of economic difficulty, agitations were organised against the 
traditional freetrade policy of New South Wales by those hit by 
and fearful of unemployment. Protection in place of unrestricted 
importation, it was argued, would stimulate colonial manufacturing 
industries and would provide ample employment opportunities.^
A relatively small number of men sincerely believed in 
the efficacy of a full protectionist policy for New South Wales, 
and in times of distress they eagerly disseminated their ideas 
to attract followers. In the years 1878 to 1880, a period of 
hardship in Sydney, a number of organisations emerged to uphold 
protection as a panacea for the ills of the colony. Included 
among these organisations were the Working Men’s Defence
1/2
Association (WMDA), the Political Reform Association (PRA), the 
New South Wales Political Reform League (PRL), the Political 
Reform Union (PRU), and the League for the Encouragement of Col­
onial Industries (LECI). Although many protectionist advocates
?formed the backbone of more than one of these associations, 
the numerical weakness of the associations is indicated by a re­
port of a meeting of the largest of them, the PRL, at which it 
v,ras stated that the League had ”150 members on its roll, of whom 
80 have paid their subscriptions”.^
Despite the prominence of protectionist agitation in 
times of economic distress, until the 1880s the fiscal conflict 
had proved only spasmodically important as a political issue, 
both at elections and in parliament. In early 1864? the ministry, 
led by James Martin, attempted to increase import duties and im­
pose 5% ad valorem duties on a range of imported goods; a small
group of men, who viewed the proposed duties as protectionist in
Acharacter and as ’’ruinous to the colony” , formed the colony’s
first Freetrade Association (FTA).9 This first FTA was the only
such body formed prior to 1885? and it seems to have been dis-
c
banded less than a year after its formation . When the time 
came at the end of 1864 for an electoral test of strength between 
the freetraders and the so-called protectionists, the scope of 
the fiscal contest was very limited indeed. In its early days, 
the FTA announced its intention to organise a wide freetrade 
electoral campaign by creating a central organising executive, 
forming branches of the association throughout the colony, and
7selecting candidates for election to parliament . Despite this
intention, and the later assertion by a leading freetrader, Sir
John Robertson, that the 1864-65 electoral battle was won ”by
convincing the people all over the country that free trade was o
right” , the battle- between freetrade and protection, and the 
activities of the FTA at the general election, were limited 
solely to two metropolitan electorates, East Sydney and West 
Sydney9.
During the first half of the 1880s, hov/ever, protection­
ist advocates made a determined effort to raise the fiscal con­
troversy to greater political prominence. An active protection­
ist organisation, the Protection and Political Reform League
1/3
(PPRL), was formed in 1881 out of the rump of the PRU and the 
LECIJ'', The PPRL inc1uded a nuraber o f ardent and v oc1ferous 
protectionist propagandists, chief among whom were Ninian Mel­
ville, Richard Charles Luscombe and William Richardson. Their 
evangelist work in the protectionist cause was substantially 
aided by the colony's renewed economic difficulties, due to 
severe droughts and declining state revenue after 1882. The
resulting depression, and the presence of unemployment in Syd- 
11ney became the focal point of the protectionist agitation. 
B.R.Wise’s comment that "Times of depression and distress dis­
pose unthinking men to listen more kindly than they otherwise
would, to quack proposals", pinpointed an important factor in
12the increasing popularity of protectionist ideas after 1882
The depressed economic conditions in the colony after
1882 provided the background of protectionist agitation. A
variety of groups became more inclined than before to listen
to protectionist arguments; these groups included farmers,
artisans and manufacturers, all of whom were adversely affected
13by the colony’s plight . The PPRL was quick to sense the in­
creasing popularity of protection amongst the working classes
and manufacturers and it worked hard to take full advantage 
15of this ; by 1883 it was claiming that "some of the most in-
16fluential gentlemen in New South Wales” favoured protection .
It would, however, be misleading to assume that the 
worsening economic situation and protectionist propaganda were 
alone responsible for the prominence of the fiscal controversy 
as a political issue after 1885* Indeed, it appeared to many 
by the end of 1885 that the efforts of the protectionists had 
borne little fruit. Since 1881 two further protectionist org­
anisations had been'formed: the Democratic Alliance (DA), and 
the Land and Industrial Alliance (LIA) . The LIA came into 
existence as an organisation that combined a demand for land 
law reform with the advocacy of protection. Its dominant 
rural membership, however, showed little interest in the doc­
trine of protection and the purely protectionist urban wing of 
the Alliance proved so uninfluential that, in 1886, the pro­
tective plank was eliminated, ”so as to leave the Alliance 
purely a Land Lav/ Reform Society,...”^. Despite the claims
of the PPRL and the LIA to have swung the country districts 
over to support of protection by the creation of a network ofIQlocal country branches ', B.Revise's assessment of the advance 
made by protection in the country districts seems to have had 
some validity: "Whenever two or three persons meet together..., 
a telegram announces the formation of a 'Protection Associat­
ion', although in reality there has been no change in the op­
inion of the district and the members who compose the 'assoc-
20iation' are neither numerous nor influential". The wide­
spread lack of interest in and support for protection among the 
country districts in 1885 was demonstrated at the July confer­
ence of the LIA, held in Sydney. With over thirty active aff­
iliated rural organisations^"“, the LIA was basically a land
law reform society, and when, at the conference, it sponsored
22two resolutions in favour of a policy of protection , some 
country delegates displayed their displeasure and lack of int­
erest. One delegate claimed that in the conference invitation 
"no word was said about Protection", and "he believed it was un­
fair to those constituents who had sent him to speak on the
23question of the Land Bill to talk about Protection". Other 
delegates were openly hostile to protection, one stating that 
"he would be wanting in respect to himself, to those who sent 
him, and to his native land if he did not enter his protest
against the principle of Protection".^  Nevertheless, the
23resolutions were carried and, although the protectionists in 
no sense controlled the country districts, the Herald was forced 
to concede in November 1885 that they had "aroused a good deal 
of discussion, and had succeeded in forming fresh centres for 
protectionist activity"."
It was in the electoral and parliamentary spheres,
however, that the inability of the protectionists to make any
real headway by the end of 1885 was most clearly revealed. In
1882, John Lucas told a protectionist meeting that "if they
wished protection to become adopted here, they must make it the
27one great question at all future elections". Fired with zeal, 
the PPRL expressed its determination to work with unremitting 
vigour "until a majority of protectionist members were returned
1/5
2gto the Assembly, [even] if it took ten years to accomplish it". "
By the end of 1885? the return on their efforts barely justif­
ied their vigour. Although they were forced to admit that
"neither protection nor free trade formed directly a question
29of open profession" , the protectionists did claim that the 
general election of 1882 brought about a rise in their numbers 
in the Assembly from three^to ten.^ By August 1885? protection 
had made such little progress that it was confidently predicted 
that "the forthcoming elections would not be contested upon the
32question of Protection or Freetrade, but upon the land question".
Despite this opinion, the Herald was forced to admit after the
election that "the [fiscal] question was invested with a greater
interest than had been displayed with regard to it for several 
33years".
Nevertheless, the fiscal question was not a prominent
issue at the 1885 general election, and one of the successful
protectionist candidates, AcForsyth, after his election 'apol-
34ogised' for his reticence on the subject, adding that, "Although
I believe in the wisdom of a Protection policy, such a policy is
not sufficiently understood nor so numerously accepted as to
35justify anyone relying for support on that alone". The Herald
took delight in pointing out that "Those candidates who sought
election simply on the merits of Protection were ignored -
36contemptuously ignored", a statement that was most certainly 
37true. As a result of the election, the number of avowed pro­
tectionists in the Legislative Assembly rose to sixteen.^ It 
is important here to make the distinction between those men who 
professed a definite adherence to protection at the time of their 
election in October 1885> and those who, later in the life of 
the same parliament, professed a support of protection. Al­
though the number of avowed protectionists did undergo an increase 
in October 1885} this success was offset by two factors: a
protectionist group identity was unlikely, due to the election
39of the sixteen protectionists largely on other grounds; and
five of the protectionists were totally new to parliament, un-4 9known and uninfluential. These factors led the most influential 
of the protectionists, L.F.Heydon, to forecast after the election
1/6
that "by some mischance the small band of which he was the 
leader might be wiped out".'T^  By the end of 1885) the fiscal 
question certainly did not seem to be increasing in political 
prominence to any great extent; rather, it almost seemed to be 
on the verge of undergoing a decline. The following year, 
however, saw a remarkable reversal in this trend.
During the ’boom' days of the l8?0s, when income was 
buoyant, governments embarked on an extravagant spending spree, 
which was largely devoted to the expansion of the railway net­
work. The main part of the revenue was derived from the sale 
of crown lands, a source which governments in the 1870s ex- 
ploited to the full, it enabled them to reduce import and 
excise duties, and to limit overseas borrowing, while still 
maintaining a high level of expenditure. During the term of 
the Parkes-Robertson coalition ministry, however, there began 
a vocal campaign to end the ’wholesale alienation of the pub­
lic estate’, and Alexander Stuart took office in 1883 on a
L Bpromise to place a strict limit on land auctions. As a result 
of fulfilling its promise, Stuart's government faced the need 
to offset the consequent large loss of revenue, and, when parl­
iament refused to sanction steep taxation increases, the gov­
ernment, still determined to expand its expenditure, turned to
44the London capital market to borrow funds on a huge scale.
This action was made all the more necessary when the revenue 
continued to fall as a result of severe droughts and the end­
ing of the wool boom. The increased borrowing placed an even
more serious strain on consolidated revenue, on which the int-
45erest commitment was a primary charge. Still there was no 
inclination to curtail government expenditure. Only at the 
very end of 1885 was it revealed to parliament just how serious 
the financial position had become, when the Colonial Treasurer, 
George Dibbs, made a financial statement in v/hich he stated that 
"we have to face a debit balance of £1,052,614".^  By early 
1886, the Consolidated Revenue Fund had slumped from a credit 
of £3,889,000 in 1882 to a deficit of £1,287,000.47 By 1886, 
then, it had been finally placed beyond doubt that "government 
spending could continue at current levels only if heavy tax-
I o
ation increases v/ere made". Parliament, however, still showed
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extreme reluctance to ratify extra taxation, and, from mid-
1885 to February 1886* four separate ministries proposed new
taxation measures, largely in the form of direct taxation,
49before losing support in the Assembly.
It was in this situation that recourse to the customs 
was again proposed as a means of raising the desperately needed 
revenue. On 26 February 1886, the Jennings-Dibbs coalition min­
istry took office, with Sir Patrick Jennings sworn in as Colonial 
Treasurer, and George Dibbs as Colonial Secretary. On 6 April, 
Jennings made a financial statement to the Assembly, in which he 
announced certain ’’additions to and alterations in the customs 
tariff”. The existing schedule of specific or fixed duties 
on imports was to be altered by increasing both the range of 
goods to be taxed, and the duty levied. In addition, it was
announced that "we propose to levy what are commonly known as
90ad valorem duties ... at the rate of 5 per cent.... ”. The
resulting Customs Duties Bill was not, however, finally ratified
81by parliament until September.
The depressed economy and the proposed solution to the 
problem of revenue by imposing ad valorem duties have been re­
garded as providing "the immediate occasion for making protect-
82ion ... a 'burning' political question". This statement is 
certainly true, but it is important to realise that the 'occ­
asion' did not of itself make protection a 'burning' political 
question. The history of tariff changes in New South Wales 
after i860 makes it clear that neither the threat nor the real­
ity of imposing ad valorem duties automatically raised the 
fiscal Issue, and led to a battle between freetrade and pro­
tection. Certainly such occasions provided astute politicians 
with an opportunity* to raise the fiscal controversy, if it 
suited their purposes, but it is clear that such an opportunity 
had to be deliberately and successfully exploited, if a pro­
posal of ad valorem duties were to erupt into a fiscal conflict. 
This point is most clearly demonstrated by the case of Sir 
John Robertson.
Cn a number of occasions prior to the l88Cs, govern­
ments in New South Wales were faced with the problem of a
1/8
shortage of revenue, and in most cases they were finally forced
to resort to the customs house to remedy the problem. One such
instance was in 1864 when James Martin proposed the imposition
of ad valorem duties to solve the problem. The opportunity
to make political capital out of the situation was not lost
upon Martin's political opponents, led by Charles Cowper and
John Robertson. In conjunction with a small group of men out-
53side parliament, who formed the FTA, Cowper and Robertson vig­
orously attacked Martin's proposals as being protectionist in
character. Partially on this issue, Cowper and Robertson,
SIstanding as freetraders and supported by the FTA, defeated
the 'protectionist.' ministerialists in the 1864-65 general
election, and replaced Martin in office. Many years later,
Sir John Robertson, relating how "the great battle of freetrade
was fought and was won" in 1864j boasted that "we had trampled
protection out ... until the unfortunate combination of Dibbs
56and Jennings came into power" in 1886. The boast need not be 
queried, but the fact remains that the 'staunch freetraders', 
Cowper and Robertson, faced with the same financial problem 
that had faced Martin, shortly resorted to the same remedy.
In 1865) they enacted measures which increased specific duties, 
and imposed 5% ad valorem duties. In this instance, however,
the imposition of ad valorem duties was not regarded as pro­
tection, and the fiscal issue lay quietly where it had been dis­
carded by Cowper and Robertson after its usefulness had been ex­
hausted .
A similar revenue shortage was faced in 1871 by a
ministry, again including the 'freetrader' Robertson, that re-
enacted measures identical to those of 1865* Once again the
imposition of 5% ad valorem duties was not generally regarded
as a protectionist measure, the undisputed freetrade leader
after 1886, Sir Henry Parkes, remarking at the time that to
claim that the duties afforded protection to colonial industry
59was "the idlest pretence". Once again a practical measure for 
the purpose merely of raising revenue was allowed to pass vir­
tually unmolested.
A situation in which support of ad valorem duties could 
be regarded either as displaying a leaning towards protection,
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or as being entirely consistent with the principles of free- 
trade, was bound to result in general confusion as to the 
actual point of difference between a freetrader and a protec­
tionist. By the end of 1886, it was generally accepted that 
one could distinguish a freetrader from a protectionist on the 
basis of an announced support for, or opposition to, the im­
position of ad valorem duties; at the time that Jennings and 
Dibbs came into office in February 1886, however, this criter­
ion was not generally acknowledged. Because of the uncertainty 
about the relevance of ad valorem duties in determining fiscal 
allegiance prior to 1886, a number of men could honestly supp­
ort ad valorem duties while still proclaiming their allegiance 
to free trade. During 1886, such men came to be regarded as 
political hypocrites; B.R.Wise , for example, condemned them as 
"men who ... call themselves freetraders and who vote in favour 
of protection...".^ If all those who had supported ad valorem 
duties, who yet claimed to be freetraders, had been prepared to 
accept the 1886 label of ’protectionist* and to drop their claim 
to be freetraders, then their freetrade claims prior to 1886 
could perhaps be taken, as mere hypocrisy and political opport­
unism. But this was not so. In 1886 a number of men renounced 
their belief in ad valorem duties in order to maintain cred­
ibility as freetraders; this would seem to confirm the general 
uncertainty that existed prior to 1886 as to the exact dist­
inction between freetrade and protection.
This confusion prior to 1886 was heightened by avowed 
protectionists who claimed that those MsLA who supported ad 
valorem duties were adherents to the protectionist cause. In 
February 1884, Henry Copeland proposed in the Legislative Ass­
embly the imposition of 10% ad valorem duties. Among those 
who supported Copelaiid's proposal were J.C.Ellis, Sydney Smith,
, ■ cp
Francis Abigail and A.J.Gould. As a result, R.C.Luscombe
wrote to the Herald expressing his satisfaction with ’’the
result of the division on Mr Copeland's amendment", and claimed
that "we [now] have a force of 27 members on the protectionist 
68side ...". The fact was, however, that those who supported 
the adoption of ad valorem duties prior to 1886, despite being 
claimed as protectionists by committed protectionists, were not
] /IQ
commonly regarded as such, and did not regard themselves as
such. A more realistic appraisal of true protectionist strength
at the time of Copeland's amendment was given by Ninian Melville,
himself a committed protectionist, when he claimed that there
6hwere only about eight protectionists in the Assembly. ' The
categorisation of men like Abigail, Smith, Ellis and Gould as
protectionists was purely a propagandist device without meaning.
The position of- such men was explained by Abigail, who later
stated that his support of ad valorem duties had simply been on
the grounds of "expediency as to which was the easiest way of
getting revenue, and the question of free trade or protection
65had not then cropped up;...". When the question did 'crop 
up' in 1886, however, and support for ad valorem duties became 
positively equated with support for protection, all four men 
were to be found firmly among the 'anti-ad valorem' freetraders. 
Furthermore, three of them became members of' freetrade ministries 
after 1886.^
Perhaps the best illustration of the fact that ad
valorem duties were not generally regarded as protection, even
r at the beginning of 1886, was the consideration given by that
'staunch freetrader', Sir John Robertson, to their imposition
67as a means of raising revenue. Very early in 1886, the Herald
stated that Robertson "does not say that he will propose to
meet the deficit by the imposition of ad valorem duties; but
68this is clearly what he is thinking about". Faced with a 
desperate financial crisis, Robertson clearly foreshadowed the 
return to ad valorem duties when, referring to the financial 
crisis of 1871, he told the Mudgee electors that his government 
"had to resort to ad valorem duties, as the money had then, as 
now, to be got ... in some fashion or other". Yet, this in­
evitable resort to ad valorem duties was still not generally 
regarded as in any way interfering with freetrade: Robertson
stated that "the Government would have the money, and would
69not interfere with Free Trade".
The same uncertainty also existed prior to 1886 in 
regard to other proposals, which, after 1886, became commonly 
regarded as signifying a belief in protection. In 1878, there
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appeared in the Assembly a group, known as ’the Hay and Corn 
Party’. This group was composed of representatives of free 
selector constituencies, and it was concerned with the pro­
tection of farming interests by the imposition of import 
duties on agricultural produce. E.W.0’Sullivan later des­
cribed the group as "a body of country members who ... were 
anxious to impose duties on hay, corn, chaff, etc.,...".
O ’Sullivan was also careful to .point to the claims of its
70members to be freetraders. By 1886, 'the leader of the group
was William Clarke, who, in April, unsuccessfully proposed that
71duties be imposed upon grain, beans, peas, hay and chaff.
Clarke and C.J.Roberts, both members of Parkes's freetrade 
ministry in 1887? voted in favour of the motion. This, how­
ever, did not make them protectionists. In fact, Clarke 
claimed, with some justification it would appear, that a
number of avowed protectionists voted against his motion "as
75he would not support a general system of protection".
Certainly Clarke did not regard himself as a protectionist,
and his name is found among the members of the first council
of the FTA, formed towards the end of 1885•^  Clarke, like
others, was simply a victim of the uncertainty of the criteria
that governed fiscal labelling prior to 1886. There is no
doubt, however, that he regarded himself as a freetrader, and,
when, in 1886, his views were specifically deemed to be incon-
75sistent with freetrade, he abandoned them. Another similar
case exists in respect of John Sutherland, Minister of Works
in Parkes's 1887-89 freetrade ministry. For a number of years
Sutherland had supported the encouragement of local industry,
and this had been enough for him to be classed by Luscombe as
7 6a protectionist. Sutherland, however, did not regard himself
as a protectionist, declaring in 1885 that "protection was the
77worst misfortune that could befall any country". He earned 
himself a tirade of abuse from his 'protectionist' colleagues 
for his "traitorous" conduct in voting against Clarke's motion
n  O  ri q
in April 1886, and against ad valorem duties in June 1886. * 
Only the strict and highly artificial definition of 'a protect­
ionist', put forward in 1886, made Sutherland appear to have 
been anything but a freetrader previously.
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The general uncertainty surrounding the whole question 
of fiscal faith was demonstrated after the 1885 general elec­
tion. Luscombe claimed that those elected members who had 
professed support for ad valorem duties should be included
among the 'protectionists’, thus bringing their total togOthirty-nine. Of the fifteen, successful candidates' who had 
specifically favoured increased.duties without having dec­
lared themselves protectionists, however, all later accepted 
the 1886 equation of ad valorem duties with protection, seven
becoming 'anti-ad valorem’ freetraders, and the remainder acc-
~ glepting the label of protectionist. The lack of certainty in 
1885 about which.fiscal label he should adopt was expressed by 
one of these men, A.Lysaght, when he said that he was/’a free­
trader to a great extent ... [but ] would not, however, nail 
his colours to.free, trade, nor say he might not yet become a
3 2protectionist". - Perhaps Joseph Creer summed up the situation 
most aptly whön he stated that "he was not a protectionist nor
o-z
a freetrader. There were no such things". J
At the beginning of. 1886, the fiscal, issue was' not 
only unimportant and undefined in the parliamentary context, 
but it was also largely irrelevant in the shaping of political 
allegiances and groupings, which remained dominated by the 
presence of personal followings or factions. The lack of a 
group identity among the protectionists was unfavourably comm­
ented upon in 1883 by the PPRL,^and, by 1886, the situation 
was no different. Personal allegiance far outweighed protec­
tionist adherence when three avowed protectionists agreed to
8 C5join the ministry of Sir John Robertson in December 1885. One
of them, L.F.Heydon, commented at the time that "his views
upon the question of Protection he had subordinated for the
present", a decision he justified by stating that "he had no
desire to have Protection discredited by being introduced at
86this particular moment".
Thus, at the time Jennings and Dibbs came into office, 
the fiscal issue was an insignificant and undefined force in 
parliamentary politics, and their proposal to impose ad val­
orem duties would not have automatically had the effect of
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instituting a full-scale fiscal conflict within parliament, 
had that conflict not been deliberately sought and engineered. 
In order to make Jennings' customs proposals the basis of-a 
conflict between freetrade and protection, two points had to 
be established: first, it needed to be successfully demonstrat­
ed that the practical revenue-raising measure of imposing ad 
valorem duties was relevant to the conflict between free- 
trade and protection; and,secondly, opinion on the imposition 
of ad valorem duties needed to be clarified in terms of the 
fiscal conflict. The man who successfully undertook this task 
in 1886 was Sir Henry Parkes. What induced him to raise the 
fiscal issue was his earnest desire to introduce into the parl­
iament of New South Wales an issue which would create a firm 
and principled two-sided polarisation of MsLA, thus providing 
a stability of allegiance that would replace the fluid and un­
stable allegiances associated with three or more personal fac­
tions, The conflict between freetrade and protection had great 
potential as an issue that could successfully polarise parl­
iament into two stable, rival groups: it was not a new issue; 
it was an issue that aroused passion and emotion; it was, if 
clearly defined, a simple two-sided issue; arid, it was, in 
theory at least, an issue which had a practical effect on the 
lives and fortunes of many members of the community. By 1886, 
all that was required was an opportunity, a motive, and a pol­
itician influential enough to take advantage of the potential. 
Jennings and Dibbs supplied the opportunity; Parkes had the 
motive, seized the opportunity, and proceeded to demonstrate 
his powerful influence over the politics of the colony.
Circumstances aided Parkes in his task. Despite the 
failure of the protectionists to make the fiscal conflict a 
significant electoral or parliamentary issue, outside parl­
iament, on the fringes of politics, the potential prominence 
of the issue was demonstrated towards the end of 1885» Just 
as, in 1864, the colony's first FTA had been formed to oblit­
erate protectionist heresies and parliamentary candidates, so, 
in August 1885, the freetraders of Sydney reacted to protect­
ionist propagandist activity by forming a second FTA. In the 
opinion of one Herald correspondent, the delay in forming the
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FTA was "due to the fact that there is as yet no danger of
88our existing freetrade policy being interfered with",1'" and
certainly one of those involved in the establishment of the
FTA "questioned very much whether it was absolutely necessary
8°for them to enter upon the matter at all". y It would appear
that there was general criticism of the FTA as forming "the
backbone of protection", which, without the notice given it by
90the association, "would die away". The protectionists, how­
ever, loudly applauded the establishment of the FTA; for them, 
it could only mean increased prominence, and it did represent
a step closer to the time when the battle between freetrade and
91protection would oe the colony’s dominant political issue.
Parkes was also aided by protectionist propaganda that
stressed the relevance of the proposal to impose ad valorem
duties to the fiscal conflict. Despite the realistic view of
Ninian Melville in 1884 that "the imposition of 5 per cent
fad valorem]duties on all goods was neither protection nor 
92freetrade", other ardent protectionists had been all too will­
ing to claim ad valorem duties as a first instalment of a pro­
tectionist policy. When, in 1871, 5% ad valorem duties were 
imposed to alleviate financial difficulties, the protection­
ists were "clear-sighted enough to perceive an opportunity in 
the country's extremity, and strong enough to seize it. The 
imposition of the ad valorem duties was a revenue measure ...
f,but it] was hailed by some of those who supported it as the 
thin end of the protectionist wedge". During the 1880s, pro­
tectionists continued to make similar claims, H.S.Bond stating
in 1884 that 5% ad valorem duties should be regarded as an in-
94stalraent of protection.
The protectionists were not the only group who had
come to claim ad valorem duties as protectionist in character.
The wealthy merchant and commercial class in Sydney had come
to similar conclusions. Their affluence as a group had been
achieved under the colony's existing freetrade policy and, as
W.H.Traill explained, "it was natural that they should repulse
with apprehension any proposition to alter conditions which
95had worked so well for them". Their vested interest in pre­
serving the fiscal status quo led to the insistence that
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ad valorem duties were a first instalment of protection. When 
Sir John Robertson hinted in January 1886 at the possibility of 
imposing ad valorem duties, the reaction of the merchants was 
swift and antagonistic. The Herald, the mouthpiece of the comm­
ercial class, claimed that "to reintroduce ad-valorem duties 
... would be to provide the foundation for a policy of Protect- 
ion". In February 1886, the vice-president of the Sydney 
Chamber of Commerce (SCC) told his fellow members that, while 
not wishing "to bring to life the dry bones of the free-trade 
and protection controversy", his "great fear" was that "we may
have a system of ad valorem duties adopted, ultimately tending
97in the direction of protection, . ..".
It was, however, the definite proposal of Jennings and
Dibbs to introduce ad valorem duties that provided Parkes with
the opportunity to introduce the fiscal conflict fully into
parliamentary politics, and to recast the political system of
New South Wales along more stable and recognisable lines than
had hitherto existed. B.R.Wise later remarked, "The groundwork
98of the [fiscal] struggle was the Dibbs deficit" ; the respon­
sibility for the emergence of that ’struggle', however, must 
rest with Sir Henry Parkes. A.W.Martin has written that Parkes, 
in fostering the fiscal issue in parliament, was merely "using
the fiscal controversy that was developing outside Parliament 
99. ..". Correct as this judgment is, it tends to underestimate 
the importance of Parkes in raising the issue to parliamentary 
and electoral prominence. It was most unlikely that the arg­
uments of rabid protectionists and vested-interest freetraders 
outside parliament could inspire a parliamentary conflict that 
would convulse the politics of New South ’Wales for the next 
twenty years. The parliamentary debate on Jennings' ad valorem 
proposals, up until Parkes made his move, bears this out.
When Jennings first announced to parliament on 6 April 
1886 his intention of introducing ad valorem duties, he was 
well aware that he would be met by both vested-interest free- 
trade abuse, and protectionist applause. For this reason, he 
took great pains to stress that "our present intention.and de­
sire in our policy is to adhere to the free trade system ....
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I say that these amendments are not made for the purpose of 
protection - with no desire to give the slightest tinge of a 
protective character to our t a r i f f J e n n i n g s  argued 
firmly that the proposed duties were ’’manifestly imposed to 
meet the exigencies of our present situation - to raise rev­
enue to assist in paying off the existing deficiency".'^'1'
Jennings' defensiveness, in the face of his awareness that
"it is very distinctly argued by some people that these dut-
102ies are of a protective character,...", was largely unnec­
essary; during the long debate that followed the announcement 
of the ministry's intentions, the 'protective character' of 
the proposals was little emphasised. Of the five speeches 
that railed against the ministry's 'protectionist' proposals, 
four were delivered by merchant or commercial freetraders, all
of whom were either members of the SCO or its virtual political
103satellite, the FTA. ^The SCO, whose task it was "to watch over
104the vast commercial interests of the colony", backed up the 
statements of its parliamentary representatives. At its quart­
erly meeting in May, attended by Lloyd, Inglis and Edward 
Pulsford, secretary of the FTA, resolutions that characterised 
the introduction of ad valorem duties as "the introduction gen­
erally of the thin edge of protection into our whole fiscal
103system" were passed. Although Jennings' slight paranoia about 
the implications of his taxation proposal led him, on the fourth 
night of the debate, to repudiate "the insane report raised by 
certain persons who call it protection", the fiscal issue 
had so far received scant attention from the majority of min­
isterial opponents.
The opportunity had, however, been created; Parkes
seized it, and, in doing so, displayed the attributes that led
an astute parliamentary observer years later to say of him:
"... no politician in the Australian world could better judge
of the opportune time to take over an agitation than Sir Henry
Parkes. He seemed to carefully watch other men driving the
coach along till it came to a certain point, then he would
jump up on the box, push the driver aside, and, taking the
107reins in hand, 'tool' the vehicle into town". The respons­
ibility for raising the fiscal issue from relative inisgnificance
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to the foremost political issue of the day was not only freely
108attributed to Parkes, but also claimed by him. A.D.Nelson,
a protectionist candidate at the 1887 general election, stated
that "Had Sir Henry Parkes not thus boldly raised the flag of
free trade, that spark of protection which had shown only a
mere glimmer for years would not have blazed out as it had
109done at this moment".
Silent for over a month on the ministry's taxation 
proposals, Parkes entered the debate with vigour on 11 May, 
by delivering a speech introducing a set of resolutions, diss­
enting from the government's proposals to end the financial 
crisis. Parkes began by pointing to the meandering and mean­
ingless nature of the debate so far; he referred to the "diverse" 
character of many speeches, and concluded that "they have, in
many instances, travelled over ground ... distinctly apart from
110the main question to be considered". Parkes's determination 
to give "a more definite character" to the debate and to de­
fine "the main question to be considered" were revealed when 
he stated that "I move these resolutions with one primary ob­
ject - that men may declare themselves whether they are in
H ifavour of free-trade, or in favour of 'sneaking in' protection".
Taking hold of Jennings' phrase, 'sneaking in' protection,
Parkes pointed to the ministry as the initiators of the evil
system of protection: "I do not know the peculiar phrase
'sneaking in' ... [,but] I think I shall be able to show that
if it is a discreditable thing to 'sneak in' protection, that is
exactly, and beyond all dispute, what the Government are do- 
112ing". Parkes's speech, for the first time, raised into real 
parliamentary prominence the question of freetrade and protect­
ion, and set the tone for all future debates on the question of 
ad valorem duties. The effect of his speech was almost instant­
aneous, and the ensuing debate confirmed C.E.Lyne's assessment 
of Parkes, that "no one who sat in the Legislative Assembly of 
New South Wales was more able ... to sway it in the direction 
he desired".^ ^Despite George Reid's contention that Parkes's 
resolutions distinctly did "not raise the issue of free-trade 
and protection", and his warning to members not ^ to be "so 
weak as to be led into the trap laid for them", the fiscal
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issue had at last begun to make its mark really felt; on
rising to speak in the debate on Parkes's resolutions, Charles
Garland launched immediately into the question of freetrade and
protection, adding in parenthesis, "for that is the question
115which I take to be involved in this debate”.
Parkes fervently continued his attack, declaring, on 
19 May, uLet the words 'sneak in' never be forgotten. They 
are sneaking in protection with a vengeance". In the sec­
ond reading debate on the Customs Duties Bill, Parkes introd­
uced another catch-phrase, when he claimed that the bill would
"introduce beyond doubt the thin edge of the wedge of protect- 
117ion...". Parkes's full development of his 'sneaking in'
argument was masterly; although he admitted that "this bill 
has not any provision to give substantial aid in the direct- 
ion in which the protectionists require it", ^°he claimed that 
the protectionists constituted a sinister political force that 
was actually powerful enough to force full protection upon the 
colony. Although he stated that Jennings' bill "in itself 
offered no particular inducement to the votaries of Protect­
ion", he "supposed" that "the advocates of Protection espoused 
the Bill because it ... introduced the principle of Protection" 
and he claimed that "once introduced and incorporated in the
laws of the country, it would be easier to put some new force
119on the screw or to drive the wedge farther". This was the 
more likely, argued Parkes, because of the ministry's embarr­
assing position of subservience to, and dependence upon, its 
protectionist supporters. Here, then, was a hint at conspiracy 
a picture of an honourable, though naive, ministry being 'used' 
by a knot of committed protectionists to achieve the otherwise 
unattainable object of instituting a fiscal policy of full 
protection. This argument, which portrayed the ministry at 
the mercy of the ardent protectionists, was first expounded by 
Parkes on 19 May, when he made reference to a speech by J.H. 
Young, in which Ninian Melville, the ardent protectionist and 
member for Northumberland, was "twitted" for never having made 
a convert. On the contrary, declared Parkes, "The hon. member 
for Northumberland has converted her Majesty's Ministers .... 
The Government are the followers of the hon. member for
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120Northumberland”. Parkes developed this emotive argument by
pointing out the Government's actual numerical dependence on
the protectionists* On 8 July, he stated that "this free-
trade Government is really carrying this bill by the votes of
these protectionists, because they could not carry the bill
121without the votes of those gentlemen”. Parkes was undoubt­
edly exaggerating when he estimated that "There are in this
House, I think, twenty-two or twenty-four .avowed protection- 
122ists”, though his credibility was substantially safeguarded 
by some of the protectionists themselves, one of whom had 
stated in March that "they possessed gentlemen in Parlia­
ment ... who were thorough protectionists, in favour of ad
123valorem duties, ..c”. Parkes proceeded to elaborate his 
point when he stated: "The majority on the second reading of 
the bill was eighteen; if the protectionist votes had been 
withdrawn the bill would have been defeated, . The con­
clusions to be drawn from this line of argument were obvious, 
and Parkes did not hesitate to proclaim them. He pointed out 
that the small group of protectionists were "really determ­
ining the fiscal policy of this country", and he accused the 
government of being "mere ciphers", referring to its members
as "mere feathers blown about by the very breath of this
123little group of protectionists". Parkes's attack on the 
feeble ministry and its protectionist 'masters’, eagerly supp-12 gorted in the freetrade press, made the strength and influence
of protection in the government of the colony appear to be a
force really to be reckoned with. As George Dibbs remarked
in 1887, the action of Parkes and the opposition did "more to
galvanise protection into life than twenty years of advocacy
127by the most advanced protectionists in the country".
The question remains, however, as to why Parkes was so 
insistent on raising the protectionist alarm, and raising up 
with fierce intensity the quiescent conflict between freetrade 
and protection. The issue was in itself really irrelevant to 
the ministry's specific proposals, as Parkes virtually admitt­
ed, and as Jennings pointed out when he snapped at Parkes that 
"it is all very well to get up and utter homilies and speeches
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on abstract principles which might as well be delivered before 
a debating society for all the practical application they have
to the immediate object we have in view; .^Furthermore,
Parkes1s substantive opposition to Jennings' financial prop­
osals was based simply on his advocacy of a different practical 
approach to the solution of the colony's financial plight. 
Jennings proposed to solve the deficit by increasing taxation, 
in order to maintain government expenditure at a high level. 
This practical approach to a serious problem was dubbed 'pro­
tectionist' by Parkes, whilst his own practical approach -
that of curtailing expenditure in order to maintain a low lev-
129el of taxation - was dubbed 'free trade'„ ' The effective
dissemination of such an eminently popular pledge as 'no fresh 
taxation' did not, however, require the raising of the fiscal 
issue to publicise it. Yet, the fact remains that Parkes went 
to extreme lengths to brand the government's financial prop­
osals, and the government itself, as protectionist-dominated.
It has been suggested that Parkes's intention in rais­
ing the fiscal issue was to set himself up as "the archpriest 
of freetrade", thereby placing himself "at the head of a new 
and powerful'political movement".^^George Dibbs substantially 
presented this view, when he stated that "the Opposition has
forced this question before its time, [in order] to obtain
131office...". Personal political prominence, and the ambition
to regain office may have motivated Parkes to raise the fiscal
issue. He certainly did place himself at the forefront of
'freetrade' reaction to ad valorem duties, and he did succeed
132in becoming recognised as the high-priest of freetrade.
He did not, however, neglect to appeal to the electors of the
colony during his campaign, declaring that "the country is now
being cheated out of its privileges ..0 by the very men who
have taken a solemn oath to administer ... affairs ... right- 
133eously". Certainly Parkes sought a return to office, but con­
temporary public opinion, insofar as it can be gauged, would 
suggest that his popularity, and chances of electoral success 
depended, not so much on his stance in the fiscal conflict, as 
on his attractive proposition of no fresh taxation. That this 
is a valid distinction was amply demonstrated during late 1886,
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when a popular movement in favour of Parkes, and directed 
against the government, swept the colony.
A large number of 'indignation meetings’, to get up
petitions to the Governor, asking him to dissolve parliament,
were held all over the colony; 'many ended with hoots for 
135George Dibbs,^ and nearly all with resounding cheers for Sir l 3 gHenry Parkes.*' The ’indignation movement! culminated on 20 
November, when a deputation of citizens presented to the Gov­
ernor forty-three petitions, containing an aggregate of13723j900 signatures. 'Although some mention was made of the
1 7 0fiscal controversy, 'the main area of concern of the protest 
movement was the practical question of alleviating the colony's 
financial crisis. The most common specific complaints against 
the government rested upon its continued extravagant expenditure, 
and the resulting necessity to impose fresh taxation. A fam­
iliar resolution at the meetings was ’’That this meeting protests 
against the extravagant course of administration by which the 
colony has been plunged into financial difficulty and distress, 
and that as the Government has not carried out a retrenchment 
policy it does not possess the confidence of the electors of139the country". - On the basis of his practical financial prop­
osals, Parkes came to be viewed as "the only statesman who could 
properly administer the affairs of the country". ^ ^It would 
thus appear that Parkes’s popularity was more positively conn­
ected with his practical approach to the financial crisis, than 
with his cry to defend freetrade. Although he endeavoured to 
link retrenchment with 'freetrade', one astute observer claimed 
that the result of the 1887 general election would have been as 
strongly in favour of Parkes even if he had gone to the country 
on the ticket of "Sir Henry Parkes and Protection".'5"^
If Parkes's practical proposals of retrenchment and no 
fresh taxation assured him of personal and electoral popular­
ity, his great vigour in raising the fiscal issue to political 
prominence served another far more subtle and far-reaching 
purpose; by the mid-l880s, Parkes saw himself as a political 
reformer with a grand mission. By then, too, he recognised 
that the dormant, but potentially explosive, fiscal issue was 
the means of fulfilling his mission.
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II
The term 'responsible government' has been viewed as 
having had two meanings to the colonists of New South Wales 
during the 184-Os and 18/Os. The "first and dominant meaning" 
of responsible government was self-government, "self-govern­
ment being interpreted primarily as colonial responsibility for
1 / ,  pall colonial affairs". '+ Out of the struggle to attain self- 
government emerged an appreciation of the concept of minister­
ial responsibility, and, hence, the second meaning of respons­
ible government - that of a cabinet government chosen from, 
and relying on the support of, the majority in the popular 
chamber.1;^The advent of self-government in 1856 was, there­
fore, naturally accompanied by the idea that colonial govern­
ment would involve "the collective responsibility of an admin­
istration depending for its term of office on the support of 
the majority of the [elected] assembly". ^'4'4Founded on this 
law of British parliamentary practice, responsible government 
commenced its operation in New South Wales. There were, how­
ever, several factors, which worked within this accepted notion 
of responsible government, but which made the practical work­
ings of the system rather more 'irresponsible' than its title 
would suggest.
Given the basic fact that ministries were required to 
command the support of a majority in the Legislative Assembly 
in order to survive, it is clear that the stability of the 
system depended upon consistent support being given to a min­
istry by individual‘members of parliament. Consistent supp­
ort for a ministry has been, and still is, regarded as being 
primarily due to the presence of political parties. A.C.V. 
Melbourne acknowledges the dependence of a system of respons­
ible government on 'parties', when he states that the colonists 
of New South Wales refrained from demanding responsible govern­
ment in 1850 because of the absence of political parties in the 
colony. 1,Lf^ T.H. Irving disputes this claim that the colony lacked 
'parties', when he argues that the 1840s and 1850s saw "the
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appearance in New South Wales of what the colonists thought
j L\ f')of as ’parties’". ' "He further argues that, even if what was 
meant by ’parties’ was ’’simply factions within the legislature, 
there is no necessity to assume that these groups could not 
secure ministerial responsibility”. 4 'What the faction system, 
which dominated politics after 1856, failed to provide, how­
ever, was the consistent and constant political allegiances nec­
essary for the stability of a parliamentary system based on 
the concept of ministerial responsibility.
Unlike a true 'political party', allegiance to a fac­
tion was not based on political principles, or a set of prac-
148tical objectives, but rather solely on personalities. In
1881, William Forster summed up the situation, when he stated
that ”...we have had no parties in the colony; we have had
nothing but personal followings.... the parties have been simply149personal followings”. Coinciding with this system of personal
allegiance, was a traditional liberal abhorrence of a sectional,
or class, approach to politics. What was insisted upon was a
concern for the 'public interest' and the welfare of the whole
150community, not merely a part of it, and it was this insis­
tence that inhibited a highly-divisive and permanently polar­
ised class approach to politics, with its consequent ideolog­
ical, practical and emotional overtones. The emphasis on 'the 
whole community' resulted in little more than mere administrat­
ive government, and what was stressed were "Material wants, not
151social and political views,...”. Thus, the major factors that 
separated leading colonial politicians were produced far less by 
"any radical or irreconcilable difference between their respect­
ive creeds or tendencies, than by their personal antagonism and
their want of generosity, courtesy and self-control in their
152treatment of each other”. In essence, the conflict between
leading politicians was "not so much about what should be done
155as about how it should be done and who should do it”.
Whilst factional allegiance v/as partly based on the 
shifting sands of personal prejudice, an even more important 
determining factor was the capricious system whereby support 
was given in exchange for favours, particularly paid cabinet
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154posts or public service appointments. Furthermore, the em­
phasis on administrative government accentuated a spirit of 
localism and competition between electorates for government 
favours, in the form of public works, and produced the ’roads
and bridges member'; a member pledged his support in return
155for administrative favours in his electorate. Although each 
faction leader did manage to command the loyal support of a 
hard core of members, many factors, such as disappointment over 
a 'broken promise', loss to a rival claim, tempting counter­
proposals, and mere caprice, affected a large percentage of 
parliamentarians, and kept the state of political alignments 
in a constant state of flux.
Another important factor affecting political stability 
was the traditional liberal insistence on a consistent and 
untrammelled 'independence' in an MLA, for it was argued that 
no man who was wholly committed to a party could hope to con­
sider any issue on its intrinsic merits. The result of this 
necessary independence was pointed out by the Herald, when it 
stated that "it is utterly impossible that honest and indep­
endent men can be expected to give any government more than 
steady support which may ... be withdrawn without violation 
of party fidelity". yDThis carefully guarded independence of 
the MLA served only to make political allegiance, already 
clearly precarious, even more fluid, and to make impossible 
firm and continuous control of the House by the ministry in157office. Thus, a system based on government by majorities,
where majorities could never be assured or relied upon, in-
158evitably produced unstable government.
Another meaning of the term 'responsibility in pol­
itics', and one which had attained general acceptance in 
British politics by the 1840s, invoked the concepts of duty 
and moral responsibility. In the same way as a headmaster is 
responsible for his pupils, so a government is responsible for159the welfare and progress of the people it serves. A govern­
ment discharges this responsibility by assuming control and 
leadership of public affairs.lo<l'uring the first twenty years 
of responsible government in New South Wales, however, the
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impossibility of a ministry being able to secure a firm control 
of the Assembly, coupled with the lack of political principle 
basic to the system, reduced the role of government to that of 
exercising control over little but a narrow range of ’public 
business’, usually confined to financial and administrative 
matters. Transitory and uncertain support, and frequent chang­
es of government, prevented any real long-term planning of pol­
icy, and ministries avoided the construction of coherent legis­
lative programmes. With their support so fluid and fickle, 
ministries also tended to regard it as too tricky and fate- 
tempting to touch issues that aroused great passion and con­
troversy in the community. The dominant ethos of classlessness 
further inhibited the formulation of policies aimed at economic 
reform, and the social and political development of the colony. 
Since such policies could scarcely be expected to meet with the 
full approval of every sector of colonial society, they were 
regarded as partisan and offensive. The accepted role of the 
ministry was, therefore, more or less to'satisfy' the whole 
community, rather than to lead it. At least until the late 
1870s, the accepted notions basic to the faction system had all 
combined to make the role of the ministry ineffectual, and to 
clog up the v,'heels of the parliamentary machine. "For years 
past", the Herald commented in 1878, "public business has been 
retarded and legislation has been brought almost to a standstill 
by the petty divisions which have prevailed in the Assembly.
There have been no lack of forces in the House, but those forces 
have been made powerless for good by the predominance of faction".
Sir Henry Parkes, described later by B.R.Wise as having
"an almost intuitive perception of constitutional propriety,
according to the underlying principles of Responsible Govern- 
I62ment", ‘ was well aware of the degree to v/hich the instability 
of the faction system had demoralised the operation of respons­
ible government in New South Wales; during the course of his 
third ministry, between 1879 and 1882, he sought to eliminate 
the factors that had made the political system, so 'irrespons­
ible' . His chief concern was that,- in a system, basic to which 
were the concepts of government by majority and ministerial 
responsibility, there existed no real basis on which a ministry
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could seek, achieve and rely upon a steady and consistent 
support within parliament. Parkes realised the ineptitude 
and anarchy of a system, in which a man was often found
'supporting* a string of successive governments, irrespec--
16~5tive of his prior affiliations. -''Parkes hotly attacked such 
mindlessness and unruly independence, and at the same time 
indicated his projected solution to such a state of affairs: 
"Nothing ... could be so injurious to the honest and whole­
some working of parliamentary government than for gentlemen 
to be elected to the Assembly who pretended to be of no col­
our, of no party, and who had no opinion of their own, but to 
support whatever turned up at that moment" . “^Parkes * s prime 
mission during his tenure of office was to imbue a decaying 
political system with a degree of stability and consistency, 
that had previously been lacking. His successful efforts to 
effect a coalition of his own supporters with those of Sir 
John Robertson during late 1878 at once represented a clear 
attempt to create a strong and lasting government to rectify 
the inadequacies of the faction system, and to introduce some 
stability. The Parkes-Robertson coalition ministry remained 
in office for precisely four years and tv/o weeks, a term much 
longer than any other ministry since 1856.
Parkes was also concerned with the role of the ministry 
in the government of the colony, and he expressed his long- 
held views on this subject some years later, during an import­
ant speech: "It was not particularly desirable that private 
members should introduce measures; the Government should int­
roduce and pass into law all the measures to meet the present 
needs of the country". ‘'"^During the life of the coalition, 
Parkes combined his desire for more stable and responsible 
political allegiance, with his aim to elevate the role of the 
ministry to one of tight control over public business and leg­
islation. By defining the role of the ministry as one of
leadership, and by assuming control for the ministry over most 
167legislation, 'Parkes aimed at achieving a firm tv/o-way polit­
ical polarisation within the legislature, in terms of ' for-or- 
against* the ministry.
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Parkes realised that, in order to assert its leader­
ship and provide a basis for the polarisation, the ministry 
would have to be prepared with a programme of measures, to 
which it must pledge itself, and, shortly after the ministry's 
formation, Parkes presented the outlines of a clear legislative1 go
programme. °°Parkes could now maintain that the basis by which 
support should be given or withheld was "whether the general 
tendency of a party was in the direction of the advancement of 
the interest of the country", and he pleaded for "such decision 
and constancy of parties as would enable some body of men hon­
estly ... to carry cut great legislative objects". He could 
now declare that "There was sufficient difference between parties
at all times for members to declare either on one side or the 
169other". The new role of the ministry, and its willingness to
tackle important and long-delayed issues, provided "good ground
170for party division", and led to an increased and more stable
171polarity of members’ attitudes and voting patterns.
By 1882, Parkes had provided evidence of "his vision 
172of orderly politics", by effecting changes in the political 
system in the form of a new political stability, as the result 
of providing a sound basis for distinct and consistent polit­
ical allegiance. His great mistake, as he must later have 
realised, was that the stable political polarisation he achiev­
ed between 1879 and 1883 depended solely on the existence of his 
ministry, and was therefore only transitory. Once his ministry 
ceased to exist, little remained to prevent a return to the 
flux of former years. In essence, nothing existed in the way 
of a permanent group commitment, forged on the basis of princ­
iple, that could overcome the effects of a change of government.
The coalition government resigned in January 18835 
after a lost election, and Alexander Stuart came into office 
on a promise of land reform. Once this matter had been dealt 
with, however, the recent emphasis on sound legislative work 
disappeared and the government embarked on lavish administrat­
ive spending. It was, therefore, natural that, in consequence 
of this mindless activity, political alignments should revert 
to personalities, and the worst features of the system that
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Parkes had so earnestly endeavoured to reform, returned. The 
situation, as it developed, became too much for Parkes to 
bear; on 3 November 1884 5 he resigned his seat in the Assemb­
ly, and in a letter to his constituents launched a bitter att­
ack on the state of parliament. He claimed that "In the pres­
ent Parliament political character has almost disappeared from 
the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly, and personal 
objects - to put the matter in the mildest form - have to a 
large extent absorbed that kind of consideration which has 
taken the place of deliberation and legitimate debate". What 
had returned to the political forum, was the old practice of 
support in return for favours, and Parkes claimed to have
"seen immense sums of public money voted away by private press-
" 1 ^ 5ure and bargaining, ... . The political instability, a con­
sequence of the fluidity of personal, unprincipled allegiance, 
had also returned,' M'and, during the four years from the fall 
of the coalition government to the formation of Parkes's next 
ministry, four separate ministries occupied the Treasury bench­
es, one of them lasting only a little over two months. E.A. 
Baker summed up the situation when he despairingly told the 
Assembly, in January 1887, that "They had had four Governments, 
and were to have two general elections in the course of 15 
months. During this time they had practically done no business 
at all. He would like to ask hon. members how long this kind of 
thing was to go on. Was there to be no finality to it?".^'^
Certainly by the mid-l880s, there was again a pressing
need for reform, particularly in view of the colony's rapidly
deteriorating financial position, which successive ministries
proved incapable of solving due to the absence of any firm and
consistent support for the measures they proposed. N.B.Nairn
has argued that "there was no chance of reform being effected
178from within the system", 'and that the 'old order' merely 
attempted to confuse the situation "by attempting to force a 
spurious division of parliament and the electorate on the basis 
of 'the fiscal question'", an issue with "barely a tangential 
relevance to the solution of the basic problem confronting the177colony". Parkes, however, did attempt reform from within the
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system, his,method, being similar to his efforts of 1379-82, 
in that he utilised the fiscal issue, however irrelevant in 
reality, to create a firm and committed two-way polarisation 
of parliament, in the hope that political allegiance and be­
haviour would become stable enough to allow a ministry some 
real chance of solving the colony’s problems.
In 1881, Sir Bartie Frere, until recently Governor 
of the Cape Colony, told the Royal Colonial Institute that a 
weakness in the British colonial system was ’’The belief that 
responsible government could not be perfectly carried out ex­
cept by the operation of contending parties in the legislature, 
and he argued that party government was not essential to the 
success of representative institutions, . °As far as 
Parkes was concerned, however, the history of responsible gov­
ernment in New South Wales seemed to demand the emergence of 
a stable party system to ensure the successful operation of 
the colony’s representative institution. This belief, in 
I88p, was not nev/ to Parkes. In 1893j while serving on the
Legislative Council's Constitutional Committee, he "had corn-
179plained ... of the want of 'party' in the House", and he 
later became increasingly convinced of the need for political 
activity, based on the presence of firmly established group­
ings within the legislature. As he stated in his autobiography, 
"Instead of the abolition of Party, we want an intelligent and
1 PiClconscientious adherence to Party lines, and, in another
passage, "Parliamentary government can only be carried on by 
political parties", °"Parkes summed up his views in a speech 
during 1894? in which he said that "the fact remained that 
party government was the best form of government the wit of 
man had invented".' '“Parkes correctly gauged that the backbone 
of parliamentary proceedings was the notion of conflict: "Every 
question of sufficient magnitude to enter into the policy of a 
Government, ..., must have two sides". '"'’lie realised the perm­
anence of this contention, when he stated, in 1894? that "So 
long as civilised society was formed of intelligent beings
there would be difference of opinion, which would display it-184
self in opposing minds". Parkes had endeavoured to utilise 
this constant factor of conflict between 1879 and 1882, by
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applying it to his ministry’s legislative programme in order 
to create two stable and consistent political groupings, on 
the basis of support for or opposition to the programme.
The weakness of this attempt at reform was the lack of perm­
anence involved in the basis for polarisation. A simple ryes- 
no ’ division on the basis of proposed practical measures engen­
dered no real continuity, or permanence of allegiance, and the 
possibility existed for fresh divisions of opinion as each sep­
arate measure came under review. The continuing absence of 
conflicts involving principle, whether real or imagined, doom­
ed Parkes's polarising efforts to short-lived success. Con­
flict over practical issues could create short-term polarisat­
ion, but permanent allegiances and alignments were the products 
of conflicts of principle. As the Herald stated during the 
life of the coalition government, while ’’the principal meas­
ures of a session do not embody broad principles ..., it will
l8Salways be difficult to make party government a reality”. ^
Such a realisation, both during and after the life of 
the coalition, must have raised in Parkes the question as to 
what exactly constituted a ’party’, that entity that could pro­
vide the permanent stability he so eagerly desired for the pol­
itical system of New South Wales. Turning, as was his wront, 
to Britain for inspiration and guidance, °Parkes could view 
not only developments in English politics, but could also heed 
the v/ords of Edmund Burke, who described ’a party1 as ”a body 
of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the nat­
ional interest upon some particular principle in which they 
are all agreed”. 'Parkes could review the emergence, during 
the 1830s and I8h0s, of a ’nev/ theory’ of party, based on con­
flicts of principle, clearly perceptible during the 1832 Reform 
Bill debates, and in Peel’s betrayal of Conservative election pled­
ges by repealing the Corn Law's. Such principled conflicts, 
when they arose, stultified the old theory of party, whose
foundation was the personalised eighteenth-century faction, and
188became ”the life-blood of the new theory”."“ °As a result, the 
commonly accepted theory of ’party’ changed as the nineteenth 
century progressed, and by the time he came to write his 
autobiography, Parkes v/as acknowledging ’party’, in its ’’true
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sense", to be based on "attachment to and promulgation of
3 89openly avowed principles, . ‘ The Herald confirmed this
view of 'party’ as the accepted definition, when it upheld
"the need ... of joining together for the support of common
1QQprinciples or the promotion of common purposes, '
When Parkes resigned from the Legislative Assembly in 
November 1884? he stated that he no longer possessed the streng­
th "to assist in effecting a change for the better in this state 
191of things", but it took him only five months, in which to
192muster enough strength to re-enter the parliamentary fray.
A revived spirit and reforming zeal seems to have possessed
him; he took his seat in the Assembly in September 1885 with
193an impertinent contempt for a degraded parliament, and a det­
ermination to rise above the chaos of factional manoeuvring.19'9 
This determination was regarded, somewhat justifiably, as a
belief in himself as "the only necessary man, and the only man
195who can do good". In view of subsequent events, it would seem 
that Parkes's reforming spirit had not only revived, but had 
also matured to a point where he realised the need, both to pol­
arise politics into two distinct groups, and to provide foundat­
ions that would make these groups stable and permanent. The way
to achieve these objects was to introduce into New South Wales
196politics a conflict involving principle. Since conflicts of
principle were basic to 'the new theory' of party, in order to
foster the growth of 'principled' parties, it became necessary
to invent such conflicts "whenever they were not immediately 
197apparent". It is in this light that Parkes's full-scale introd­
uction of the fiscal issue into New South Wales politics should 
be viewed. The raising of the fiscal issue, although of 'tang­
ential relevance' to a practical solution to the colony's diffic­
ulties, was designed t.o make the political system sufficiently 
stable to be able to provide a solution, not merely propose one.
Parkes saw in the fiscal issue the prerequisites for a 
new and lasting political division - conflict and principle. In 
his autobiography, he posed the question, "What ground for agree­
ment or accommodation can be discovered between freedom of comm- lcercial intercourse and restriction of commercial intercourse,...?",
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and, during 1886, he promoted to the full this emphasis on 
conflict. In January 1887, J.M.Toohey related how, on being 
alarmed at the extremism of both sides, he had proposed that 
Ma conference between the heads of the parties would be a 
proper way out of the difficulty". He had, however, discov­
ered that "there was no possibility of a conference with or
199conciliation of the freetrade party...".
To Parkes, political stability as the result of a 
permanent and 'principled* political polarisation was the 
chief objective. He made his reformist intentions, in rais­
ing the fiscal issue, quite clear during the course of his 
campaign» On one occasion he related how, "For some years 
past such confusion, such perplexity, such uncertainty had 
prevailed in the political life of this colony that it had 
been hardly possible to tell what any man’s belief was, or 
what his vote would be. They at all events intended to ter­
minate that state of things, ...".^^He told another audience 
that "The advantage ... of placing before the electors a clear 
issue was that it would clarify the political atmosphere, and 
form people into intelligent sides". w Parkes, in 1887, demon­
strated the lessons he had learned from his 1879-82 experience. 
He endeavoured to overcome the problem of fluctuating support 
and opposition by creating a political polarisation based on 
fiscal principle. Such fiscal division, Parkes hoped, once 
formed, would remain permanent and would apply not only to 
purely fiscal matters, but would also determine and dictate 
allegiance on other issues. Therefore, what Parkes aimed at
was "conscientious adherence to parties when the attachment
202v/as once formed". This attachment had, as its foundation, the
belief "in any given principle of political science - say free-
205trade, if you like - it should not, however, he claimed,
be confined simply to the one principle used to form the init­
ial attachment. He advocated ’conscientious adherence to part­
ies’ on the basis of the "general principles" and "broad aims 
of the party",^^or "the whole policy of the Government"• ^ 05
This emphasis on conscientious party allegiance was 
primarily designed to rid the political system of the
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untrammelled independence that had contributed so greatly to 
the political instability of the colony. Parkes ’s determin­
ation to foster the acceptance of true party allegiance led to
a natural hostility towards "the independent member, one who
206cannot be trusted by any party*'. Parkes was fond of quoting 
Lord Palmerston fs remark to Queen Victoria: '’Your Majesty, my 
experience of independent members is that they can never be 
depended upon”„ ' Exhorting the electors during the 188? elec­
tion to return "men who would steadily support the principlespQg
the Ministry had announced” °Parkes also appealed to them 
"to set their faces against the chicanery and the so-called 
independent candidates who seek to steal into Parliament under 
the cover which simply hides their self-seeking or worse purp-
Perhaps the ultimate reason for Parkes’s reformist
efforts was his realisation of the need to make the operations
of parliament efficient, meaningful and constructive. For this
reason, his 1887 election campaign concentrated on the issues
210of "good government and commercial freedom". By ’good govern­
ment’ was meant, not only "the urgent work of extricating the
211country from its present deplorable condition", but also the 
urgent need to create conditions in which a stable and secure 
government could operate efficiently and effectively to per­
form ’the urgent work’. He gave expression to this meaning of 
1 good government’, when he wrote that "It is very desirable 
that the machine of Government should run on with as little
friction and at the same time as much effectiveness in the dis-
212charge of its functions, as possible". Parkes summarised his
views when he told B.R.Wise that "... we have to fight not only
for freetrade but for something higher and better - for pure
213and efficient Government".
Parkes, then, was equally convinced of the need for re­
form in the methods of government«. He told the Governor: "For 
the last few years Government with us has been carried on in a 
manner which has always appeared to me highly irregular and 
fraught with much mischief .... The proper lines of official 
discipline and deference have often been lost sight of. Not
1/34
only has the state of things been reduced to 'Sixes’and 'Sev­
ens’ in some cases but to a condition in others where 'Jack 
was as good as his Master'”. "‘“Parkes emphasised the need for 
reform, particularly to the ministry, and he stressed that a
ministry must be run on the lines of "Oneness of consultationpiuand action”, •''to remedy the "past example and practice" of
Departments being run "as if they were independent bodies",
and to achieve the object of "getting Government into better
working order",“ 1'°In a letter to every member of his 1887-89
ministry, Parkes made his position even more clear when he
declared that "our usefulness as a Government consists in
concert of action and this can only be maintained by the Head
governing the Body". He went on to say: "In future I must
make it a rule to be made acquainted with any new or unusual
217proposal before it is even submitted to the Cabinet". He 
also related that, prior to the swearing in of the 1887 min­
istry, he had told his ministers that "I must in reality be 
the leader of the Government and that no new departure in any 
Department must be entered upon, no new thing done, without 
my knowledge and concurrence’1.^ '"0
Parkes also tried to apply these standards of discip­
line to the entire freetrade 'party*. How successful he was 
in firmly establishing the concepts of party discipline, loy­
alty and responsibility will be analysed later, but there can 
be little doubt that he aimed to bring about a substantial 
change in the operation of the political system in New South 
Wales.
Ill
Speaking in the Legislative Assembly, following the 
1887 general election, George Dibbs summed up the method, mot­
ive and result of Parkes’s fiscal polarisation campaign: "A 
cry was got up against the late Government that the imposition 
of the ad valorem duties was the insertion of the thin end of
the wedge of protection. I said at the time that it was a
1/35
bogus cry, and a sham got up for party purposes, and the game
21Qhas been well played”* "Indeed, the game was well played, and, 
despite the irrelevance of the fiscal issue to all practical 
concerns, Parkes, by shrewdly utilising existing factional 
alignments and successfully capitalising on the polarising 
potential of the fiscal issue, was able to condition a stable 
two-sided political alignment.
The Jennings-Dibbs ministry, which took office in Feb­
ruary 1886j represented a combination of the Stuart, Dibbs and
Jennings factions, a combination which was formally instituted
220in August 1882 to oppose the Parkes-Robertson coalition,"
and which succeeded to office on the coalition’s defeat. Al-
221though the combination's internal cohesion was suspect," ' it 
was at its strongest when faced by its arch-enemy, Parkes.
Thus, when Parkes raised his cry against Jennings' taxation 
proposals, it may be fairly claimed that many gave Jennings a 
vigorous support out of factional antipathy to Parkes. The 
motivating force of factional prejudice was amply demonstrated 
by strong Stuart-Dibbs-Jennings supporters who, during the 1885 
election, declared themselves 'staunch freetraders', and yet 
retained their factional allegiance in 1886, strongly support­
ing ad valorem duties in the face of Parkes's equation of them
with protection, and later became avowed 'converts' to protect- 
222ion. The same overriding factional motivation was, of course, 
also evident in support of Parkes. Prior to, and during,1885, 
a number of Parkes's factional followers had declared in favour 
of such fiscal measures as ad valorem duties, retaliatory grain 
duties against Victoria, and encouragement to local industries. 
During 1886, however, the advocacy of such measures was sudden­
ly dropped, as these men rallied to Parkes in his fight against
223the 'protectionist'*advocates of such measures. In a number of 
cases, factional prejudice coincided with fiscal opinion; whilst 
Henry Copeland, Travers Jones, J.M.Chanter, T.Ewing, and the 
long-standing protectionists, W.S.Targett, N.Melville, P.Hogan,
R.Barbour, and W.T.Coonan could combine their antipathy to Parkes 
with a genuine belief in the efficacy of ad valorem duties,
G.A.Lloyd, W.C.Wilkinson and W.J.Foster were able to combine their 
personal allegiance to Parkes and their opposition to ad valorem
duties.
But the effect of the ad valorem proposal itself, 
carrying as it did the fiscal label of ’protection’, must not 
be underestimated as a determinant of political allegiance, 
both in and after 1886. Irrespective of other previous fact-
p p t ,
ional allegiancej£"""‘Ta small number of long-standing protect­
ionists came instinctively to support the.imposition of ad
225valorem duties as a first instalment of protection. 'Yet 
even among ardent protectionists factional instincts remained 
strong, and three avowed protectionists placed their factional 
loyalty to Parkes and Robertson above their principled beliefs. 
Several other examples exist, however, to demonstrate that 
a rivalry between factional loyalty and fiscal allegiance did 
exist, and that this rivalry was not always resolved in favour 
of the former. I. S. Ives and R. V/. Thompson had been associated 
since their entry into parliament with the Jennings-Dibbs fact­
ion, but both opposed the imposition of ad valorem duties. Two
long-standing supporters of the Stuart-Dibbs-Jennings combinat-
227ion, W.J.Trickett and G.H.Reid, also felt constrained to opp­
ose ad valorem duties. Reid later declared that ”1 came at 
last to the conclusion that I could not continue to support the 
Government, and made this clear on the second reading of the 
[Customs Duties] Bill".^C
The greatest influence of the fiscal issue itself, in 
determining political allegiance, was its creation of a simple 
two-way alignment, thus eliminating factional allegiance extra­
neous to the conflict between ’protectionist’ Jennings-Dibbs 
and ’freetrade’ Parkes. At the beginning of the conflict, a 
significant extraneous force did exist, in the form of Sir 
John Robertson's personal following; it is testimony to Parkes' 
skill and influence that he was able to achieve the elimination 
of this force, all those who comprised it finally fitting into 
the neat two-way alignment. Robertson himself was in no way 
allied with Parkes in the latter's fiscal campaign; when Parkes 
moved his resolutions on 11 May, dissenting from Jennings' tax­
ation proposals and really raising the fiscal conflict, Robert­
son declared his opposition to Parkes for not giving the
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229ministry "fair play”, 'and he voted with Jennings in the
230resulting division. As far as Robertson was concerned, ins
231personal antagonism to Parkes1" overrode all else, and posed a 
distinct threat to the success of Parkes's fiscal polarisation 
campaign.
Not all Robertson’s supporters, however, were prepared 
blindly to follow their chief. After Jennings took office, 
the intensity of Parkes’s fi’scal campaign worked slowly to el­
iminate feelings of personal loyalty to Robertson, and his per­
sonal followers began to divide largely on the basis of their
genuine fiscal beliefs. When Parkes moved his resolutions on
23211 May, James Inglis declared that he intended to vote for
them, ’’because they are in the interests of good government
and sound fiscal policy”, and he accused Robertson of being un-
233true to ”his expressed opinions and principles”. In the div­
ision on the resolutions, a number of Robertson's followers
23Achose to vote against their chief in support of Parkes. ‘ Dur­
ing the debate on the resolutions, James Inglis declared that
”We are told that if we vote for these resolutions we pledge
233ourselves to the leadership of Sir Henry Parkes”, and, whilst 
Inglis denied that this was so, Robertson must have been aware 
of the strong pressure being applied to the loyalty of his per­
sonal followers by Parkes's persistent fiscal campaign. In 
recognition of "the fact that an absolute retirement ...
[would] facilitate new political arrangements”, Sir John Rob-
2 - ($ertson announced his retirement from parliament in June 1886.  ^
Parkes's success in breaking down the Robertson faction to 
create a two-way polarisation was confirmed by the Herald, 
which wrote that Robertson's "unwillingness to turn the pres­
ent Government out, ... [has] made Sir Henry Parkes the most
formidable member of the Opposition. To all intents and purp-
237oses, he has been the real leader for weeks past; ...”.
Robertson's retirement left the way open for a formal division
of his supporters between the 'freetraders' and the 'protect-
238ionists', and whilst the majority joined Parkes, some sided
239with Jennings in support of ad valorem duties^  ^ most of them 
eventually becoming 'protectionist converts'. At the time of 
the final passage of Jennings' Customs Duties Bill through the
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Assembly, Parkes*s projected two-way fiscal alignment had 
materialised to the extent that only six men were arrayed 
against the ’fiscal grouping* into which they would finally
The degree to which the fiscal issue had permeated pol­
itics by the end of 1886 was demonstrated by the disintegrat­
ion of Jennings’ faction ministry and the succession of Parkes 
to office. The ostensible reason for Jennings' resignation in 
January 1887 was a serious cabinet conflict between himself 
and George Dibbs, although both Dibbs and W.H.Traill offer 
an alternative explanation. According to them, Jennings' min-
p hpistry "lost all semblance of coherence"1“ ' as the Premier "all­
owed member after member of his Government to drift away into
213the hands of the protectionists Traill maintained that
Garvan, Lyne, Copeland and "some others" declared their 'con­
version' to protection, while "Only two, Messrs Want and Dibbs, 
ventured to assert their fidelity to freetrade, while preserv- 
ing their attitude of antagonism" to Parkes. ' ' fFaced with the 
choice of re-construe ting the ministry or resigning, Dibbs 
claimed that Jennings took the "inglorious course, and aband­
oned the position to the enemy" by resigning.
The effect of Parkes's fiscal campaign on his personal
fortunes was revealed when the Governor, Lord Carrington, sent
2A6for Parkes, "the recognised leader of the Opposition", and 
commissioned him to form a government, despite the fact that, 
as William Lyne pointed out, Parkes's position in the Assembly
p i  rn
was nothing more than that of "the leader of a minority".
Lyne's comment, though critical and partisan, was essentially 
true; the ministry had not been defeated in an important parl­
iamentary division and had "a large and loyally working major-
PL> 8ity" at its back. ' Lyne strongly argued that "a gentleman with
the same policy as that of the retiring Government" should have
249been commissioned to re-construct the ministry. It would app­
ear, however, that Carrington, when he sent for Parkes, had
been influenced by the popular movement that regarded Parkes
230as the only man who could rescue the country, and was also 
convinced that his new Premier was assured of a sweeping elect­
oral victory, despite the serious minority in which he found
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251himself on his assumption of office.
Despite a number of contemporary and recent opinions 
to the contrary, ■" ~Park.es does not seem to have deviated from 
his fiscal polarisation principles in the construction of his 
ministry. He maintained that the ministry he would form would 
be "a thoroughly free trade Government” and would be restricted 
to the side of the Assembly which had been hostile to Jennings’ 
ministry. Where misunderstanding arose was in the claim that, 
in choosing his ministry, Parkes adhered to the latter condit- 
ion, but not to the former. "'‘'This claim appears irrelevant 
when it is remembered that, according to the fiscal criteria 
laid down by Parkes in 1886, opposition to Jennings automat­
ically represented adherence to freetrade. Although it was a 
slight exaggeration, Parkes was essentially correct when he 
stated that "I have taken my colleagues from the ranks of 
those with whom I have acted for the last twelve months”.
For this reason, it was not unnatural that there was included 
on his ministerial short list a mixture of men from previously 
diverse political groupings, since Parkes was only concerned
with the group cohesion forged on the issue of Jennings ’
25bCustoms Bill.'" From his own factional following were included
257V/.J.Foster, J. Sutherland , W.Clarke, F. Abigail, C.J. Roberts,
258R.Wisdom, G.A.Lloyd, and J.C.Neild; among the ex-Robertsonians,
2^9J.F.Burns, J.Inglis, T.Garrett, C.Garland, and J.H.Young;  ^ and,
finally, as a result of "the growing friendliness of the
260Read [ sic ] section of the House”, and of his desire for "pro­
ceeding on the clear lines of a Free Trade policy for the 
country", " rarkes offered G.H.Reid a place in the ministry. 
Operating on the premise that, by the end of 1886, only two
’sides’ existed in the Assembly, Parkes ’s offers and final 
265choices were perfectly consistent with his polarisation ob- 
jec tives.
Again, it should be stressed that it was the political 
stand taken in regard to Jennings’ Customs Duties Bill that 
was, for Parkes, the basic determinant of a man’s fiscal belief. 
It is in this context that the accusation that his ministry
26Acontained four nrotectionists 0 should be treated. Certainly
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all four had, as Loveday and Martin point out, "previously
? 6 L:'advocated the imposition of certain duties",""' 'but this did
not mean that, prior to 1886, they were commonly regarded as
being in favour of protection. As Abigail pointed out, his
advocacy of ad valorem duties was at a time when the whole
fiscal issue had "not ... cropped up", but, as soon as it
"came into the arena of politics", a fact he presumably saw
as being due to Parkes, "he nailed his colours to the [free-
trade] mast", and spent his energy "in resisting every effort
6^6to pass the tariff proposals of the late Government, . ..".
William Clarke, the advocate of duties on imported farm prod-
267uce, still claimed to be "an outspoken advocate of free-trade", 
and, when it came to the point, he gave notice of his prior­
ities when he stated that "when he was asked if he would support 
the ftd valorem duties ... he declined to do so, and said he
would rather lose his motion to tax grain than ... involve the
268country in a general system of protection". ' Rallying to
269Parkes*s freetrade standard, Clarke also assented, on joining
the ministry, to Parkes*s demand that "all notions of duties
270on imported produce must be given up In addition, two
of the doubtful four, Clarke and Sutherland, were closely ass­
ociated during 1886 with at least one of the two influential
extra-parliamentary bodies advocating freetrade, the FTA and 
271the SCC. The only member of the ministry whose fiscal conform­
ity with Parkes1s standards raises any doubt was C.J.Roberts,
who, despite being described by Parkes as "one of the staunchest
272and ... most loyal members of the Opposition", continued to
271admit his support of grain and ad valorem duties.
Despite the success achieved by Parkes in polarising
politics into two distinct camps and in achieving office, the
acid test for his reformist ideas still remained to be faced.
A two-way polarisation, built largely on factional prejudice
and so far applicable to only one practical matter, was not a
sufficiently strong foundation on which to build two stable
'principled* political 'parties’. What was required to make
permanent the new political alignment was the confirmation and
consolidation of the issue that had determined it as the fund-
271amental basis of political conflict; and, in order to elevate
3 A-l
the fiscal issue to that status, what was necessary was an 
unmistakable commitment, on the part of all politicians, to 
either the principles of 'ireetrade' or those of 'protection1, 
as defined by Parkes. The obvious opportunity for achieving 
these goals was a general election. The general election of 
February 1887 provided Parkes with a stiff challenge, which 
he met with extraordinary vigour, but the results of which 
were not entirely to his satisfaction.
Parkes's first main objective in regard to the election
was to narrow the field of contention down to the single issue
of free trade and protection. His campaign during 1886 had
laid the foundation for success in this objective, so much so
that Jennings, ignoring his prior denial of the relevance of
the fiscal issue, told the Assembly in January 1887 that "the
time has come when a definite issue on the question of free-
27 btrade or protection should be put before the country".
Parkes's determination to have the election fought solely on 
the fiscal issue was amply demonstrated by his ministerial 
statement to the Legislative Assembly on 2A January 1887.
During the course of his speech, Parkes stated that "there 
will be no mincing of the issue before the country. It will 
be for the Government or against it - free trade or protection".c 
There was, however, an even deeper significance attached to 
Parkes's statement, in which he outlined the course to be pur­
sued by the government, both during and after the election.
Parkes himself described the statement as "an innovation upon
the usual practice" of revealing the government's intentions
277only after an election, and a number of members demanded to
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know the meaning of this departure from standard practice. ‘°
It would seem that Parkes merely desired an opportunity to sugg­
est to all members of the House the lines on which the election 
should be fought, for after outlining the government's freetrade 
policy and highlighting the importance of the fiscal issue, he
concluded: "I have stated sufficient for the guidance of hon.
279gentlemen". Clearly Parkes desired a clear-cut two-sided 
electoral contest; this he achieved by what one newspaper termed 
as "the adoption of a policy on which the country can take 
sides", the result being that "the people can then range them-
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?80selves into free-trade and protection carps accordinglyM.
Parkes’s stated determination to ’’plant the flag of free trade”
-81on ’’every hustings in the land”1 was no idle threat, and he
himself, apart from appearing in many metropolitan electorates,
undertook six separate trips into the country to foster fiscalog ?warfare and promote a freetrade victory.1 "The success of his 
campaign was confirmed after the election when the Herald comm­
ented that ’’Usually a large number of questions divide the att­
ention of the constituencies at a general election, but on this 
occasion there was one issue - and one only - the issue of free 
trade and protection”. This fact, claimed the newspaper, was 
in striking contrast to previous general elections, and made 
the 188? election "the most remarkable that has been fought in 
this colony”.
Whilst Parkes was successful in achieving an electoral 
contest based almost exclusively on the fiscal issue, the way 
in which the issue was treated and defined by many parliament­
ary aspirants proved in no way satisfactory to the achievement 
of Parkes’s goal of creating two defined, cohesive and ’princ­
ipled fiscal parties’. Parkes’s reformist scheme envisaged a 
polarised political situation, which was initially based large­
ly on factional prejudice with some fiscal trappings, but which 
would quickly develop into permanent ’principled’ fiscal group­
ings, due to the acceptance of his criteria of fiscal allegiance 
supporters of Jennings and ad valorem duties were protection­
ists; supporters of Parkes and opponents of ad valorem duties 
were freetraders. The universal acceptance of these criteria 
and their associated labels was not, however, fully achieved 
during the general election of 1887. Only when the practical 
political futility of non-conformity to Parkes’s criteria was 
revealed, did the lingering clouds of fiscal confusion disappear
CHAPTER 2
FACTIONS AND FRICTIONS, PRINCIPLES AND 
PROGRAMMES, 1887-1891.
I. Fiscal Conflict, Liberalism 
and the Parliamentary Free­
traders ,
"Labour has won its present pos­
ition in Australia not by virtue 
of its organisation, but by vir­
tue of its aims. Other parties 
have not failed to organise mer­
ely because they are too indol­
ent or too proud, but because 
they lacked the united impulse, 
the common faith essential to 
give the method effect”.
The Times (London).
I
Between 188? and 1891> neither parliamentary fiscal 
group achieved any general collective agreement on the precise 
economic meaning, implications and practical operation of its 
fiscal creed. In fact, it was not until 1889 that all members 
even nominally accepted the fiscal label of the group they 
professed to support. The 1887 general election greatly con­
tributed to the achievement of such nominal unity, but it fell 
well short of total success.
Among the members of the opposition there was consid­
erable reluctance in early 1887 to accept Parkes's dictum 
that their support of ad valorem duties automatically branded 
them as 'protectionists’. On 20 January 1887, a full meeting
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of ’’members of the Opposition” was held, and was followed by 
a separate meeting of "the protectionist members of the Opp­
osition”. However, at a meeting on Zk January of "between 30 
and JO” opposition members, ”it was determined that the chall­
enge thrown down by Sir Henry Parkes with regard to freetrade 
and protection should be accepted without hesitation”, and it 
was resolved that ’’The Opposition will therefore appeal unit­
edly to the constituencies in advocacy of a policy of moderatepand judicious protection”. This decision indicated a general
willingness to regard the imposition of 5% ad valorem duties
and import duties on agricultural produce as 'protectionist'
measures,^and the meeting was careful to draw a distinction
between ’’extreme or ultra-protectionist” views and ’’those of
moderation”.L' This decision to accept the protectionist label
created no problems for those members of the opposition who
were protectionists of long standing, nor for those who had
been converted to an acceptance of the label during the crisis
6of 1836." Other members of the opposition now also v/illingly 
accepted the protectionist label, declaring their conversion
ri
during the course of the election campaign.(
There was, however, a considerable number of the opp­
osition that refused to accept Parkes's fiscal criteria by 
undergoing immediate protectionist conversion, and many mem­
bers of the opposition continued to regard themselves asg
staunch freetraders or, at least, stoutly refused to be termed 
9protectionists. In addition, a number of others adopted high-
10ly ambiguous and equivocal fiscal stances, while some refused 
to adopt any fiscal label at all.^In February 1887, a recent 
protectionist ’convert', Harold Stephen, declared that in con­
sequence of its collective adoption of the doctrine of protect­
ion, the opposition had "lost several gentlemen, such as Mr 
Dibbs, who was with them before, but, being a freetrader, he
could not consistently now fall in with the protectionist 
12policy". It transpired, however, that, on the assembling of 
parliament after the election, the opposition had not 'lost' 
its fiscal non-conformists; all were firmly planted upon the 
opposition benches. -'Although the specific fiscal beliefs Gf
all these men conformed to Parkes's definition of a protection­
ist, it was a significant set-back to the consolidation of at 
least a nominally united 'protectionist' opposition that so 
many refused to accept their designated fiscal label. Further­
more, also included among the opposition ranks was P.B.Wilkin­
son who, although he approved of Parkes's fiscal declarations 
and condemned those of the opposition, decided to sit with the
opposition because he approved of "its policy for the treat-
14ment of country districts".""'
An equally disturbing factor for the realisation of
Parkes's object of two clear-cut fiscal groups was the number
of declared protectionists who stated that they would support
Parkes. Ninian Melville referred to this situation when he
stated, after the election, that "there are a number of hon.
gentlemen following the Government whom I have myself heard
advocating protection. Some of them even went the length of
advocating it at their meetings, and yet during the contest
they actually ... declared for the hon. gentleman at the head
lbof the Government". One of the particular cases specified by
Melville"^ was that of Jacob Garrard who reinforced his prior
17advocacy of protection during the election campaign by dec­
laring his opposition to the repeal of ad valorem duties and
18his support for "the encouragement of local industries".
At the same time, Garrard referred to Parkes as being "head
and shoulders above any other man in the colony", and the only
man who could "lift them out of the slough of despond into
19which they had fallen". An even more striking example, also
20specified by Melville, was that of W.F.Schey who, although 
stating his support for "a policy of discriminative protection" 
declared that "he considered it was his duty to allow his op­
inions to stand by for the present", on the grounds that "Sir 
Henry Parkes was the only man capable of dealing with their 
present difficulties". He concluded by "unhesitatingly" prom­
ising that "to Sir Henry Parkes he should, if elected, accord
21his heartiest support". It was, therefore, not surprising
that on the assembling of parliament, five protectionists
22were found occupying the ministerial benches.
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In addition, the ministerial ranks contained two men
23who had supported the imposition of ad valorem duties in 1886,"' " '  
one at least of whom had not repented, declaring that he would 
not vote for their abolition.1' 'Also there was a parliamentary 
newcomer, Thomas Waddell, who had declared that "in the main 
he was a free-trade candidate", but who declared his support 
for ad valorem duties. "If the 1887 general election had gen­
erally aided the consolidation of two antagonistic fiscal 
groups, it had also created, or at least failed to solve, a 
number of incongruities, which required elimination before 
even a nominal fiscal consensus could be achieved by both part­
ies.
Parkes's fiscal criteria had, however, been accepted 
to such a degree that the not inconsiderable number of fiscal 
non-conformists seemed to occupy an unprofitable political no- 
man's land in the new two-sided division.°In March 1887, J.P. 
Abbott was elected leader of the opposition, although the Her­
ald pointed out that, "as the party who have chosen Mr Abbott
as their leader are protectionists, ... it is very probable
27that a third party will be formed in the House". No such party 
ever eventuated, the fiscal non-conformists almost to a man 
deeming the wiser course to be a 'conversion' to fiscal con­
formity as defined by Parkes. Led, in July 1887, by the con­
version to 'protection' of George Dibbs, both fiscal groupings 
began to achieve nominal fiscal unity; by 18895 with only minor 
exceptions, the process was complete.~°Although the fiscal in­
consistencies were eradicated, the true nature of the issue 
that was supposed both to divide the two parties, and to pro­
vide the basis of unity within each one, was soon to be demon­
strated. In March 18875 men who upheld 5% ad valorem duties - 
the basis of Parkes'-s definition of a protectionist - were 
found among the opposition in the guise of both protectionists 
and freetraders, as well as among the ministerialist free­
traders. Furthermore, the ease with which 'conversions' were 
made tends to throw doubt on both the degree of profundity in­
volved in the fiscal conflict, and the degree of real cohesion 
likely to be present in either party. That the leaders of 
both fiscal parties had little regard for the real meaning and
economic implications of both freetrade and protection, was 
made manifest during the years 1887 to 1892 in the customs 
arrangements designed by both parties. That each party came 
under fire from the other for its failure to practice the doc­
trine it preached, certainly threw considerable doubt on its 
credibility. The fact, also, that the fiscal measures, passed 
into law between 1887 and 1892, became the subject of consid­
erable tension and controversy within each party, destroys any 
illusion of real cohesion within each on the only issue on 
'which they professed to be united. A nominal consensus there 
may have been, but there we,s certainly no cohesion about the 
basic fiscal principles or details. The issue, as raised by 
Parkes, was for the political purpose of stable polarisation.
The more simplified and non-specific its expression, the more 
likely it was to achieve its purpose; but the more vaguely the 
fiscal theories were defined, and the greater the avoidance of 
expounding their specific economic implications, the less 
likely was the achievement of anything more than a purely nom­
inal fiscal consensus within each party.
Parkes at no stage dwelt on the economic or theoretical 
meaning of freetrade, and the only sense in which he applied 
it to political reality was as a label for a purely pragmatic 
projected solution to the colony’s financial difficulties, 
that of retrenchment and no further taxation. The policy of 
no new taxation impositions was, however, theoretically anti­
thetical to pure freetrade principles, which ’’abjure all imp­
ort duties”, thus placing the burden on other forms of tax-
29ation for the raising of revenue. The facts that revenue was 
required so urgently in the colony and that Parkes proposed no 
fresh taxation could only mean that the customs was still to be 
used as the primary-source of state revenue; as Traill commented, 
’’Where a Custom-house establishment has to be maintained, it 
is a cheap and handy way of getting money for the public Treas­
ury. But it involves a violation of free-trade p r i n c i p l e s -  J 
In July 1887, Parkes1s Customs Duties Bill was passed 
ad valorem duties were to be abolished, the number of articles 
to be charged specific duties was largely reduced, and a new 
schedule of specific duties was included at lower rates. The
new tariff, however, resulted in only a marginal difference in
the revenue obtained from import duties, the amount failing
from the 'protectionist* high in 1886 of £2,068,571 to the
'freetrade’ low of £1,879?086 in 1890.'■'“Further, although
the I887 Customs Duties Bill abolished the ’protectionist’
ad valorem duties, Parkes indicated the degree to which revenue
considerations overshadowed any doctrinaire adherence to free-
trade by continuing their operation until- 1 October 1887? thus
33earning £227?000 for the freetrade ministry. In order to off­
set this slight drop in revenue, Parkes had further recourse
to the customs, passing in 1887 bills raising the excise duty
34 35on colonial spirits' 'and tobacco,'" and initiating an excise
duty on beer brewed in the colony. °By these measures, re-
37ceipts from excise duties were greatly increased, thus rais­
ing the total customs revenue for 1887? 1889 and 1890 above 
that of 1886."'°
Commenting on the new tariff arrangements, a regular 
columnist in the Herald declared ’’The fact is these shibboleths 
’Free Trade1 and ’Protection’ are, after all, more or less 
’will-o’-the-wisps’. The Jennings Government proclaimed that 
. .. its tariff ’was imposed for revenue purposes only. The 
tariff of the Parkes Government is obviously imposed for revenue 
purposes only; but it is not a freetrade tariff. It is a sim­
plified tariff, and its simplicity .... constitutes its only
3 0genuine claim to acceptance”. W.H.Traill put the issue in 
correct perspective when he compared protectionist Melbourne 
and freetrade Sydney, and concluded that "the difference in 
the amount collected for Customs at the two places was so 
sllo^f &s to be almost immaterial as bearing upon the influence 
of the political systems prevailing at the two places”. Zf0Dur- 
ing the passage of the tariff, Parkes himself admitted that 
”Je have never pretended to give to this tariff of ours the 
character of a purely free-trade tariff. We know that in 
their incidence some of the duties are protective”, a situat­
ion hich, he went on to claim, "we are prepared, as soon as 
v/e possibly can, to rectify As long as Parkes remained
Premier oi Hew Soui,h Wales, however, nothing was ever done to 
dlter the tariif, despite a number of embarrassing reminders,
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constant pressure, and further pledges to do so. Thomas 
Waddell exposed the farce by declaring the Parkes ministry's 
"policy was neither free trade nor protection. It was ab­
surd to say ... [there] was a distinct issue of free trade
upand protection before the country".
Perhaps the most embarrassing reminder of the non-
freetrade nature of the 'freetrade' tariff was the campaign
mounted in 1889 against the retention of 'protective' duties
on butter, bacon, cheese and kerosene. T.H.Hassall referred
to "the anomaly of a free-trade Ministry" taxing such comm-
43odities; T.C.O'Mara claimed chat "so far from elevating the 
flag of free trade", Parkes and his ministry "had betrayed the 
cause" ;^and J.P.Abbott maintained that "Kerosene was protect­
ed here, and so were butter, bacon, and cheese, and yet those
u 5who advocated those duties called themselves freetraders"A" 
Even a freetrade correspondent was forced to admit that "the 
advocacy of our cause has been greatly weakened through allow­
ing a number of protective duties to disfigure our tariff".L° 
The climax of the campaign came on 2 April 1889 when, in a
successful attempt to embarrass Parkes's new Colonial Treas-
47urer, W. McMillan, the leading protectionist, J.P.Abbott, 
moved that the government"bring in a Bill to remove the duties 
now imposed upon bacon, butter, cheese, and kerosene imported
I o
into the Colony". +°As Abbott pointed out, "If we are to have
free-trade at all, then let us have free-trade, pure and
simple. Do the free-traders of this country imagine for one
moment that they are to govern the country by taking revenue
49from what must be protective duties?" The success of this
motion put McMillan in the awkward position of being forced to
pledge that the ministry would endeavour to make its tariff a 
50free-trade one, a pledge that was never honoured. The free- 
trade correspondent, therefore, could justifiably conclude:
"'We have been constantly taunted by the protectionists that 
we preached one doctrine and practised another, and there is
51no doubt we have laid ourselves open to this reproach, ...".
The basic lack of doctrinaire concern among many prot­
ectionists was amply demonstrated by the fact that the man who
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declared in April IBS? that "I shall not be a free-trader to-
spday, and a protectionist to-morrow"," 'was, five months later,
ISelected leader of the protectionist party. ""'On the strength of
his 1886 advocacy of ad valorem duties as a means of raising
revenue, Dibbs was deemed fit to represent the views of the
majority of the protectionists. The majority view of 'prot-
ection* as an increased customs tariff to raise revenue
hardly coincided with the doctrinaire view of protection as
"import duties which either exclude foreign commodities of
particular kinds, or so raise their selling price as to give
515an advantage to local producers of like articles". This fact
was recognised by Dibbs*s 1891 Colonial Treasurer, John See,
when he stated: "a truly protective measure would, not give us
revenue. We know that perfectly well." See went on to equate
his ministry’s revenue-raising policy with "the principle of
protection", only "because our friends opposite have called
56it by that name". He thus reaffirmed Parkes’s hollow criteria, 
of 1886 as the basis of ’protectionist’ belief among the maj­
ority of his colleagues.
That the consideration of revenue formed the basis of 
protectionist belief among most protectionist MsLA, was clearly- 
revealed by an altercation among the protectionists in the 
Assembly during October 189’0. Outlining his fiscal views, 
O.O.Dangar stated that, since "it was imperative that revenue 
should be obtained, ... I would use the Custorns-house as a 
financial channel for collecting further revenue, ...’’. By 
way of explaining his retirement from the protectionist party, 
Dangar claimed that his ’theory’ was "not one to which the pro­
tectionist party are prepared to nail their colours", whereupon
Henry Copeland irritably retorted, "It is exactly what the
57protectionist party are advocating!". In confirmation of Cope­
land’s retort, Dibbs's revised tariff of l892^bore limited 
resemblance to protectionist theory, but increased the incid­
ence of indirect taxation through the customs, in order to 
reap revenue to wipe off a deficit and sustain a high level of 
expenditure. The new tariff, effective from December 1891? 
greatly increased the number of articles subject to specific 
duties, and imposed ad valorem duties of 10% on common articles
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and 15% on a range of luxuries. Successful in raising the
total customs revenue to almost £3 million in 1892 '’the
tariff soon after lost its effectiveness to the point v/here
only £2,400,000 was collected in 1893? and £2,349?000 in
I899.°°The practical difference, therefore, between freetrade
and protection, as applied in New South Wales between 188? and
611892, was slight; both were designed to raise revenue. " The 
term that more accurately described them both was "revenue 
tar if fism" .
The Maitland Mercury neatly exposed the depths of 
the fiscal controversy after 1886 when it stated that "Elect­
ors should ... remember that the issue to be raised is not 
between freetrade ana protection as rival theories. It is
between free trade and protection as a present means of re-
63plenishing the revenue chest". In purely fiscal and economic 
terms, Parkes never intended the issue to have any greater sig­
nificance than this. But if Parkes was not motivated by 
principle, neither was George Dibbs. As P.N.Lamb points out:
"To political observers throughout Dibit’s turbulent political 
life, there was never any question of his accepting the doc­
trine of protection. Like Parkes, he was an opportunist 
highly skilled in exploiting doctrines for political ends". 
Dibte’s political ends in 188? were no more idealistic than a 
simple desire for power.
Dibbs realised that Parkes's unmistakable leadership of
the freetrade party destroyed his own chances of achieving
65power and influence as a freetrader. He further recognised 
that, unless closely identified with, or preferably in charge 
of, the opposition,. his way to power was barred. This aware­
ness was reinforced by two episodes in Dibbs's political car­
eer shortly before his 'conversion' to protection. In March
1887? Dibbs contested the Speakership of the Assembly against
66J.H.Young, and was defeated 63/49* As J.H.Young himself later 
commented: "... he [Dibbs] had great hopes that he would be in­
cluded in a freetrade Government, and when he was put up to 
oppose him (Mr Young) for the Speakership and was defeated he
knew that he had no hopes of office from the freetraders ...".
6
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During 1889 > B.R.Wise related how "five weeks before Mr Dibbs
turned protectionist he asked every new member of the Assembly
if he would join him in forming a free-trade party to turn
Parkes out of office", and it was only when "every member of
the House refused" that he turned protectionist. As Wise
concluded, "If some of the members had hastened to Mr Dibbs's
blandishments and sacrificed themselves he would have been a
68freetrader at this moment". Leadership of the protectionist
opposition was the only way to political power for Dibbs.
George Reid shrewdly observed that "the front Opposition bench"
was a "highly attractive place for ambitious politicians, ...
69[but] they could only get there by becoming converted". As 
a result, fiscal conversion became "a symptom peculiar to the
HA
times".( ;Dibbs1s blatant exploitation of, and complete lack of 
doctrinaire concern for, protection was amply revealed in Feb­
ruary 1889. In order to prolong the life of his minority min­
istry, Dibbs expressed his willingness to abandon "the proposal
to change the fiscal policy" so as "to receive support from
71members generally . . ." .
As far as Parkes and Dibbs were concerned, then, the 
fiscal struggle simply represented the 'old game' of power- 
based faction politics in a new, but more stable, form.
Parkes's intention in raising the fiscal issue was not to des­
troy, but rather to rejuvenate and stabilise, a political sys­
tem, which had as its basis an unqualified and unprincipled 
quest for power. Explaining his reasons for refusing to con­
test the election of 1889} S.W.Moore described the election as 
"a battle ostensibly between two great rival policies, though 
in reality between two political parties ... the real issue 
is 'which party shall rule'; whether Dibbs and Co. or whether
Parkes and Co. shall be entrusted with the reins of Government
72.... It is party first, and whatever you like next". Writ­
ing in 1890, Sir Charles Dilke assented to Moore's description 
of the unprincipled factional power struggle when he approv­
ingly referred to the Bulletin's efforts "to get rid of what 
it calls the 'rival syndicates', which it continually asserts 
are 'played out' - the syndicates being Sir Henry Parkes and 
his friends, and Mr Dibbs and his friends". ^
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To Parkes, Dibbs and many of the survivors of the
faction system, the fiscal issue was seen as little more than
the basis of a re-orientation and rejuvenation of a system of
7 dpersonalised, power politics. To them, the fiscal issue rep­
resented little more than a means of resuscitating a political 
system, to which they were accustomed and committed, and which 
had appeared, at the end of 1887? to be in the process of dis­
integration. The fiscal issue as a controversy involving pol­
itical philosophy, principled debate and specific social and 
economic overtones had little relevance for them; they therefore 
envisaged little real change in the substance of politics.
Other men attracted to politics in 1887? however, saw the matter 
in a different light. The raising of the fiscal issue in 1886 
to supreme political importance enticed new men to enter the 
political arena, men whose concern for fiscal doctrine per se 
was very real. In general, such men either had economic inter­
ests that would be seriously threatened or vastly enhanced by 
a policy of freetrade or protection, or were men of real polit­
ical principle to whom freetrade or protection was an integral, 
component of an overall political philosophy, which they now 
viewed as capable of practical achievement. It was these men 
who were responsible for the substantive changes that took 
place in politics after 1886.
Despite the lack of reality of the fiscal issue as a 
principled source of party division, there was in both parties 
a significant number of men who did regard the fiscal issue as 
more than simply a means of providing political stability or 
achieving power. Such men were genuinely concerned either about 
the economic implications or the theoretical basis of the pract­
ical application of their chosen fiscal doctrine. V/ithin the 
freetrade party, these genuine fiscal concerns became evident, 
but their presence in no sense created a consensus about the 
principles of freetrade. Rather, what resulted was a deep con­
flict within the party over the specific meaning and application 
of the doctrine.
Traditional freetrade policy in New South Wales was
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based on a customs tariff, which favoured the merchant and 
commercial classes. The absence of protection to colonial ind­
ustries meant that the infant colony depended on the import 
trade. On many necessary items of import, however, there were 
imposed customs duties of an incidence low enough not to afford 
protection, but high enough to form the basis of state taxat­
ion, by providing vast sums of revenue, contributed equally by 
all colonial consumers, rich or poor. Under this system, as 
W.H.Traill pointed out, the "magnate of the mercantile class” 
and the "great capitalist" had achieved their affluence, and 
"it was natural that they should repulse with apprehension
any proposition to alter conditions which had worked so well
75for them". It was for this reason that a number of Sydney’s
prominent merchants decided to enter political life early in
1887. DIn reply to J0P.Abbott 's taunt that "he never sought
a seat in Parliament until the business he was engaged in was
7 1-7affected by taxation", '"William McMillan, prominent Sydney
78 79merchant, ex-president of the SCC and member of the FTA, was
forced to "confess honestly" that "one of the principal reasons
which led me to come forward at the last general election was
that an attempt was being made to alter the whole commercial
and fiscal system of the colony, and because I believed that
upon the free-trade system, which had been in vogue more or
less up to that time, depended the future prosperity of the
80colony". McMillan was here referring to his fear of protect­
ion; during the next five years, however, he and his merchant 
colleagues were given an even greater cause for apprehension 
by the desire on the part of some members of his own party 
to alter the colony's 'fiscal system'.
The freetrade policy enacted by Parkes during 1887 
served well the interests of Sydney's wealthy merchant class. 
Opposed to the fettering of trade by prohibitive import duties 
(a fact which ad valorem duties seemed to introduce), they 
nevertheless regarded freetrade as compatible with the impos­
ition of some import duties, particularly on common or necess­
ary items, in order to raise substantial revenue, and to do 
away with the necessity forimposing fresh taxation, namely
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8idirect income and property taxation»' One such imported comm­
odity, whose customs taxation met with general merchant approv­
al , was tea* In 1889? McMillan described the duty on tea as 
"a freetrade duty*’, and defended it on the grounds that it 
nmay very reasonably be used as a tax on the working man for
O  Q
his protection . ‘"The merchants quite openly expressed their
support of ’revenue’ tariffism'. Just prior to his election to
parliament in 1887, McMillan defended the traditional freetrade
tariff, by explaining that it was "not scientifically a free-
trade tariff", because "things which were considered best for
raising revenue were put upon the list". In altering the tariff,
he concluded, "it would not be a question of anything but simply
8 8revenue with him"«.'"' William Clarke, who had large commercial 
interests, also supported the system of taxation through the 
customs. He represented popular commercial and merchant opin­
ion when he told his constituents that "whatever duties were 
imposed would be imposed for revenue purposes only. Their pol-
g/icy was distinctly free trade".
The members of the colony's wealthy commercial class, 
which included a significant number of freetrade MsLA between 
1887 and 1892,^both benefited from and staunchly upheld this 
traditional freetrade policy of indirect customs taxation. As 
a result, they fiercely resisted any proposals to alter it. In 
particular, they emphatically repudiated the elimination of in­
direct customs taxation and its replacement by a system of dir-
86ect taxation on land, property or income, a substitution that 
scientific freetrade doctrine envisaged. Not really pushed to 
state its true opinions about direct taxation until its imm­
inent imposition in 1894, Sydney’s merchant community then ex­
pressed its preference for 'revenue tariffism’ in no uncertain 
terms. This preference was so deep-seated, in fact, that many 
'freetrade' merchants expressed a preference for Dibbs's 'pro­
tectionist' revenue tariff rather than for direct taxation: 
"Hence it comes to pass that the repeal of even an oppressive 
and iniquitous tariff may be regarded with misgivings by a
commercial community whose sympathies are mainly with free-8 /trade". This attitude was even more clearly expressed in 1895
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when another survey of merchant opinion concluded that, "As to 
the question of the land and income taxes, there are many in 
commercial circles who do not thoroughly approve of the prop­
osals as they stand at present.... The idea of having an in­
come tax receives but very little support from the majority of 
the merchants. They would prefer the reimposition of the dutyo q
on tea,0"'from which, a sum could be derived much in excess
89of the amount that the income tax was expected to yield".
Parkes’s own traditional freetrade views were in acc­
ordance with the vested-interest ’revenue tariffisra' of the
merchants; revenue from the customs, or indirect taxation,
90formed the basis of his freetrade beliefs. Income taxation
91was anathema to Parkes, and he showed equal reticence about
9 2the introduction of a land tax.y ParkesTs revised 1887 tariff 
gave clear evidence of the revenue considerations that were 
basic to his view of freetrade. Furthermore, the reactions 
to the tariff by members of the freetrade party clearly re­
vealed the fundamental division of opinion about freetrade 
within the party. The revised 1887 tariff reduced the number 
of items to be taxed, by abolishing the duty on the import of, 
amongst other things, galvanised iron manufactures, a number 
of timber manufactures, biscuits, varnish and oil paints.
High specific import duties, however, were retained on the 
raw materials used in the manufacture of all these articles. 
This was obviously a measure designed to appeal to merchants 
and importers, rather than colonial manufacturers. The merch­
ants ana traders, however, whilst undoubtedly delighted at the 
trading prospects of such a tariff, expressed concern at the 
amount of revenue that the tariff would yield. In a letter 
to Parkes in May l8873 the FTA, dominated by merchants,"''" 
pointed out the inevitable decrease in the revenue that would 
be collected from the customs by allowing manufactured artic­
les in free. In the knowledge that the volume of their trad­
ing business could scarcely be affected, the FTA merchants 
suggested that, in addition to taxing raw materials, the gov­
ernment also impose "equivalent duties" on manufactured items 
"until the time arrives when the revenue will ... permit of the 
abolition of the more important duties named." Signed by the
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secretary of the FTA and prominent member of the SCC, Edward 
Pulsford, the letter purported to have received ’’the approval
Q hof the president and council of this association”.
Parkes’s 1887 tariff, however, gave no joy whatever 
to the group of doctrinaire freetraders within the party; they 
were strongly of the opinion that ’freetrade’ meant the admiss­
ion of all articles of import into the colony without duty, and 
that ’revenue tariffism’ was simply incompatible with freedom 
of trade. While the merchant freetraders advocated indirect 
taxation, as in the duty on tea, in preference to direct tax­
ation, the doctrinaire freetraders held the opposite opinion. 
Their most consistent spokesman, B.R.Wise, expressed this view 
when he urged Parkes to grant ”a concession ... to the general 
taxpayer by reducing the tax on some general article of con­
sumption, like tea”, and by ’’calling upon all classes to pay 
some form of direct tax”. Clearly, then, Parkes’s 1887 revenue 
tariff was, to men like Wise, totally incompatible with free- 
trade. Wise, in fact, stated that many of its items were ’’direct
hindrances to trade, and unjustifiable upon any fiscal princ- 
96iple”.'/ Elaborating on the inequitable nature of the tariff in 
taxing the import of raw materials and not manufactured goods, 
Wise disagreed with most of his colleagues in the FTA by maint­
aining that the ’’true remedy” was not to tax manufactured goods
97as well, but rather ”to admit raw materials free from duty”.
The view that, by taxing the import of raw materials, 
the freetrade tariff was inconsistent and contained ’anomalies’
was strongly held by a small, but vocal, group of freetrade
98 99MsLA. Their determination to remove the tariff’s ’anomalies’'y
was demonstrated on 9 April 1889 when James Tonkin, an advanced
freetrader, moved for the abolition of the duties on the import
of timber. Although the motion was decisively defeated 60/6,
several freetraders displayed their disillusionment with Parkes’s
tariff by supporting it.^^At the FTLA conference in August 1889?
a resolution calling for ’’the admission of raw material free of
duty” and ’’the removal of all other [tariff ] anomalies" was
unanimously c a r r i e d . D e s p i t e  these expressions of
dissatisfaction, Parkes and the merchants remained unmoved.
As B.R.Wise stated some years later, "...the freetrade party,
which came into power in 1887, never introduced a really free-
trade tariff, ... the Colonial Treasurer never moved for the
102abolition of the anomalies which then existed".
Despite Loveday and Martin’s criticism of Edmund
108Burke’s definition of a 'party', Martin has elsewhere con­
firmed the necessity for unity within a parliamentary group 
before that group can be justifiably termed 'a party'; the 
parliamentary group must be "united by a desire to promote a10 Llpolitical principle, or set of principles". Certainly all 
the members of the parliamentary freetrade group after 1886 
were united by a desire to promote the principle of freetrade, 
but it was in the attempt to elucidate what was meant by ’the 
principle of freetrade' that fundamental differences and dis­
unity arose. Furthermore, the conflict over the meaning and 
application of freetrade was simply one aspect of a more pro­
found and fundamental conflict among the members of the free- 
trade group. If the motive' of the wealthy commercial free­
traders in upholding 'revenue tariffism' was the retention of 
what, for them, was an advantageous economic system, that of 
the doctrinaire freetraders in opposing the 'anomalous' 
duties was expressed by P.H.Morton when he claimed that "Most
of these duties bore heavily upon the class least able to
105bear them - the working class". What formed the real basis for 
conflict within the freetrade party was not freetrade doctrine 
per se, but a developing social and political conflict between 
labour and capital, between radical and conservative. Until 
the appearance of sophisticated socialist theory and militant 
political labour organisations to challenge assumed traditions 
and champion the rights of 'the common man', the conflict be­
tween labour and capital was largely waged within the intell­
ectual and philosophical bounds of nineteenth-century British 
liberalism. In Britain, the conflict erupted within the Lib­
eral party in the early 1880s, and the antipathy between ad­
vanced or radical liberals and conservative laissez-faire lib­
erals within the freetrade party in New South Wales between 
1887 and 1894 represents the colonial version of the same
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conflict. It was this conflict, which, at least until 1894? 
kept the freetrade party deeply divided on a wide range of 
social, economic and political issues, prevented the formulation 
of a relevant and constructive ’party' policy, and inhibited the 
achievement of even basic principled unity so essential in a 
true political party.
II
Writing in 1900, Alfred Deakin maintained that "With 
us [in N.S.W.] the British tradition that a Liberal is necess­
arily a Free Trader still obtains, ^^Certainly Parkes
constantly referred to the indissoluble tie between freetrade 
107and liberalism, and the link was further emphasised early
in 1889 when B.R.Wise "first adopted the distinctive epithet
108’Liberal’ for the Freetrade party”.~ 0Although his idea was
109met with ridicule and a certain amount of opposition from 
within the freetrade party, ' Liberal1 came to share with 
’Freetrade' a prominent place in the title of the party and 
its organisations.
The chief factor which led Wide to adopt the title
’Liberal' for the freetrade party was his concern for other
issues outside the bounds of the purely fiscal theory of free-
trade, issues which he felt were being neglected and ignored
by most politicians. Wise expressed his frustration with the
existing situation when he complained to Parkes in August
1888 about the continued obsession, to the exclusion of all
else, with the narrow "tin-kettle controversy between Protect-
111ion & Free Trade”. In a speech less than a month later, he 
was rather more explicit when he claimed that "while this 
wretched controversy between Protection and Free Trade occ­
upies public attention, the difficulty is to obtain consid-
112eration for any measure of reform”. His stated aim was to 
involve the freetrade party in "other important questions
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besides those relating to commerce",' ^ "and his desire to 
alter the party’s name to ‘the Liberal party’ was one way of 
achieving that aim. The significance attached by Wise to the 
party’s title was expressed by another prominent freetrader, 
Bruce Smith, when he stated that ”a political party-title .,. 
should, before all things, signify, with some degree of clear­
ness, the certain fixed principles, however general they may be, 
by which those who embrace that faith intend to be guided in 
pronouncing judgment upon any public question”.^ 14The party's 
change of title to ’the Liberal party’ would not only autom­
atically broaden the scope of the party’s political concerns,
but would express the basic principles determining the free-
115trade party's ’’action .. . upon other important questions” 
and. its ”judgment upon any public question” .
As a doctrinaire liberal himself, Smith gave his op­
inion that Wise's ’’determination to couple with the subject of
Free Trade ... the much broader one of Liberalism” was ”an
13 7undeniably wise course”. It was, however, in the very agree­
ment of Wise and Smith that the free trade party should openly 
espouse the broader principles of liberalism, that fundamental 
conflict emerged; for between the two men there existed an 
irreconcilable division of opinion over just what those prin­
ciples of liberalism were. After 1887, this conflict slowly 
engulfed the entire free trade party and kept it divided on al­
most every major political issue at least until 1894* Nowhere 
is the basis of this fundamental conflict more clearly expound­
ed than in the copious writings and speeches of the two major 
protagonists, B.R.Wise and Arthur Bruce Smith.
The conflict was not of colonial origin. Its origins 
were clearly in the 'developments within the British Liberal 
Party in the years after December 1868, when Gladstone formed 
his first ministry. The London Times outlined the conflict 
when it declared that, long after Gladstone entered parliam­
ent, ’’one of the chief notes of instructed Liberalism was the 
dogma that the best government is that which interferes least 
with social affairs. The grandeur of the principle, that the 
free play of individual character is the surest guarantee for
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the well-being of the nation, was then unquestioned, ,„,,
Now, it is hardly too much to say that every liberal measure, 
of any consequence, involves, directly or indirectly, a neg-] i paticn of that principle”. " "The chief spokesman for the new 
trend in British liberalism was the Birmingham manufacturer, 
Joseph Chamberlain, who believed that MIt belongs to the auth­
ority and duty of the State ... to protect the weak, and to 
provide for the poor; to redress the inequalities of our social
condition, [and] to alleviate the harsh conditions of the
]i Qstruggle for existence, . o.u.
To Bruce Smith, such views were the work of dangerous
radicals.“'- In so claiming, however, Smith paid particular
attention to the long tradition of radical thought within the
Liberal party, drawing a sharp distinction between the ’old
Radicalism’ of the laissez-faire Manchester school of Richard
Cobden and John Bright, and the ’’New Radicalism” of the Birm- 
121ingham school. Whilst Smith contended that there was ’’little
122difference” between the 'old Radicals' and true liberals,
he maintained that the new school of radical thought "can have
123little in common with true Liberalism”. What Smith particularly 
regarded with horror was best expressed in the words of 
Chamberlain's Radical Programme, which advocated "the inter­
vention of the State on behalf of the weak against the strong, 
in the interests of labour against capital, of want and suffer-
1 pi
ing against luxury and ease”. ‘ f To Smith, such views were
“j r- -| p £ )
"synonymous with socialism”-"'^ and despotism.
Smith regarded the individual as the cornerstone of 
127society, and he viewed with abhorrence any interference with 
the free play of the individual in social, political and econ­
omic matters. The basic task of Smith's liberalism was the re­
moval of all man-made obstacles, which prevent all men having 
equal opportunities,“ °though he was quick to point out that 
such a task did not imply making all men equal, for the bestow­
al of equal opportunities was not synonymous with "uniformity
129of wealth, or an equality in social conditions;...”. Smith 
held that "Men will always be unequal in wealth, [and] in
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social position, . . „ , so long as they are born with different
abilities, among different surroundings, and with different
1 30constitutions and susceptibilities’'. Given such social real­
ities, all liberalism could, do, he maintained, was "to secure 
to every man 'equal opportunities' for the exercise of what­
ever faculties he may possess", allowing the spoils to go to
131the ablest and the fittest. Any attempt to create "a more
extended equality, such as equality of wealth, or of social
conditions, would involve a departure from true Liberalism,
inasmuch as it would at once have the effect of rendering the
132opportunities unequal". To Smith, the Liberal doctrine was
one which "encourages individual man, inasmuch as it offers
an incentive to self-help, and discountenances all forms of
compulsory aid, calculated to perpetuate the unfittest at the
133expense of the fittest".  ^ Attempts to redress social injustices 
"must flow from humanitarian springs, and not from the iron 
hand of an act of parliament", since the latter simply amounts 
to "legislative encroachments upon the incentives to progress134in the more fortunate of our fellow citizens, .
Although Smith claimed that his individualist laissez-
faire views represented true Liberalism, there were those who
disagreed. Writing in 1900, Alfred Deakin claimed that "A
Colonial Liberal is one who favours State interference with
liberty and industry at the pleasure and in the interest of
the majority, while those who stand for the free play of ind-
135ividual choice and energy are classed as Conservatives".
B.R.Wise was one of those who challenged the view that liberty 
is best served by a minimum of state interference. Basing his 
view of liberalism on the ideas of such thinkers as T.H.Green 
and Arnold Toynbee, '/^Wise denied the view that the state had 
no authority or obligations in the spheres of economic, polit­
ical and social life. In fact, Wise actively favoured "the 
right of the state to interfere to create better conditions of 
social justice and economic equality within the capitalist sys-
137tern". To Wise, the existing social and economic inequalities 
were largely the result of the Industrial Revolution, during 
which the labourer lost his liberty, being "seldom, if ever, in
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a position to make terms as to the price at which he shall
"I 7  O
sell his labour", >^0and thereby compelled to accept whatever
139terms were offered in order to avoid starvation. To correct 
this injustice, Wise favoured the intervention of the state 
"to place the competitors in the industrial strife more 
nearly on a footing of equality", ~+ and "to establish a real 
state of freedom, in which the stronger party to the bargain 
could not take advantage of the other's weakness". He was, 
therefore, also an ardent advocate of trade unionism and a 
severe critic of the principle of 'freedom of contract', so 
venerated by the individualist liberals.' '
Wise believed that the major goal of liberalism was
the creation of conditions of social, economic and political
equality throughout the community, and he saw legislative
action as an important means in the achievement of this goal.
As a result, he urged the passage by parliament of a long list
143of liberal social reforms. These included measures such as 
payment of MsLA, equality in the electoral system and an elec­
tive Legislative Council, all of which were designed to secure 
direct working class participation in politics. In addition, 
he advocated measures to define and safeguard the rights and
welfare of labour, such as a compulsory eight-hour working day,
144unemployment relief, factory legislation and a minimum wage, ‘H 
and measures designed to bring about a more equitable dist­
ribution of wealth.
It was measures such as these which Bruce Smith called 
on liberals to resist "in defence of 'individual liberty' and 
'freedom from restraint'", and it was this conflict which 
split the freetrade party, almost from its inception, into two 
irreconcilable camps. Many freetraders agreed with Smith that 
the measures advocated by Wise violated the sacrosanct philos­
ophy of laissez-faire liberalism. J.F.Burns expressed his 
agreement with the philosophy of laissez-faire in his view that 
"the greatest good for the largest number would at all times be
best accomulished by leaving every individual unfettered by
146State restrictions ...". William McMillan gave practical
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point to this view in his advocacy of the principle that "no 
government has a right to do anything which can be done by 
the people themselves". 4 '"To men like McMillan, the doctrine 
of freedom of trade was indissolubly tied to the philosophy 
of unfettered individual freedom and "the principle of non- 
restriction by government". 4°When, therefore, the freetrade 
Minister of Mines, Sydney Smith, in 1891 included a compulsory 
eight-hour working day clause in a proposed coal mines bill, 
McMillan was led to protest: "What right has any one to legis­
late to tell me, or any other man in the country that I shall
9work for eight hours a day and no more?" The conflict, en­
gendered by Smith's action and aggravated by the Labor Party,
was directly responsible for the resignation of the ministry
180less than a week later on 19 October 1891* "
Although the conflict within the freetrade party had as 
its basis the debate over the philosophical principles of lib­
eralism, it really amounted to a conflict between a radical and 
a conservative view of politics. William McMillan aptly defined
his standpoint when he confessed to "a conservative instinct",
151in the sense of being "distrustful of innovations". Men like 
McMillan and Bruce Smith had virtually become defenders of the 
status quo, because, to them, "In many respects the condition 
of things towards which a Liberal policy is always approximat- 
ing ... [had] been already reached". They were, therefore, 
distrustful of the "reformers", who are "ever eager for some­
thing new, and who do not wait to consider that any change may
prove to be for the worse instead of the better; that it may, in
153fact, be a reform but not an improvement". W.H.Traill aptly 
described their political outlook when he stated: "They could be 
nothing else than Conservative, since to them change meant154risk". On a wide Tange of social, economic and political issues, 
then, the freetrade party was split into what were basically rad­
ical and conservative 'caves'. Some of the more prominent of 
the conservatives or conservative liberals were, apart from 
Bruce Smith and McMillan, J.F.Burns, J.F.Cullen, J.H.Young,
T.Garrett and A.J.Gould. Among the radicals or advanced liberals,
the more prominent were, in addition to Wise, A.Allen, F.Farnell,
155J.C.Seaver, Charles Garland, J.H.Carruthers and Sydney Smith.
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During 188? and 1888, the radical and conservative 
groups within the freetrade party gradually crystallised and 
took shape; the conflict between them first erupted at the 
end of 1888, and was thereafter an ever-present threat to 
the party's paper-thin nominal fiscal cohesion. Until Oct­
ober 1891j however, the result of the clashes that took place 
was always the same: a successful conservative resistance tc 
increasingly outspoken radical pressure for social reform.
The man primarily responsible for inhibiting the progress of 
the radicals within the party, and for maintaining the illus­
ion of party unity was the freetrade leader, Sir Henry Parkes. 
Before examining Parkes's role in successfully resisting rad­
ical pressure within the freetrade party prior to 1891, how­
ever, it is important to understand the nature and urgency of 
conservatism's defensive role, both in the colony in general, 
and in the freetrade party in particular, after 1887.
In 1871, the TLC was founded as a central organisation
1^6to further the industrial aims of the colony's trade unions.'"''"''
157After an unfortunate early experience in the political arena, ^
the TLC concentrated solely "on the consolidation of the ind-
158ustrial base of the labour movement". It assumed a leading
role in the advocacy of such industrial reforms as an eight- 
159hour day, workers1 compensation, and reform of the conditions
160for work in factories and workshops. Although concerned direct­
ly with solely industrial matters, the policies and activities 
of the TLC had far wider implications. The TLC's advocacy of 
radical reform had the effect of awakening public awareness of 
the need for changes in the colony's social and economic system, 
and of increasing the pressure on parliament to effect those 
changes. In particular, the advocacy of industrial reforms was 
undermining the hallowed doctrine of laissez-faire and upholding 
the advanced liberal conception of the powers and duties of the 
state. Although the practical political aims of B.R.Wise and 
the TLC were basically identical, Wise believed that the Council's 
political philosophy lacked one basic- ingredient: a commitment 
to the doctrine of freetrade. Wise's belief that a nation's 
resources and wealth should be so controlled by the state that 
all its citizens have the best conditions, and sufficient
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material support for a secure life was complemented by his
belief that a nation could achieve the highest accumulation
1 6 2of wealth for this purpose by a policy of freetrade.' It 
was on the basis of this view that, in 1885 > Wise had att­
empted to win the support of organised labour for freetrade, 
and its developing political organisation. In August 1885 5 
he delivered a lecture to the TLG on the benefits of trade 
u n i o n i s m , f o r  which he was preferred thanks by the Council. L 
Wise followed up this initial success by suggesting that two 
TLC delegates should assist in the impending formation of the 
FTA,lo^but this suggestion was firmly re jec ted. l USvise, however, 
did not give up, and, in September, he again wrote to the TLC 
asking it to name "two or more working men" willing to become 
members of the FTA.~L 'Although his second overture again ach- 
ieved no immediate results," °it appears that the support of 
several individual TLC delegates was forthcoming during 1886,
and during that year successful efforts were made to increase
169TLC representation on the FTA council.
This success, it must be emphasised, was very limited, 
and the TLC delegates who joined the FTA in no way reflected
1 nr\
the general opinion of the TLC. ' The real significance of 
Wise’s overtures to the TLC was the way in which they demon­
strated his perception of the opportunity created by the pol­
itical prominence of the fiscal issue for the forces of rad­
ical change to enter forcibly into politics; and, even if 
organised labour ignored the lead given them by Wise, other 
men of similar radical persuasion did not. They, like Wise, 
linked the economic doctrine of freetrade with a positive, 
radical aijproach to the social, political and economic problems 
of the colony, and were attracted to fiscal politics by the 
apparent promise of ‘radical reform. That such radicals and 
advanced liberals were, in fact, inspired by the fiscal issue
to enter politics was demonstrated by their ever-increasing
171representation in the Legislative Assembly after 1886. To 
the conservative laissez-faire liberals, however, this trend 
spelt danger. The social and economic system, which their 
own interests and instincts led them to uphold, seemed to be 
threatened with demolition. They, therefore, saw their role
as defending that which they revered.
Ironically enough, if the elevation of the fiscal 
issue into supreme political prominence helped to accentuate 
the pressure for social change, it also provided the means 
whereby the conservatives were successfully able to resist that 
change. It is at this point that attention must again be foc­
ussed on Parkes, for during the five years to the end of 1891 
it was he, as leader of the parliamentary free trade party and 
Premier of the colony, who posed the major obstacle to the ach­
ievement of radical liberal reform. Despite his reformist con­
cern for the instability of the political system, Parkes, as a 
man of principle, belonged well and truly to the 'old school' 
of conservative Gladstonian liberalism. As a reviewer of his 
autobiography wrote in 1893j "Dir Henry Parkes, like Mr Glad­
stone, is clearly a Conservative by birth. His first impulse
172is to resist change, and refuse to consider it". George Reid
wrote that Parkes "had evolved from Radicalism of the Chartist
175type to Liberalism of a broad but rather conservative type", 
a statement which Parkes himself qualified by denying that he 
had ever had any connection with Chartism.^^+Parkes defined a 
liberal as "a man who seeks to leave the subject free to do 
the best he can for himself, free to work out his own individual175destiny, free from all fetters, free from all regulatory laws", 
and on this individualist basis he opposed such measures as
"I n r -I nn
payment of MsLA,- "unemployment reliei‘1 and a compulsory eight- 
hour working day. ' °Parkes, too, like the other freetraders of 
similar liberal convictions, abhorred any partisan 'class' app­
roach to politics; he would have agreed with McMillan, who des­
cribed the proposal for a compulsory eight-hour day as "the
thin edge of the wedge of a class of legislation leading dir-
179ectly to communism and socialism".
It is with Parkes's political conservatism in mind 
that the composition of his two ministries after 1886 should 
be considered. Formed prior to the 1887 general election, and 
therefore prior to the development of any ideological tension 
within the party, Parkes's first ministry reflected, above all 
else, the process of factional amalgamation and Parkes's desire
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for fiscal conformity and ministerial stability."1"'1 For this 
reason, the ministry appeared very much a faction ministry, 
full of seasoned campaigners and with a rather confused doc­
trinal appearance, ranging from the laissez-faire views of 
J.F. Burns to the progressive views of Francis Abigail. " ^ J‘At 
the same time, however,the ministry did appear fundamentally 
conservative, largely because of the presence within it of 
four men with definite merchant and commercial associations.
In accordance with his insistence on fiscal conformity, Parkes 
naturally turned to the freetrade bodies outside parliament,
and together the FTA and the SCC provided him with four of his 
5 ’ l82ministerial colleagues. u nevertheless, actual doctrinal con­
siderations played a minimal role at this stage, both in 
Parkes's practical objectives and in the creation of his min- 
istry. The basic qualities which Parkes sought, demanded'
and achieved, were those of personal loyalty, and subservience
1 Rito his own directions and opinions."
The first vacancy in the ministry occurred in May 1887
when, as the result of a personal feud with Parkes over a vac-
185ant judgeship, V/.J. Foster resigned as Attorney-General. "'The
fact that Parkes appointed the radical, B.R.Wise, to replace
him can be explained by the need to fill the post with "a man-1 qg
of principle ... with a good legal mind", "’ wise's undoubted
attachment to freetrade, 'and the close personal relation-1 qq
ship between the two men." wise remained in the ministry,
189however, for less than a year, and was replaced as Attorney-
General by an inexperienced member of the Legislative Council,
G.B.Simpson. Simpson's appointment suggests that it may have
been the dearth of 'good legal minds' amongst the ministerial
freetraders in the Assembly that led Parkes to appoint a man
with so little experience, and of such radical views, as B.R.
Wise to the ministry. The only other addition to Parkes's
first freetrade ministry was J.N.Brunker, who was appointed
Secretary for Lands in August 1888. A man of moderate politic 
190al views, Brunker was a politician of the 'old school'. A
191devoted Parkes supporter since the early 1860s, Brunker owed 
his success in the cut-and-thrust of faction politics to his 
rather uncritical personal loyalty and unimpeachable character
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qualities which were sufficient to earn him a place in the min­
istry. Parkes later described Brunker as "a man who by his
personal conduct and general bearing through a long life, had
192secured the respect and confidence of all classes,
It was during the events that led to the fall of Parkes's 
1887-89 ministry that the first real eruption of the developing 
ideological conflict within the freetrade party occurred. The 
result was the resignation of the 1887-89 ministry, and the 
creation of a situation in which Parkes, the traditional con­
servative, saw the need to strengthen the party's parliamentary 
leadership with men of a rather more doctrinaire conservatism, 
in order to defend an increasingly threatened view of govern­
ment and political philosophy. The events of January and Feb-
198ruary 1889 also revealed that, contrary to other opinions,
Parkes was in no sense losing his influence over the majority 
of the freetrade party, but was in fact indispensable to the 
continued success of the party's conservative majority in re­
sisting radical pressure for change.
In January 1889? B.R.Wise directly referred to the in­
ternal party conflict, which brought about the fall of Parkes's 
ministry, when he pointed to the "differences such as those,
for instance, which have divided the party on two occasions
194lately - ...". The first of these occasions was in December 
1888 and concerned Parkes's proposal to transfer the administ­
ration of Sydney's tramways from the government to private en- 
199terprise. The division on the proposals resulted in their de-
196feat, twenty-two freetraders crossing the floor to vote with
the opposition. This was the first of two occasions in which
197the ministry was "defeated by its own party", and, although
it had been distinctly intimated that the tramway proposals
198would not be treated as a "party question", close analysis
shows that the division was used to demonstrate a hardening of
radical opinion against Parkes and the ministry. Of the eight-
190een recognisable radicals within the party at the time, 
twelve took part in the division, v/ith nine voting against the 
government. ‘“^ O n  9 January 1889? a fresh attack was launched
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against Parkes. Led by his factional freeti-ade opponent,
J.H.Want, a motion of adjournment was moved in order to raise
the matter of the government's appointment of a new Commissioner 20]for Railways. 'The division on the motion again resulted in
20?defeat for the government.' '‘"Al though the House was sadly dep­
leted, the division list again provides evidence of a radical 
rebellion.” Although only eight radicals took part in the div­
ision, six of them voted with the opposition.20/+0f the eleven 
freetraders who voted against the government,20^six were rad­
icals and three were factional opponents of Parkes, two of 
whom shortly afterwards experienced protectionist ‘conversions'.20^
In consequence of this defeat, the ministry resigned."'0' 
William McMillan later described the defeat of 9 January as a 
vote against Parkes, rather than against "the broad policy of
o q Q
the Government". From the point of view of the rebellious 
radicals, the vote was most certainly directed at Parkes him­
self, but in being so, it was also a vote in direct criticism 
of the government's policy. Whilst Jonathan Seaver accused 
Parkes of betraying the cause of freetrade,202S.W.Moore plainly 
stated that his vote was intended to force the ministry from 
office. He expressed general radical disillusionment with the 
government when he stated: "I could not support the Government -
for there are other things to consider besides free-trade and
210protection - ...". Moore felt so strongly that he declined to 
contest the general election later that month, refusing "to 
help to bring back into power the party that ... [he had] helped 
to turn out". His objections certainly wrent beyond a mere per­
sonal criticism of Parkes when he declared, "Freetrade, forsooth! 
Free-broken-promises, ..., free-shirking-of-the-financial-diff­
iculty, ... free-staving-of f-of-useful-legislation, free-failure".21 
Implicit in the radicals' rebellion was a refusal to be tied 
hand and foot to the directions and expectations of Parkes.
John Haynes, for instance, desagreed with the observation that 
"the House meant Parkes and a number of ciphers", and claimed
it may shortly be discovered that "the ciphers are the masters
212of him and his party". It is important to note, however, that
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not all the freetrade radicals adopted this antagonistic att­
itude towards Parkes, and a number of them voted with the min-
P 1 -2
is try in both divisions.“
A].though it was the radical freetraders who led the 
rebellion against Parkes, conservative freetraders outside the 
ministry, and in particular their doctrinaire spokesman, William 
McMillan, staunchly supported h i m . ‘The close ties that exist­
ed between Parkes and the conservatives were shortly to be re­
vealed even more clearly. After Parkes tendered his resignation 
on 10 January, George Dibbs was commissioned by the Governor to 
form a ministry. On 16 January, the outgoing Treasurer,
J.F.Burns, moved on behalf of the defeated ministry the custom­
ary bill granting supply to the new ministry to cover the per-
21biod of ministerial elections. William McMillan then rose to 
move an amendment opposing the granting of supply and recommend­
ing that the Governor be informed of the "dangers to the public
interest" arising from the exercise of authority by a ministry
216commanding only minority support in the Assembly. With Parkes
and his ministry opposing it, and the majority of freetraders
217supporting it, the amendment was narrowly carried." Loveday 
and Martin have represented this vote as a test between prin­
ciple and personality, concluding that it "gave notice that prin­
ciple, and not attachment to a leader, was the real cement of 
the freetrade party". °In the sense that many freetraders were 
not prepared blindly and uncritically to follow Parkes in a 
course of action that he felt constitutionally bound to follow, 
the assessment is undoubtedly true; but to conclude that the
vote demonstrated that the party, and particularly the conserv-
219ative bloc within it, had discarded Parkes as its leader is
less convincing. Despite Parkes1s expressions of irritation
and wounded pride at the lack of total personal trust and attach- 
220ment, he knew, as McMillan pointed out, that the vote was not
221a personal censure. The freetrade opposition to Parkes on 
16 January was in no way analagous to the opposition to him as 
expressed in the votes of 13 December and 9 January.
The point at issue on 16 January was simply whether 
traditional constitutional courtesy was more demanding of party
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support than logical, common-sense political action, B.R.
Wise pointed out the constitutional obligations encumbent upon
the ministry, declaring that "it would have been impossible ...
for the Ministry to have acted otherwise”, for the "simple
constitutional reason" that they had "resigned their trusts"
22pto the new protectionist ministry. ~ On the other hand, the
political reality of the situation was expressed by McMillan’s
determination that "a government representing a minority in
this country will not be allowed to carry on in the face of 
225majority . . . " . A  vote supporting this view was not necess­
arily a vote aimed at Parkes, but was a vote that simply up­
held the basic concept of responsible parliamentary government. 
As a result, McMillan could fairly claim that "the position 
which the free-trade party occupies to-night is that of a com­
pact and integral party", ^ ^ f  or any freetrader, radical, con­
servative or otherwise, not bound by traditional constitutional 
propriety, was unlikely to have voted his majority party immed­
iately into opposition without a fight.
To conclude that the vote of 16 January demonstrated
that "no faction in the old sense now survived at Parkes'
225back" is reasonable; it would not be reasonable, however, 
to maintain that the party had now no further need of its 
leader. Rather than severing the party from Parkes, the vote, 
which virtually ensured the freetraders a speedy return to 
power, served only to tighten the bond between him and the 
majority of freetraders. Ironically, the basic reason for the 
strengthened ties was the very fact that, for a large proport­
ion of freetraders, personal loyalty was no longer the most 
powerful force dictating political allegiance. This fact no 
doubt aided the success of McMillan’s amendment, but it had 
also created a situation in which the freetrade party, rather
2) o
than being 'strong and u n i t e d w a s  in reality splintered 
and divided. The one factor that could operate to paper over 
the cracks was the continued leadership of Parkes. After 
February 1889» it was Parkes's experience and influence as 
leader that provided the only bond between the splintered sect­
ions of the freetrade party; most of the diverse groups within 
the party either respected, or needed, Parkes's charisma and
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influence to such an extent that his continued presence as
227leader served to maintain at least nominal unity. Although 
the rebellious radicals of December and January felt little 
love for. or need of, Parkes, their opposition was offset by 
the loyalty of other radicals, like Wise and Carruthers, whose 
regard for Parkes led Wise to express the hope that he would
o o Qcontinue to lead the freetrade party.r"'~cWithin the party, there
was also a group of men still personally devoted to Parkes,
and their opinion was expressed by James Inglis when he told
Parkes that "The country and the party still look to you as
229leader - and I am now as ever your leal henchman". It was, 
however, by the conservatives of the party that Parkes was most 
needed. His command of support and his strong leadership com­
bined with his basic conservatism to provide the electoral and 
parliamentary basis for a freetrade government, and the con­
tinuation of a conservative approach to the tasks of govern­
ment. Parkes’s indispensibility to the party in general, and 
the majority conservatives in particular, was demonstrated 
shortly after the general election of February 1889»
On 19 February, Parkes informed William McMillan of
his decision "not to seek nor accept the position of Leader-
230ship in the new Parliament". " On the same day, McMillan,
spokesman of the doctrinaire conservatives, replied, stating
that he had taken it for granted that Parkes would continue
as leader, and "most earnestly" asking him to re-consider his 
23]decision. Parkes, however, replied on 21 February that he had
232not changed his mind. In his first letter,Parkes spoke of the
necessity of "acquainting our political friends" with his 
233decision, and, when McMillan declared that "I must consider
2 3 ^4your communication as private", Parkes again urged him to
23 3inform their colleagues. In June 1891» Parkes stated that
236his decision had not been revealed by McMillan. It would
237thus appear that, when the meeting of fifty freetrade MsLA,
p7 O
under the chairmanship of McMillan,^ got under way on 22 Feb­
ruary at 2 .3 0 pm, ^ 9 oniy McMillan was aware of the decision 
which could have led to Parkes’s political retirement. The 
first business raised, presumably by the chairman, was the
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PZi_oquestion of party leadership. Parkes did not attend the
early part of the meeting during which, he must have assumed,
the leadership discussion would take place, but when he arriv-
243ed at "about 4 pm", 'he found that he had been unanimously
p / .  ■/>re-elected leader.1' 1 It is, then, not unreasonable to assume 
that Parkes's decision to retire as leader was at no stage re­
vealed by McMillan to the meeting, for the simple reason that 
Parkes may have been taken at his word. There would then have 
followed the election of a new leader, less able than Parkes 
to provide security to conservative interests, and less able 
to maintain enough party unity to preserve freetrade as the 
governing party. In November 1891» Parkes’s decision to resign 
the leadership of the party was made public and he was replaced; 
in February 1889» McMillan probably let it be assumed that 
Parkes would continue as leader, thereby averting the possib­
ility of any leadership challenge and leadership change.
Whatever the reasons for Parkes ’s stated intention to 
retire as leader, the fact remains that most freetraders, part­
icularly McMillan and the conservatives, saw the need for him 
to remain at the helm, and it is difficult to agree that "Parkes 
came back on the party's and not his o wn terms".“^Parkes's in­
dispensability was again emphasised after the defeat of the 
Dibbs ministry in the new parliament. Asked on 6 March by the 
Governor to form a new ministry, Parkes postponed his assent, 
and that evening spoke to McMillan, suggesting that the Governor 
be advised "to send either for him or some other member of the 
Free Trade party". McMillan, however, again "urged that there 
was no one who could take my place", and consequently Parkes 
accepted the commission.
Apart from Parkes, the figure that loomed largest in the 
affairs of the freetrade party between January and March 1889 
v/as William McMillan. Although McMillan was undoubtedly more 
devoted to the principles of conservative liberalism than to 
the person of Parkes, he also realised that the successful def­
ence of his principles depended heavily on the continuance of 
Parkes as the colony's dominant and most influential political 
figure. The affinity that existed between the political
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philosophies of the two men was evident, and this resulted in
r:
the development of a close relationship between them.'" '' All 
that upset their rapport was ParkesTs decision to grant Dibbs 
supply, a decision that obviously struck McMillan as an unn­
ecessary sacrifice of a freetrade government for the sake of 
mere constitutional propriety. It was for this reason that 
McMillan led forty freetraders in their rejection of Parkes ’s
■—) I S'
motion to grant Dibbs the necessary supply." :oIn order to sec­
ure the continuance of freetrade government, McMillan led the
p / n
party to declare its independence of Parkes. ""r 'Aware that the 
consequences of his action may have led to a commission to form 
a freetrade ministry, McMillan, in the absence of Parkes, real­
ised he must be prepared to shoulder the responsibility.
Edmund Barton later revealed that he had been told the actual 
composition of McMillan’s projected ministry, f°should the 
latter have been commissioned by the Governor; as it turned out, 
however, he was not.
Although McMillan’s action has been seen as that of a 
249power-seeker,- it is as likely that he was simply acting in
accordance with principle at a time when he maintained that
25 oParkes had deserted it. ' McMillan’s action, however, was in 
no way specifically aimed at displacing or overthrowing Parkes. 
To McMillan, a freetrade ministry not headed by Parkes was 
less desirable than one that was, and once the crisis was re­
solved, not by the commission of a freetrade ministry but by 
the dissolution of parliament, McMillan swiftly sought to re­
establish Parkes as party leader. To McMillan and the conserv­
atives, Parkes was too valuable an asset to lose in their de­
fensive fight against aggressive radicalism; to any perceptive 
political realist, Parkes’s great influence in the maintenance
of nominal party unity was undeniable. Accordingly, McMillan
251tendered his 'apologies' to Parkes, and it was probably
McMillan who was responsible for Parkes's active participation
in the party’s organising efforts during the general election
that was the‘consequence of the crisis. Requested by McMillan252to aid the party’s electoral activities, Parkes became an
active member cf the parliamentary party’s election executive
253under McMillan’s chairmanship, and he also publicly supported
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McMillan’s personal campaign in East Sydney 254
The election over, it seems to have been McMillan 
who engineered Parkes's smooth and speedy return to party 
leadership, and in doing so showed himself to be a loyal and 
trustworthy ally of the veteran leader. Parkes's offer on 
6 March to McMillan of the commission to form a freetrade gov­
ernment was probably a final test of his loyalty and ambition. 
McMillan, however, had too much to lose from Parkes's retire­
ment to accept; but his obvious influence in the party, his 
conservative liberalism, and his doctrinaire approach to pol­
itics made him the idea.1 candidate for Parkes's deputy at a 
time when principled and doctrinal concerns in politics were 
becoming increasingly conspicuous. For this reason it was not
P Rnsurprising that Parkes appointed him as his Colonial Treasurer.'
The composition of his second freetrade ministry would
suggest that five basic factors determined Parkes’s choices: the
extent to which members of his previous ministry had been dis-
256credited by involvement in public scandals; the degree to 
which ’old time* faction loyalty was being replaced within the 
party as the basis of allegiance by a concern for political 
principle; the increasing pressure being brought to bear by 
progressive radicals on a traditional conservative liberal view 
of government; the degree to which the majority conservatives 
looked to him to defend conservative liberalism; and, finally, 
the need for the ministry to provide a basis for at least formal 
unity betv/een the rival groups within the party. The task was, 
therefore, difficult, but Parkes's final choices conformed well 
to the determining factors. First, he discarded all his previous 
discredited ministerial colleagues, with the exception of J.N. 
Brunker whose untainted reputation fitted him to remain in the 
ministry as the representative of Parkes’s faction supporters.
The claims of the radicals for ministerial representation were 
taken seriously by Parkes in view of their increasingly vocif­
erous and numerical presence, and the need to foster party unity. 
He, therefore, appointed three of their number, two of whom, 
however, had loyally supported him during the radical rebellion
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PR 7which led to the fall of his first free trade ministry.'''
For the remainder of the ministry, he turned to the freetrade 
conservatives. In addition to himself, the conservative rep­
resentation included A.J.Gould, William McMillan, Bruce Smith, 
and, when a vacancy occurred in 1891? J.H,Young. Of particular 
importance was Parkes*s inclusion of the younger men, McMillan 
and Bruce Smith, both doctrinaire spokesmen of conservative 
liberalism. Smith’s mammoth treatise in defence of laissez- 
faire liberalism, Liberty and Liberalism, had been published 
in 1887 during a break in his parliamentary career, but immed­
iately on his return to the Assembly in February 1889? he was 
pushed straight into the cabinet for his first experience of 
ministerial life. By the appointment of a majority of conserv­
atives and personal supporters, Parkes demonstrated his symp­
athy for a conservative liberal philosophy of government, and 
prepared the ground for its continued defence and justification 
against radical pressure.
CHAPTER 3
FACTIONS AND FRICTIONS, PRINCIPLES AND 
PROGRAMMES, 1887-1891.
II The Parliamentary Freetraders
(continued).
"To promise, pause, prepare, postpone, 
And end by leaving things alone:
In short, to draw the people’s pay 
By doing nothing day by day“.
B.R.Wise.
(SMH, 16 January 189^? p.6).
The traditional conservative liberalism of Parkes and 
many of his followers and ministerial colleagues largely dic­
tated the limits of the freetrade governments' legislative 
actions, and the nature of the freetrade party's policies and 
programmes after 1886. The manner in which Parkes's philos­
ophical ideals determined his practical approach to politics 
was clearly revealed in his view of the role and function of 
government in society. Not only did Parkes adhere to a laissez- 
faire abhorrence of state interference, but also to the tradit­
ional liberal concern for 'the welfare of the whole community', 
as opposed to class or sectional interests.^" This led to a view 
of government which emphasised non-interference and mere admin­
istrative duties, and which ’was well described by Parkes when 
he stated that "the government that exists is best doing its 
duty when it is confined as much as practicable to sustaining
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the administration of justice, preserving peace, carrying out 
necessary public work, ...; and the less it does outside these 
confines the better, not only for the freedom and. independence, 
but also for the true national happiness of the people”. This 
reluctance to become involved in matters outside the orbit of 
mere administration precluded the formulation and exposition 
of a detailed free trade party policy, which came to terms with, 
and sought to solve, the pressing social ,and economic problems 
facing colonial society in general, and its underprivileged 
sections in particular. In addition, the nature of Parkes's 
practical reformist objectives in 1886 - the creation of two 
permanent, stable and cohesive parliamentary groups - also led 
him to exclude from political consideration all major issues 
that could inhibit or prevent the achievement of his reformist 
ambitions.
Parkes was not only compared by others to the great 
British Liberal leader, William Gladstone, "'but he also made 
the comparison himself,^and in putting into operation his 
scheme of practical political reform in 1886-87, he adhered 
closely to the political tactics previously used by Gladstone 
to polarise English politics and create cohesion in his own 
Liberal party. In his electoral campaigns, Gladstone manip­
ulated 'the new theory' of principled politics by 'inventing', 
when none were readily to hand, principled conflicts on which 
to achieve both a clear political polarisation and electoral 
popularity. In so doing, he has been described as "the first 
to create 'issues' for electioneering debate", and he himself 
came to regard his "capacity for providing them" as "a gift 
from Providence", although it has also been characterised as 
cynical opportunism.0 Employing the same approach in 1886-87, 
Parkes 'invented' the fiscal issue, raised it to the utmost 
political prominence, and rode to a sweeping electoral victory 
on the back of liberal freetrade; in the process he also crea­
ted a political polarisation that endured until after 1900.
Such an approach, while providing liberal electoral 
success, did not, however, provide or constitute a liberal 
policy or programme. In fact, Gladstone, as a traditional
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conservative liberal, shunned the notion of a full-scale party 
platform that would dictate the future course and direction of 
liberal policy. In 1885? he argued that a profession of opin­
ion "in the Liberal sense” on just one or two issues supplied7ua ground broad enough to start a Government, He was
also aware of the danger of Liberal party disunity that might
result from raising ''questions on which its members might not o
be agreed", and he therefore excluded such issues from his 
electoral programme. In moulding together his own freetrade 
parliamentary party, Parkes emulated Gladstone's approach.
In addition to his own conservative dislike of pro­
grammes, Parkes realised that he must not jeopardise freetrade 
unity by raising questions outside the fiscal issue, on which 
his freetrade supporters were sure to have divergent opinions.
J.A.Ryan has pointed out that the 1887 election affords an 
excellent example of "Parkes' mastery of the game of politics",
in dictating that the election would be fought "almost solely
9on the emotion deriving from the fiscal issue". He successfully 
submerged such pertinent issues as assisted immigration, the 
eight-hour working day, and payment of members, ^ and the 'ex­
traneous subjects' he did mention were left singularly vague and 
undefined. The Herald pointed to the fact that "the land quest­
ion, the local government question, and others of almost equal 
importance" were "not very definitely treated by the Premier, 
either in his printed address or in his platform utterances,
. ,."."*"^ The paper also declared that the same could be said of
the financial question, the most pressing problem facing the 
12colony. Although eloquent on the blessings of freetrade and 
the promised repeal of ad valorem duties, Parkes gave no de­
tails about his practical proposals for raising revenue and 
reducing the deficit. He still referred to revenue from the
customs, '^claimed that "we shall seek ... to get the largest
14amount of revenue from the land that we can justly obtain," 
and stated that, "if resort must be had to any new form of 
taxation, ... v/e shall seek to devise a comprehensiv^ and 
equitably-arranged system of property taxation beyond
such equivocal statements he would net go. He expressly 
told one audience that "Any explanation of the principles upon
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'which they would try to deal with ... [the] great [financial]
problem, he could not then give”, adding that "the first full
Idexposition of their plan" would be given to parliament.
Parkes*s treatment of the property tax was particularly irr­
itating; one candidate declared that "it was put forward in
1 7an exceedingly vague way",' 'and another, a strong freetrader,
stated that, "the exact nature of that tax not having been
disclosed, it was not competent for any candidate to speak
18very clearly upon that issue*'.' JParkes’s approach to policy 
enunciation, then, was one that equivocated, avoided, or was 
impossibly vague about, those issues which offended the trad­
itional laissez-faire view of government, or which threatened 
free trade party unity.
Parkes 's emulation of Gladstone's political tactics and 
the identical nature of their conservative liberal outlook were 
largely responsible for the remarkable similarity that existed 
between the internal history of Gladstone’s Liberal party be­
tween 1880 and 1885, and that of Parkes 's freetrade party be­
tween 1887 and 1891. In the same way as Gladstone's very lim­
ited i860 election programme pleased the conservatives in his 
party, Parkes's identical approach in 1887 admirably suited 
those freetrade conservative liberals who saw their task as re­
sisting change and defending a laissez-faire status quo. Such 
men were forthright in their support of Parkes's view that 
fiscal cohesion should not be jeopardised by the intrusion of 
other issues, and they fought for the exclusion from political 
consideration of questions that threatened the success of 
their conservative defence. William McMillan told his con­
stituents in 1889 that the parliament elected in 1887 "was sent 
in entirely to review the fiscal policy of the country", and 
"consequently, when 'this great fiscal question was under dis­
cussion, any man who attempted to split up his party, or set 
up side issues, would be recreant to the interests of the 
country".^
Shortly after taking office in i860, the Gladstone
government's conservatism and lack of a specific policy became 
20obvious, and there developed within the party a conflict between
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the conservatives and the radicals; the latter had a definite
21policy and wanted it implemented/“^ Within the governing free- 
trade party, the same lack of policy was gradually revealed 
after 188?, and, in their desire for social change, the doctrin­
aire freetrade radicals were frustrated at every turn by the 
continued dominance of the fiscal issue. As long as the fis­
cal issue remained in the forefront of politics, other matters 
of vital importance to radical reformers could simply be ig­
nored. It was in this sense that B.R.Wise saw the fiscal con­
troversy as a barrier to the consideration of "any measure of 
reform”, and he neatly summarised the conservatives' tactics 
when he stated that "I have often thought that one reason why 
the opponents of reform lend their support to this controversy
is that they have adopted a device, ...of diverting public att-
22ention from pressing evils by raising a false cry". It was 
against this resistance to the promotion of a positive policy 
and detailed party programme that came to terms with the econ­
omic, social and political development of the colony, that the 
freetrade radicals directed their attack; what naturally re­
sulted was conflict. During 1887 and 1888, radical tactics 
ranged from the hostile antagonism and rebelliousness of Jon­
athan Seaver and Alfred Allen, to the reasonable and rational 
attempts of B.R.Wise to convert the conservative opposition. 
During 1889? the radicals changed their tactics, but always the 
result was the same, and always for the same reason. Wise summ­
ed up the unchanging situation when he told J.H.Carruthers:
"Unfortunately I fear that the Tory element on our own side has
23got the ear of the party at present;
The conflict within the party between advanced liberal­
ism and defensive conservatism, and the inevitable conservative 
victory are clearly revealed in the history and fate of the rad­
ical demand for the imposition of direct taxation in place of 
burdensome indirect taxation. Direct taxation, especially land 
and income taxation, was the kernel of Wise's radical liberal­
ism, and he viewed it as a basic social reform which would tax 
the accumulation of wealth, and free the poor from the unfair
burden of indirect taxation, which they shared equally with the29rich under the system of customs duties. In 1893? Wise recalled
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?5that he had advocated a land tax since 1384»"' and he went on
to claim that "no small part of the advance in favour of Land
Tax doctrines is due to my exertions . . . , in the face of much
opposition, to make the Land Tax an essential portion of a
Free-trade policy”/' Certainly Wise viewed his task within
the party as "connecting Freetrade indissolubly with a dem-p nocratic p o l i c y a n d , in striving to do so, he did meet with 
much opposition; but, as he himself remarked, "the land tax 
provided just the battle ground that was required to separatepOthe democrats and the reactionaries".“
Most of Wise's radical colleagues have left evidence 
of their strong support for direct land taxation, support 
which, in several cases, even extended to a belief in Henry 
George's radical notion of ’the single tax', a system by 
which all public revenue would be raised by a single tax upon
p°the value of land. R.W.Thompson expounded the more usual rad­
ical opinion on taxation when, calling himself "a democratic 
radical", he claimed that land taxation was "one of three tax­
es which should be imposed in every democratic country", the 
other two being "a property-tax and an income-tax".-^Charles 
Garland outlined the basis of the radicals' demand for a land 
tax when he stated that "those who grab the land, and who lock
it up while it increases in value by public expenditure, should
31be made to pay something towards the cost of government".-
Most freetrade radicals spoke out in support of land taxation
32as an integral part of a wider system of direct taxation, and
a number also expressed their support by an active membership
of, or association with, organisations devoted to the cause of 
33land taxation.
The advocacy of direct taxation necessarily supposed 
hostility to indirect taxation, and it is therefore not sur­
prising to find a number of the radical land taxers among 
those previously noted as objecting to the ’anomalies' in 
Parkes's 1887 freetrade tariff."^Similarly, those noted earl-
35ier as upholders of ’revenue tariffism’ certainly disliked 
the prospect cf direct taxation. They feared the replacement 
of a system of taxation in which all classes equally shared
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the tax burden regardless of ability to do so, with one that 
placed the tax burden on each class according to its means and 
ability to bear it. It was a vision of the government "putting 
its hand into the pockets of one class to help another class’*
7 Cthat aroused fear.' Among the freetraders, it was naturally the 
wealthy commercial and mercantile class that had most to lose 
from the imposition of direct taxation, and that, consequently, 
gave its support to indirect taxation. By and large, it was 
these same men, as representatives of capital rather than lab­
our, and employer rather than employee, who also opposed the 
radicals' urgings for active state interference in social and 
industrial relations. In the ssme way as they invoked the 
tenets of classical laissez-faire liberalism to substantiate 
their objections to the state regulation of labour conditions, 
one of their number, J.F.Burns, claimed that it was quite out­
side the province of government to impose direct taxation un-
37less it was absolutely necessary." The relationship between 
economic self-interest and political philosophy was close in 
most of the conservative freetraders and, although men like 
Bruce Smith and McMillan displayed a high-minded concern for 
liberal doctrine, A.W.Martin has pointed to the fact that "men 
are long moulded by their circumstances", and the degree to
~Z O
which "economic interest reinforced political principle".''
To appeal to a predominantly working-class and increas­
ingly politically-aware electorate on a definite plank of con­
tinued indirect taxation through the customs was to court elec­
toral disaster. It was for this reason alone that, although 
Parkes and at least three other members of his 1887 ministry
opposed direct taxation and looked to revenue tariffism to
3Qsolve the financial crisis, the bait of direct property tax
40was offered.' Speakihg in April 1889? Jonathan Seaver claimed 
that "Direct taxation is what every free-trade government has 
advocated on the hustings; but as soon as they got back into 
the House some influence has been brought to bear on them which 
has prevented them" from carrying out their pledge.^As far as 
Parkes's freetrade ministries were concerned, very little 
pressure not to impose direct taxation was required; their 
intention was clearly to remove the necessity for direct
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taxation by ensuring a high enough revenue return from in­
direct taxation.‘“'""On 30 March 18873 Burns outlined the min­
istry's proposed new tariff, the sole purpose of which was to 
collect enough revenue to render direct taxation unnecessary/1' 
The reality of this purpose was indicated two years later, when 
J.Seaver referred to those freetraders who "tell us that we do 
not want direct taxation, because there is sufficient revenue
I 11
provided by the present tariff".
The 1887 tariff reflected not only the fact of conser­
vative freetrade opposition to direct taxation, but also the 
economic interests of that opposition. As previously pointed 
out, the tariff greatly favoured the interests of the colony's 
importers and merchants,"r^ and the opposition was not slow in 
discerning merchant influence on the government. Thomas Walker 
pointed to the presence of merchant defenders "on the Govern­
ment benches",4°whilst George Dibbs extended the argument and 
claimed that "this country at this moment is being governed
by a highly respectable class of merchants, known as the 'Soft 
47goods party'". Ninian Melville described the tariff as one
"concocted in some merchant’s parlour on a Sunday afternoon,
or in the Chamber of Commerce"by merchants who, "finding that
they had a government whom they can squeeze to their heart's
content, drew up a tariff containing proposals to suit them-
48selves". ' It was, however, the failure to impose direct tax­
ation that earned Parkes the most criticism, not only because 
wealthy interests were favoured by the continuation of indirect 
taxation, but also because of the failure to honour his 'pledge' 
at the 1887 election. In answering this charge, Parkes reveal­
ed the conservative tactics of vagueness, postponement, avoid­
ance and hypocrisy that were to characterise his ministries' 
attitude zo direct taxation for the following four and a half 
years; the continued success of resistance to direct taxation 
clearly demonstrates the unbroken dominance of conservative 
elements within the party in general, and the ministries in 
particular, until the end of 1891» Parkes began by denying 
that he had made any pledge to introduce direct taxation, and
he reminded the Assembly of the exact words he had used: "If
50resort must be had to any new form of taxation,
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Furthermore, he continued, "it is rather too much to expect
us to devise ... a well considered scheme of taxation" in
the short span of the ministry’s existence and "amidst all the
other arduous and difficult duties thrown upon us"; nevertheless,
51he concluded, "if our life is prolonged we shall do it".
Despite obvious disappointment, the freetrade radicals
accepted Parkes's explanation. B.R.Wise accepted the fact that
the machinery for direct taxation could not be erected quickly,
but expressed the hope that "when the next budget is introduced
5? -a property-tax will be introduced".'"Even Jonathan Seaver, acc­
epting Parkes’s explanation and pledge for the future, remained 
loyal to the ministry."'
The failure of the ministry's measures to deal effect­
ively with the financial crisis was revealed in Burns's finan­
cial statement in December 1887. His expected surplus had not
54materialised, and the deficit remained untoucned;" clearly a 
'new form of taxation' was required0 To maintain its radical 
support and its general credibility, the time had come for the 
ministry to propose the introduction of direct taxation. Dur­
ing the course of his financial statement, therefore, Burns 
announced the ministry's intention of introducing Land and
55Property Taxation Bills during the remainder of the session.'
The government's decision was probably influenced by Wise's
presence in the ministry at the time, and it would appear that
he played a significant role in the preparation of the legis-
lation. Between May and July 1888, the ministry presented the
two bills to parliament; their fate, however, leaves little
doubt that it had no intention of turning the legislation into 
57law. That the two bills were no more than a token gesture on 
the part of an unwilling conservative ministry to impose direct 
taxation was clearly revealed by the ministry's tactics in pres­
enting them to parliament, and by the ease with which it allow­
ed the legislation to pass into oblivion.
The first point to be noted is that the parliamentary 
session of 1837-88 was set for prorogation on 24 July 1888, 
and it is in view of this fact that the comment of George Dibbs
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on 6 June is of significance. In reference to the Land-tax 
Bill, Dibbs described the action of the ministry as ’’erratic*', 
and went on to "doubt ... whether the Government are in earn­
est in proceeding with it. If the Government had been sincere­
ly desirous of passing a land-tax, surely this would have been
v8one of the first measures which they would have submitted".
Despite the foreshadowing of direct taxation in December 1887,
its first appearance was on 3 May, when Burns asked the assent
of the Committee of Ways and Means to the introduction of a 
39Land-tax Bill." Although assent was granted and the bill was
read a first time on 3 May, 1 it was over a month before the
second reading debate and division took place. ,LA further five
weeks then elapsed before the bill was read a third time on
12 July, fonly six sitting days before the prorogation. The
ministry's procedure with the Property-tax Bill was even more
sluggish. First raised in the Committee of Ways and Means on
7 June,^the Committee's assent was delayed until 3 July.^f
63Read a second time on 5 July, the bill proceeded on 12 July
to the Committee stage where its further consideration was
66postponed, "and it became a victim of the timely prorogation. 
Clearly the ministry viewed the effluxion of time as a potent 
weapon in disposing of a bill they had introduced only as a 
sham measure to save face.
Further conservative opposition, both inside and out­
side the ministry, seems to have been instrumental in ensuring 
the failure of the bills. The second reading division on the 
Property-tax Bill separated the genuine direct taxers from
f  rn
the rest. General conservative dissatisfaction with the bill0'
led to many abstentions from participation in the division,
in which only twenty-seven freetraders cast their vote, eight
of those being the radicals Wise, Allen, Garland, Garrard,
68Haynes, Nobbs, Neild, and Woodward. Under consideration in
Committee, objections were made to several clauses, as a result
of which Burns readily agreed to postpone consideration of the
69bill, and it was never heard of again. Some years later,B.R. 
Wise pointed to the successful and devious conservative tac­
tic of "pretending to favour democratic measures in the Ass­
embly, and at the same time securing a most active opposition
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t o  them i n  t h e  C o u n c i l ,  . c * by s e n d i n g  them t o  t h a t  Chamber
a t  s u ch  a p e r i o d  c i  t h e  s e s s i o n  t h a t  t h e i r  f a i r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
7 r
. is  i m p o s s i b l e '5 * f ,L  though  D ibbs  haa de c l  a r e  a t h a t  t h e  two
ry  - |
b i l l s  55w i l l  be ig 'nGrain!ousl .y r e j e c t e d  by t h e  o t h e r  H o u s e " , 1'" 
t h e  m i n i s t r y  t o o k  no c h a n c e s ,  and th e  o n ly  b i l l  t o  r e a c h  t h e  
L e g i s l a t i v e  C o u n c i l  was s e n t  t h e r e  w i t h  o n ly  s i x  s i t t i n g  d a y s  
r e m a i n i n g  i n  t h e  s e s s i o n .  The m i n i s t r y ' s  shrewd t i m i n g  and th e  
. o i l ' s  aid t h e  L a n d - t a x  B i l l  i n t o
n p
o b l i v i o n , 1 ~
The m i n i s t r y  a p p e a r s  t o  have  been  more t h a n  c o n t e n t
t o  a c c e p t  t h e  L e g i s l a t i v e  C o u n c i l ’ s a c t i o n .  J o n a t h a n  S e a v e r
a g a i n  e x p o se d  t h e  f r a u d u l e n t  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  m i n i s t r y ' s  e s p o u s a l
o f  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n :  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  he c l a i m e d ,  " s a y  t h a t  th e y
b r o u g h t  fo r w a r d  a l a n d - t a x  b i l l ,  b u t  t h a t  i t  was d e f e a t e d  i n
t h e  C o u n c i l ,  and  t h a t  t h e y  c o u l d  do no m o re" .  B u t ,  a s  S e a v e r
c o n t i n u e d ,  "They can  do m e r e " ,  and he c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  " I f  th e
G ove rnm en t ,  f a i l i n g  t o  g e t  a l a n d - t a x  b i l l  t h r o u g h  t h e  C o u n c i l ,
do n o t  a p p e a l  to  t h e  c o u n t r y  on th e  q u e s t i o n  t h e y  a r e  n o t  w or thy
7*5
o f  t h e  name o f  f r e e - t r a d e r s " .  No a p p e a l  t o  t h e  c o u n t r y ,  how­
e v e r ,  was made; no c o n f r o n t a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  C o u n c i l  t o o k  p l a c e ;  
and no t a x a t i o n  b i l l s  a p p e a r e d  a g a i n  i n  th e  Assembly  d u r i n g  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e s s i o n .  I n  f a c t ,  d u r i n g  t h a t  f o l l o w i n g  s e s s i o n ,  
t h e  T r e a s u r e r  r e v e r t e d  to  h i s  o r i g i n a l  a rg u m e n t  t h a t  " t h e r e
ry  I
was no n eed  f o r  any f u r t h e r  t a x a t i o n " “’The ’e f f o r t 5 had been  
made; t h e  r e s u l t  was n e v e r  i n  d o u b t ;  and th e  m i n i s t r y  w a s ’v i n ­
d i c a t e d  ’ .
The d i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  f r e e t r a d e  p a r t y  i n t o  t h o s e  who 
g e n u i n e l y  u p h e l d  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n  and t h o s e  
who opposed  i t  p r e s e n t s  few p r o b l e m s .  T r a d i t i o n a l  c o n s e r v a t i s m  
and economic  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  g e n e r a l l y  combined  t o  p ro d u c e  r e ­
j e c t i o n  o f  s u c h  a  r a d i c a l  p r o p o s a l ,  and t h o s e  who f a v o u r e d  a 
s y s t e m  o f  d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n  were u s u a l l y  a d v a n c e d  l i b e r a l s  or  
cham pions  o f  l a b o u r ,  who a l s o  a d v o c a t e d  su c h  p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y  
r e l a t e d  m e a s u r e s  a s  a  c o m p u l s o r y  e i g h t - h o u r  w ork in g  d a y ,  th e  
payment c f  MsLA, and t h e  r i g h t s  o f  t r a d e  u n i o n s .  One m a jo r  
e x c e p t i o n  t o  t h i s  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  d i v i s i o n  was W i l l i a m  McMil l­
an .  As a. man who em braced  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  l a i s s e z - f a i r e  l i b e r a l
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79philosophy and who used »'the word 'freedom* in its broadest
76and most comprehensive sense", McMillan opposed the eight-77hour working day legislation, payment of MsLA, an elective
n p rp q
Legislative Council,: Jundue activity by the government,' 'and
upheld 'freedom of contract5 in opposition to the demands of
gotrade unionism. As a man with wealthy commercial interests 
and associations, he resisted the rising influence of trade
O  "I
unionism, upheld continuing taxation of common consumer art-
3 2icles through the customs, ‘"and recognised that "there is no­
body in the House who suffers more materially than I do" from
O  -7
the imposition of direct taxation. ^At the same time, however, 
he claimed that "I am a staunch free-trader right to the core.
I do not allow my own interests to conflict with my free-trade 
principles". °"T
As a principled freetrader, McMillan recognised that 
direct taxation was an integral part of pure freetrade doc­
trine, and, as such, he advocated its imposition. In April 
1887j he declared his wholehearted support for a scheme of
p  c
direct taxation; v in June 1'888, referring to himself as "a 
radical", he upheld "the doing away altogether ... with in­
direct taxation", and stated that "I would go for direct
8 6taxation" as its replacement.1DIn November 1888, he called 
on the ministry to introduce and pass into law a measure of p rp
direct taxation, stating his own preference for an income tax. '
The apparent ambiguity in McMillan's attitude towards 
direct taxation was not confined to his public utterances. 
Between March 1889 and July 1891, McMillan was Colonial Treas­
urer in Parkes's second freetrade ministry. Despite his stated 
desire for the imposition of direct taxation and the removal of 
indirect taxation, and his pledge to make the tariff a 'pure 
and scientific freetrade' tariff, °nothing was done during the 
life of the ministry either to simplify the tariff or to impose 
direct taxation. If Loveday and Martin are correct in stating 
that "the core group in the new cabinet had been critics of the
1887-9 financial uolicies (especially on taxation and the tar-
89iff)",' and that Parkes "was fumbling to maintain his position
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among its new men" , " the introduction of a system of direct 
taxation should have been a foregone conclusion. If, however, 
Parkes retained a tight control over policy in the face of 
demands by his ministerial colleagues to introduce direct tax­
ation, internal cabinet dissension over policy would probably 
have resulted. This, however, does not appear to have event­
uated; of those ministers whose correspondence with Parkes
has survived, only J.H.Carruthers urged Parkes to "put a tax
91upon the unimproved value of land . .
It would seem, therefore, that, when it came to the 
point, the majority of the ministry did not favour direct 
taxation. Later, in justifying the failure of the ministry 
to institute direct taxation, McMillan employed the same ex­
planation, which his predecessor, J.F.Burns, had used in 1888 
to justify the shelving of direct taxation, and of which 
McMillan had, at the time, been highly critical. In November 
1888, McMillan had rebuked Burns for stating that "under the
present flourishing state of the finances there was no need for
92any further taxation"; yet, McMillan himself later explained 
that between 1889 and 1891 there had been no necessity to im­
pose direct taxation because the government had been assured
93of "a very fair and elastic revenue", revenue provided, of 
course, by the ’freetrade’ tariff. This argument, as Seaver 
revealed, was the classic conservative justification for 
shelving direct taxation. "Hon. gentlemen," he related, "... 
tell us that we do not want direct taxation, because there is 
sufficient revenue provided by the present tariff. I say we do 
not want the revenue provided by this tariff". Its duties, he 
went on, "lean on the lower classes more heavily than any 
other classes", and he reiterated the radical desire "to sub-
QLstitute for them direct taxation like a land-tax".' During
the last six months of the 1889-91 ministry’s life, land and
income tax billswere drafted, but they were never presented to
parliament, and they were intended only as emergency measures
when "certain indications were seen that a time of depression
99was likely to come upon this country"."'''
90
Fundamentally, then, McMillan’s attitude to direct
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taxation seems to have been one of ambivalence. Despite his
public utterances in support of taxation reform, he became
apprehensive and unwilling when it actually came to the point
of instituting such reform. In 1888, he expressed his dislikeorof the ministry’s property taxation legislation; between 1889 
and 1891, he tiid nothing to further the cause of direct tax­
ation: and, when Reid presented his Land and Income Tax Assess­
ment Bill to the Assembly in 1894, he again backed down, urging
97caution and postponement of the measure. There are two poss­
ible explanations for McMillan’s ambivalence. Birst, he gen­
uinely recognised the consistency of direct taxation with free- 
trade, but was also aware that it was men like himself who would 
most suffer from its introduction. When it came to the point, 
this conflict between principle and economic interest was re­
solved in favour of the latter. In 1894, he described Reid’s
taxation proposals as an ’’improper and ungenerous enactment
98against people who are trading in this country”.
The second explanation sees McMillan as the committed 
conservative, but also as a shrewd politician who was aware of 
the electoral implications of repudiating direct taxation.
Aware that ’’the large majority" of the votes that returned him to 
parliamert were cast by "the working population of the country", 
he publicly espoused direct taxation in 1887;''he again emph­
asised his ’radicalism’ a little over a year later. ^ ^In Nov­
ember 18885 he was clearly concerned about "the contingencies 
of future elections" when he called on the ministry to introd­
uce direct taxation, a system, he claimed, "which will make 
the freetrade cause in the country secure”.^ 'LJ.P.Garvan was 
quick to discern electoral motives in the speech of "one so
strongly imbued with a desire to keep the Government in their 
102place, Perhaps B.R.Wise came close to the truth about
McMillan's motives when he wrote, some years later, that "the 
most Conservative of politicians can achieve an easy reputation 
as a Radical by ... [supporting] democratic measures in the 
happy confidence that he can get his colleagues in the Legis­
lative Council to procure their summary rejection" ,-^ 3 Cr in 
the confidence that such measures would not even reach the 
Legislative Council.
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The ministry's 1888 sham taxation legislation and 
scarcely concealed efforts to ensure its failure did not de­
ceive the freetrade radicals, and this time they were not so 
easily fobbed off. It was, in fact, from about this time that 
radical opinion began to harden against the ministry, and that 
freetrade radicals cane increasingly to express their frustrat­
ion with the failure of the ministry to live up to radical ex­
pectations and to fulfil its 'pledges’. ’Referring to the prom­
ises and pledges given by Burns in his December 1887 financial 
statement, J.C.Neild declared the impossibility of finding that 
"any statement, promise or hope has been fulfilled".^ ' u L ‘'Jonath­
an Seaver revealed the radicals' decline from a belief that 
the coming of a freetrade government heralded real social re­
form and progress to bitter disenchantment when he stated: "I 
entered the House as a supporter of what I believed to be a 
thoroughly free-trade ministry - a ministry who would obtain 
most of their revenue from direct taxation....; but I am sorry 
to say that I begin to doubt the intention of the Government
105to carry out the measures to which they pledged themselves".
In particular, the radicals resented the conservative inactivity
of the government. F.J.Smith described the existing parliament
108as "a barren one so far as legislation is concerned",' and he
condemned the ministry for its "neglect ... to use the opport-
107unities at their command" to enact "beneficial legislation".
This radical reaction against the ministry's conserv­
atism came to a head in December 1888 during the consideration
of a ministerial proposal to lease Sydney's tramways from the1 og
government to private enterprise. This was clearly a proposal 
that involved a negation of the radicals' view of the respons­
ibility of the government in society, and was a practical ex­
ample of laissez-faire at work. In November 1888, McMillan 
had argued that "the tremendous aegis of the state overlooking
and overshadowing everything in this country" created a "dang-
109er to the future liberties of this country". By way of a rem­
edy, he had argued that the leasing of the tramway to private 
syndicates would "take off this load from the central govern­
ment of the country, which means corruption and danger to our
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] 3 0future liberties, It. was this view that the radicals
strongly resisted-,and, as previously discussed, their reb­
ellion against the ministry on the proposal was largely res-
i]2ponsibie for the fall of Parkes's first freetrade government.
Not all the freetrade raaicals, however, resorted to 
open rebellion to achieve their goals. B.R.Wise was one who 
adopted a different approach. Although he remained a defenderIP "Zof the government, '^Wise continued to urge direct taxation
litas being "absolutely necessary". 'Shortly after the prorog­
ation had sealed the fate of the direct taxation legislation, 
Wise wrote to Parkes confidentially in yet another attempt to 
convert the old conservative to the radical point of view.
Wise wrote of the "great importance to re-awaken the enthus­
iasm of the party which supports the Government, by a vigourous 
[sic] and comprehensive policy of financial reform". Anxious 
to "put an end for ever to the tin-kettle controversy between 
Protection and Free Trade", the one issue on which Parkes's 
vision of political stability depended, and which caused such 
comfort to the defensive conservatives and such frustration to 
the progressive radicals, Y/ise urged that in the next session 
the ministry should bring forward "A Land Tax, an Income Tax,
a Local Govt [sic] Bill ... and a bold alteration of the tar- 
11biff". No such moves, hov/ever, were made. By the time Parkes's 
second freetrade ministry had settled comfortably into the 
Treasury benches, the freetrade radicals had faced the unden­
iable truth. Seaver bitterly recounted the failure of the 
previous ministry to impose direct taxation, and he cynically 
predicted that "the present Ministry, notwithstanding ... 
[their] promises and pledges ..., have no intention of bring- 
ing in a scheme of .that kind either". ‘ °He was right.
Implicit in Wise's letter to Parkes was his desire 
that the individual measures he suggested should all form part 
of a comprehensive and positive party platform. After discuss­
ing the individual proposals, V/ise stated that, as a matter of
"even greater importance . . . , I ’would like to see the unity of
117these proposals plainly declared". His realisation by the
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end of 1388 of the extent to which the fiscal issue had been 
used by Parkes and the conservatives as a barrier, both to the 
consideration of more pressing and real issues and the formul­
ation of a comprehensive party programme, led him and seme of 
his radical colleagues to adopt a new tactic to convert and 
commit the party to a specific party programme. On 18 Jan­
uary 1889j a meeting of the free trade parliamentary party, at
119which thirty-two members were present, was held to prepare
for the forthcoming general election. At this meeting, "a
strong executive or working committee of nine” was formed to
120manage the party's electoral organisation. Comprising "sev-
] 2.1eral of the prominent freetr&de members1’, " "the executive was
not specifically named; it seems, however, to have certainly
122contained McMillan as chairman, ' Sydney Smith and S.Burdekin
as secretaries, ^Wise"^’1 and Parkes; “^its probable members
were G. H. Reid, 1 J. N. Brunker^'^and W. Clarke ,'^°and three other
129possibilities were J.H.Carruthers, F.J.Smith and F.Abigail.
One of the allotted tasks of the executive was ”to consider 
matters of policy in view of the general elec tion”,'^^and to
131frame ”a platform upon which the election will be contested”.
It was probably due to Parkes*s strong influence and the ever­
present possibility of creating division that nothing was done 
during the course of the campaign in this regard, and the elec­
tion was fought on the same lines as the 188? general election.
As the Maitland Mercury pointed out, ”The freetraders have not
pledged themselves in any way, except to maintain the principle
132of free trade in the fiscal policy of the country”.
After the election, on 18 February, however, it was de­
cided by the executive to extend freetrade organisation by the 
creation of a parliamentary executive or organising committee
that wrould form the basis of a "new association” to represent the
133party and manage its affairs. The new committee’s function was 
not just to be confined to management. The basis of Wise's desire 
for a comprehensive party programme was expressed in the election 
executive's declaration that "It is not intended ... to confine 
the operations of the committee to free trade and protect­
ion, but to prepare a broad, comprehensive, liberal platform - 
in fact, it is expected that this will be the first step
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towards cementing party government upon definite lines in the 
2 3Acolony". “At the time this decision was made, with the elect-
135:ions over, Parkes had probably retired from the executive, • 
and in his absence such a decision was not surprising. With­
in the executive's ranks were the freetrade radicals Wise,
F.J.Smith, Sydney Smith and Carruthers, all seeking a progress­
ive party programme. In addition, there was Francis Abigail
who, though a factional supporter of Parkes, was a man of pro­
p's ggressive views, and McMillan, whose philosophical concerns 
and sham radicalism may also have contributed to the decision.
The promoters of the "new association" were, therefore,
"a number of the freetrade members of Parliament, who thought 
the time had come for an active organisation embracing a complete 
political platform",^ ^ and, on 1 March, a "largely-attended" meet­
ing of "free trade members of the Assembly, free trade members 
of the last Parliament, and defeated free trade candidates" was
•I 7  0
held "for the purpose of forming a strong association", '4°later 
to be named "The Liberal and Political Association of New South 
Wales" (LPA). The convenor of this meeting and the basis of the 
new association was an organising committee of seven MsLA app­
ointed, in accordance with the parliamentary executive’s decision 
of 18 February, ~ Jby a meeting of fifty freetrade MsLA on about 
25 February; its allotted task was "to organise the adherents of 
the Party and to prepare a plan of action for the future”.^ '^The 
notable absentee from the seven-man executive, which comprised 
McMillan, Brunker, F.J.Smith, Burdekin, Sydney Smith, Abigail and1 I 9,
Carruthers, 'was B.R.Wise, who was still licking his wounds 
after a double electoral defeat during the general election, 
and who did not take any part in the activities of the LPA.
It was probably Wise's unfortunate absence that led 
to an immediate weakening of radical influence in the business 
of the LPA, and, in particular, in the formulation of 'a broad, 
comprehensive liberal platform'. Shortly after the LPA's form­
ation, the executive appointed a sub-committee, comprising Mc­
Millan, Brunker, Abigail, Lee, Carruthers and Garrett, to prepare 
a. draft party platform. ^ 4\he sub-committee's composition reflects 
waning radical influence. Three of its members had belonged to 
Parkes's factional 1887-89 ministry, ' yand, of these, Abigail's
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progressive views were offset by Garrett’s conservatism. 1 5
Furthermore, when it came to the point, as it soon did, the] 1,7conservatism of Lee and McMillan outweighed the radicalism 
of Carruthers* It would seem that the forces of conservatism 
had again successfully sabotaged a radical plan of action - 
and not for the last time * The process of formulating and 
adopting a platform again clearly demonstrated the presence 
of conflict within freetrade ranks, and the undoubted domin­
ance of conservative elements. The neglect of questions of 
pressing social and political importance; the refusal to con­
sider in detail issues of principle which were the source of 
friction within the party; and, finally, the replacement in
the platform of issues of principle with uncontroversial ad-
148ministrative matters, ‘ were all conservative devices to frus­
trate and prevent the formulation of a specific and progress­
ive party plat form0
On 5 March, the platform sub-committee met and drew up
a proposed platform, which, with one notable exception, was an
149example of freetrade conservatism. The proposed platform had 
two major characteristics. First, it was overwhelmingly vague, 
the plank of ‘direct taxation’ being even more obscure than 
Parkes's 1887 election utterances. No clue was given as to 
whether ’’freedom of trade" meant the existing 'revenue tariff- 
ism' that posed as freetrade, or the radical policy to remove 
the ’anomalies' in the tariff; only under later radical press­
ure was this plank made explicit. As pointed out later, the 
elucidation of "Land Policy" was hopelessly vague, to the point 
of being meaningless. The same could also be said of the 
planks advocating "Retrenchment of Expenditure",and the "Estab­
lishment of Local & Divisional Government ... by means of a 
liberal & comprehensive law". The second major characteristic 
was the avoidance of many pressing social problems that dem­
anded a solution. Industrial relations and the conditions of 
labour were, for example, totally ignored. In their place, 
emphasis was placed on such minor uncontroversial administrat­
ive proposals as the creation of agricultural schools and 
model farms, the improvement of internal communications, water 
conservation and irrigation, mining regulations, and technical
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education. The one exception to both chief characteristics 
was the section on."Electoral Reform”, in which was specified 
the radical advocacy of ’an Elective Upper House’.
Submitted on 6 March ’’for the consideration of the
] OQOrganising Committee”, "''the proposed platform underwent amend­
ments, which, again with one exception, only served to reinforce
151the basic nature of the draft platform. Although the platform 
was re-structured, none of its vagueness was removed, and its 
similarity to a programme of public works was accentuated by 
the addition of planks advocating the creation of mining coll­
eges and the enactment of ”forestry laws to regulate the use, 
preservation, and growth of timber”. Furthermore, the one spec­
ific radical proposal contained in the draft platform - an elect­
ive Legislative Council - was deleted. The one concession made 
to radical opinion was the amplification of the vague plank 
advocating ’direct taxation’, by the addition of the words, 
’’including a tax on the unimproved value of the freehold in land, 
with reasonable exemption”; even this last hint of radicalism 
was shortly to be removed from the platform.
On 26 March, a meeting of the LPA, convened by circ­
ular and attended by ’’nearly 100 gentlemen ”, was held, at
which printed copies of the platform as amended by the organis-
152ing committee were ’’freely circulated”. The meeting was then
1 53adjourned until 1 April, v  when "the consideration of the plat-
15Aform ... was resumed”.  ^rAt these tv/o meetings there gathered
all those interested in the formulation of freetrade policy,
from both within and without parliament. From the existing
limited lists of those present, it is clear that the stage
was set for a test of strength between the forces of freetrade
conservatism and radicalism. Among the dominant conservative
host were the MsLA Bruce Smith,~"^William M c M i l l a n , F . B u r n s ,
A.J.Gould, Sydney Burdekin, J.Wheeler, J.F.Cullen and J.R.Street,"
158and the non-parliamentarians Sir John Robertson, G.N.Griffiths,
139Richard Teece and Captain F.H.Trouton. Ranged against tnem160 liwere the radical MsLA Sydney Smith, D.O’Connor, J.H.Carruthers162and Jonathan Seaver, plus the radical outsiders E.W.Foxall,
T.Halloran, AoH.Sampson, F.Walsh, W.E.Johnson and Frank Cotton.163
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The ensuing debate clearly revealed the conflict that existed 
within free trade ranks; it also demonstrated the undoubted dom­
inance of the party's conservatives. By avoidance, evasion 
and postponement, they ensured that the party 'platform' be­
came little more than a vague and meaningless list of 'public 
works'.
The opening of the debate on the proposed platform^4 
set the tone for all that followed: during the consideration 
of the 'direct taxation' plank, J.F.Burns successfully moved 
"the omission of all the words after 'taxation', considering 
that it was unnecessary to specify any details of the direct 
taxation proposed". Later in the debate, three separate amend­
ments, all specifying the imposition of a land tax, were moved 
to various planks of the proposed platform; all were lost. 
Although the proposer of the first land tax amendment, F0Walsh, 
pointed to the "large and growing party in the country who 
believed in the taxation of land", it was stated during the 
discussion that the matter should be "left open for the pres­
ent", and that "they had not met for the purpose of going into 
... details". As E.W.Foxall claimed, however, the land tax 
amendment was a matter of principle, not one of detail, and 
as such deserved proper consideration. Jonathan Seaver was 
more explicit when he said that he "would not be satisfied 
unless it was stated that . direct taxation would include 
land taxation". J.F.Burns pointed to the presence of "con­
troversy", and stated that "unless they wanted to bring about 
a division in their ranks, they ought to leave this question 
alone". The presence of friction was again revealed in the 
discussion of an unsuccessful specific amendment to the vague 
plank concerning the regulation of pastoral settlement. 
Supporting the amendment, F.Walsh "pointed out that the people 
of the colony did not want mere headlines to be placed before 
them, but that the details should be shown". In reply, the 
chairman McMillan, stated that any attempt to do so would
165"have the party rending themselves into a dozen factions".
The one exception to total and meaningless abstraction was 
the successful amendment defining 'freedom of trade' as "the 
abolition of all existing duties on raw material".
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The overwhelmingly conservative nature of the plat­
form, however, was highlighted by two incidents towards the 
end of the debate.£.WiFoxall sought to clarify the empty 
plank of ’electoral and parliamentary re form * by specifying 
”An elective Upper House, one man one vote, and payment of 
members”. After Sir John Robertson had staunchly declared his 
opposition, and McMillan had emphatically told the meeting 
’’not to touch anything that was so radical'*, the amendment was 
lost. The real character of the platform was revealed at the 
end of the meeting when an amendment, adding to the platform 
an eighth plank, ’’Sanitary Reform”, was carried without diss­
ension.
The final platform was understandably met with crit­
icism. One freetrader referred to "its vague and non-comm-
i hgittal character”,"" and a critical protectionist correspond­
ent described the Association’s broad platform as ’’sufficient­
ly broad to place its boundaries and outlines beyond the men­
tal vision of any person”. Referring to the total rejection 
of ”a number of liberal amendments”, the same correspondent 
concluded that, ’’disguise it as they may, the leaders of the 
free-trade party are the Conservatives of New South Wales, 
and as such will opjjose all liberal reforms”.
What is more, despite the ’party’ platform and the 
presence in the ministry of a number of those instrumental in 
its formulation, nothing was ever done to implement its more 
principled planks0 This applied particularly to the area of 
fiscal policy. Undoubtedly the LPA platform supposedly bound 
the ministry to simplify the tariff by removing ’’all existing 
duties on raw material”,‘u and the success of J.P.Abbott’s 
embarrassing tariff reform motion in the Assembly early in 
April^^put early pressure on Parkes’s second free trade min­
istry to reform the ’freetrade' tariff. The new Colonial
170Treasurer, McMillan, in fact, pledged to do so. By July, 
however, nothing had been done, and the matter was again 
raised at the annual meeting of the FTLA, the organisation 
created in May 1889 by an amalgamation of the LPA and FTA.
At the meeting, the radical, V/. E. Johnson, moved that the
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government be urged to carry out its pledges as "the anomal­
ies existing in the tariff are inconsistent with free trade 
17.1principles”. This motion again led to conflict, the Assoc­
iation’s conservative secretary and SCO member, Edward Puls- 
172ford, defending the government’s inaction0 John Beveridge,
175another merchant freetrader and SCO member, defended the 
existing revenue duties on the ground that their removal 
would have to result in "placing a tax on something else", ^  ' L{ 
Johnson stated that his motive for bringing "pressure to bear 
upon the Government" was to show the people that their "parl­
iamentary representatives «„* were not traitors to the cause 
175of free-trade". The fact that no freetrade reform of the 
tariff was carried out until 1894 seemed to reveal, however, 
that they were.
The conflict over, and avoidance of, direct taxation 
also continued. At the first annual conference of the FTLA 
in August 1889, the debate on direct taxation was resumed, and 
this time resulted in a victory for the radicals. In response 
to a radical proposal that "a form of taxation upon the unirnp- 
roved value of land should be imposed °the old conserv­
ative tactics of avoidance and vagueness were again employed.
One freetrade MLA "was afraid that the passing of this resol-
177ution now might alienate some of the freetrade supporters",
and G.H.Reid both maintained that "Freetraders should sink
178their extreme views”, and moved the rather equivocal amend­
ment that "a form of taxation on the unimproved value of land
is adopted by this association as one of the legitimate forms 
179of taxation". The radicals, however, were this time not to 
be denied. E.W.Foxall maintained that "they were not going to 
be humbugged or hoodwinked by resolutions that meant nothing.... 
They did not want to affirm that it was ’desirable’ [that] some­
thing should be done", but that something must be done to imp- 
lernent direct taxation in the form of land taxation. ' J Frank 
Cotton, agreeing that "Mr Reid’s motion was hardly definite 
enough”, successfully moved the amendment that "a form of tax­
ation on land values, should be imposed for the purpose of
181raising revenue". The radical victory was, however, all to no
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avail. At no stage during the life of the 1889-9-1 freetrade 
ministry, as B.R.V/ise pointed out, was any attempt made "to 
carry out the declared policy of the freetrade party" as ex­
pressed in the FTLA conference resolution. Wise concluded by 
stating that during the life of the ministry "neither the cause 
of freetrade nor democratic progress was greatly advanced", 
for "nothing was done ... either to lighten the tariff or to 
tax the rich". ^W.H.Traill summed the situation up when he 
wrote: "So long as Sir Henry [Parkes] guided the policy of the 
freetrade party, the attitude of reluctance to have recourse
to direct taxation was maintained, and the propertied classes
183thus kept loyal to the freetrade interest".
The FTLA conference failed to rectify the absence of 
any specific and meaningful party platform. Concerning itself 
largely with matters of electoral organisation, the conference 
added very little, apart from the land tax resolution, to the 
LPA platform that had been adopted in toto by the FTLA on its 
inception. +What little was done only reinforced the platform's 
vague, conservative and non-political character. The subject 
of local government was removed from the realm of political185principle, being described as "no longer a party question"
1 or
and a matter "of a national character"; ' even so, the chairman, 
in response to a detailed motion on the subject, stated that "as 
to the details of the bill the conference was not in a position 
to lay down any strong lines for the guidance of any Government".^ 
A motion that municipal taxation should be placed on land val- 
ues was summarily dismissed, ^and the remainder of the time
190devoted to policy was spent in a discussion about railway rates 
and the establishment of a Department of Agriculture and a School 
of Mines.
The year 1 8 8 9 ? then, did not see the formulation of a 
specific and comprehensive freetrade party platform; the efforts 
to block every move towards that end were almost completely 
successful. In April 1 8 8 9 ? the Herald complained that parliam­
ent "persistently neglects affairs upon which the welfare of 
the community depends", and it looked to the LPA "to cure this 
great defect" by binding the freetrade party to a specific
3/102
political programme. The policy formulations of the LPA- 
FTLA, however, in no sense provided a cure: matters of real 
social and political reform were shelved; issues involving 
principles gave way to matters of mere administration; and 
the detailed consideration of almost any question was avoided.
What finally emerged was a vague, non-political ’party programme’. 
The conservatives of the party clearly dominated the formulation 
of party policy, and, in that the final programme revealed 
their refusal to come to terms with the necessity of, and press­
ure for, social reform, it could he termed a true enunciation
195of conservative principle - negative and distrustful of change. 
But, no conservative commitment on vital issues of principle 
was actually specified in the platform, a fact that was of some 
significance. Such specific conservative commitment, had it 
been forced into the platform, could only have destroyed what 
little nominal fiscal unity existed to hold the party together.
To preserve this precarious unity, controversial issues had to 
be avoided, not faced. Successful avoidance demonstrated con­
servative dominance, but it was a dominance created by force of 
numbers rather than total unanimity, and the one ’party’ re­
mained fundamentally two. It was this internal party conflict 
that was most responsible for the nature of the platform - 
vague, non-political and unprincipled. The avoidance of issues 
of principle and demands for reform served conservative ends, 
but was simply a successful political tactic rather than an en­
unciation of principle. Only the resolution of internal party 
conflict and the creation of real cohesion could result in the 
formulation of a constructive principled platform that would 
come to terms with relevant and pressing political issues.
Successful conservative resistance to the formulation 
of a comprehensive programme, stating specific party policy on 
a wide range of social and political issues, was again evidenced 
during the general election of 1891» Prior to the election, 
Parkes claimed that the ministry "intended to go to the country" 
on freetrade, federation, the perennial promise of local govern­
ment, an Electoral Bill, amendments to the Licensing Act, and IS"bills to provide for irrigation and the conservation of water". 
Although it was claimed that the ministry had prepared bills
192
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1Q 9to cover a number of these subjects, 'very few details were 
provided, and the subject of freetrade and direct taxation was
j Goalmost entirely submerged.In the absence of a comprehensive197and precise party platform, individual candidates, especially
the radicals, who sought policy guidelines were forced to turn
elsewhere. With nothing else offering, the radical freetrade
1Q8candidate for Albury, Luke Gulson, '''"and one of the freetrade 
candidates for Hawkesbury, A.Matheson, announced themselves 
"prepared to accept the platform laid down by the South Sydney 
Freetrade Association, ...".1 ^ Formed in March 1887,^^the 
South Sydney branch of the FTA,"''^unlike its parent body and 
many of its fellow branches, remained in active existence
p 02right through to the end of 1891. ~ The active participation 
in its activities of men like B. R. Wise, John Haynes, ^ LJ. H. 
Carruthers, ' '"and S. T. Whiddon^^ensured a strong radical in­
fluence within the Association.
This influence was most amply demonstrated in May 1891
207when the Association's leading radicals, Wise and C.J.panahey,2ogformulated a specific sixteen-point platform and had it rat-
209ified as the platform of the Association. “ The programme both
represented an attempt to fill the void created by the absence
of any such platform for the freetrade party as a whole, and,
although radical in content, exposed the irrelevance of the
platform originally drawn up by the LPAj unlike its predecessor,
it was specific and it came to grips with matters of pressing 
210social concern. C.J.Danahey pointed particularly to the eff­
orts they were making "to ameliorate the condition of the 
211masses". 'Unable to prevail upon the party as a whole to ad­
opt such a specific and progressive programme, Wise had been 
forced to act independently through the one freetrade organ­
isation in which his' views held sway. The radicals had begun 
to retaliate.
By June 1891? the efforts of men like Wise to commit 
the freetrade party to an active policy of reform "to ameliorate 
the condition of the masses" had been stifled from within the 
party for over four years. In fact, the reactionary attitude 
of Parkes's two ministries on questions concerning the rights
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and conditions of labour was quite clearly revealed during 
1890. The year 1890 was one of widespread industrial disturb­
ance that culminated in August and September in the maritime 
PI 3strike. -"'In attempting to deal with the strikers, William 
23 UMcMillan demonstrated the basic conservatism, protecting 
economic self-interest, that had dominated the freetrade party, 
both in and out of parliament, since 1886. Early in September, 
McMillan’s instinct to use force against the strikers led him 
to apply unsuccessfully to Parkes for authority to use ’’the 
military and police".^''’
On 19 September, a skirmish occurred at Circular Quay
2l6between the strikers and non-union labourers. °The outcome
of this incident fully revealed the neuroses of the ccnserv-
21?atives, for, "within an hour of its outbreak", a deputation 
from the SCC was in consultation with its past president and 
champion,McMillan, who assured his commercial colleagues that 
"they could go away feeling sure that the Government would now 
protect them". °He maintained that, in the face of an attempt 
to set up "a temporary semi-revolutionary Government", the sit­
uation could not continue "without absolute anarchy and disorder
ensuing". He added that"I speak for the whole Government in
219the unfortunate absence of my chief". He did not, however, 
speak for Parkes, whose rejection of his subordinate's assump­
tion of authority and implied threat to use force was not slow 
220in forthcoming. In repudiating McMillan's stand, Parkes de­
tached himself from McMillan's obvious economic and class int­
erests; his own far more objective brand of traditional conserv­
ative liberalism was revealed in his determined defence of non­
partisan neutrality. He told a Herald reporter that the gov­
ernment "cannot defend the interests of any one class to the 
neglect of a n o t h e r t h e  duty and obligation thrown upon it
must be performed, as far as possible, on the lines of non- 
221partisanship".
McMillan's response to the maritime strike was evid­
ence of his emotional conservative class prejudice; his own 
and many of his colleagues' laissez-faire beliefs were also
revealed during the strike and its aftermath. And again the
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deep conflict between two irreconcilable liberal philosophies
that kept the freetraders splintered and disunited came to the
fore. Trade union demands and strike action symbolised to
the lalssez-faire freetrade liberal the tyranny of unionism
in .repudiating the sacred individualist right of 'freedom of
contract', the right of employers freely to engage suitable lab-
22?our, whether unionist or not. The individualist liberal view 
was expressed by the Herald which stated .that 'freedom of con­
tract' is "on the same broad basis as freedom of action and
223freedom of speech, ...". 'To this argument, B.H.Wise retorted 
that, in existing circumstances, the individual labourer lost 
his freedom by being forced to accept the employer’s terms of 
contract, and that trade unionism and the right to strike help­
ed to rectify the imbalance between the power of capital and 
22hthat of labour. He unequivocally stated that 'freedom of con­
tract' was "a social and industrial evil of the first magnit- 
223ude", and elsewhere maintained that "I cannot see how the 
demand of trade unionists that labour shall be employed through 
the union, and not by individual bargaining, can be logicallyppgresisted".“ v/ise clearly revealed the division within the
party when, in declining nomination by the FTLA in a by-elect-
22?ion for East Sydney, he told the council of the Association 
that "I feel unable to deny that the labour party is more right 
in its principal contentions than the capitalist party which is 
now ojjposing them". °Wise' s remained, however, the minority 
view, and the conservative view of 'the capitalist party' re­
mained dominant in successful resistance of unionist demands. 
Given such a situation, it was, therefore, only natural that 
the democrats, unionists and labouring classes outside parl­
iament should seek a new political advocate; in July 1891> 
that new advocate first appeared in parliament in the form of 
the Labor party.
The Labor party began its parliamentary career by
giving the freetrade ministry a loose support on the basis of
229'support in return for concessions'. It was not surprising, 
therefore, that the radical elements in the freetrade party 
found a basis for an informal alliance with their kindred Lab­
or spirits. It was this union of spirits that was responsible
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for the loosening of the conservative domination of the free- 
trade party towards the end of 1891; the presence of the Lab­
or party in the Assembly had the effect of bolstering radical 
confidence and resolution. The confidence it gave one free- 
trade radical to fly in the face of his conservative colleag­
ues severely shook conservative dominion and sent the free- 
trade party into opposition.
The radical freetrader who caused all the trouble was
Sydney Smith, Parkes ’s Secretary for Mines and Agriculture,
and the only rebellious radical included in the minis try.231In August 1891j Smith took it upon himself  ^ to present to
parliament a Coal Mines Regulation Bill, clause 17 of which
provided a compulsory eight-hour working day for miners bet-
232ween the ages of fourteen and seventeen. The eight-hour day
had long been basic to the political demands of radicals and
organised labour, but had been staunchly resisted by the
laissez-faire conservatives. In moving the second reading of
the bill, Smith realised that "some hon. members will object
233to the bill" on the grounds of its eight-hours clause, 
but this did not deter him. When the clause came up for con­
sideration in a poorly attended Committee, Smith was prepared 
to go even further; he assented to the Labor MLA, Joseph Cook’s 
amendment that gave the eight-hour day to all miners, Monday
23Lto Friday, and the amendment was agreed to without division. "n
Smith also assented to radical amendments of clause 21 which
233provided for the ventilation of the mines.
The dissension in the freetrade ranks, caused by 
Smith’s action, became evident on 15 October, v/hen he moved 
the third reading of the bill._JOAlarmed at the prospect of 
the compulsory limitation of working hours and the other rad­
ical amendments passed in Committee, Smith's former minister­
ial colleague, William McMillan, moved an amendment that the
bill be re-committed for the further consideration of clauses 
23717 and 21. Supporting McMillan in the "angry debate" that 
238followed were Smith's ministerial colleagues, Parkes and 
239Bruce Smith. Just when it appeared that McMillan’s amendment
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was doomed, there sprung to the conservative freetraders' 
defence the conservative protectionist, Edmund Barton, who
24 omoved that the debate be adjourned. Smith himself accepted 
the motion, for it gave him time to consult with his dis­
gruntled colleagues, and he appealed to "his [Labor] friends"
to add their consent, promising to proceed with the bill v/ith- 
241in two days. Most, however, refused, and joined the pro­
tectionists to defeat the ministry. ^'4c~They realised that, in 
the face of powerful conservative reaction, Smith was not 
strong enough to get the amended bill through; his radical 
stand, however, was responsible for the ministry's resignation.
And so it vras that discontented and disillusioned 
freetrade radicals had largely brought about the fall of the 
tw^ o freetrade ministries between 1887 and 189 3. hot strong 
enough to control, or even force compromises on, freetrade 
policy and ministerial action, the freetrade radicals were 
strong enough to prevent freetrade cohesion and unseat free- 
trade ministries. This conflict among the freetraders, how­
ever, had the effect of forcing all matters of principle and 
issues of vital concern to the colony's welfare and develop­
ment into the background, all in the cause of maintaining nom­
inal unity and preventing friction from dismembering a ruling 
majority. The 'party', therefore, remained a group with power, 
but without policy; the principled policy vacuum of the fact­
ion system still remained to be filled. Efforts to fill the 
vacuum, however, had begun, and it was the unremitting endeav­
ours of the new men of principle that made the freetrade group 
more than a faction, but still less than a cohesive, principled 
political party. Furthermore, the history of the parliament­
ary protectionist party between 1887 and 1891 bore a remark­
able similarity to that of the freetrade party, and it is on 
the protectionists that attention should now be focussed, for 
it was they who were called on to succeed Parkes's deposed 
ministry.
CHAPTER i-t
FACTIONS AND FRICTIONS, PRINCIPLES AND 
PROGRAMMES, 1887-1591«
III The Parliamentary Protectionists 
and Some Conclusions.
11 The protectionists have never 
formulated a special policy. We 
have had moderate protectionists, 
discriminating protectionists - 
(laughter) - and. a whole catalogue 
from 5 per cent ad valorem down to 
prohibition.... But the question 
comes, what is this protection go­
ing to be?”
- Wi11iam Me Mil1an.
(DT, 17 October 1889, p.5).
n ...j there have been tv/o strugg­
ling parties in this empire, under 
the names of Tramecksan, and Slam- 
ecksan, from the high and low heels 
on their shoes, by which they dist­
inguish themselves”.
Gulliver’s Travels
I
Like the freetraders, the protectionists were irrec­
oncilably divided over the specific meaning of their professed 
fiscal doctrine; as Thomas Waddell pointed out, "Protection 
with different men had different meanings". The basic point
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a t  i s s u e  was "how f a r  p r o t e c t i o n  s h o u l d  g o " ,  and th e  two b a s i c  
a l t e r n a t i v e s . ,  b o th  r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  p a r t y ,  w e re ,  
i n  W i l l i a m  M c M i l l a n ' s  w o rd s ,  " m o d e r a t e  p r o t e c t i o n "  and " p r a c -  
t i c a l  p r o h i b i t i o n ” .' The f u n d a m e n t a l  d i f f e r e n c e  be tw een  th e  
two a l t e r n a t i v e ' s  c o n c e r n e d  t h e  d e g r e e  t o  which  a p o l i c y  o f  p r o ­
t e c t i o n  s h o u l d  be a means o f  r a i s i n g  s t a t e  r e v e n u e .  ' D i s c r i m ­
i n a t i n g ' ,  ' j u d i c i o u s '  o r  'm o d e r a t e  p r o t e c t i o n ' ,  d e s c r i b e d  by 
one p r o t e c t i o n i s t  MLA as  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  ” 10 or  19 p e r  c e n t  
ad v a lo re m  d u t i e s " , ~1 had a s  i t s  c h i e f  o b j e c t i v e ,  n o t  th e  h i n d ­
r a n c e  or r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  i m p o r t s ,  b u t  r a t h e r  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  
l a r g e  amounts  o f  r e v e n u e .  ' P r a c t i c a l  p r o h i b i t i o n ' ,  on t h e  o t h e r  
h and ,  a d e q u a t e l y  c h a r a c t e r i s e s  th e  v iew s  o f  more d o c t r i n a i r e  
p r o t e c t i o n i s t s  who f a v o u r e d  " o n l y  i m p o r t  d u t i e s ,  which  e i t h e r  
e x c l u d e  f o r e i g n  c o m m o d i t i e s  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  k i n d s ,  or  so r a i s e  
t h e i r  s e l l i n g  p r i c e  a s  t o  g i v e  an a d v a n t a g e  t o  l o c a l  p r o d u c e r s
c;
o f  l i k e  a r t i c l e s " . " '  To a c h i e v e  t h i s  p u r p o s e ,  th e  i n c i d e n c e  o f  
ad v a lo r e m  d u t i e s  was s e e n  i n  t e r m s  o f  a b o u t  29%5 ^ and s u ch  a 
p o l i c y  c o u l d  s c a r c e l y  be r e g a r d e d  a s  a means o f  r a i s i n g  r e v e n u e .
U n d o u b te d ly  th e  m a j o r i t y  o f  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  MsLA r e g a r d e d  
p r o t e c t i o n  a s  a means o f  r a i s i n g  r e v e n u e ,  s i n c e  most o f  them 
had o n ly  a c c e p t e d  t h e  l a b e l  o f  ' p r o t e c t i o n i s t '  when P a r k e s ' s  
d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  J e n n i n g s '  r e v e n u e - r a i s i n g  9% ad v a lo re m  d u t y  as  
a ' p r o t e c t i o n i s t  m e a s u r e '  became g e n e r a l l y  a c c e p t e d .  Such prom­
i n e n t  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s  a s  George  D ib b s ,  J . P . A b b o t t ,  J . S e e ,  J . P .  
G a rv an ,  W i l l i a m  Lyne and Henry C o p e lan d ,  a l l  ' c o n v e r t s '  from 
f r e e t r a d e  d u r i n g  l a t e  1886 o r  1887 ,  r e g a r d e d  p r o t e c t i o n  as  l i t t l e  
or  n o t h i n g  more t h a n  " a  s y s te m  o f  f i s c a l i s m  £ th a t^ J  i n v o l v e d  a
7
w h o l e s a l e  r e c o u r s e  t o  t h e  C us tom -house  f o r  r e v e n u e " .  While  su ch  
d o c t r i n a i r e ,  p r o h i b i t i v e  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s  a s  N . M e l v i l l e ,  E.W.
o
O ' S u l l i v a n ,  J .M .T o o h e y ,  T . P o s e ,  and W . H . T r a i l l 0 r e c o g n i s e d  su ch  
a p o l i c y  a s  " a  c h eap  and handy way o f  g e t t i n g  money f o r  t h e  pub­
l i c  T r e a s u r y " ,  th e y  r e g a r d e d  i t  as  " a  mos t  com prom is ing  r e s o u r c e
9
f o r  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s " .  I n  f a c t ,  i t s  a d v o c a t e s  were a t  t i m e s  r e ­
f e r r e d  to  by r e a l  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s ,  n o t  a s  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s  a t  a l l ,
~| Q
b u t  a s  " f r e e t r a d e r s " . The re  was ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a r e a l  c o n f l i c t  b e ­
tween t h e  v ie w s  o f  the  r e v e n u e - r a i s i n g  m o d e ra te  p r o t e c t i o n i s t
11
and " t h e  e x t re m e  v ie w s  o f  t h e  u l t r a - p r o t e c t i o n i s t  p a r t y " .
2
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Throughout the period 1837 to 1892 the formulation of 
the fiscal policy of the protectionist party was dominated by 
revenue-oriented, ’moderate’ protectionists. In its initial 
agreement to conform to Parkes’s fiscal criteria by professing 
its protectionist proclivities in January 1887, the parliament­
ary opposition stated that its adherence to protection was based
’’not upon extreme or ultra-protectionist grounds, but upon those 
12of moderation”o Its continued moderation was reflected not only
in those who led the party, J.P.Abbott,' J.Lyne^4and G . R. Dibbs,“L"/
all lapsed freetraders, but also in the composition of the two
protectionist ministries formed during the period. Called upon
to form a ministry in January 1889 after Parkes’s resignation,
Dibbs excluded ’’all the staunch men of the protectionist party”,^
and included only those with moderate protectionist views, al~
i 7most all of whom were lapsed freetraders. The freetrade Herald 
congratulated Dibbs, ’’not only as to the men he has chosen, but 
also on the omissions which their choice implies”. uDibbs’s 
treasurer, J.P.Garvan, made clear the basis of the ministry's 
belief in protection when he stated that, in view of the contin­
ued deficit, ”he thought no remedy remained, save raising the
19revenue through the Custom-house”. Dibbs was in complete agree- 
20ment. The rejection, of the doctrinaire protectionists was just
as evident in the formation of Dibbs's next ministry in October
1891. Once again he chose his colleagues from the "moderate
21portion of his party”, and this was almost immediately reflect­
ed in the revised customs arrangements, introduced by the minis­
try in December 1891.
22Once again the problem was the financial deficit, and
once again the preposed solution was "common sense, rational,
23moderate protection”* a revenue-raising tariff. The doctrin­
aire protectionists were harsh in their criticism of the meas­
ure, W.H. Traill describj_ng what he termed "the trumpery tariff” 
as "really a revenue tariff, fwhichl ... if the freetraders came 
into power to-morrow they would only slightly modify”. 4George 
Reid revealed the basic division when he pointed out that the 
tariff was not a "true protectionist one. They would never get 
the genuine article from a lot of turncoats; if they had had 
Mr Melville as first Minister, they would have some sort of
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t a r i f f  w h ic h  th e  o r i g i n a l  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s  would r e c o g n i s e ,
A n o th e r  i m p o r t a n t  s o u r c e  o f  c o n f l i c t  w i t h i n  p r o t e c t ­
i o n i s t  r a n k s  was th e  h o s t i l i t y  t h a t  e x i s t e d  be tw een  c e r t a i n  
econom ic  i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  a d h e r e d  to  p r o t e c t i o n ,  and th e  d e g r e e  
to  w h ich  t h e s e  r i v a l  i n t e r e s t s  e m p h a s i s e d  d i f f e r e n t  a s p e c t s  o f  
th e  d o c t r i n e .  At t h e  LIA c o n f e r e n c e  o f  1885> i t  was p r o p o s e d  
t h a t  " t h e  f a r m e r s ,  m a n u f a c t u r e r s ,  m i n e r s ,  and i n d u s t r i a l  c l a s s e s
s h o u l d  combine  i n  p o l i t i c a l  u n i o n ” i n  a common a d h e r e n c e  t o  th e
26p o l i c y  o f  p r o t e c t i o n ;  s u c h  a p r o p o s a l  i m p l i e d  a b a s i c  u n i o n  o f  
t h e  econom ic  i n t e r e s t s  o f  c i t y  and c o u n t r y  f a v o u r a b l e  t o  p r o ­
t e c t i o n .  The main c o u n t r y  i n t e r e s t s  t o  be s e r v e d  by p r o t e c t i o n  
were t h o s e  o f  t h e  s m a l l  f r e e - s e l e c t o r  f a r m e r .  The i n t e r e s t  o f  
t h i s  c l a s s  i n  p r o t e c t i o n  i n c r e a s e d  g r e a t l y  d u r i n g  th e  1880s  as  
more and more s e t t l e r s  i n  c o u n t r y  d i s t r i c t s  t u r n e d  from g r a z i n g
to  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  and as  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n  began  t o  o u t -
27s t r i p  t h e  demands o f  l o c a l  m a r k e t s .  T h i s  p ro b lem  was made 
worse  by t h e  f r e e  e n t r y  i n t o  New S o u th  Wales  o f  t h e  p ro d u c e  o f  
o t h e r  c o l o n i e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w hea t  from V i c t o r i a ,  and t h e  c u s ­
toms b a r r i e r s  a g a i n s t  th e  e n t r y  o f  New S ou th  Wales p ro d u c e  i n t o  
o t h e r  c o l o n i e s .  Such a  s i t u a t i o n  t u r n e d  th e  t h o u g h t s  o f  f a r m e r s  
t o  t h e  i d e a  o f  im p o s i n g  r e t a l i a t o r y  d u t i e s  on a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d ­
uce  e n t e r i n g  New S o u th  W ales ,  e s p e c i a l l y  d u t i e s  on t h e  i m p o r t  o f  
V i c t o r i a n  g r a i n . ^ J I n  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  numbers  and 
b r o a d e n  t h e i r  b a s e ,  a r d e n t  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s  c l a i m e d  t h a t  t h e  a d ­
h e r e n t s  o f  r e t a l i a t o r y  d u t i e s  were a l s o  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s ,  and a
r e s o l u t i o n  a t  t h e  LIA c o n f e r e n c e  p r o p o s i n g  r e c i p r o c i t y  o f  t r a d e
29f o r  fa rm p ro d u c e  was th e  s i g n a l  f o r  s e v e r a l  p r o m i n e n t  p r o t e c t -
30i o n i s t s  t o  d e l i v e r  e u o l g i e s  o f  t h e i r  chosen  f i s c a l  d o c t r i n e .
31
D e s p i t e  some h o s t i l e  r e a c t i o n  t o  t h i s  m e n t io n  o f  p r o t e c t i o n ,  
t h e  e q u a t i o n  o f  r e c i p r o c i t y  o r  r e t a l i a t i o n  w i t h  p r o t e c t i o n  soon 
became g e n e r a l l y  a c c e p t e d  by t h e  f a r m e r s ,  one d e c l a r i n g  t h a t  
" t h e  f a r m e r s  must  have  some k i n d  o f  P r o t e c t i o n ,  and he c o n s i d ­
e r e d  t h e  form of  R e c i p r o c i t y  a most s u i t a b l e  way o f  p r o t e c t i n g  
our  p e o p l e ” .
The p r o t e c t i o n i s m  o f  r e t a l i a t i o n i s t s  was c r y s t a l l i s e d  
d u r i n g  1886 by P a r k e s ’s  i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  t h e y ,  l i k e  th e  s u p p o r t ­
e r s  o f  ad v a lo re m  d u t i e s ,  must be r e g a r d e d  as  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s ;
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ar.d, in accepting Parkes1 s criteria, the parliamentary opposit­
ion included "import duties on agricultural produce - in other- 
words, grain dutj.es" in its policy of moderate protection prior 
to the 1887 general election,' "Retaliatory sentiments were 
particularly strong in the agricultural regions of southern 
New South Wales near the Victorian border, particularly the 
Southern Tablelands, Riverina and South-west Slopes ,"'M and also 
in the wheat growing belt around Orange and Dubbo. Parliament­
ary aspirants greatly enhanced their chances of election j.f 
they came out in support of retaliation; in fact, an intending 
freetrade candidate for Queanbeyan in 188? told Parkes that 
"no person need offer their services ,,, with the slightest
chance of success unless he goes in for a duty on imported grain, 
33. As a result, many country MsLA were retaliationist 'pro­
tectionists’, although the imposition of retaliatory duties was 
for many the limit of their belief in protection» Like the in­
tending candidate for Queanbeyan, a number of men in south­
western rural constituencies presented themselves for election 
in 1887 professing their belief in both freetrade and "recip- 
rocity or retaliation";^ their later 'conversion' to protection" r 
was based simply on the artificial criterion that adherence to 
retaliatory duties constituted adherence to protection. The 
imposition of import duties on any type of imported agricultural 
produce also came to be regarded as 'protection' for those farm­
ers of New South Wales who produced the taxed produce«, Henry 
Clarke, member for the far south coast electorate of Eden, 
thought the farmers of his electorate had a "right to be pro­
tected", and he therefore advocated "a produce duty on cheese, 
butter, and bacon" as being "highly beneficial to the coast
v O
districts".JOA considerable number of protectionist MsLA, there­
fore, entered parliament as distinct representatives of small
39farmer and free selector interests.
The urban and industrial interests served by protection
40were those of "manufacturers, miners, and industrial classes",
41or industrial labourers and "town artisans". Protection would 
serve their interests by the encouragement it would give to 
colonial industry and manufacturing through the imposition of 
high or restrictive tariffs on the import of manufactured goods.
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As a consequence, the manufacturers or employers would see the 
scope of their enterprises expand, and a rise in their profits; 
the artisans or employees could expect both a rise in their 
wages and an end to unemployment. Protection, therefore, would 
serve urban interests, employer and employee alike, and country 
farmer interests, and this supposed common fiscal adherence was 
the basis of the idyllic union agreed upon at the 1885 LIA 
conference. Even there, however, the differences that existed 
between the city and country approaches to protection were re­
vealed, and the basis of conflict laid bare. It was indisput­
able that prohibitive duties on imported manufactured goods for 
the purpose of fostering colonial industries would raise the 
prices of manufactured items throughout the colony, almost en­
tirely to the benefit of local manufacturers. Import duties of 
sufficiently high incidence to raise the prices of imported man­
ufactures to a point where similar items of colonial manufacture 
could compete would also have a similar effect. This would par­
ticularly affect rural areas with their dependence on imported 
farm implements and machinery. Despite E.W.0 'Sullivan ’s reass­
urance to the farmers that the disadvantage of having to pay "a 
little more for their implements” would be offset by having "mar-
I Okets near to them for their grain and stock”, "the farmers 
would not accept duties on imported farm produce hand in hand 
with duties on imported manufactured goods.^
On the other hand, the urban manufacturers had their 
own reservations about the imposition of retaliatory duties on 
agricultural produce. The free entry of Victorian grain into 
New South V/ales combined with a system of cheap sea freight 
rates and low railway rates on imported produce to create a 
situation that, as James Gormly pointed out, "shut [the farmers 
of New South Wales']‘out of their legitimate marke ts”. ^‘^Concurr­
ently, a system of high colonial railway rates denied them 
"cheaxj transit to the seaboard”^and "taxed [ them] severely"/1^  
thus raising the price of their produce to uncompetitive levels.
Such a system was justifiably viewed as "Protection for the47Sydney merchants", hut retaliation against farm produce im­
ported from Victoria could mean increased food prices in Sydney.
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F u r t h e r m o r e ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  ' p r o t e c t i o n ’ o f  c o l o n i a l
a g r i c u l t u r e  and t h a t  o f  c o l o n i a l  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  were o f t e n  men-
48t i o n e d  i n  th e  same b r e a t h ,  1 p r a c t i c a l  economic  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
v i r t u a l l y  d i c t a t e d  t h a t  o n ly  one o f  t h e  two s h o u l d  r e c e i v e  th e
b e n e f i t  o f  ' p r o t e c t i v e *  d u t i e s ,  t h u s  e x a c e r b a t i n g  c o n f l i c t .  As
O .O .D an g a r  r e a l i s t i c a l l y  p o i n t e d  o u t :  " . . .  upon a r t i c l e s  t h a t
we produced or were m a n u fa c tu r in g ,  we s h o u ld  p la c e  such a duty
a s  would e n a b l e  u s  t o  g i v e  e i t h e r  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r e r  o r  th e  p r o d -
49u c e r  an advantage  over  the im p o r t e r " .  I t  was l i t t l e  wonder,  
t h en ,  t h a t  the p r o t e c t i o n i s t s  a t  no s t a g e  drew up a f u l l y  a r t ­
i c u l a t e d  t a r i f f  to  form p a r t  o f  t h e i r  p o l i c y .  O.O.Dangar r e ­
g r e t t e d  i n  1890 t h a t  "the p r o t e c t i o n i s t  p a r ty  have n e v e r  ha,d the  
m a n l i n e s s  to  frame a t a r i f f " ;  i n  r e p l y  to  J .M .T o o h ey ' s  r e t o r t
t h a t  "They n e v e r  had a c h a n c e ! " ,  Dangar  p o i n t e d l y  a s k e d ,  "What
90were t h e i r  c o n f e r e n c e s  fo r ? " . '  Between 1887 and 1890 th r e e  imp­
o r t a n t  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  c o n f e r e n c e s  were h e ld  -  a PU c o n f e r e n c e  i n  
August 1 8 8 8 ,  a PP£1> c o n f e r e n c e  i n  May 1 8 8 9 3 and the NPA4 c o n f e r -  
ence  w i t h  two hundred and f i f t y - n i n e  d e l e g a t e s  i n  October 1889 -  
but a t  none were any t a r i f f  d e t a i l s  c o n s i d e r e d .  In accordance
w i t h  t h e  PU’s s t a t e d  i n t e n t i o n  " t o  frame a  s k e l e t o n  t a r i f f  o f
52p r o t e c t i v e  d u t i e s " ,  ‘i t  was proposed a t  the I 888 PU c o n f e r e n c e ,
55a t t e n d e d  by t e n  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  MsLA, t h a t  " t h i s  c o n f e r e n c e  . . .  
f rame a  s k e l e t o n  t a r i f f  s u i t a b l e  f o r  t h e  s e v e r a l  c l a s s e s  o f  c o l ­
o n i a l  i n d u s t r i e s ,  a s  a b a s i s  f o r  u n i t e d  a d v o ca c y  a t  t h e  n e x t  g en -  
54e r a l  e l e c t i o n " . '  The p r o p o s e r  was th e  p r o m i n e n t  ro p e  m a n u f a c t u r e r ,  
A r c h i b a l d  F o r s y t h ,  b u t  MLA, E . W . O ' S u l l i v a n ,  a l l  t o o  aware o f  co n ­
f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s  and u l t e r i o r  m o t i v e s ,  l e d  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  and
55s u c c e e d e d  i n  d e f e a t i n g  th e  m o t i o n . '
Which o f  th e  two r i v a l  i n t e r e s t s  -  i n d u s t r i a l  o r  a g r i c ­
u l t u r a l  -  would p r e d o m i n a t e  w i t h i n  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  p r o t e c t i o n ­
i s t  p a r t y  was l a r g e l y  d e t e r m i n e d  by y e t  a f u r t h e r  b a s i c  d i v i s i o n  
w i t h i n  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  r a n k s .  In  c o u n t r y  a g r i c u l t u r a l  a r e a s ,  p r o ­
t e c t i o n i s t s  a d v o c a t i n g  r e t a l i a t i o n  and c l a i m i n g  to  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  s m a l l  l a n d - h o l d e r s  were c o n s i s t e n t l y  e l e c t e d  by th e  
s t r u g g l i n g  f a r m e r s ;  i n  u r b a n  e l e c t o r a t e s ,  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  t h e  man­
u f a c t u r i n g  i n t e r e s t  d i d  n o t  f a r e  so  w e l l .  W i th in  th e  p r o t e c t ­
i o n i s t  movement,  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r e r s ,  who s t o o d  t o  g a i n  from p r o ­
t e c t i o n ,  were  r e g a r d e d  by p r o t e c t i o n i s t s ,  who c l a i m e d  t o  r e p r e s e n t
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56working-class interests, as persorsa non grata. "' The president
of the radical PPPL expressed this antagonism when he stated
that ’»We have no desire to place the hands of manufacturers
57into the pockets cf the consumers'*„ This antagonism, combined 
with free trade propaganda persuading urban labourers that, what­
ever duties were imposed, they would have to pay higher prices, 
had the effect of keeping the parliamentary representation of
58i-he urban manufacturing interest at a bare minimum/ The fact 
that the urban labouring classes saw little to benefit them­
selves in protection was revealed by their almost solid alleg­
iance to freetrade until 1891, when the Labor party gained their
considerable support. As a result, the parliamentary protect-
59ionist party had a basically 'country* character, and after 
the I889 general election only five of its sixty-six members 
represented Sydney metropolitan electorates.^Their lack of rep­
resentation in the parliamentary ranks led the manufacturers to 
use their wealth and influence in a number of attempts to in­
fluence the party from outside parliament. It would appear 
that they assumed complete control of the major protectionist 
extra-parliamentary organisation, the PU, during 1886, ’ 'and 
sought to build up the parliamentary party's indebtedness to 
them by controlling and liberally financing the protectionist 
electoral campaigns of 1887 and 1889«"'When, however, the parl­
iamentary party sought in October 1887 to break the manufacturers65stranglehold on the PU, the conflict between the majority of the
parliamentary party and its small manufacturer element was fully
revealed; the brewer, J.M„Toohey, announced his repudiation of
the party leader, Dibbs, took to the cross-benches in the Ass- 
61erably, hand gathered about him a small "push” of sympathisers, 
who were still refusing to communicate with the majority of the 
party at the end of 1888.^
Largely because of its basic 'country* character, the 
parliamentary party paid only lip service to the notion of 
'protecting' and fostering native manufacturing industries; the 
dominant country interests within the party, as well as the 
overriding concern for revenue, clearly determined the character 
of the 1891 tariff. Increased specific duties on a range of 
agricultural produce, including grain, were scarcely matched by
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increased duties in aid of an almost non-existent iron industry 
and local producers of paper, rope, candles and soap. As 
A,W.Martin points out, an analysis of the tariff clearly rev­
eals that nby far the greatest vested interest in protection ... 
was represented by the agriculturalists of the colony. Despite 
frequent protestations that their object was to build up man­
ufacturing industries, the protectionists had extended aid to
66a very limited set of producers in this field, ...u.
It is of fundamental importance, however, to realise 
that even these new or increased duties on both agricultural 
produce and a few manufactured items were scarcely protective 
in their incidence. Imposed ostensibly ”to protect local int- 
erests", 1 the duties in no sense restricted imports, giving 
little in the way of real encouragement to the local producer; 
they did, however, give joy to one important class in colonial 
society, the wealthy, for they proceeded to reap considerableA o
revenue.°°It was this central characteristic of the tariff - 
its capacity to raise large amounts of state revenue - that was 
the source of the most deep-seated conflict within the protect­
ion party. This conflict went far deeper than differing defin­
itions of ’protection’; it had its roots in the immediate econ­
omic implications and the wider social implications that govern­
ed the choice every protectionist made between protection to 
raise revenue and protection to prohibit. This conflict split 
the party into two hostile groups, somewhat similar to the free­
traders, one defensive and conservative, the other aggressively 
radical. Furthermore, in its wider context, the conflict ass­
umed more than a hint of a class struggle between labour and 
capital *
The immediate economic implication of the practical 
implementation of protection concerned the colony’s system of 
taxation. Revenue-raising ’moderate protection', like revenue­
raising freetrade, ensured the continuation of the system of 
indirect taxation, which spread the tax burden evenly over the 
colony's entire population, regardless of the taxpayer's abil­
ity to 'contribute. Prohibitive protection, like pure freetrade, 
would eliminate or drastically reduce customs revenue, forcing
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recourse to direct taxation on land, property or income on a 
scale commensurate with the taxpayer’s financial means and ab­
ility to pay. Thus, basic to the majority view of protection 
as a means of raising revenue, was the use of "the tariff as a
taxing medium in order to stop the imposition of either land or
69income taxes"* Vested-interest wealth clung to the advantages 
of indirect taxation, while the party’s democrats sought its 
removal and the imposition of an equitable form of 'direct tax­
ation o Only when the protectionists came into office in Octob­
er 1891 for a prolonged period, was this conflict fully reveal­
ed, especially during the passage of the 1891 tariff; the seeds 
of the conflict, however, were firmly sown well before 18915 
and between 188? and 1891 the nature of, and the issues involved 
in, the conflict crystallised and expanded, constantly keeping 
the protectionists divided and unable to present a united front 
or policy on almost any pressing issue of social concern.
If the freetrade party was largely representative of
the colony's wealthy commercial and merchant classes which
sought to protect their economic interests and prevent direct
taxation, the same was true of the protectionist party, albeit
70on a smaller scale. Such men, almost all of whom were avowed 
freetraders prior to 1887 5 reasoned that their commercial and 
business interests could not be harmed by a fiscal system that 
was generally regarded as involving nothing more than the coll­
ection of large sums of customs revenue from the import of ess­
ential items. Their 'conversion' to protection, therefore, in­
volved no substantive alteration of their basic fiscal beliefs, 
for, as has been seen, revenue tariffism was certainly not re­
garded as incompatible with freetrade by Sydney's commercial 
classes. Among the colony’s wealthy business and commercial 
community, the differences between those who adhered to free-
trade and those who adhered to protection appeared slender and
71were, in fact, practically negligible* Their mutual aim was the 
collection of substantial customs revenue. To achieve this, the 
commercial freetraders employed specific import duties, distrust- 
ing ad valorem duties on the grounds that they could be employed 
to restrict trade if their incidence was high enough; the comm­
ercial protectionists, on the other hand, had no such fears.
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They supported the use of ad valorem duties to raise their 
revenue in the certain knowledge that their incidence would 
not be restrictivej for if such were the case their revenue­
raising purpose would be defeated* Hence, men of commercial 
wealth could, and did, fit comfortably into the protectionist 
party in the certainty that their party would not threaten their 
prosperity by introducing direct taxation. Their certainty was 
based on the knowledge that they, with other conservative allies, 
exercised full control over protectionist policy.
Prominent among these allies was a considerable number 
of representatives from the colony's prosperous professional7pclass, most of whom were also lapsed freetraders. The chief 
factor that had prompted such men of commercial and profession­
al wealth to undergo fiscal conversion was their factional ant­
ipathy towards Parkes; Parkes’s monopoly of freetrade sentiment 
naturally inclined them to adopt the rival fiscal label, part­
icularly if they had ambitions for political power and influence. 
Another important factor seems to have related to the fact that
the country districts of New South Wales became the stronghold
73of protection, "'and men of commercial or professional prosper-
ry j
ity, who already held country seats'4or whose influence and
73connections were largely country-based, reasoned that their 
chances of defending their interests in parliament were far 
better if they promoted the dominant ’protectionist’ sentiments 
of their country electorates, rather than fight a possibly fut­
ile battle in the name of freetrade. Whatever their reasons 
for fiscal conversion, however, all these men of wealth were 
linked by a universal adherence to ’moderate’ or ’discriminating’ 
protection, the basis of which was an aversion to direct taxat­
ion. Dibbs expressed the common opinion when he admitted that, 
although ’’there was necessity for fresh taxation in some shape 
or other” to remedy the colony's financial defecit, ’’they must 
find fthisH taxation through the Custom-house”, thereby avoiding
L  J  rpr
the need for direct taxation, °or what Henry Clarke described
77as ’’the objectionable income and property tax”. William McMill­
an exposed this line of argument when he referred to those ’’men 
who ... prefer moderated protection, as it is called, who ... 
prefer to have a 10 per cent ad valorem duty, although they hold
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free-trade principles, in order to avoid direct taxation,
The accuracy of McMillan’s comment was revealed in 1888 when, in 
response to the Parkes ministry’s sham proposal to introduce 
direct taxation, John See expressed the common protectionist re­
action by stating, ’’with a view to show that the proposed land- 
tax was unnecessary”, that the imposition of 10 per cent ad val­
orem would be the preferable way of obtaining revenue, and con­
cluding that "this is not an opportune time for an alteration in
7°the taxation of the country”.
This emphasis on indirect taxation had a particular
appeal to the colony's wealthy class, another section of which
became closely identified with the protectionists between 1887
and 1891c The economic principles of protection had little to
o ooffer to the colony's wealthy pastoralists, "'“but since the early
1880s many had been politically associated with the factional
8lopponents of Parkes,0 'and had therefore made the natural conver- 
sion to 'protection' in 1887- In addition, others, like R.B. 
Wilkinson, who distinctly denied being a protectionist, prob­
ably based their support of the protectionists on their "nolicy
85for the treatment of country districts, The threat of a
land tax in 1888, however, prompted a further increase of
Oi
squatter support for the protectionists. 4E.W.0'Sullivan had 
warned that "a land-tax will drive every man of property and
O  [T
wealth over to the side of protection”, 4and the 1889 general
election proved him correct, for protection swept the "pastoral
86inland districts”, ’ Jforcing the Herald to remark on the degree
to which "the squatting constituencies” had favoured protect-
87ionist candidates. 'The election therefore produced an increase
in the number of squatters returned to the Assembly as members
88of the protectionist party.
E.W.0'Sullivan also perceived the motive for this in­
crease in squatter support for the protectionists when he de­
clared that it was "Not because they love us, or altogether app­
rove of our principles, but they will save pounds, shillings,
89ana pence”. The Herald was forced to agree: "Mr Dibbs had de­
clared that if protective duties are established there will be
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no need for a land tax; and it is pretty clear that the hope
of avoiding a land tax has influenced the pastoralists in fav-
Q0our of protection”.'“The pastoralists, moreover, did not deny
it. Host outspoken was T. H. Hassall, who declared: **I shall
never advocate a system of direct taxation. I believe the prop-
91er way to derive revenue is through the Custom-house”. W.H.
Traill’s comment that "the protectionist party was held in det-
92estation by the propertied class" seems, therefore, less accur­
ate than Dilke’s observation in 1890 that "rich people generally 
... supported the protectionists to avoid a land-tax or a prop­
erty-tax which would fall mainly upon them. Customs duties, 
the rich rightly think, will bear more heavily upon other class-
Among the prosperous protectionist manufacturers there
was, however, a division of opinion concerning direct taxation.
On the one hand, there were doctrinaire protectionists, like
Q4J.M.Toohey, who favoured virtual prohibition-' and the consequent
99recourse to direct taxation as giving the greatest benefits to
manufacturers; on the other hand, there were those who preferred
a semi-protective policy "to raise revenue from imported luxur-
96ies and goods suitable for home production", with the aim of 
creating some expansion of domestic production, as well as re­
taining the benefits of indirect taxation. As a result, a num­
ber of manufacturers, including the MLA,W.J.Allen, opposed dir- 
97ec t taxation.
There were, however, a number of protectionists who
universally condemned indirect taxation for the very reason that
it did "press with unequal force upon different classes of the
community", and who strongly felt that "The wisest course is
consequently for protectionists to have recourse to direct tax-
98ation", on the grounds "that taxation should be imposed accord-9Qing to the ability of people to bear it". •'Such men were the 
party's democrats, but not all came from the ranks of the col­
ony's less fortunate. Some, notably the two pastoralists Thom-100as Waddell and Alexander Ryrie, favoured direct land taxation; 
Ryrie admitted the justice of a tax that would tend to break 
up the large pastoral estates, despite the fact that he was a
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10.1considerable land holder himself»” ' For the most part, however, 
those who advocated direct taxation were the special represent­
atives of the poorer members of colonial society, particularly 
the small farmer and the urban labourer. The advocacy of dir­
ect taxation amongst the representatives of these sectional int­
erests was not, however, entirely unanimous. Furthermore, cert­
ain sectional differences existed amongst them to prevent them 
forming a thoroughly united democratic phalanx, and certain fis­
cal ambiguities were also present to create a degree of confus­
ion and division amongst them over the actual timing of the im­
position of direct taxation.
Not all those who regarded themselves, or were commonly
regarded, as representatives of the small farmer and free sei- 
102ector were advocates of direct taxation. One notable example 
was W.J.Lyne who represented Hume in the interests of the free 
selectors,^ ^and who stated that the object of a protective pol­
icy v/as that "duties . . . imposed upon various articles , . .
should bring a revenue which ... would prevent taxation in other
104directions ' ’Even those small farmer representatives who
did favour direct taxation had certain reservations, particul­
arly about a land tax, and differences of emphasis arose amongst 
them. A considerable number favoured a land tax to 'burst up 
the big estates', but nearly all demanded a considerable exempt­
ion figure or a progressive tax to prevent the tax burden fall­
ing on the small farmer. Instead of exemption from tax for
holdings up to the value of £500, as proposed by the Parkes min-
105istry's land tax bill, James Gormly claimed that "the exempt­
ion ought to apply to properties of the value of £2,000",^°
107and E.W.0'Sullivan put the figure as high as £5,000. ‘Austin
Chapman strongly pressed for a progressive land tax. °0thers
argued against a land tax in any form. Both J.M.Chanter and
E.W.0 'Sullivan agreed that "the principle of a land-tax is good",
but Chanter objected to a policy that placed "additional burdens"
on those whom he represented, particularly in circumstances in
which the farmers were given no encouragement "to get their prod-110uce to the markets of their own colony". O'Sullivan maintained 
that it was "grossly unfair to attempt to make the landowner, 
selector, and farmer bear the brunt of the taxation of the
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country". Men with such views felt that "there would be far
greater justification for an income tax" on the grounds that
112"there would be a more general distribution of taxation", 
forcing not only landowners, but also "rich lawyers, and doc­
tors, and other professional gentlemen ... to contribute a fair
113amount of taxation". ' ^
Other democratic protectionists who did not directly 
represent the interests of the small farmer were less concerned 
with the specifj.c details of a land tax than with the simple 
goal of lifting the burden of indirect taxation from the work­
ing class "by requiring property and prosperity to contribute 
to the expenses of Government in some approach to the proport­
ion of their redundancies of me ans" . " ^Thus, men like W.H.
Traill, N.Melville and T.Walker advocated direct taxation with-
113out reservation, whilst W.C.Wall and R.Stevenson were able to
116vote for the freetraders' direct taxation proposals, "Don the 
grounds that what was provided was of greater importance than 
what was withheld.
Of even greater significance in producing ambiguities 
in the advocacy of direct taxation by democratic protectionists 
was their concern for protection. Many of the democrats, like 
Melville, O'Sullivan, Traill and Rose, were doctrinaire prohib­
itive protectionists, who realised that "... if you have a true
117protective policy, you must have direct taxation".  ^Yet, whilst 
they recognised that "in the matter of direct taxation there is 
scarcely a shade of difference between [true] protectionists and 
freetraders", °they could not support the freetraders' propos­
als for direct taxation. Their first priority was the creation 
of a protective tariff, and many agreed with O'Sullivan when he 
stated that "no form of direct taxation will suit me until we 
get a protective tarif f". ^ ^They regarded freetrade proposals
to introduce direct taxation as inimical to the creation of a
120true protective tariff: “ the closer the approach to true free-
trade, the greater the distance from.true protection. High­
lighting the ambiguity of his stance, O'Sullivan proclaimed
that "Men, by their environment, are often obliged to oppose
121measures of which they approve".
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They were, moreover, obliged to support measures of 
which they disapproved, and such was the protectionist demo­
crats’ dilemma in relation to Dibbs’s 1891 tariff, for in no 
sense was it a truly protective tariff and it merely perpet­
uated the undemocratic system of indirect taxation. The protec­
tionists had just achieved power, and the democrats among them
felt that they could not kill the bill and bring down the min- 
122istry, but they were not slow to describe the measure as "a
125mongrel sort of tariff”, and to declare that "it was not sat- 
isfactory to the supporters of the protectionist party”. 'In 
particular, the radical protectionists complained that the tar­
iff was not ’real* protection, but simply a "bastard system of
custom-house taxation”, designed "to shield the rich and to tax 
125the poor”. W.H.Traill later gave point to the latent conflict 
within the protectionist party when he described those who ad­
vocate "a sweeping tariff for revenue purposes, spiced with 
just sufficient flavour of protection to deceive and cajole the 
protectionist electors” as "Tories”, and among them he singled 
out Lyne and See. _DShortly after the introduction of the Dibbs 
tariff in December 1891> a number of the democratic protection­
ists, including T.Pose, E.W.O'Sullivan, H.McKinnon and G.T.Miller 
expressed their dissatisfaction by creating "a political organ­
isation, to be called the Democratic Party”, one of whose ob-
127jectives was "a more equitable adjustment of taxation”.
Direct taxation was, however, only one aspect of the 
democrats' range of concerns. W.H.Traill, who described him­
self as "a democrat and a protectionist”, expressed the broad­
er context of democracy when he "described democracy as a pol­
icy of feeling for others less fortunate than themselves in the 
present organisation^of society, and the extension of the ben-
efits of life through the widest possible area”. ~°Democrats
129particularly supported "The interests of labour”, and there 
was within the protectionist party a number of men who espoused 
the cause of the labouring classes by openly supporting trade 
unionism and advocating such measures as the eight-hour day 
and factories and workshops legislation. Some had long been 
associated with the cause of the labouring classes. For
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instance, H.C.Hoyle had been "an active trades unionist" since 
the late 1860s, and was "a prominent figure in the ironworkers1 
strikes in 1873 and 1882"; ^  ^ Ninian Melville was a prominent 
leader of the WMDA in the late l8?0s ; ^ a n d  E. W. 0 * Sullivan was 
the representative of the Typographical Association on the TLC 
in 1882, ^ "^and became the Council’s president in 1883.
During the 1.880s, moreover, these protectionist radic­
als had worked hard to tie the fortunes of organised labour to
134the cause of protection. Unlike the radical freetrader, B.R. 
Wise, men like O'Sullivan had considerable success in this ven­
ture, but even they were doomed to ultimate failure. In May 
I885j the PPRL invited the TLC to send its president and sec- 
retary to a protectionist conference,"' and the invitation was
accepted after a "lengthy and acrimonious discussion" and a
136close vote, in which O'Sullivan recorded his assent. At the
second session of the conference, the TLC delegates committed
themselves to the protectionist cause, and a resolution was
passed calling on every trade to "pledge itself to support
none other than protectionist candidates at the forthcoming gen- 
137eral election". This commitment was reinforced in September 
1886 at the inaugural meeting of the National Protection Assoc­
iation (NPA1) when the president of the TLC, J.V.Wiley, strong-
1 7 0
ly supported the association and its protectionist objectives. J
The NPA1 was soon after remodelled and renamed the Protection
139Union of New South Wales (PU). ' Initially under the strong 
influence of the radicals, O'Sullivan and Rose, the NPA1-PU 
continued to press the TLC to become closely involved in pro­
tectionist organisation. In October 1886, the new TLC presid­
ent, W.Westman, was appointed to the executive committee which 
refashioned the NPA1 into the PU, and TLC secretary, Symons, 
ex-president, Wiley, future president, Talbot, and Westman were 
members of a committee to organise "a mass demonstration of pro­
tec tionists".l4lThe TLC delegation at the demonstration on 13 
November was completed by the vice-president, J.V/est, 4 and he 
later told the TLC that "from 20 to 25 Trades were represented" 
at the meeting.1/44 The PU followed up this success by inviting
the TLC president and secretary to become permanent members 
144of its council, ''but it was at this point that the formal
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relationship faltered. TLC delegates had already expressed their
concern that ’’danger may arise from the Council taking a too
] L ^prominent part in Political matters”, ""and it was thought that 
the PU’s latest proposal ’’should not be entertained”.lz+°The 
invitation was, therefore, courteously rejected as being "out- 
side the objects of the Trades Labour Council”. Although this 
decision did not deter some prominent TLC members from maintain- 
ing their protectionist associations, Jthe possibility of a 
permanent formal union had disappeared, and the TLC reasserted 
its position as ”a non-political body”, able to ’’take no part 
in party politics” .J'4 *
Despite this setback, the number of parliamentary pro­
tectionists with democratic instincts and sympathy for the cause
of labour grew, particularly after 1887. During 1886, O ’Sullivan
150launched a campaign in parliament in support of labour reform, y 
and, in the fight for labour, he and others like Melville, 
J.Creer, R.M.Vaughn and J.k.Mackinnon were joined in the Assemb­
ly by such other democratic protectionists as T. WajLker in 1887,
J.P.Howe in 1888,1^1W.N.Willis, W.P.Crick, W.Grahame,152 
W.H.Traill, A.Hutchison, W.F.Schey and J.G.Gough in 1889? and 
H.C.Hoyle and Thomas Rose in 1891. In addition, some of those 
elected as representatives of the colony's small farmers, not­
ably R.Barbour, G.T.Miller, H.McKinnon and A.Chapman, joined 
those already mentioned in advocating the cause of labour. The 
democratic sentiments cf some of these protectionist MsLA were 
demonstrated in 1891 when five were chosen by the LEL to run as 
Labor candidates. On 9 June 1891> the Redfern LEL chose W.F.
Schey and J.P.Howe, after both had pledged themselves to the 
1 53Labor platform; in Young, J.A.Mackinnon and J.G.Gough pledged
154themselves to the LEL platform, and both were selected to rep-
155resent the cause of Labor; '""finally, R.M.Vaughn, ”a declared
156supporter of the whole labour platform”, was chosen by the1^7Grenfell LEL as its candidate. In addition, the Labor League
of Bourke, which was not officially recognised by the central 
158 159LEL, chose W.N.Willis and J.P.Howe, after the latter’s de~
160feat for Redfern, as its candidates. As a result, Gough, 
Mackinnon and Vaughn re-entered the Assembly in July 1891 as
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.1 61official members of the Labor party.
Within the protectionist party, the democrats came to 
form a solid core, pressing for labour reform and opposing the 
basic conservatism of the party. In December 1891} men like 
O ’Sullivan, Rose, H.McKinnon and G.T.Miller formed a democrat­
ic parliamentary protectionist 'cave13 the Democratic Party,
whose major object was the passing of "democratic and labour 
16-legislation", ‘"including regulations for factories, workshops
and coal mines, amendment of the Masters and Servants Act, and
163the restriction of alien and pauper labour. -"After lapsing in-
to inactivity, the party was revived during 1893k ‘and its
numbers expanded to include such other democrats as W.H.Traill,
163A.Hutchison, R.Barbour and A.Chapman* 'The radical cause was 
further advanced by the formation in February 1892 of the "re­
trenchment party", ^ "’^ with a membership of over thirty, and led 
by O ’Sullivan as president, and Rose as secretary * ^ Dedicated 
to curtailing unnecessary expenditure, reducing the salaries of
officials, resisting salary increases, and pruning military ex- 
168penditure, A °the retrenchment party was seen by O ’Sullivan as
169"a pathfinder of democratic politics", and was supported by 
such democrats as W.H.Traill, who claimed that, while the col­
ony suffered a depression and its working class struggled to
survive, it was unjust that officials should receive high sal- 
170aries. Such a development among the democratic protectionists
during the life of a protectionist ministry was seen by the
Herald as "nothing less than flat rebellion". ‘ A further act
of rebellion took place in September 1892 when four radicals,
O ’Sullivan, Melville, Walker and Willis, supported a Labor move
to censure the Dibbs ministry for its handling of the 1892
172Broken Hill strike. Dibbs had apparently ordered the arrest
173of the strikers' leaders,' and his radical ’supporters’ did 
not approve; within the protectionist party, there was a basic 
conflict between those who upheld the force of capital and these 
who supported the cause of labour.
This conflict had always been present among the prot­
ectionists, and had erupted on a number of occasions before 
1892, particularly when strikes and trade unions were involved.
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In October 1883, the Parkes ministry despatched troops to New­
castle to quell a series of labour disturbances. This action 
led to a number of altercations among the parliamentary pro­
tectionists, Ninian Melville castigated the ministry for ’’the 
soldiers being used to help the wealthy mine-owners to crush the 
poor miners", but J.P.Abbott "found himself compelled to uphold
*i n I
the Government in this matter", 'George Dibbs went even furth­
er, declaring that "he himself would have despatched the de­
tachment of troops some weeks sooner", thus demonstrating, as 
the Herald put it, his support for the anti-unionist and pro-T n c:capitalist doctrine of ’freedom of contract’„' 1 Even prior to 
the expression of this conservative hard-line, it had been re­
ported that Dibbs "was universally distrusted by the working 
classes on the leading questions of the day" and that he was 
"looked upon as an enemy",' °The same conflict was evident
within the protectionist party during the labour disturbances 
of 1890 and I89I, While O ’Sullivan, Melville, Traill, Greer, 
Walker and Schey championed the cause of the trade unionists 
during the Maritime Strike of 1890, the wealthy mine-owner,
James Fletcher, demonstrated his vested-interest opposition to 
178trade unionism.
The protectionist party also contained others who had 
similar reasons for repudiating the claims and rights of labour. 
The shipowner, John See, for instance, participated in a confer­
ence in 1886 in support of a proposal by the Steamship-owners’
Association to reduce the v/ages of seamen in view of trade179union interference in the management of the industry, ^In add­
ition, the coastal shipping firms of both See and B.B.Nicoll
180were members of the Steamship-owners’ Association, whose re- 
rejection of the marine officers' wage claims in July 1890 pre-n p 2cipitated the maritime strike," 'The squatters, W,Alison and
W.E,Abbott, were prominent members of the Pastoralists’ Union
2 q p  1 8 ^of New South Wales, formed in July 1890 ^to resist the demand
of the Amalgamated Shearers' Union that pastoralists employ
only union members as shearers. In fact, it was W.E.Abbott,
184 ,"an intrepid opponent" of the Shearers' Union, who came to 
assume the leadership in the pastoralists' refusal to recognise 
the Union and its relentless fight for the individualist
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185principle of ’freedom of contract*. "Furthermore, the manu­
facturer element within the party was commonly designated as
"selfish fand"] undemocratic" and "the object of the Trades
186Unionists’ deepest detestation". ' it was claimed that they 
"want no Eight-hours Bill, no Factories and Workshop Acts, ..., 
ho stringent Employers’ Liability Bill - in short, nothing that 
would ameliorate the lot of labor, and reduce the profits of 
monopolists"
Opposition to trade unionism and the cause of labour
in the protectionist party was also reflected in the continuing
adherence to the traditional Manchester liberal emphasis on the
evil of class legislation and on the non-intervention and neut-
rality of the state in social and industrial matters. ~°This
non-partisan conservative liberalism was expressed during the
ISOmaritime strike by Henry Copeland, who claimed that "The
duty of Parliament is to make laws, and not to interfere with
what, after all, may be regarded as a private quarrel between
190two sections of the community". " The dominance of vested-inter­
est conservatism and traditional conservative liberalism in the 
protectionist party was reflected clearly in the leadership of 
George Dibbs, and in the men he chose to serve in his two pro­
tectionist ministries. With the possible exceptions of J.M. 
Chanter and the vacillating Copeland, no men with progressive 
or radical views were included in either ministry. Dibbs set 
the seal on his conservatism when he announced , in 1893> that 
at the next general election "he would make the abolition of
payment of members the cry of the Government", a proposal that,
191according to V/.H.Traill, "would mean death to democracy".
Dibbs’s decision brought to a head the internal conflict with­
in the party, for it prompted Traill to declare that "he could 
not, and would not any longer support Sir George Dibbs ....
It was impossible for him to hold as a leader any man who made
it a Government cry, the abolition of the most essential of
192democratic legislation - payment of members".
Prior to the protectionists’ assumption of power in 
1891j the internal party conflict between the democrats and the 
conservatives at no point reached the stage of an open breach
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such as that declared by Traill in 1893. This was largely be­
cause the protectionists, without the burden of having to gov­
ern or legislate, could and did avoid specific policy pronounce­
ments on issues likely to cause internal party controversy. The 
conservative domination of the party was demonstrated by the 
fact that, despite the constant efforts of the protectionist 
radicals to bind the party to a specific programme of social and 
political reform, no such programme was ever adopted. The con­
servatives successfully resisted all radical attempts to come to 
terms with the colony’s pressing issues, and even on the few occ­
asions when such issues as direct taxation and overdue social 
and labour reform were raised, discussion was vague, details 
were avoided and the matter was quickly dropped. The risk of 
fully exposing the obvious rifts within the party, and the im­
possibility of satisfying all the interests represented in it 
prevented the formulation of a specific principled party plat­
form. Furthermore, the longer the conservatives could avoid 
the detailed consideration and adoption of proposals for soc­
ial change, the longer the status quo that was to their advant­
age would be preserved. Under their guidance, therefore, what 
emerged from policy discussions, in place of a specific party 
platform adjusted to the colony’s urgent social and economic 
problems, was little more than a vague and rather irrelevant 
list of administrative generalities *
Like the conservative freetraders, the protectionist 
leaders also conveniently prolonged the life of the fiscal issue 
as the primary source of political conflict, in order to avoid 
having to face and commit themselves on more pressing issues.
Not that there was any more basic consensus on the details of 
protection than on any other issue, but vague fiscal platitudes 
sufficed to create the illusion of party unity, and all other 
issues could either be ignored or left to individual opinion.
In I89I5 Archibald Forsyth correctly pointed out that the pro­
tectionist appeal to the electors in 1887 and 1889 was based 
solely on ’’the beam” of protection. ^ ^In 1887? "in view of the 
determination to make the fight one of freetrade v. protection”, 
the parliamentary opposition resolved that ’’All other questions”,
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including direct taxation and payment of members, be "regarded
as secondary" and "left to the individual discretion of the
1Q Lmembers of the Opposition". Even at this early stage the 
conservatives’ dominance was made clear. On the subject of a 
direct property tax, it was reported that "opinion was not un­
animous", end, because "the suggestion does not on the whole
pocappear to have met with approval", it was cast aside.
All subsequent deliberations on the formulation of a 
party platform or programme took place within the protectionists' 
extra-parliamentary organisations. These, however, were also196under conservative control and, consequently, all the efforts 
of the radicals to bind the party to a specific programme of 
social reform were dashed; all that emerged were undefined 
platitudes to prevent the exposure of fundamental conflicts, 
and a conservative emphasis on non-political questions, all 
major issues being either ignored or considered in meaningless 
generalities. In July 1888 the radicals, Melville and O'Sull­
ivan, attended a conference of local protectionist organisations 
in Yass, and there outlined the programme of a new democratix 
protectionist federation, the Australian National League. In­
cluded in the programme was a long list of social and politic-197al reforms. The following month a wider conference of the
198manufacturer-dominated PU was held m  Sydney, at which it was 
moved that the platform of the League, including such democrat­
ic reforms as an elective tipper House, payment of members, leg­
alisation of the eight-hour system and a Workshops and Factories 
Act, be endorsed by the conference. The proposal, however, was199rejected out of hand. B.R.Wise pointed out the successful con­
servative tactic of "diverting public attention from pressing 
evils" by hiding behind the fiscal issue;^ ^this tactic was 
employed by the conservatives in both fiscal movements. Aware 
that the adoption of the new radical platform would be proposed 
at the conference, PU vice-president and conservative manufact­
urer, Archibald Forsyth, "better known among the working men of
901Sydney as 'Anti-eight-hour Archy " V  demonstrated his opposit­
ion» The PU, he claimed, was formed for the sole purpose of 
achieving "a change in the fiscal policy of this country", and 
it was "undesirable and ... extremely injudicious to change
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the position taken up ’ey the Protection Union from its format-
POPion" by the consideration and espousal of other issues. v‘_
Aware of the dangers to party unity by raising con­
tentious issues, and conscious of the dominant conservatism of 
the party, George Dibbs appealed to the electorate in 1889 on 
such non-political issues as water conservation, the establish­
ment of agricultural colleges and model farms, sanitary reform,
the development of mineral resources, railway construction and 
PO'5law reform. "The same approach tc protectionist party policy
was also adopted at the NPAJ+ conference in October 1889? held
partly to undertake "the formation of the general platform of 
20bthe party".^ ‘Despite an awareness of the poor relations "exist--
205ing between capital and labor”, the announced list of subjects 
which, ’’when considered, would form the basis of the future pol- 
icy” of the party,'" was extremely limited, and was dominated 
by such topics as railway construction, mining laws, different­
ial railway rates, water conservation, encouragement of the
207fisheries and the establishment of a department of agriculture.
The conference chairman, Edmund Barton, recognised the limited 
and largely irrelevant nature of the policy issues to be dis­
cussed when he stated that "if liberal conclusions were come to, 
only on the matters named on the list of subjects,they would by 
dealing with them alone do good work ...”. °Such topics, how­
ever, were nothing more than "practical matters, which concern
209administration rather than principle”, and, as such, the
leading protectionist, Archibald Forsyth, recognised that they
"cannot be considered political party questions” and "could not
210usefully form part of a platform”.
The protectionists obviously realised the risks of 
including issues involving large principles, and they included, 
at the most, two on their agenda. As in the deliberations of 
the freetraders, the discussion of such issues revealed latent 
conflict, yet the dominance of the conservatives was made plain 
in the refusal to discuss details, the vagueness of the decis­
ions arrived at, and the deliberate avoidance of certain issues. 
One of the few subjects that involved political principles was 
the question of electoral reform, including the proposals for
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211single-member electorates and ‘one man one vote’. It was un­
animously resolved that "plural voting be abolished, and the
212principle of one man one vote be substituted",- 'but on the 
question of single-member electorates, there was considerable 
division of opinion. In general, conservative opinion opposed 
the proposal on the grounds that it "destroyed the power of min- 
orities being represented",1 'whilst progressive opinion was
P ~ l Jstrongly favourable.1" ‘The final resolution was the meaning­
less compromise that "the system of single electorates be ad-
213opted where practicable". A further subject under the heading 
of electoral reform revealed mere clearly the basic conflict be­
tween the conservatives and the progressive democrats. A res­
olution that "all elections should take place on the same day 
throughout the colony", ' Jalthough finally agreed to,6" 'evoked 
prolonged discussion and considerable differences of opinion.
The cautious, conservative approach was expressed by a delegate 
from Bathurst, who pointed out that "they would have to be care­
ful not to do anything rash. There was a possibility of going
218too far, and it might be that they had done so already". ‘The
conservatives, Barton and Archibald Forsyth, rallied to this
point of view, Barton declaring that "there were large, grave
public dangers to be feared from having all the elections on 
21Qone day". The radical MsLA and future MsLA at the conference,
however, vigorously supported the resolution. E.W.0 ’Sullivan
declared that "It was a true democratic principle", and that
"it was better to lose the services of one or two good men,
220and have the reflex of the voice of the people".
The conservatives showed their strength when a move
221was made to discuss the question of an elective Upper House; 
not only was the suggestion immediately ignored, but the quest­
ion was not raised again during the conference. The conserv­
atives also demonstrated their successful tactics of avoidance 
over the issue of direct taxation. One of the subjects set 
down for discussion was the question of local government. In 
itself, it was scarcely an issue involving basic principles,
and it was generally recognised as being "no longer a party 
222question"." In his introductory speech, however, Barton stated 
that, during the discussion of the subject, "he hoped they would
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2 v <discuss taxation on Land values”. Che initj liscussion 
the question, however, deliberately avoided any mention o: 
direct taxation, the principal re-solution simply affin ing that 
"this conference recognises the necessity of a Local Government
Q  -A )
Bill j and recommends its early introduction”.'* ‘ "‘The question of 
direct taxation was not raised until the introduction of m . 
endnent, which sought to confer the powers of taxation on local
22 sgovernment authoriti.es.. ' General protectionist reticence abour.
direct taxation was revealed by one delegate, who stated that
"He would prefer to see f a "] Free-trade government introduce the
bill, because there was a number of people who did not wish to 
226be taxed, When the radical protectionist, S. A. Byrne,
supported the amendment, he was cut short by the usual conserv­
ative objection that "it was not competent for the conference toop?enter into the details of the bill". The conference generally 
steered well clear of the taxation question, and the general
2? 8feeling was that "the amendment appeared ... to go too far"/''''
22 qand that "it would be wasting time to go into details". As a
result, the question was shelved, the amendment was lost and
the vague and rather meaningless original resolution "was carr-
230ied by a very large majority".
Although no other questions involving political princ­
iples were broached, Edmund Barton told the audience at the fin­
al public meeting of the conference that the protectionists 
"had been engaged in ... deliberation on ... the policy which
they would announce as their platform to the public in any con-
23]test they might have in the future", ' and he called upon the
meeting to endorse what he referred to as "the future legislat-
232ive policy of the party". - Vague and hollow, rather than spec­
ific and meaningful,# and based largely on matters of practical 
administration rather than questions of principle, the forty's 
’platform' gave little satisfaction to the protectionist radic­
als. It was hardly surprising, then, that under the leadership 
of O ’Sullivan, J.P.Howe and the future MLA, R.A.Price, there
was held in October 1890 a meeting of "protectionists favourable
233to the adoption of a more democratic platform". The meeting 
decided to form a new organisation, to be named the National 
Democratic Association, and it adopted a sixteen-point platform
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that included such democratic measures as reform of the Upper
House, legalisation of the eight-hour system, and a Factory and
234Workshops Act with inspection.
Not only was the radicals' specific platform totally 
ignored by the party's parliamentary leaders, but what little 
the NPA4 had provided by way of a party platform was also dis­
regarded by George Dibbs during the general election of 1391. 
Immediately prior to the election, it was reported of the pro­
tectionists that "No policy has been decided upon, and Mr Dibbs
explains that it is not the function of the Opposition to form-
235ulate one at the present stage". Several days later it was re­
vealed that "one thing only will be required of candidates opp­
osed to the Government - allegiance to Mr Dibbs on the fiscal
policy. On other questions of the day candidates are to be all-
236owed freedom of opinion and speech". ' Archibald Forsyth testif­
ied to the lack of any party policy when he expressed his "re­
gret that the platform of the party has not been laid before 
the electors at this crucial juncture", and he highlighted the 
party's general refusal to formulate a specific and relevant 
party policy when he stated that "It has been determined to carry 
on this campaign on the same lines" as those employed during the 
1887 general election. Once again the undefined and emotion­
ally charged fiscal issue masked the reality of an unprincipled 
electoral contest on old factional lines, and it again served 
to submerge issues of great social and political importance be­
neath the political surface. By 1891> however, the success of 
this tactic was beginning to evaporate. At the previous elect­
ions in 1887 and 1889 the uncomplicated, but unprincipled,
238"freetrade v. protection" approach had been unchallenged; no 
other political party existed to expose its hollowness, and the 
radicals in both parties presented no alternative policy in con­
trast to the official party approach, as projected by Parkes and 
Dibbs, except in their individual speeches. This, however, was 
not the case in 1891*
In 1891 the freetrade radicals disassociated themselves 
from the ’old' approach and used a radical-dominated extra-
23 'parliamentary body to present their specific programme of reform; "
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the protectionist radicals did the same. In May 1891? there 
was formed in Newcastle a new organisation, the Newcastle 
Labour and Protectionist Parliamentary League. Und er the 
leadership of local protectionist radicals, the League adopt­
ed a radical platform, which included the eight-hour day, an 
elective Legislative Council, direct taxation and "the advoc­
acy of any measure calculated to elevate and improve the vvork-
ph ping classes"."' As a result, it was not long before the radic­
al MsLA, O'Sullivan, Gough and Grahame, were using the League
pLpas a mouthpiece for their opinions. ' A similar development 
took place in the electorate of Argyle, where the radical pro­
tectionist, Thomas Rose5 contested the election in advocacy of 
a progressive platform drawn up by the Goulburn Protection 
Union and including direct taxation, factory legislation and 
eight-hour legislation. '^These developments within both part­
ies clearly demonstrated that by 1891 the radicals were no long­
er prepared to submit quietly to conservative dominance; by mid-
1891 they were prepared to take a stand independent of their
24 A--party's conservative leadership. In terms of the progressive 
cause, this decision paid dividends, and a number of freetrade 
and protectionist radicals were returned to the Assembly for 
the first time. ^ ^Af ter three defeats ,^^Thomas Rose was at 
last successful in Argyle.
If these developments made a dent in the conservatives’
armour, the entry of the Labor party into the Assembly did more
to loosen the conservatives' dominance of both fiscal parties.
At the 1891 election, there existed for the first time a viable
alternative to the hollowness of fiscal politics, a new party
247with a specific sixteen-point programme that came to terms
with "large and urgent problems" and tapped "a vast reservoir
of protest and will to reform". ,0At the election the Labor
21Qparty won thirty-five seats in the Assembly, to hold the bai-
250ance of power between the two fiscal parties. Its powerful 
parliamentary presence urged the fiscal radicals on to further 
acts of independence in defiance of dominant conservative ooin-
251ion, and some Labor members actively joined with the protect­
ionist radicals in exerting radical pressure on Dibbs after 
1 8 9 1 • Yet, despite these developments, all of which made 1891
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a very significant year in the transition from Factions to co­
hesive, principled non-1 boi parties, th protectionists re­
mained by the end of the year a party without a clearly defined, 
principled policy. Although clearly in the ascendancy, the con­
servatives had deemed the wiser course to be to ignore and avoid 
facing up to the major social problems that beset the colony and 
begned so1ution, rather than commit themse1ves, however conserv- 
atively, on the large principles involved. Perhaps their tradit­
ional liberal notions of classlessness and state non-interference 
facilitated this avoidance, but there were also other important 
factors. To ignore successfully the colony's pressing social 
problems and need for reform was effectively to postpone change 
and. preserve the status quo; in addition, the policy of avoid­
ance had the great advantage of suppressing and delaying the ex­
posure of the fundamental conflicts of principle that lay just 
beneata the surface of both parties.
IT
Some Conclusions
In the years between 1887 and 1891? the differences that 
divided the two fiscal parties, conservative-controlled as they 
both were, were negligible. After the large 'policy-making' 
conferences held by both parties in 1889? at which almost all 
major issues of principle were avoided or treated with scant re­
spect, the opinion was expressed that "after all there is pract­
ical unanimity between the two fiscal parties upon everything
253but the great main issue".' And even on the fiscal issue, there 
was, in reality, very little to separate them/''The general 
nature of the conflict between the two fiscal parties, as shaped
by the men who led them, was that of two 'rival syndicates',
2 55motivated oy the quest for political power and little else. -y
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Fiscal politics simply perpetuated the old factional "battles
between the ’ins’ and the *outs ’"« " 'But that was the way
Parkes planned it, for the one major objective of his scheme
of re form, so astutely conceived and executed in .1886, was pol-
itical stability,*■ ' and his obvious success in achieving that
much-needed quality provided in itself a basic change from pre-
258viously inchoate factionalism. The creation of two political 
parties any more than superficially united in nominal adherence 
to an undefined fiscal doctrine was neither considered nor att­
empted, and in the years to 1891 did not eventuate.
Parkes's employment of the tralitional conflict between 
freetrade and protection, however, sowed the seeds for the event­
ual emergence prior to 1900 of at least one true political non­
labor party: a body of MsLA united in principle, political phil­
osophy and legislative vision. Unintentionally, Parkes had laid 
the foundations for further changes that would dramatically alter 
the nature of politics in New South Wales. The transition from 
the stable, but unprincipled, fiscal syndicates, sired by Parkes, 
to principled and cohesive political parties was, however, slow 
and tortuous.
The wide-ranging practical, principled and philosophical 
implications of both freetrade and protection, initially ignored 
by Parkes in his quest for political polarisation, attracted a 
large number of new men to politics in 1887 and thereafter, and 
it was their genuine concern for principle and doctrine that in­
jected a new element into the colony's political life. Between 
these men of principle, however, there existed fundamental diff­
erences over the specific economic meaning and the social implic­
ations of their respective fiscal creeds, and there developed 
within each party a deep-seated conflict between what was bas­
ically a conservative political outlook and a view that regarded 
either freetrade or protection as a means to eliminate class 
privilege and achieve a just social orderc This new principled 
or doctrinaire approach to politics began to impinge not only
upon the nature of party policies, but also on such aspects of25Qpolitical life as parliamentary behaviour and discipline and
26Oelectoral organisation, and it began to effect changes in the
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political system well beyond those envisaged and wrought by 
Parke s«
In view of the rising tide of doctrinaire concerns, the 
older pragmatic faction politicians were virtually forced to de­
clare themselves either conservatives or progressives. Being 
older traditionalists, nearly all, including Parkes and Dibbs, 
sided in principle with the conservatives. As a result, doc­
trinaire conservative liberals, vested-interest defenders of 
the status quo and the older factional traditionalists combined 
in both parties to control their party’s fortunes, and to stave 
off the challenges of the radicals to assumed traditions and an 
outmoded social order. Political stability and party unity had 
still to be maintained, however, and by submerging explosive 
and divisive issues beneath ’’the tin-kettle [ fiscal] controversy” -' 
radical change was avoided and the conflicts within both parties 
were papered over and hidden from view. Policies adjusted to 
the colony’s social and economic problems were sacrificed to the 
maintenance of political stability and superficial party unity.
The issues upon which both parties appealed to the elec­
torate were, then, largely undefined and irrelevant, and almost 
identical. The gulf that separated them was negligible; the
real political conflict lay within them both. Both parties ’’ass-
262umed a vertical division in the colony”, containing repreSent-
p^-7
atives, both conservative and radical, of all social classes/ 0" 
W.H.Traill elaborated on this fact when he stated that ’’Had the 
separation of classes been complete - had all the Conservatives 
and no others been on the side of freetrade, and all the democ­
racy on the side of protection - the result would not have been 
as many months in doubt as it now has been years. But the fact 
was otherwise the democracy was divided between both”/' ‘
The 'principled policy’ vacuum in both fiscal parties 
and the failure of both to formulate constructive solutions to 
the colony's social and economic problems slowed the transition 
towards principled politics that began after 1886. In addition, 
meaningful inter-party conflict, with one party providing a 
viable alternative to the governing principles and policies of
the other, was conspicuously absent prior to 1891. But change 
had begun, and it was the men of principle in both parties who 
provided the force behind that change. The traditional con­
servative liberals, themselves men of earnest convictions, were 
happy enough to acquiesce in the continuing policy stagnation 
of remodelled factionalism; and it was the progressive radicals 
who applied the pressure for change in the area of principled 
party policies. The consequent conservative-radical conflict
was also evident in other spheres of politics subject to change,
265notably party allegiance and discipline. Only in the field of 
electoral organisation were the new men of principle able to 
achieve some degree of harmony; their co-operation in this 
field constituted a basic change in the political system. Be­
fore a political party, united in principle, policy and prac­
tice, could emerge, however, it was necessary that the basic 
conflict within each fiscal group be resolved.
Between 188? and 1891? the conflicts within each party 
simmered, but the tension gradually mounted as, especially on 
matters of principle and policy, the radicals in both parties 
were repeatedly frustrated. To a large extent, it was in 1891 
that the conservatives’ dominance of both fiscal parties was 
loosened. Not only did the radicals themselves in that year 
act more positively and independently, but their cause was 
given great impetus by the entry into politics of the Labor 
party, a body which came into being largely because of the in­
transigent conservatism of the fiscal parties during the prev­
ious four years. Its presence instilled new vigour and determ­
ination into the fiscal radicals' challenge to the dominant 
forces resisting change.
In the face of this rekindled vigour, conservative con­
trol began to evaporate and the decks were cleared for an un­
disguised ideological war to be waged within both parties. In 
October 1891? the freetrade radical, Sydney Smith, aided sub­
stantially in forcing the resignation of the ministry of which
he was a member, and in the same month Parkes was replaced by266G.H.Reid as freetrade leader. In the new atmosphere, the
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radical challenge assumed a more direct form, and a new radical2 A 7free trade organisation, the FTLREC,“ under the leadership of
268B#R. Wise, fought an unremitting battle to bind the free trade
«'“N
party to a policy of direct taxation and social reform."’0"
Reid, a genuine reforming moderate liberal^ and an astute pol­
itician, sensed the dynamic of this movement and he pledged the
freetrade party to a policy of genuine "liberal progress and re-
‘ 271form", adjusted to the needs of the colony» In doing so, he 
forced recalcitrant conservatives either onto the fringes, or 
out of the party. By the end of 1897? after struggles with 
Parkes, other conservatives and the relentless Wise, Reid had 
moulded together a political party that was united in principle 
and policy, and that was prepared to come to grips with the prob­
lems facing the colony.
The evolutionary process among the protectionists was 
much slower. Forced to bear the stigma of conservatism on acc­
ount of Reid's progressive policy, shackled until 1895 by the 
unprincipled, outmoded leadership of George Dibbs, and hampered 
by the need to retain sufficient cohesion between 1891 and 1894 
to keep the party in power, the protectionists made little head­
way in the resolution, of their conflicts. Despite their trench­
ant criticism of Dibbs and his ministry, the radicals had to 
support him to prevent the return of the freetraders to power.
In 1892, E.W.0 1 Sullivan expressed his desire "for a new and 
clear line of cleavage between the political parties; the con­
servatives would drift to one side, the democrats to the other, 
272In a sense this happened, but not in a way that gave 
joy to the radical protectionists. The fact that in 1895 a num­
ber of old freetrade conservatives, under the leadership of
Parkes, 'drifted* ove-r to the protectionists and into coalition 
273with Dibbs did not make the radicals' task any easier. Austin 
Chapman recognised the trend when he stated in April 1897 that 
it was "apparent to the observant that of the recent converts 
to protection not an insignificant quota must be credited to the 
revolt of those who ... are made aware that even an approach to 
real freetrade must impose upon them an unwelcome burden of new 
[direct^] taxation"; ^ ^4and Y/.H.Traill referred in 1893 to a
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conservative "conspiracy” which sought to capture full power 
in the protectionist party, to bind it to a determination "to 
abolish direct taxation”, and "to sell Tit] ... into Tory bond- 
age"* -'By 1897s the conservative-radical conflict among, the
pn r
protectionists still remained unresolved.^ °
The ultimate resolution of the fundamental conflicts 
of principle that existed within both fiscal parties is well 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but their conclusion cannot 
be divorced from their origins. It was during the late months 
of 1886 and the early months of 188? that a fundamental trans­
ition in New South Wales politics was begun; by 1891 it was, 
however, far from concluded*
CHAPTER 5
I 3CHANTS AND MANUFACTURERS: Extra-
Far liainentary Fiscal Organisations.
I. Development, 1885-1389
"There were ... a large num­
ber of manufacturers and oth­
ers who had a direct interest 
in protection .... There were 
[also] a large number of merch­
ants who had a direct interest 
in free trade. There was no 
doubt about that;
- G.H.Reid, 1837
(DT, 27 September 1887,p.5).
I
After 1885 & number of extra-parliamentary fiscal 
organisations were active in the colony's political life; by 
1891> however, all were virtually extinct, victims of the 
principled conflicts and power struggles in an era of political 
change and transition. Both had been torn apart by the same 
ideological conflict that threatened to dismember their related 
parliamentary parties.
The structure of a true political party depends upon
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a fundamental and permanent co-ordination between the parliam­
entary group and the extra-parliamentary body, a bond based on 
the presence o'f frequent and consistent connections." By the 
beginning of 1889? however, regular co-ordination between the 
two parliamentary fiscal parties and their related extra- 
parliamentary organisations had not been established. This was 
for two basic reasons. In each parliamentary fiscal party 
there was represented a wealthy and predominantly conservative 
interest group: Sydney's merchant class was significantly rep­
resented in the free trade party, and the colony's manufacturing 
interest was present, though in a very limited way in the pro­
tectionist party. The development of the major extra-parliam­
entary fiscal organisations, at least until March 1889? should 
be seen in terms of their domination by these economic interest 
groups. The wealth and resources of the freetrade merchants 
and protectionist manufacturers enabled them to maintain an 
organisation and direct its activities. Their leadership, how­
ever, became a power monopoly, discouraging or preventing the 
participation of those with conflicting interests. As a result, 
the major protectionist and freetrade extra-parliamentary bod­
ies were narrow in composition and unrepresentative of the more 
broadly based parliamentary parties. Consequently, the relations 
that existed between the parliamentary fiscal parties and the 
extra-parliamentary organisations until 1889 were either very 
limited, or, in the case of the protectionists, antagonistic.
The second basic reason for the absence of permanent co-ordinat­
ion between the two wings of each fiscal movement was the dev­
elopment of a basic power struggle, in which each sought to ex­
ercise ultimate control over the other.
By the beginning of 1885 there existed in the colony
three separate organisations that advocated protection. Of
these, the first to have been established was the Protection
and Political Reform League (PPRL), which came into being in
July 1881. As the leader of the infant protectionist movement
in the colony, the League immediately attracted to its ranks
•2
members of Sydney's equally infant manufacturing class, " and 
by early 1883 "some of the most influential gentlemen" in the 
colony were its active supporters/' The leaders of the PPRL,
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however, sought a far wider and more representative base of
support, and it was their basic democratic instincts which
gave the League its real and lasting character. Led by radie­re 6 7als like Ninian Melville,' William Richardson and R.C.Luscombe, f
an ardent admirer of the Victorian radical leader, Graham o
Berry, the PPRL also espoused the cause of the colony's work­
ing classes by agitating in their interests. As early as Dec­
ember 1881 the PPRL had been in contact with the TLC, seeking 
to arrange a joint public demonstration to celebrate the pass­
age of legislation restricting the entry of Chinese into the 
colony.^ In March 1883? Luscombe again corresponded with the
TLC on the subject of their joint opposition to assisted imm- 
1 0igration, "and in 1885, the PPRL consolidated its ties with 
organised labour by securing TLC representation at a confer­
ence on protection. "^By 1883? then, it was authoritatively 
reported that the PPRL was supported by both manufacturers and 
working raen.^
The League strove to cement this alliance by present­
ing protection as the panacea for the grievances of both 
groups; in fact, it aimed to v/eld all the struggling forces of 
production - labourers, manufacturers and farmers - into a
cohesive army, bound together by a common adherence to pro-
13tection as their only means of self-preservation. To achieve
this, the League formulated a platform based on protection for
industry and agriculture and backed it up with the advocacy of
such other measures as land law reform, an absentee tax and
payment of members.~^0n the strength of its appeal to the 'dis-
1 5contented', the PPRL grew from an initial membership of twelve
to 100 in 1884?"^ and to over 200 by the beginning of 1887." ^
The League also mounted a vigorous campaign to establish local
branches throughout the colony. By the time its vice-president
set out in July 1883 on a tour of country areas to initiate
18branches, at least eight local leagues had already been est­
ablished . ^ B y  the end of 1885? at least a further five local
20leagues had been opened, and from the ranks of one of these,
21the Canterbury Reform and Protection Alliance,' there first
emerged into public life a young twenty-nine year old radical?
22Thomas Rose. In May 1889? it was claimed, probably not without
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exaggeration, that since its inception, the PPRL had establish-
, 23ed over sixty branch associations. "
The PPRL's populist ambitions to unite the forces of 
discontent behind protection^ ''"''were shared by another emerging 
radical protectionist, E.W.0'Sullivan, and it was he who was 
responsible for the creation of the other two protectionist 
organisations in existence at the beginning of 1885. At a 
public meeting in January 1884 to protest against assisted imm­
igration, 0 ’Sullivan delivered an address "on poli tical matters, 
such as protection, and lie proposed that a democratic alliance 
should be formed to meet ... and discuss matters affecting the 
welfare of the working people". On 5 Febraury 1884> the Demo­
cratic Alliance (DA) was formally inaugurated "to secure as 
far as possible a due and proper representation of the working 
classes" in parliament.^ 0 ‘Sullivan outlined an extensive pro­
gramme of radical reforms, including legalisation of the eight- 
hour system, abolition of the Legislative Council, an absentee
tax, payment of members ("the keystone of the democratic arch"),
27and, of course, protection. O'Sullivan's founding efforts
attracted to the DA such prominent urban radicals as G.F.Carton,
W.P.Crick, Alfred Miller, A.J.Kelly, S.A.Byrne and F.Flowers/0
Having galvanized the urban labourers into political action,
O'Sullivan now tried to attract the forces of rural discontent
to the Alliance. In July 1884? he changed the name of the DA
to the National Reform Association, and invited the participation
29of sugar growers, farmers and miners. "To the farmers, the sub­
ject of land reform was paramount, and O'Sullivan proposed that 
the Association hold a convention in January 1885 to discuss 
the two issues of land reform and fiscal protection
Events intervened, however, to prompt O'Sullivan to 
drop his scheme that envisaged the DA as the basis of a broad- 
based reform league, and to explore other avenues to gain the 
support of rural interests for protection arid democracy. The 
passage of the 1884 land bill, providing security of tenure 
to the squatters, aroused great agitation among the farmers 
and free selectors. This agitation presented O'Sullivan with
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an immediate opportunity to influence the rural community. As
he himself later commented, he "kept moving with the times",
abandoning the National Reform Association or DA, as it again
became known, and "going as a delegate to a Farmers' Confer- 
51ence" held in August look under the auspices of the Land Law
32Reform Alliance." “This was now to be the organisation through 
which he would attempt to create his national reform organicat- 
i on.
Although the subject of protection was not raised at
the 1884 conference, O'Sullivan initiated his plan when, in
the final resolution, he succeeded in having the name of the
organisation changed from the Land Law Reform Alliance to the
Land and Industrial Alliance (LIA), and L.F.Heydon was elected
33president of the new body. O'Sullivan later recalled his eff­
orts in founding the LIA, "which was intended to combine the
ti farmers with the workers in the city and towns as a democrat- 
34ic movement". Thereafter, however, O ’Sullivan's account of 
the LIA becomes off-handed and inaccurate; he fails to mention 
the presence of Heydon,who remained president at least until 
the end of 1885?" "said he limits the total membership of the 
Alliance to three men, himself as president, and the two rad­
icals, W.P.Crick and S.A.Byrne, as vice-president and secretary
38 37respectively.' In fact, O'Sullivan was the LIA secretary^'and
"z O
Crick was prominent,°but Byrne's importance in the Alliance is
39 40doubtful.' Rather than treating the LIA as "a leg-pull",
O'Sullivan was probably irked by the fact that the Alliance, 
in which he had placed so much faith, failed him as the means 
of realising his vision of a united reform movement; its dom­
inant rural membership proved rather too sectional and lukewarm 
on protection. Further, O'Sullivan's refusal to acknowledge 
Heydon is probably explained by the fact that it was the con­
servative Heydon who first proclaimed the view that the manuf­
acturers were the rightful leaders of any protectionist organ­
isation, and who later led the betrayal of O'Sullivan's popul­
ist scheme in the cause of manufacturer domination.
In direct contrast to O'Sullivan's account, the LIA by 
November 1884 had expanded considerably since its inception.
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As the result of a vigorous campaign to gain the official supp­
ort of the rural communitythe LIA comprised, by the end of
1884, twenty-three branches and affiliated farmers' unions and
j
free selectors’ associations. Throughout 1884? however, the
three protectionist and reform organisations remained separate
entities, the relations between them being at times distinctly
unfriendly. Rivalry, rather than co-operation, dominated their
relations. In February 1884-, the newly-formed DA requested that
the PPRL withdraw its candidate, secretary R.C.Luscombe, from
the field for a by-election in East Sydney, but the request was 
43flatly refused. r This rivalry between the two city-based organ­
isations was heightened in July, when DA leader, O'Sullivan, 
described PPRL president, Richardson, as "a mad teetotaller", 
and secretary Luscombe as "a narrow minded fanatic".
3y mid~l885> however, the time for the attempted integ­
ration of all three bodies into one broadly-based protectionist 
reform organisation had come, and the LIA, O ’Sullivan’s chosen 
vehicle, undertook the task. The Alliance planned a conference 
"of all the industrial classes of the Colony" to be held in July
1885, for the purpose "of combining them for their common good,
45and deciding upon a united policy". The LIA, therefore, summ­
oned its sixty-four branches and affiliated rural organisations 
to attend the conference / ’^ and also invited a number of trade 
unions, miners' organisations and "several leading manufacturers 
to attend. !'In addition, both the PPRL and the DA were invited 
to attend, and both accepted.^From the very start of the con­
ference, the need for unity between "the selectors and farmers
who people our soil, the artisans who throng our cities", and
49the "toiling" miners was stressed, and the conference concluded
with the unanimous adoption of a resolution that "the farmers,
manufacturers, miners, and industrial classes should combine in
50political union,
No formal motion consolidating this statement of des­
irable union was moved or adopted, however, and no new organis­
ation, amalgamating all the interests represented at the confer­
ence, was inaugurated. Despite the fact that the PPRL and the 
LIA co-operated in campaigning during the 1885 general election,
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the LIA conference had clearly demonstrated the strength of 
the sectional differences that were to prevent the creation 
of a fully integrated protectionist organisation. These diff­
erences were most forcefully revealed during the discussion on 
the question of protection itself. Although the urban inter­
ests present were committed to the advocacy of protection, 
O'Sullivan had not previously attempted to bind the dominant 
rural elements in the LIA to the doctrine, and its introduct­
ion as a subject for discussion at the conference clearly sur-
52prised and angered a number of rural delegates." Sven those 
from rural areas who favoured protection displayed their sec­
tional concerns by opposing a resolution that made no distinct­
ion between protection for farmers and protection for manufact­
urers, and they were successful in forcing the conference to
55treat them as two separate questions."''
A further disquieting feature of the conference was 
the strong claim made by Sydney's manufacturers to the outright 
leadership of any integrated protectionist organisation. Al­
most until the conference began, the ranks of the manufacturers 
were scattered and disorganised, and in any united protection­
ist body they faced the prospect of being dominated by the pop­
ulist radicals who had set the wheels of integration in motion. 
In response to this unpalatable prospect, however, the manufact­
urers set about consolidating their forces, and creating an 
organisation that would rival the radical-dominated LIA as the 
basis of an integrated protectionist organisation. The LIA 
conference formally met and was opened on the evening of 30 
July 1885 in the Sydney Town Hall, ‘that same afternoon in the
same place, a number of prominent manufacturers had met, under
the chairmanship of Archibald Forsyth, "to consider the advis-
55ability of establishing a Chamber of Manufacturers". "In the 
circular inviting them to attend, Forsyth had commended the 
formation of the Chamber to the manufacturers for their "mutual 
benefit and protection of their interests", and had concluded 
by envisaging the Chamber as a body that would take steps "to 
join the various existing organisations for tariff reform, ..., 
in forming a powerful, and general association on a fair trade 
basis, which might be appropriately named the Fair-trade and
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g GProtection League of New South Wales”. "The meeting approved 
the proposal, and a committee was appointed to bring the Chamb­
er into active operation. ! It was in the light of this activity 
that the manufacturers' friend and ally, L.F.Heydon, that same 
night told the LIA conference that the leadership of any integ­
rated organisation should naturally fall to the manufacturers. 
Because the "farmers and working men cannot maintain an expens­
ive and complete and long continued organization", the manufact­
urers, Heydon claimed, were "the natural officers" of the move­
ment. Only they, he maintained, could "find money for elections", 
support a newspaper and paid officials, pay lecturers, "and gen- 
erally keep on the sustained campaign necessary for success...".'''" 
Heydon had perceived the potential for manufacturer-domination 
of the protection movement, and he was later to be instrumental 
in aiding the manufacturers realise that potential; he, more than 
anyone else, was responsible for the lack of truth in his own
statement that "the rank and file of the Liberal army, the farm-
59ers and artisans, can trust them absolutely"."
Rather than promoting unity, the LIA conference clearly 
revealed the difficulties that confronted men with populist vis­
ions, like O ’Sullivan. Rural concerns were obviously not the 
concerns of the urban dweller, and rural interest in protect­
ion was lukewarm. ^ Moreover, among the urban interests, the 
manufacturers were clearly not prepared to accept the leader­
ship of working-class radicals. The LIA conference had demon­
strated that the ideal of a grand rural, artisan and manufact­
urer alliance was feasible only in theory; the closer it came 
to realisation, the stronger were the reservations, and the 
more conspicuous were the narrow sectional interests and rival­
ries which acted to keep the forces of protection divided. The 
populists were thus forced to start again, this time on a narr­
ower front and with modified ambitions. Their efforts now be­
came solely concentrated on the consolidation and amalgamation 
of the forces of urban discontent in support of protection. 
Probably revitalised by Parkes's mounting fiscal crusade in the 
Assembly, the process of integration seems to have been resumed 
first among the urban radicals, for, in July 1886, the "joint 
secretarys [sic]" of the PPRL and the DA secured the participation
5/150
of the TLC in a demonstration in favour of protection. 1 Clearly 
the PPRL and the DA had overcome their rivalry; although they 
never officially amalgamated, ^they were now obviously working 
in close harmony, and several prominent members of the DA, inc­
luding G. F. Carton, now became prominent members of the PPRL.1'
This encouraging development seems to have infused new 
life into those radicals who strove to integrate all who favour­
ed protection into one central body, and on 17 September 1886
the inaugural meeting of a new organisation, the National Pro-
61tection Association (NPA1), was held in Sydney. ''"Attended by
r f -
representatives of the PPRL,o:>the TLC, the radical urban wing
of the LIA, the Chamber of Manufactures (CM), and almost cert-
66ainly the DA,^ the conference unanimously supported a resolut­
ion that, "in view of the fact that there are several protect­
ionist associations in existence, this meeting considers it ad­
visable for each of them to send two or more delegates to a 
conference, for the purpose of establishing a central council 
to govern the whole body".J'Although confined to the integrat­
ion of urban protectionists, the NPA was clearly the brainchild 
of protectionist radicals whose populist visions had been prev­
iously frustrated by the sectionalism of rural interests. The 
radical, Thomas Rose, was president of the new organisation, 
and O'Sullivan, in seconding the above resolution, expressed 
his great pleasure in seeing "the various protectionist bodies
ro
drawing closer together, ...". °In the euphoria of unity, how­
ever, a. major problem remained hidden from view: the threat to 
unity posed by the presence in the new organisation of two fund­
amentally opposed urban interests. The presence of both spoke­
smen for the industrial labouring class and representatives of 
the colony's manufacturers brought the basic conflict between 
labour and capital into the affairs of the NPA, and, in the con­
sideration of hov/ power would be distributed within the 'united' 
movement, the conflict soon became apparent.
■s
The voice of the manufacturers was scarcely heard at 
the NPA's inaugural meeting; at the conference of "about 50 
representatives" of the various protectionist organisations, 
held in October to discuss the details of the new integrated
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organisation, their influence, however, was clearly present.
Not only was the conference chaired by their friend and ally,
69L.F.Heydon, but the manufacturers also secured equal repres­
entation with the radicals on a committee, appointed to give 
effect to a resolution that "a supreme council, consisting of 
delegates from the various manufacturing associations, protect­
ionist bodies, trades organisations, and others, be formed for
the purpose of promoting and directing” the protectionist move-
70menu. The specific task of "the Supreme Council Committee” 
was "to draw up a constitution for a union of existing assoc­
iations in favour of protection”, and to make recommendations
nion the actual formation and composition of the Supreme Council. ~ 
Its report and recommendations, therefore, would ultimately de­
termine the nature of the united organisation, and, despite 
their subsidiary role in initiating the integrated body, the 
manufacturers were not to be denied a strong influence in its 
creation. A second committee appointed by the conference to
7?make arrangements for "a mass demonstration of protectionists” 
was of much less importance, and it was of little consequence
73that the manufacturers secured only three of its twelve places."
On 10 November, the two committees reported back to the 
conference. The council committee had drawn up a constitution 
for "The Protection Union of Nev/ South Wales” (PU), and this be­
came the official name of the organisation, formed "to unite ... 
the various associations formed for and now advocating the in­
troduction of a protective policy ... into an active political 
organisation”. 4The report was adopted, and the conference pro­
ceeded to appoint "a preliminary committee of 21 ... to fully
75initiate the union”. The composition of this preliminary comm­
ittee, elsewhere referred to as the "provisional executive comm-
76ittee of the Protection Union”, and what was, in fact, the bas­
is of the Supreme Council of the PU, was of vital importance.
The integration of protectionist forces, evident in the decision 
to establish the PU, was clearly the work of those radicals 
whose populist visions had been demonstrated since the early 
1880s; should they lose control of the organisation, the PU ran 
the risk of being swamped and dominated by sectional interests, 
narrow in vision and self-seeking in aim. This, in fact, is
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what happened. Although there were nine prominent radicals on 
the provisional executive, control 03" the committee belonged to
nn
the CM and its allies;1'how they would utilise their control 
remained to be seen.
Meanwhile, jubilation at the novelty of apparent integ­
ration, and the vigorous activity usually associated with a new 
organisation, held sway. On 17 November, it was reported that 
Thomas Rose "had been elected the paid secretary of the union", 
and that the PU would set up a permanent office in the city
no
"for protection work". °It was hardly coincidental that the PU
offices were located in the rooms occupied by the CM in Bathurst 
79Street. Affiliation of the various protectionist bodies with 
the integrated Union also began. On 16 November, the PPRL de­
cided to hand over all its "heavy correspondence" to be "attend-
8 0ed to by the union secretary", and it agreed to forward "the
8lsum of two pounds ... as officiating fee". Other bodies must 
have followed suit, for it was reported during December that
3the Union's finances were "in a flourishing state". ‘
The three major objects of the PU were the spreading 
of the protectionist gospel, the establishment of "branches of 
the union throughout the colony", and the provision of assist-
0 7
ance to protectionist candidates in electoral contests. '"’From 
the moment of its inception, the Union embarked with vigour, on 
its propagandist task. The arrangements for a mass demonstration 
of protectionists at the Sydney Domain were energetically proc-
O )
eeded with, 4and the gala occasion was duly staged on 13 Novemb- 
89er. That, however, was just the beginning; by mid-January 1887?
the PU had arranged lecture tours of country areas by some of
86its prominent members,°°arranged and held a further "open-air
O  ry
mass meeting" of protectionists,0'and appointed a literary comm­
ittee to examine the "desirability of at once publishing protect-
QQ
ion literature".
The establishment of a network of local branches depended 
initially on the willingness of the branches of bodies like the 
PPRL and LIA to become affiliated with the PU. The PPRL seems 
to have encouraged its branches to affiliate v/ith the PU, and
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the branches themselves responded by sending in the affiliation89
i e e f q r t h eir r e pres e n t a t i o n i n t h e U n i o n. T h e LI A, no w under
the central direction of Crick and O ’Sullivan, also played its 
part. The reticence of a number of LIA branches and affiliated 
rural associations to commit themselves to an advocacy of pro­
tection, and the consequent difficulty of affiliating the ent­
ire LIA organisation to the PU was recognised by the LIA central 
committee. In December, it overcame the difficulty by eliminat­
ing the advocacy of protection from the LIA platform, "so as to 
leave the Alliance purely a Land Law Reform Society", and also 
by granting "leave to such of its various branches, as so des­
ired, to affiliate with the Protection Union, thus consolidating
90the protective parties all over the country". The PU itself 
also prepared to take an active part in the initiation of bran­
ches by drawing up "A code of rules for the formation and govern-
91ance of country branches . ..". The activities of the PU in 
establishing its branch network, however, were interrupted to­
wards the end of January 183? by the need to attend to the 
third of its major duties, electoral organisation.
It has been claimed that the prote'c tionists ’ organisat­
ion during the general election of 1887 "may be fairly describ­
ed as the first full-scale ’party* organization in New South 
Wales". This claim is based not only on the fact that the PU 
appeared to have integrated all professing protectionists into 
a central protectionist organisation, but also on the fact that 
the protectionists’ electoral campaign was "directed by a cent­
ral executive composed of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
92elements". Duverger has stressed this parliamentary-extra­
parliamentary relationship as basic to a political party: "Once 
these mother-cells, .parliamentary groups and electoral committ­
ees, have come into being, it is enough that some permanent co­
ordination be established between them and that regular connect­
ions unite them, for us to find ourselves faced with a true pol- 
93itical party". Despite the appearance of ’co-ordination’ between 
the PU and the parliamentary opposition in January 1887? the 
development of the PU, both before and after the general elect­
ion, demonstrated that this co-ordination was neither ’permanent’ 
nor harmonious. From its inception, in fact, the PU successfully
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resisted the creation of permanent links with the parliament­
ary wing of the movement; instead, there developed a condition 
of permanent estrangement between the Union and the parliament­
ary party, and the two wings engaged in a long-lasting struggle 
for control of the protectionist movement throughout the colony. 
The reason for this estr ngement seems clear. Shortly after 
its inauguration, the PIT, through its council, came under the 
domination of the CM and its allies, to the virtual exclusion 
of all other interests and opinions. Manufacturer representation 
in the parliamentary party, however, was quite the opposite; 
farming, pastoral, commercial, professional and radical elem­
ents held sway in the parliamentary party, to the almost total
exclusion of the manufacturers, who, after 1886, were able to
94win no more than two seats in the Assembly. 'In view of this, 
and determined to retain their strong influence in the movement, 
the manufacturers forcibly resisted all attempts by the parl­
iamentary protectionists to make the extra-parliamentary body 
more representative and to bring it under the control of the 
parliamentary party. This resistance was the cause of much 
friction.
The process by which the CM assumed its monorjolistic 
control of the PU was begun early in December 1886. The con­
stitution of the Union empowered the council to add to its num­
bers, and, using their slender majority on the original council, 
the manufacturers, on 4 December,'elec ted five new council mem­
bers, all of whom were manufacturers and four of whom were prom-
95inent members of the CM. This take-over process received added
impetus on 21 December, when six new additions were made to the
council. These included two members of the CM, and two promin-ogent allies of the manufacturers, L.F.Heydon and S. H. Hyam.'y "The 
domination of the CM was fully revealed in the formal election 
of the officers of the PU. Heydon's services were recognised 
by his election as X're£i^ent of the Union, and Hyam was accord­
ed the honour of sharing the vice-presidency with CM president,
A.Forsyth. The office of treasurer and the places on the small
five-man executive committee were then filled almost exclusively
97with members of the CM. The influx into the PU council of man­
ufacturers and their wealthy al.lies continued unabated throughout
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the early months of 1887,' and the point was eventually reached 
where the PU was regarded as "nothing more nor less than a little 
party of manufacturers, who have been posing as a national pro­
tectionist organisation, whereas they were merely the nominees 
of the Chamber of Manufactures, which means, of course, them-
QQselves” ''It is in this context that the relations of the PU 
with the parliamentary protectionists should be examined.
It was in connection with the mass protectionist demon­
stration of November 1886 that the PU first made real contact 
with the developing protectionist force in the Assembly. Only 
three MsLA had been actively engaged in the creation of the PU,^^ 
but the demonstration seemed to initiate and herald a close tie 
between the PU and the parliamentary wing of the movement. The 
PU demonstration committee announced on 10 November that the 
prominent MLA and potential protectionist convert, J.P.Abbott, 
would preside over the demonstration,Ju“and at least eight other
MsLA attended the November demonstration and the one held at the
10?end of December. Any closer or more formal association than
this was not, however, desired by the PU council for fear of
diluting manufacturer domination, and this was subsequently made
103quite clear. Of the two MsLA on the original PU council, one 
was a radical and the other a prominent manufacturer; thus the 
anticipated equal representation of diverse interests in the 
integrated organisation was achieved. Despite the support given 
to the PU by protectionist MsLA, by the time of the 1887 general 
election, the council had added only three further MsLA to its 
ranks, and all three were either members of the CM,or sympathet­
ic to it in its successful bid to monopolise the Union."^'Clearly 
the council was neither prepared to admit anyone who did not 
share its limited outlook, nor was it prepared to run the risk 
of being dictated to by the parliamentary wing of the movement.
Thus, when the PU council met "the protectionist memb­
ers of Parliament" (as distinct from the parliamentary opposit­
ion) at the offices of the CM on 25 January 1887 to arrange the 
organisation of the protectionists' general election campaign,
"an animated discussion extending over nearly three hours" took
105place before any decisions were arrived at.
93
The 'animation'
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probably arose from an argument as to which wing should assume 
the ultimate control over electoral organisation, and it would 
appear that it was the PU that carried the day. Although the 
meeting appointed "a joint committee of protectionist members 
of Parliament and gentlemen selected from the council ... [to] 
prepare a list of suitable candidates", the list had first to 
receive the approval of the full PU council before being re­
leased for publication.1 ^ 'Further, although joint finance and
107literary committees were also appointed at the meeting, the
control of these matters clearly rested with the PU. As was
3 08pointed out by Heydon in 1885?’  ^ and as was again the case dur­
ing the 1889 general election,^^it was the manufacturers' fin­
ancial resources that finally determined the PU's organisation­
al leadership. It was accurately pointed out that "Political 
warfare cannot be successfully conducted ... without funds",“ 1 
and the fact that the protectionists had "plenty of money"1“1
and spent "ten pounds for every one" disbursed by the free- 
112traders was due to the indispensable involvement of the PU. 
Only with PU financial involvement, later estimated by the 
Union itself as close to £1,500, "could the protectionists 
employ "lecturers and agents", print "protectionist bills and 
pamphlets by the hundred thousand", and subsidise candidates.
The PU duly issued a list of candidates whom it "dec­
ided to support", and the list was first published on 29 Jan- 
117uary. It contained selections for fifty-two electorates, to
11 8which those for three further electorates were later added.
The final number of electorates for which candidates selected 
by the PU were announced rose to fifty-seven out of a possible
seventy-two due to the movement of some selected candidates from
119one electorate to another. At first sight, this organisation 
seems impressive, particularly in view of the necessary haste 
in preparing the list and the fact that in only one electorate
did a local protectionist league contribute to the selection of
120a protectionist candidate. Furthermore, the PU also undertook
the task of providing protectionist candidates where none had
offered themselves, and in several electorates the protectionist
3 PIcandidates appear to have been positively sent out by the PU.~ 
Thomas Rose, for instance, in contesting Argyle, stated that he
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"had been sent out by the Protection Union, so that the free-
122traders might not have a walk over", ' and W.S.Targett was sent
] 2'5by the Union to contest the Hastings and Manning electorate*
Such activity was, however, far from comprehensive, and twelve ] pielectorates remained uncontested by any protectionist candidate..
Because of inexperience and over-anxiety, the most dam­
aging weakness of PU organisation was the fact that a large num­
ber of candidates supported by the Union seem to have been chos­
en without their knowledge and consent. This created a situat­
ion in which many candidates denied their candidature and repud­
iated their PU selection, thus creating gaps that were never 
filled in many electorates, and generally casting doubt on the 
credibility of the PU1s electoral organisation. In response to
requests from local protectionists in Inverell and Orange to
125provide a protectionist candidate, the PU selected a candid­
ate for each elecotrate and included them in its original pub- 
126lished list. Both candidates, however, denied their candidat- 
127ure, one claiming that he had "never given any authority" for 
128his selection. A number of other candidates selected by the
129PU also publicly denied their candidature and selection. In
fact, out of the fifty-seven electorates for which the PU made
selections, its original arrangements were upset, in one way or
another, in no fewer than twenty-seven. Some of these changes
were caused by selected PU candidates changing electorates to
fill gaps, J but the majority were simply due to the failure of
131PU candidates to enter the contest at all. Apart from a minor 
reshuffling of its candidates, the PU replaced none of these 
non-starters, and, as a result, no PU candidate was nominated
132in twelve of the electorates for which selections had been made
and, in terms of its original arrangements, the PU was under-
133represented in a further eleven electorates. Another factor 
that further reduced the effectiveness of PU organisation was 
some candidates' repudiation of any ties, particularly financial, 
with the Union on the grounds that such links threatened their 
independence, the greatest of political virtues.
Yet, what was most revealing about both the embryonic 
state of electoral organisation and the far from settled nature
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of fiscal allegiances was the fact that the PU gave its supp-
] 35ort to a number of declared freetraders. '"This led to vehement
denials of any connections with the protectionists and sharp
’156repudiations of PU selection, ''and gave point to B.R.Wisers
observation that "Certain newspapers were giving an imaginary
list of protection candidates, but the next morning they found
many of the gentlemen named indignantly denying the fact, and1^7saying they were freetraders".
A further aim of the PU was to ensure that "candidates 
running in the interest of protection ... [would] not clash",1 
but events in two electorates clearly demonstrate the overall 
failure of the Union to deploy its forces efficiently and to 
prevent disastrous vote-splitting. On 29 January, it was ann­
ounced that the PU would support V/.P. Crick for both East and
13°West Macquarie, and J.Hughes for East Macquarie. This conform­
ed correctly to the number of seats available, but to simplify 
matters, Crick retired from West Macquarie and Hughes left East 
Macquarie to take his place. 1Af0When, however, Crick was defeat­
ed in East Macquarie, he re-announced himself for the single­
seat West Macquarie, thus duplicating PU representation and 
causing a split in the vote that cost the protectionists the 
seat. In Hartley, the president of the PPRL, William Richard-1 hpson, was announced as the selected PU candidate, "but this in 
no way inclined tv/o local protectionists, B.Doyle and R.J.Inch, 
to r e t i r e . I n  desperation, two days before nomination, the 
PU recalled Richardson, replaced him with the less strident 
John Young of the CM,^H and again appealed to at least one of145the recalcitrant local men to retire. The Union's efforts, 
however, were to no avail, and the presence of three candidates
in a single-seat electorate cost the protectionists another vie-
, 146tory.
The PU must have been aware of the inadequacy of its 
organisational efforts, for immediately after the election it 
prepared "an electoral circular setting forth the desirableness 
of organisation, and calling upon protectionists throughout the 
colony to form associations in their various electorates"."1 ' 
Throughout the remainder of 1887, the PU was principally
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occupied in fostering the establishment of a widespread net-
1 4 8work of local branches, ’ ^and in April 1888, the Union's annual
I./Qreport stated that fifty-six branches had been formed, w
The character of the PU during 1887, however, became 
no more representative; in fact, the dominance of the manufactu­
rers became even more pronounced. As a result of the 1887 elect­
ion, the representation of MsLA on the Union council declined
1^0from five to two," and no others seem to have been elected to 
replace those who had lost their seats in the Assembly. Some 
measure of the PU's reticence to admit MsLA to its ranks was 
shown in its refusal ever to elect to the council the longest- 
standing and most consistent protectionist in the Assembly,
Ninian Melville. Melville's rejection was also evidence of the 
Union's thinly disguised rejection of the protectionist radic­
als. After January 1887? however, the latent antipathy between 
the capitalistic manufacturers and the pro-labour radicals be­
came more evident. As the manufacturers assumed full control 
of the PU, the radical elements in the council were gradually 
forced out or voluntarily resigned in protest, thus further 
accentuating the manufacturers' dominance. In January, the PU
was represented to the TLC as "hirelings of the Chamber of Man- 
151ufacturers", and the Council severed what formal links it had
152established with the Union. In the same month, the Union's
radical secretary, Thomas Rose, resigned his post to contest
153the electorate of Argyle at the behest of the council; but 
following his defeat, the council failed to re-appoint him as
151,secretary. Finally, E.W.0 'Sullivan, the one radical MLA on
the PU council, had by the end of 1887 resigned from and pub-
155licly repudiated the Union.
The ever-widening gulf between the PU and the radicals
inevitably produced open and hostile clashes between the two
sections of the movement. During the 1887 general election,
the president of the radical DA and candidate for South Sydney,
Alfred Miller, characterised those connected with the PU as
156"paid hireling[s] of the manufacturers", and in May, during
the ministerial election in South Sydney, PU president, Heydon,
157indulged in a reciprocal public vilification of Miller. This
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action, it was later claimed, aroused »»the hostility ,., [of 1
the working classes” towards the PU, and was responsible for
] 03the narrow defeat of the protectionist candidate. '• As a con­
sequence, it was further claimed, “a movement for radically
159re-organising the protectionist party" was begun, "'and this 
movement came to a head in October 1887*
The demand for re-organisation came from two main sec­
tions of the movement: "the parliamentary section of the pro­
tectionists" criticised the PU as "worse than useless" and un­
representative in character,'^'0^and the protectionist radicals
claimed that the Union was neglectful of, and, in many cases,
1 6lopenly hostile to, the cause of labour. ' They pointed to an
instance in December 1886 when three members of the CM, all of
J 6 Pwhom were also members of the PU council, came out in oppos­
ition to certain provisions of a proposed Workshops and Factor­
ies Bill. In particular, they objected to the introduction of 
the eight-hours system and to a general shortening of working 
hours per week, to the payment of employees during holidays, 
and to the inspection of factories.“^Towards the end of 1887, 
the protectionist MsLA and radicals combined to initiate a re­
organisation of protectionist forces, and on 7 October, they 
convened a conference, to which the PU was not invited "rand
165at which they expressed their dissatisfaction with the Union. 
Among the MsLA present were the radicals E.W.0 ’Sullivan, N.Mel­
ville, T.Walker and J.Creer, as well as the new party leader, 
G.R.Dibbs, together with J.Fletcher and J.P.Garvan. Among the 
extra-parliamentary radicals present were W.H.Traill and Thomas 
Rose, as well as John Norton, J.R.Talbot, T.Symons, J.E.West,
1 r r
J.Mennie and C.Johnson of the TLC, and W.Richardson and R.C. 
Luscombe of the PPRL, which had also split from the PU and had 
expressed its "readiness to merge their own organisation in any 
new one which would unite all sections of the party". JrDibbs 
expressed the concern of the MsLA when he called for an amal­
gamation of all sections of the protectionist movement to be 
directed by a new "supreme central executive", presumably con­
taining a significant number of MsLA. The radicals gave vent 
to their grievances by claiming that "the interests of the 
working-classes had not been studied with sufficient care ...
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in the past”, and the PU*s neglect of "matters of ... politicalInVreform" gave rise to "some very severe strictures".
The conference decided to form a new organisation "with 
a view of concentrating the whole forces of the party under one 
central executive". The new body was named the National Pro- 
tection Association (NPA2),' '"a resuscitation of the name used 
by the radicals in their sabotaged attempt to form a truly int­
egrated protectionist organisation almost exactly twelve months 
previously. The conference also appointed a radical-dominated
sub-committee "to draw up the manifesto, programme, and rules
170of the new organisation". These decisions amounted to a dir­
ect challenge to the primacy and authority of the PU, partic­
ularly when the sub-committee resolved "to complete the amalg­
amation of the whole of the metropolitan and provincial organ-
171isations under the executive" of the NPA2. Armed with these 
intimidatory resolutions, a deputation from the NPA several 
weeks later approached the PU "with a view to securing the co­
operation of that organisation". The mission, however, failed, 
the PU refusing to co-operate on the grounds that "the steps 
taken to reorganise the party involve the extinction of their 
body". '^Nevertheless, several PU members and its president, 
Heydon, attended the conference on 31 October, convened to hear 
the report and recommendations of the NPA sub-committee. What 
they heard gave them little joy. The new association was char­
acterised as "more a combination for political purposes, and less 
an organisation for furthering the interests of the manufacturer", 
and the interim governing body of the organisation, appointed
at the conference, was purely parliamentary in composition -
1 73fifteen MsLA and seven MsLC, with George Dibbs as chairman.
It was envisaged that the twenty-two parliamentary protection­
ists would later merge with radicals and manufacturers' repres­
entatives to form an integrated and representative NPA council.
I m
Although "ripe for putting into execution", '^the scheme was 
upset by the PU's continued refusal to co-operate. At the con­
ference, the PU "objected to being merged into the new associat-
ion","' ^and, despite a further conference in an attempt to ach- 
176ieve unanimity," Heydon later stated that the PU council had
177been "unable to fall in with the proposals made".”" As a result,
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and to the continuing frustration of the radicals, the NPA2
1 78never got off the ground,J "and the PU maintained its separate 
and defiant existence. Yet another attempt at integration had 
failed.
A final attempt at integration was made during July- 
August 1888, and again the radicals were in the vanguard. This 
time, it would seem, the radicals directed their attention to 
the local branches of the PU. It was hoped that the branches 
would threaten to cut their ties with the central PU council 
unless it adopted a more liberal outlook and became more rep­
resentative of the entire protectionist movement. At a confer­
ence of the Ginninderra, Cootamundra and Yass branches of the 
Union, attended by O'Sullivan, Melville and Pose as represent­
atives of the "metropolitan unions", and held at Yass in July 
1888, a new democratic protectionist platform was adopted. '
The Cootamundra branch informed the PU council that it would 
maintain its allegiance to the PU only if the central body also 
adopted the platform. ' The showdown came at a general confer­
ence of PU branches, under the presidency of Heydon and held in1 o i
Sydney the following month. ' The delegate from Cootamundra
moved the general adoption by the PU of the radical platform,182but the motion was rejected. "O'Sullivan then proposed that 
the "central and controlling body" of the PU be made more rep­
resentative by the inclusion of "members of the party in Parl­
iament and delegates from all protective bodies", and he gave
his motion substance by naming and proposing the appointment
183of a fully integrated central committee. His motion, however, 
was not even seconded.
One lasting .result of the October 1887 're-organisation'
was, however, the establishment of "the protection members of
Parliament at the head of the protection organisation".^ °^Their
newly achieved authority was demonstrated early in 1888 in the
organisation of two by-elections, thereby depriving the PU of
183its organisational monopoly. Recognising the threat to its 
primacy, the PU then attempted to stifle the parliamentary 
challenge by belatedly offering representation on its executive 
and council to the parliamentary party. Ostensibly "to secure
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greater concentrated effort, and singleness of action", the PU
offered Dibbs a seat on the executive committee, and places to
186eight MsLA on the council. " This, however, was no more than a
token gesture, for, had the protectionist MsLA merged with the
PU in the manner proposed, real authority would have returned
p 87to the PU manufacturers."'' !Furthermore, the PU’s offer was ex-
188tended only to selected conservative MsLA;' radical, doctrin­
aire MsLA, like Melville and O ’Sullivan, were deliberately ex­
cluded from the offer. As was pointed out, "singleness of action" 
without any radical representation was a preposterous notion, 
and, had the invited MsLA accepted the offer, they would have
run the risk of further "splitting up the party both within and
18°without Parliament". ''For these weighty reasons, and with their 
own influence established, the MsLA rejected the offer.
Thus, by the end of 1888, the protectionist forces out­
side parliament were still splintered. Radicals, conservative 
manufacturers, and power-seeking MsLA were involved in a tangle 
of rivalry for control and authority; integration had proved 
impossible; and still no ’permanent co-ordination1 had been est­
ablished between the extra-parliamentary and parliamentary wings 
of the movement. During 1888, the parliamentary party had grad­
ually asserted its authority, but the events of January 1889
v,rould shortly give the manufacturers the opportunity to win back
] 90the influence of which they had been deprived.
II
Just as the 'protectionists’ most influential extra- 
parliamentary organisation fell under the exclusive control of 
wealthy conservative manufacturers, the one and only freetrade 
extra-parliamentary body also came to be dominated by wealthy 
conservative interests - Sydney's merchant, mercantile and comm­
ercial class. It was largely in reaction to the protectionist 
activity of mid-l885> especially the preparations for the LIA 
conference, that the formation of a freetrade league was first 
proposed. In July 1885? a correspondent to the Herald contended
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that "it is the duty of those who ^support ~j ... a free-trade
policy to form an .association for the propagation of sound views
1 91... to defeat the protectionist agitation". ' Shortly after, 
B.E.Wise agreed that "the time has arrived for taking systemat­
ic measures to correct protectionist misstatements", and he
announced that "it is proposed to form a Free Trade League in
192New South Wales". The first attempt, however, was a failure; 
only eight persons bothered to respond to an anonymous advert­
isement inviting attendance at a meeting on 10 August to consid-
195er "the desirableness of forming a free-trade league". ' A  fur­
ther meeting a week later was more successful, and a resolution 
that "an association be now formed for the purpose of promul­
gating and advocating the principles of free trade in this col­
ony, such association to be styled the ’New South Wales Free
194Trade Association’" (FTA) was unanimously carried."'
Prominent in the formation of the FTA was the radical, 
future MLA, B.R.Wise, whose literary ability and thorough under­
standing of the fiscal conflict placed him in the forefront of
1°5freetrade advocacy and made him indispensable to the cause. 
Appointed to the original fourteen-member executive council ofIQ gthe FTA, Wise began a concerted campaign to win for freetrade 
the support of organised labour by inviting the representation 
of the TLC on the FTA. J ^ Despite Wise’s efforts, the FTA was at 
its inception, and remained thereafter, basically an organisat­
ion formed by, and in the interests of, Sydney’s mercantile and
commercial class - those, as Wise commented, who "stood to gain
198most from the continuance of Freetrade, ...". ''"Of the original
fourteen-member executive, at least five members had definite
connections with the mercantile and importing community, and six
199were members of the SCC. Of the eleven men added to the counc­
il at the end of August, four were members of the SCO, two were 
prominent in shipping circles, two were merchants, and three 
were active in the business world.^°The TLC’s rejection of 
Wise’s overtures did nothing to alter this trend, and by the be­
ginning of 1887, out of a total of fifty-three FTA council mem­
bers, seventeen belonged to the SCC and at least twenty-nine 
were members of the mercantile and commercial community. This 
commercial control of the FTA was reflected in the Association's
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office-bearers, the majority of whom throughout the life of 
the FT A were members of the SCC. .
The wealth of the SCC was, therefore, powerfully rep­
resented in the FTA. In fact, the Association was at times 
spoken of as the virtual political wing of che SCO. William 
McMillan, SCC president and FTA council member, hinted at this 
when he stated that the FTA "was doing work which could not be 
done by the Chamber of Commerce", for the simple reason that 
the Chamber "could not be actually considered to be a politic­
al association, [even though] ... it must be known as a free-
2 Qotrade association". ‘Close links, then, were forged between 
the two bodies. In April 1886, they jointly expressed their 
condemnation of ad valorem duties, and conferred together on a 
proposal to send a joint deputation to the Colonial Treasurer 
in opposition to the imposition of ad valorem duties.^ ^During 
1887, the Chamber bore the expense of sending to all its memb­
ers a copy of a freetrade pamphlet written by FTA secretary, 
Edward Puls ford/"1“' Immediately prior to the 1887 general elect­
ion, McMillan told the SCC that all its members "should feel 
an interest" in the FTA, and he called on them to render the 
Association "substantial personal aid". fie then remarked on 
the FTA's need of "the monetary support of the people connected 
with trade", and stated that "he would like to see members of 
the chamber give from their abundance some contribution to the 
Free-trade Association". As an added incentive he appealed to 
their "selfish interests", and reminded them that their support 
"would pay them very well". In response to McMillan's appeal, 
it would appear that Chamber members contributed upwards of 
£300 towards the FTA's election expenses.” '"In addition, B.R. 
Wise later recalled how two "leading men in the softgoods trade"
both FTA and SCC members, had paid his election expenses and pro
,, . , 207vided him with secretarial assistance from their warehouses.
Shortly after the formation of the FTA, the Telegraph 
hinted that it appeared to be "too much an association of the 
mercantile element", and pointed to the possibility that it 
might become "a mere organisation of ... the conservative party 
..., opposed to everything in social and political matters which
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the working-classes hoped to attain"/'^The predominance of 
the wealthy merchant class in the FTA did give the Association 
a decidedly conservative aura, and this was reflected especially 
in the issue of direct taxation. When B.R.Wise spoke at an 
FTA public meeting in favour of taxes upon land and income, he 
was careful to state that his personal views were not those of 
the FTA council. /-'In fact, a significant number of Wise's FTA 
council colleagues later became associated with the conservat­
ive anti—direct taxation National Association* Jn complete 
contrast to merchant representation on the council, the pres­
ence of freetrade radicals, at least until after 1888, was very 
limited. Apart from Wise, only John Haynes, John Nobbs, S.T.
Whiddon, N.B.Downing and four TLC representatives gave the FTA 
council a hint of radicalism prior to late 1888/"1 Viore typical 
were the conservative views of FTA treasurer, George Pile, who 
looked upon the proposed introduction of payment of members with 
horror, and those of insurance broker and avowed conservative,
C.McKay Smith, who did not disguise his "strong repugnance to 
property taxation", which he believed to be "morally iniquitous".
Included in the ranks of the FTA council during 1885 
and 1886 were a number of men with commercial connections, who 
were also members of parliament, or who were shortly to be act­
ivated by the protectionist challenge to obtain a seat in the 
Assembly. Among those on the council who were MsLA at the end 
of 1886 were J.H.Young, A.Kethel, William Clarke and James
o n  }
Inglis. To them could be added J.F.Burns who, although not a 
member of the council until 1889? claimed to have been "about 
the third member enrolled on the association". ^  ^ Those on the 
council who became MsLA after 1886 were W.McMillan, J.T.Wil- 
shire and W.H.Vivian.
Shortly after its formation, the FTA stated that it was 
"in no way connected with any political party",^ 17but during 
1886 the Association obviously provided Parkes with a vehicle 
for arousing fiscal fever outside parliament, and he made good
use of it. In January 1836, he was chairman of an FTA public
218meeting, and in July, he attended and addressed the Assoc­
iation's first annual public meeting.^"^The success of the
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protectionists in disrupting this meeting, and the subsequent 
pledge by one of those present that any future free trade meet­
ings would be broken up by force / '“'"'assisted Parkes in his rous­
ing fiscal campaign: such threats, he claimed, furnished ’»proof 
that if the protectionists had the power they would not allow 
men to raise their voices in the cause of freedom»’P”'”"1 Parkes 
also aided the FTA’s efforts in spreading the free trade gospel 
by donating six cases of Ccbden Club books for general distrib- 
ution. Given Parkes»s association with the FTA during 1886, 
and his sympathy with the views and interests it basically rep­
resented, it was scarcely surprising that, when called upon to 
form a freetrade ministry prior to the 1887 general election, 
he chose several MsLA who were prominent in the Association, 
namely James Inglis, J.F.Burns and William Clarke. “^ T o  another,
J.H.Young, Parkes apologised for his omission from the ministry, 
and concluded that "I hope you and I shall yet be colleagues".”'"^ 
Young, in fact, was Parkes ’s nominee for the Speakership of the 
Assembly, and defeated Dibbs for the position in March 1887.
In 1891j Young did become a ministerial colleague of Parkes when 
he entered the ministry to fill a vacancy.
In addition to stating its independence of any politic­
al party, the FTA, on its formation, also clearly defined the 
limits and scope of its activities. These were to be confined 
to purely propagandist work, both to »’advocate freedom of trade”
and ”to refute the sophistries and expose the frequent misrep-
225resentations of protectionists”. Association president, R.
Teece, reaffirmed in 1889 that the FTA had been formed more
"for the purpose of acting as an educational medium” than any-
thing else/"'" and during the first year of its existence the
FTA confined itself to "disseminating information” and "arguing
227the rfiscall question in the public ear”. "The month after its
L J opQinauguration, the FTA began its active propagandist work/" °and 
during the general election in October 1885, the Association 
spent nearly £300 on the publication and distribution of al­
most 250,000 books, pamphlets, papers and leaflets. ^ ^The FTA 
also encouraged the formation of local branches and, although 
Wise exaggerated when he boasted in November 1886 that the FTA 
"has now branches in many ... electoral districts of the colony”,231
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at least four electorates contained branches by early 188 ,7 232
It was Parkes*s fiscal campaign of 1886 and the result­
ing dominance of the fiscal issue in politics that was respons­
ible for the change in the role of the FTA as a political org­
anisation. The first mention of the FTA in any other than a 
propagandist capacity was in November 1886, when B.P.Wise stated 
that "It is of the utmost importance that when a general elect­
ion comes the association should be sufficiently strong financ­
ially and numerically to fight an effective battle", and he
particularly alluded to the task of exercising "energy and ...
2 v vproper care in the selection of candidates, This ex­
pression of opinion by its president, and the imminence of a 
general election forced the Association to reappraise its role 
in politics, and, at a council meeting early in January 1887, a
"lengthened discussion took place on the general v/ork of the
234association, In view of the approaching election, propa-
23^gandist activity was stepped up, but the real change came on 
28 January, two days after the dissolution of parliament, when 
the FTA council, under Wise’s direction, decided to "form it­
self into a central committee for furthering the election of 
free trade candidates, and to prevent as far as possible the
236division of the free trade vote, the committee to sit daily".
That this decision initiated a basic change in the role of the
FTA was confirmed in the association’s second annual report.
The report prefaced its review of the Association's work during
the general election by stating that "During the year the assoc-
237iation has considerably extended the sphere of its operations".
The decision to enter the field of political and electoral org­
anisation, however, was not taken without certain misgivings.
FTA president, Richard Teece, told the Association's fourth ann­
ual general meeting that although "they had endeavoured to re­
frain from interference with politics", they "had found pthat-j 
to be exceedingly difficult", and had, as a consequence, "found
themselves undertaking tasks which they believed to be foreign
238to the purposes for which they were e s t a b l i s h e d " v ^
The pressure to extend its activities was prcbably 
exerted on the FTA council by its parliamentary members and by
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those political activists in its ranks, like Wise and McMillan,
who clearly associated themselves with Parkes and his developing
239freetrade parliamentary party. ''For this reason, and especially
in view of FTA representation in the ministry, it is difficult 
to detect any distrust or division of purpose between the FTA 
and Parkes over the organisation of the freetrade election cam-
p hr)
paign;"''rather, Parkes and the FTA seem to have worked in com­
plete harmony throughout the campaign. Certainly Parkes himself, 
as in previous elections, remained a central figure in electoral 
activity. He continued to make use of his personal network of 
electoral agents throughout the electorates, and was the rec­
ipient of numerous communications from candidates informing him
242of their progress and chances of success, ‘ requesting his aid 
and support, ^and arranging the details of his supporting vis­
its. irIn addition, he received a number of letters from men
24 3announcing their intentions to become candidates,' and numerous 
requests from various electorates for him to supply suitable free-
P  / r
trade candidates/ ’ It would appear, however, that some of this 
information and several of these requests formed the basis of 
much of the FTA’s electoral work.
In fact, Parkes seems to have been actively involved in 
the FTA’s task of providing and arranging for freetrade candid­
ates to contest the election. On 1 February, the report of the 
FTA's work included the announcement that J.T.hingen would be 
sent to contest the electorate of Braidwood. f,It was clearly 
Parkes, however, who arranged Bingen's candidature. Asked by
Parkes to become a freetrade candidate, hingen informed Parkes
243of his agreement on 26 January. The FTA was probably respons­
ible for the choice of electorate, for hingen told Parkes on
2A931 January that ”1 start this morning to contest Braidwood".
Here, then, was apparent co-operation; Parkes supplied the man­
power, the Association supplied the electorate. In other inst­
ances, it would seem that the roles were reversed. During the 
first week of February, Parkes received urgent appeals from the
electorates of Monaro and Yass Plains to send freetrade candid- 
250ates. These, it would seem, he passed on to the FTA, for on
8 February the Association announced that it had arranged can-
231didates for both electorates. It seems also that the FTA made 
use of Parkes!s influence in persuading freetraders to offer
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themselves as candidates. On 3’1 January, FTA vice-president, 
George Munro, wrote to Parkes: "I got Mr McMillan to call upon
o q pMr Street, and say that you would like to see him". It seems
that Munro wished Parkes to persuade J.R.Street to offer himself
as a candidate for East Sydney. Parkes performed his task well,
253for Street was soon after announced as a candidate. '"''Parkes
clearly retained influence not possessed by the FTA, and this
alone made him indispensable to the Association in its direction
of the campaign. Despite »Vise's statement that his candidature
2SAfor South Sydney was at the request of the FTA, ' he elsewhere 
admitted that his appearance was due to the fact that he had 
been "asked by Sir Henry Parkes to contest the borough of South 
Sydney".
Parkes also showed himself more than willing to give the 
FTA's chosen candidates the benefit of his support in their var­
ious electorates. When the Association requested and arranged 
for council member, N . B. Downing, to contest Northumberland/"'^'' 
Parkes promised that he would visit the electorate to support 
him, ^rand he did so. ''"’Parkes's co-operation with the FTA was 
no better demonstrated than in his compliance with "an earnest
request" by the Association to visit Yass in support of the FTA 
259candidate. In doing so, it would appear that he went to the
260trouble of adding to his already tight personal tour itinerary/" ’
The FTA also approached other freetrade MsLA and successfully
arranged that they "speak in various country electorates on be-
261half of the freetrade candidates". The first MsLA approached 
by the Association were naturally those who already had formal 
connections with it, and McMillan, Wise, J.H.Young and Clarke 
were active in touring the colony on the Association's behalf/ 
Other MsLA, including F.Abigail and G.H.Peid, also gave their 
services to the FTA.^°^
In addition to the electoral work done in co-operation
with Parkes and the freetrade MsLA, the FTA worked independently
with great energy in organising the freetrade campaign. Its
previous electoral role of distributing freetrade propaganda
26 Awas resumed and greatly expanded, “ but it was the Association's 
new role of providing freetrade candidates to contest various
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electorates that demanded most attention. As the only formal
265freetrade body in charge of electoral organisation, "the FTA 
received numerous requests from the electorates for candidates, 
and it worked hard to fulfil them. On 31 January, the FTA re­
ceived four telegrams from Care oar ’’pressing for a second free- 
trade candidate" to run with C.L.Garland, °‘and on 3 February it 
announced that steamship company proprietor, C.E.Jeanneret, was2gg
on his way to the electorate.1“ °In response to "the earnest re­
quest of several members of the Free Trade Association", N.B.
2 69Downing undertook to contest Northumberland, and in its ann­
ouncement the FTA stated that W.S.Lloyd would probably join
270Downing as the second freetrade candidate, and this was con-
271firmed the following day. ' The Association clearly went to 
great trouble to provide candidates where they were required.
In the three-member electorate of Mudgee, the FTA undertook the 
provision of two more freetrade candidates to contest the elec­
torate in conjunction with A.G.Taylor. Although its initial
attempts to persuade a freetrader to contest the electorate 
272failed, the Association persevered, and within a week had
273secured the two required candidates. Further, where existing 
arrangements or its own electoral arrangements were upset, the 
FTA acted quickly to repair the damage. On receipt of the in­
formation that the sitting freetrade MLA for Glen Inr.es would 
not re-contest his electorate, the Association immediately 
placed itself "in communication with a likely candidate for the
seat", ^ ^and two days later announced that he had agreed to
275fill the vacancy, and had already left for the electorate.
The Association began its search for a candidate to contest
p n r
Wellington on 4 February,^ 'Jbut when its announced candidate,
277J.Leeds, failed to appear, it took less than a day for the
pr-7 O
Association to replace him.
Unlike the PU, the FTA did not issue a full list of 
all those candidates it supported. Only the candidates it ac­
tually provided were specifically mentioned; in addition to the
five electorates already mentioned, the Association provided
?79candidates in a further eleven elec torates1 y thus making a 
total of sixteen. Thus, at first sight, the FTA would appear 
to have been much less active than the PU. In reality, however,
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the FTA seeras to have been far more energetic, taking more care 
in its selection of candidates and acting promptly to fill any 
gaps created in its arrangements. For instance, unlike the PU, 
which supported a number of avowed freetraders, the FTA took 
care to check the fiscal credentials of its candidates. When 
it was rumoured that the Association's candidate in Murrumbidgee,
R.H.Reynolds, favoured the imposition of duties on grain, the 
Association immediately "sent a telegram to Wagga Wagga to in-2gQ
quire as to the correctness of the report". Further, when the
Association learned that the sitting member for Macleay, R.B.
Smith, supported ad valorem, timber and grain duties, it immed-
po-j
iately initiated steps "to find a suitable man to oppose" him.1
Like the PU, the FTA also aimed to prevent vote-splitting -
"to prevent as far as possible the division of the free trade
vote".^ "In this endeavour, only moderate success was achieved.
Certainly S.B.Bailey complied with the FTA’s suggestion that he
retire from Shoalhaven to avoid splitting the vote with W.F.P q ~z
Martin, '"’"and, at Forbes, H.Montagu also "yielded to the suggest­
ion of the Free-trade Association to retire", thereby preventing 
a division of the vote. ^Elsewhere, however, the FTA was clearly 
unable to prevent vote-splitting; in fact, probably aware of its 
lack of influence, the FTA made very little effort to rectify 
threatening situations, thus exposing its basic weakness at the 
crucial time. In the four-member electorate of Paddington, six 
freetraders offered themselves as candidates. Apart from an FTA 
communication to the six candidates "expressing an earnest hope 
that steps will be taken" to reduce the number of candidates to 
four, the Herald correctly observed that "nothing appears to 
have been done", and it attributed the probable loss of a seat 
to "disunion" and "want of management".'1' °An even more potentially 
disastrous situation existed in Canterbury, where nine freetraders 
vied with one protectionist for the four available seats. The 
FTA's reaction to this situation constituted a firm decision 
that "the Association should not interfere in the matter, but
should leave it entirely to be settled between the electors and
2 87candidates themselves". In view of this decision, the Herald
2 8 3candidly observed that "party discipline has failed", and its
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observation equally applied to the situation in West Sydney,
where the Association again refused to intervene to prevent 
289vote-splitting. Although the Association appears to have taken
more positive steps to induce a necessary retirement in Central
Cumberland,' the effort failed. The FTA’s lack of effort and
influence meant that, of the electorates contested by both free-
trade and protectionist candidates, the freetrade vote was split 291in seven.
A further problem for the central FTA was created 
by the attempts at local organisation present within some elec­
torates. Although local branches of the FTA were few by Feb­
ruary 188?) local organisation was more in evidence among the 
freetraders than the protectionists. What work was done by its 
local branches in 188? provided the FTA with a taste of both the 
satisfaction, and the displeasure, with local organisation felt 
more widely by both central fiscal organisations during the 
following two general elections. The Bathurst branch of the 
FTA. was particularly active during the election, and it select­
ed and organised candidates for the Bathurst, East Macquarie
292and West Macquarie electorates with admirable efficiency.
The FTA paid tribute to the branch in its second annual report 
when it singled it out as showing "the great value of well org­
anised and energetically conducted branches", and attributed
to its "enthusiasm and activity" the defeat of protection in all
293three electorates with which it was connected. In two other 
electorates, however, two problems of local organisation, so 
common in 1889 and 1891? were first revealed: the lack of co­
ordination, sometimes resulting in conflict, between a local 
branch and the central organisation; and the problem of ineff­
iciency and lack of.energy at the local level. On A February,
the FTA was requested to provide a candidate for the electorate 
29kof Young, and it immediately set about its task of securing 
293a suitable man. It obviously experienced some difficulty,
hov/ever, and when no candidate had been announced by 8 February,
the local freetraders took matters into their own hands, formed
a branch of the FTA,^band chose a local pastoralist, James
P97Gordon, as its candidate. 1 Mean while , the central FTA contin­
ued its search, and finally persuaded council member, G.N.Griffith
5 /m
to contest the electorate. On arrival in Young, however, 
Griffiths was confronted by an antagonistic local FTA, and the
p o Qdifficulty was only overcome by his re tirernent. The FTA re­
ranceived a similar request for a. candidate from Gwydir, ' "but
when it was announced that the local FTA in the electorate was
* 00”bringing forth1’ a local c a n d i d a t e t h e  central Association 
probably relaxed its efforts. The local branch, however, did 
not persevere with its candidate, and the seat was consequently 
won by the protectionist candidate unopposed.
After the election, FTA president, B.R.Wise, freely 
admitted that "we have made mistakes”, and he rightly attrib­
uted these to inexperience, lack of proper organisation, and a 
lack of funds.'^‘Hvise regarded the Association's lack of funds 
as chiefly responsible for what was probably the greatest weak­
ness in the FTA’s organisation: ”Had we more money we could 
contest, almost every country constituency; as it is we
are compelled to decline many pressing requests for candidates,
302owing to our want of funds”.'" ‘Although Wise also stated that
the Association in no instance "paid ... any part of the exp-
'^ 03enses of any candidate”,' he later admitted that the FTA had
"expended funds on behalf of freetrade candidates” p^^and one
candidate who received pecuniary assistance was N.B.Downing in 
305Northumberland. The FTA’s total campaign expenditure was, how-
7Q Cever, no more than £700, Jand, consequently, many FTA candid-
307ates received no financial assistance. It was, therefore, 
difficult for the Association both to induce candidates into 
the field, particularly in distant country electorates, and to 
prevent their retirement from contests that did not promise to 
be successful. As a result, seven electorates, all in the
7 n O
country, remained uncontested by any freetrader,'"' uand FTA-
arranged candidates retired from the contest in seven elector- 
309ates, but left victory assured to the protectionists in only
Despite the FTA’s mistakes and inadequacies, Wise was 
aware of the innovative nature of the electoral work performed 
in 1887: "It would, indeed, have been almost impossible for us, 
following a course without precedent in New South Wales, . to
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have avoided mis takes ”." " C1 ear 1 y the 188? general e 1 ec tion
presented a ’’picture of an electoral system in process of trans- 
33 2formation”;" 'the evolution towards the modern, centralised el­
ectoral party machine had begun. But a great deal of further 
change was required before such a transformation could be said 
to have been completed. During the election, for instance, the
fiscal issue and organisations were often ignored and continued
313emphasis given to purely local issues," "and the organising role 
of the electoral organisation at times offended, and. was openly
X] hcondemned by, traditional individualists'In general, then, 
influence, control, experience and assurance were largely miss­
ing from the fiscal electoral organisations in 1887? and these 
factors were necessary before electoral organisation could 
bridge the gat) between stated aims and intentions, and actual 
performance and results. Many more mistakes remained to be 
made, and many more problems to be encountered, however, before 
the gap was bridged. Not the least of these problems were the 
difficulties created by the slowly expanding role of local 
branch organisations in electoral management.
Local organisation had been minimal in 1887, and, after
the election, the FTA, like the PU, turned its attention to the
extension of its network of branches. The election itself had
315prompted the formation of a number of branches," and, in re-
316sponse to Wise's call "to organise the country districts”,"
N.B.Downing was appointed the Association1s "electoral agent”,
with the task of touring the colony for the purpose of "forming 
317branches”. The most difficult task, however, was not forming 
local branches, but keeping them active between elections, and 
the FTA was probably experiencing this difficulty when, in Aug­
ust 1888, it adopted a number of proposals "intended to increase 
the efficiency of the branches, and to bring them into closer
710
union with the central association” .J uThe failure of all meas­
ures to prevent branches becoming moribund was, however, demon­
strated at the time of the unexpected general elections of 1889
„ 319and 1891.
3?0An FTA banquet, first mooted on 7 January,' agreed to 
on 21 J a n u a r y a n d  arranged during the course of the election,"^
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was held on 14 March 1887-”'4'" Its significance lay chiefly in 
its demonstration of the harmony and goodwill that existed be­
tween the Association and a considerable section of the parl­
iamentary freetraders; of the twenty MsLA in attendance, most 
had distinct merchant or commercial connections, thus making 
then; identifiable with the dominant interests represented in 
the FTA. In addition to six MsLA who had close formal links 
with the Association, and of whom five were men of commerce,"'" 
five other commercial freetrade MsLA, four of whom were members
of the SCC, were present, and one of these was later elected a
325member of the FTA council.' ''Of the remaining nine MsLA present,
two had worked with the Association during the election, and
three subsequently attended further FTA functions, but none est-
'Ll6ablished formal connections with the Association. "'4~
Parkes’s absence from the banquet again raises the 
question of his relationship with the FTA. Asked to state his 
"views and wishes" concerning the arrangements for the occas- 
ion, he seems to have become actively involved in the prep­
arations. On 19 February, he wrote to FTA secretary, E.Pulsford, 
expressing reservations about the proposed date of 4 March. In 
reply, Pulsford admitted that Parkes’s objection was "a strong 
one", and he stated that he had "therefore taken steps to have
7 p O
the matter further considered";- ‘ the result was that the date
v;as altered to 14 March. Parkes, then, was obviously involved
in the banquet arrangements, and the explanation that his ab-
329sence was due to illness was probably genuine. In view of 
his interest in the Association, Parkes was invited to attend 
and address the second annual general meeting of the FTA, to 
be held in September 1887; again, however, he was absent.
His absence was compensated for, however, by the continued int­
erest and involvement in the affairs of the Association by a 
significant number of other freetrade MsLA, twelve of whom 
attended the general meeting. Of these, two were members of 
the FTA council, two were later elected to the council, and a
further four had also attended the March banquet. Significantly,331at least six of the twelve were active in the world of commerce."''"
Prior to 1889? the freetraders came much closer than
5/177
t h e  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s  t o  f u l f i l l i n g  D u v e r g e r ’ s c r i t e r i o n  o f  a
33?
t r u e  p o l i t i c a l  pa r ty :"""  “ t h e  c o n n e c t i o n s  b e tw ee n  th e  p a r l i a m e n t ­
a r y  f r e e t r a d e r s  and t h e  FTA were  c e r t a i n l y  more i n  e v i d e n c e  and 
more r e g u l a r  th a n  t h o s e  b e tw ee n  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s  
and th e  PU. The r e l a t i o n s  t h a t  e x i s t e d  b e tw een  th e  p a r l i a m e n t ­
a r y  f r e e t r a d e r s  and t h e  FTA m u s t ,  how ever ,  be q u a l i f i e d  by two 
i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r s ,  one o f  which  p r e c l u d e d  D u v e r g e r ' s  e s s e n t i a l  
a s p e c t  o f  " p e r m a n e n t  c o - o r d i n a t i o n ” b e tw ee n  th e  two w i n g s , and 
t h e  o t h e r  which  exposed  t h e  b a s i c  s e c t i o n a l i s m  o f  th e  F'TA and 
i t s  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  a l l i e s ,  t h u s  making  t h e  f o r m a l  a l l i a n c e  u n ­
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  th e  f r e e t r a d e  movement a s  a w h o le .  D e s p i t e  
t h e  i n t e r e s t  shown i n  th e  a f f a i r s  o f  t h e  FTA by a c o n s i d e r a b l e  
number o f  f r e e t r a d e  MsLA, i n c l u d i n g  P a r k e s ,  by t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  
1889j o n l y  t e n  MsLA had e s t a b l i s h e d  fo r m a l  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  th e  
A s s o c i a t i o n . " " '  T h i s  a p p a r e n t  d i s c r e p a n c y  was p a r t i a l l y  e x p l a i n ­
ed i n  1887 by G .H .R e i d ,  when he s t a t e d  t h a t  "he was n o t  a mem­
b e r  o f  t h e  F r e e t r a d e  A s s o c i a t i o n  . . . .  H is  own f e e l i n g  -  th o u g h  
i t  m ig h t  be an a b s u r d  one -  was,  and a s  a member o f  P a r l i a m e n t  
had a lw a y s  b e e n ,  t h i s  -  he l i k e d  t o  s t e e r  c l e a r  o f  a l l  a s s o c ­
i a t i o n s ,  w h a t e v e r  t h e y  m ig h t  be . . .  b e c a u s e  he t h o u g h t  t h a t  
members o f  P a r l i a m e n t  were n e v e r  mere i n d e p e n d e n t  -  and th e y
o u g h t  t o  be i n d e p e n d e n t  i f  t h e y  were  t o  s e r v e  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n t s
33Tf a i t h f u l l y  -  t h a n  when t h e y  t o o k  t h a t  c o u r s e " .  '  T h i s  view was 
p r o b a b l y  s h a r e d  by P a r k e s ,  whose i n v o l v e m e n t  w i t h  th e  FTA was 
a l s o  te m p e red  by a c a r e  n o t  t o  become t o o  p u b l i c l y  i n v o l v e d  
v / i th  a body t h a t  was b a s i c a l l y  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  o n ly  w e a l t h y  
c o m m e rc i a l  i n t e r e s t s .
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  a s  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  p a r t y ,
P a r k e s  was c o n c e r n e d  t o  d e f e n d  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t ­
a r y  wing i n  m a t t e r s  .of o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  and t o  p r e v e n t  i t  from 
coming u n d e r  t h e  d i c t a t i o n  o f  any e x t r a - p a r l i a m e n t a r y  body.
When P a r k e s  a sk e d  Wise i n  1894? "Why c a n n o t  members o f  P a r l i a m ­
e n t  be a  l i t t l e  more c o n t e n t  w i t h  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  t h a t  l i e s  
t o  t h e i r  hands  i n  P a r l i a m e n t  i t s e l f ? " ,  " h e  s i m p l y  e x p r e s s e d  an 
a p p r e h e n s i o n  o f  p o w e r f u l  o u t s i d e  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  t h a t  was l i k e l y  
t o  be f e l t  by any p a r l i a m e n t a r y  l e a d e r .  And, l i k e  D ib b s ,  P a r k e s  
e n d e a v o u r e d  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  p a r t y  r e t a i n e d  u l t ­
i m a t e  a u t h o r i t y .  In  S e p te m b e r  1888, P a r k e s  and Wise c o n f e r r e d
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over the formation of a parliamentary-controlled freetrade
336league with branches throughout the colony,'" but nothing more
was heard of the plan during 1838. The creation in January
1889, however, of a parliamentary executive, including Parkes,
as an organising body, established parliamentary authority in
the sphere of electoral organisation."" All this did not mean
that Parkes was antagonistic towards the FTA; during the 1889
33‘gelection, he again co-operated with it* All he desired was 
some equitable balance of influence between the two wings of 
the movement. The desire of the parliamentary election exec­
utive to perpetuate its influence in the organisation of the 
freetrade movement led to the creation of the LPA in March 
1889 ;"^its later amalgamation with the FTA to form the FTLA 
provided the missing ’permanent co-ordination’ between the two 
wings, and Parkes was far from inactive in the activities of 
the integrated body. By then, however, both the parliamentary 
and the extra-parliamentary wings of the movement were split 
by internal conflicts, v/hich destroyed the possibility of that 
principled unity, also essential in a true political party.
It was the emergence of the freetrade radicals as a 
distinct and powerful force within the parliamentary party dur­
ing 1888 that most clearly revealed the inadequacy of the FTA 
as a representative party organisation. Basically an organis­
ation of the commercial class, there were few radicals who were 
influential in the FTA prior to late 1888, and, of the MsLA on 
the council, only three were progressive in outlook."^^The FTA, 
then, was scarcely representative of the movement as a whole, 
and the relationship that existed between the Association and 
most of its parliamentary allies was little more than an all­
iance of common economic interests. As radical opinion crystall­
ised and hardened within the parliamentary party, the exclusive 
character of the FTA was fully recognised, and radical pressure 
was exerted on the Association to become more representative. 
During the latter part of 1888 and early 1889> radical repres­
entation on the FTA council was substantially increased ,J^‘-but 
an equitable balance o f opinion was not fully achieved until 
mid-1889«- And then the tantalising question arose: could the 
radicals and conservatives co-exist in harmony, or would the 
FTLA be destroyed by their interminable conflicts?
CHAPTER 6
CONSTANCY AND CONSCIENCE, DISCIPLINE 
AND DISOBEDIENCE: Parliamentary and 
Ministerial Independence and Discip­
line, 1887-1891/
"I always voted at my party's call, 
And I never thought of thinking for
myself at all”
Sir Joseph Porter in 
Gilbert and Sullivan’s 
H.M.S. Pinafore
”1 must follow my own judg­
ment and conscience, and 
not the voice of any party 
leader”.
John Bright, 1888.
Both fiscal groups failed to formulate a specific 
party policy - conservative or otherwise - on practically 
every major political issue, including their own fiscal doc­
trines. This was largely due to the impossibility of doing 
so without exacerbating the latent divisions within both 
groups and shattering the precarious cohesion that depended 
solely on the emotive force of fiscal conflict. The only 
force that maintained group cohesion and allegiance was a 
purely nominal commitment to one of the rival fiscal doc­
trines. Party allegiance was not felt to be binding in regard
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to issues on which there was no specific party policy, and on 
these issues men were left free to exercise their own independ­
ent judgment. The vagueness of Parkes's policy utterances dur­
ing the 1887 general election led the Herald to comment that he 
"may count upon the new Assembly for support in maintaining free- 
trade principles, but as regards the finances and other questions 
of great moment, the Assembly will be free to act according to 
its judgment"."1' The continued insistence on vagueness, shrouded 
with non-committal platitudes, in the exposition of party policy 
after 188? neither eradicated the basis of this justification of 
independent action, nor acted to foster solid party allegiance. 
Instead, the fiscal groups emerged as 'one-issue parties' only.
That the fiscal controversy was the only issue on which 
party allegiance was binding, was hinted at during the 1887 elect­
ion, and expressed more forcibly during the 1889 election. For 
instance, the freetrade MLA, Alexander Bowman, expressed "his 
adherence to freetrade principles" and opposition to "any tamp­
ering with the fiscal question", but stated his willingness to
2"support any good measures" of the new Dibbs ministry. The most 
obvious example, however, was Andrew Ross, who declared his supp­
ort for "a policy of protection" and for Dibbs "if he introduced 
good measures", but who declared that "otherwise he would oppose 
his party". A well-known admirer of Parkes, Ross, it was be­
lieved, would "vote with the protection party on the fiscal 
question, but on other questions his old allegiance would prob­
ably be continued"/' W.C.Proctor expressed the same view as Ross 
when he told the electors of New England: "He had been a support­
er of Sir Henry Parkes, and would feel disposed to help him again, 
except on the free-trade policy, to which he was totally opp- 
osed". It was the fiscal parties' failure to consolidate fiscal 
polarisation and allegiance with specific and comprehensive party 
platforms that was largely responsible for this continued emph­
asis on factional loyalty as a basis of political allegiance.
This continuing emphasis tended both to confuse political align­
ments and to undermine the achievement of permanent 'party' all­
egiance. It was the freetraders' failure to provide a principled 
basis for party solidarity that led the Herald to comment in 
February 1889 that "We are in the habit of speaking of the
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'Free-trade party', but the phrase is one of convenience rath-
er than of accuracy"»' In the formation of the LPA, with its
promise of 'a broad, comprehensive, liberal platform1, the
Herald saw "the first step towards cementing party government7upon definite lines in the colony", and it predicted "a new
thing in our politics", the "creation of a distinctive bree­ch
trade party for political action".v
As has been seen, however, the LPA platform effected 
no meaningful change, and MsLA continued to feel bound to their 
fiscal 'party' only on the fiscal issue» Henry Copeland told 
the Assembly in October 1890 that he did not think that "be­
cause a member of this House belongs to the protectionist party 
he should necessarily vote as the Opposition vote on all occas­
ions .... With the exception of the one question upon which we 
have been sent here - the question of protection - I think the 
greatest latitude should be allowed to hon. members in the ex-9ercise of their individual judgment"." Sir Charles Dilke accur­
ately summarised the state of fiscal allegiance when he wrote: 
"There are not in the colonies clearly marked party lines, and 
there is support and opposition to each measure under discuss­
ion as it comes up, but little permanence in party".J°This narr­
ow concept of party allegiance was evidenced in December 1888 
when a freetrader, F.Jago Smith, told Parkes that the government's 
Tramway Resolutions were "expressly removed from the sphere of 
party politics", and that "Under those circumstances I shall 
always assert my right of individual judgement; ...".And, 
again in September 1889? Parkes was informed by another free­
trader that, as "Freetrade and nothing else" had been the basis 
of his entry into parliament he had assumed a position of indep­
endence on other matters, and "As an example I have opposed the 
land bill, . ,.".12
It was this attitude that posed a central problem to 
Parkes's concept of political reform. Parkes viewed the erad­
ication of such independence as basic to the creation of a strong
party;^his view was accurately summarised as "The more individ-14ual independence the weaker the party". What Parkes desired 
was a permanent party allegiance, having as its ideal basis
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15the aims, principles and policies of a true political party,'"
In the reality of -achieving a clear two-way polarisation and 
basic fiscal group unity, however, extraneous, non-fiscal matt­
ers that were likely to dilute fiscal cohesion were better av­
oided. As a result, Parkes was forced to emphasise other 
grounds as the basis of his desired permanent party allegiance. 
He strove to maintain party allegiance on matters not related 
to the fiscal issue and told one freetrader that "in attaching 
yourself to any new Party on one or two questions of public pol­
icy, it will hardly be wise to assist their enemies on other and 
minor questions in so damaging their character that they will 
not have the moral strength to carry out the policy in which 
you profess to believe".^ The other means Parkes saw of achiev­
ing constant allegiance to a party without a comprehensive pol­
icy v/as to utilise the enduring factional concept of personal
17loyalty and obedience to the party leader. In a speech to the 
Assembly on the principles of party politics, Parkes exhorted 
members to give "steady support to their leaders", and argued 
that members need not, and should not, oppose their party "If 
they can trust these leaders of theirs". °By "trusting to party 
to govern the country", members must trust and support their 
leaders in all things, including "the intricacies of adminis­
tration, or the affairs of the country will soon come to error".
Prom the concept that allegiance to a ’cause* should
20be given in the form of total allegiance to a ’person*, it 
was a natural extension to claim that the ’person’ or leader 
had a right to supervise that allegiance by controlling all 
the actions of his followers. Parkes demonstrated his belief 
in this concept of control when he told William McMillan: "I 
venture to lay it do.wn as a principle of combined action that
the Leader of a Party cannot be led by those who profess to
21follow". That Parkes attempted to exercise such total author­
ity over the freetraders was confirmed by the "most respectful 
protest" by one freetrader against his "plainly expressed claim 
to control the votes of all „.. [his supporters upon all matt- 
ers submitted to Parliament by ... £ his] G o v e r n m e n t " Parkes's 
concept of party solidarity demanded not only total party all­
egiance and obedience, but also the sacrifice of individual
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interests for the collective benefit of the party. One express­
ion of this collective spirit was the obligation, imposed by 
Parkes on all freetrade MsLA, to attend the sittings of parl­
iament "day by day, even though it be at some personal incon­
venience” .'' y
The degree to which Parkes’s concepts of party duty - 
total personal allegiance and the sacrifice of individuality - 
were accepted, was revealed by Parkes himself during late 1.888 
and early 1889« Graciously thanking those "who have supported 
the Government ... for the general and consistent support they 
have given me”, "4Parkes nevertheless complained that he "felt 
frequently very much disappointed and very much pained at the 
want of confidence with which I seemed to be regarded by some 
members of our party". In November 1888, he had questioned 
William McMillan's "frequent (sometimes boastful) allusions to 
the 'steady and compact majority' which is ready to carry the 
Government safely through the performance of miracles” by point­
ing to the fact that, on the previous night, the government suff­
ered a defeat due to the action of ”7 of the 'steady and compact' 
[who] voted dead against us". °After the resignation of his min­
istry in January 1889? Parkes told McMillan that "the Minister­
ial majority in the late Parliament disclosed aspects of polit­
ical conduct which I do not care to meet again .... There was
no coherence, no compact union amongst those to whom the Minis-
27try were entitled to look for support”. The failure of members 
to accept the obligation of constant attendance was also subject 
to critical comment by Parkes. In the same letter to McMillan 
in which he exposed the fallacy of the 'steady and compact maj­
ority’, Parkes remarked that, on the night in question, in a 
House of 124 members, "89 members were absent from their places”. 
He concluded by stating: "This is Parliamentary Government with
a vengeance. It would be very much better to put us out of off-
2 8ice”. when, soon after, his ministry was put out of office,
Parkes reiterated his complaint to McMillan, stating that "If
members had ... made the necessary sacrifice of being in their
places throughout the sittings, ... large measures might have
29been carried into law"«, As a correspondent to the Herald remark­
ed after the Ministry’s defeat: "Sir H. Parkes had a large maj­
ority on paper”, but it "had become lax, devoid of discipline".^0
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Certainly the large freetrade majority in the Assembly had 
undergone a change prior to January 1889 to become ’lax’, and 
the reasons for this change will shortly be discussed.
Between 188? and 1891> Parkes's advocacy of total party
allegiance won no more than a handful of consistent adherents.
In addition to the few men who at the 1889 election declared
themselves 'constant', 'staunch' or 'strong1 supporters of the
31new Dibbs ministry," ' were those whose total allegiance was ex­
pressed, not in reformist terms, but in accordance with the 
factional principle of undying personal loyalty. Such faction­
al loyalty, although at times a positive hindrance to the crea­
tion of distinct party lines, was, for all practical purposes, 
acceptable to Parkes as a means of achieving his goal of total 
allegiance. The politicians prepared to make such pledges of 
undying personal support were, however, mainly pre-1887 MsLA, 
and by 1889 their numbers were on the decline. Hugh Taylor 
told the electors of Parramatta in 1889 that "He had remained 
firm to Sir Henry Parkes since 1870", and he "hoped that he
would long remain by the side of the greatest statesman in the
32Australian colonies". Jacob Garrard told his constituents that
he had given "his faithful and consistent support to the Premier,
33in accordance with his promise to them two years since",' and
John Hurley justified his "fealty to Sir Henry Parkes on the
grounds of the latter's ability and wise statesmanship".^Those,
however, who justified their constant allegiance in terms of any
political or philosophical principles, or moral obligation to
their party were scarce. One freetrader explained his consistent
allegiance to the ministry on the grounds that "he was one of
35their pledged supporters",' and another stated that "Nothing 
would compel him to relinquish his allegiance to the free-trade 
party, because he believed that free-trade meant liberty in its 
truest and greatest sense, ^Perhaps, however, the most
philosophical of those who supported Parkes's reformist view 
was the freetrader, Nicholas Hawken, who was later described as 
being "singularly fond of taking excursions into regions of ab­
stract thought"Hawken admitted the "loyal support" he had 
given the Parkes ministry, and claimed that "In government by 
party a representative must in a measure sink his individuality,
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or progressive legislation would be impossible’’. ' °He concluded
his campaign by stating that he would be elected »‘If fidelity
39to party . .. was appreciatedi’" '
Although he was elected, Hawken's brand of »fidelity 
to party' was little appreciated. By his protectionist oppon­
ent he was criticised for having given "a slavish and servile
/. osupport to the Government»»;7 that such a comment could form a 
line of attack reveals the latent hostility to, and rejection 
of, total allegiance. Other constant party supporters were 
subject to the same line of attack. John Hurley, it was claimed 
uaci mei ely ^cd the part o± a voting machine" for the min­
istry ,Zfl '»voting subserviently at their bidding at all times»'./f2 
Joseph Creer probably gave the most vivid pejorative descript­
ion of the faithful when he referred to them as "blind subserv­
ient machines, who voted for the late Premier servilely, and
A3v/ere willing to descend to anything at his bidding". But the 
faithful party adherent was not only condemned by his political 
opponents.^During December 1889 and January 1890, a conflict 
raged within the protectionist party over "the duty of the ord- 
inary members of a political party". Alexander Hutchison argued 
that it was his and every man’s duty "at all times to be true 
to principle, party, and the recognised leader". His conclus­
ion that any man who was "not prepared to act on these lines"
46had "no claim to be a member of the National party'r' 'gave rise 
to an indignant defence of independence. W.E.Abbott vehemently 
denied that "the whole duty of the ordinary member of Parliam­
ent is 'to do what he is told ' ", Z+2and Henry Copeland condemned 
men like Hutchison as "mere 'voting machines foAmongst the 
freetraders the same conflict was present. Bruce Smith, for
instance, claimed that "party government" reduced men like
49Hawken "to mere puppets or automata", and the freetrade press
upheld the virtue of independence by referring to faithful
freetraders as members of "a 'dumb-driven' majority", and rep-
50resenting them as "a curse to the country".
There is little doubt that most politicians regarded 
the concept of total allegiance as intrinsically wrong. In 
September 1889? the freetrade MLA, E.W.Turner, told Parkes that
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he did ’’not now consider it right to support any government at 
all hazards”3 and that his actions would be based on ”what is51right instead of what is merely seemingly expedient,
What was seen as being offensive about the obligation of total 
allegiance was its implied rejection of the principles of class­
ical liberalism: individual liberty and independence, personal
52freedom of opinion and action. Replying to an ’attack’ on his 
independence by George Dibbs in October 1890, O.O.Dangar claimed 
that the purpose of the attack ’’was to prevent me and other hon.
tr ~z
members ... from exercising their freedom of opinion”. J Tae 
Herald reflected the continued dominance of individualist lib­
eralism by stating that ’’men v/ho are worth anything in public 
life” enter ”a general agreement to abide by party decisions ... 
[only] on the basis of a fundamental reservation of personal 
rights and individual freedom”.^'
Due to the strength of individualist principles, it 
was generally held that the exercise of an individual’s indep­
endence and conscience was perfectly compatible with a firm all­
egiance to his party. The Herald stated that "a member of a
party has his individual rights, and may exercise them without
55forfeiting his position as a party man”, and the Telegraph
forthrightly claimed that ’’the more individual independence
56the stronger the party”.' Naturally enough, independent action
57was vindicated by the doctrinaire laissez-faire liberals," but 
the real strength of the notion was demonstrated by the fact 
that it was also upheld by a number of anti-laissez-faire rad­
icals. B.R.Wise, for example, stated that "it is surely a sign
of ... fa party’s] strength, to leave a certain freedom of
L J 58thought and action to its Parliamentary representatives”.
59Stating that "conscience [ was] his highest standard”, Alfred
Allen pledged that he "would stick to his party as long as he
60could give a conscientious vote".
It was further maintained that should aspirants for 
places in parliament pledge themselves to total party subserv­
ience, they would be rejected out of hand. The C 0 0 r. a n b I e T1 m e s 
appears to have been correct in its claim that "Sir Henry Parxes 
may desire mere machines as supporters; but the constituencies
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desire independent members, ♦..". Again with reference to 
Parkes's concept of total allegiance, the Telegraph maintained 
that "the people would not consent to be represented by persons 
who agreed with that conception of Parliamentary duty"0 "'During 
the 3.889 general election, in fact, the candidate who did not
61make reference to his "untrammelled and unfettered" independence,
r  I s' —
his "individuality", OM’or his "judgment and conscience", J^was def­
initely the exception rather than the rule*j('
In sharp contrast to the tone of the 1889 general elect­
ion campaign, however, was that of .1887, during which candidates 
demonstrated a much greater willingness to declare themselves
"staunch", ^ f i r m " ,fj^ "thick and thin"^and "out-and-out" '^ 'supp-71orters of Parkes and the ministry. Although M.J.Conlon's state­
ment that each freetrader elected in 1.887 ’’was pledged to supp-
72ort Sir Henry Parkes at all hazards" was an exaggeration, the
incidence of declared independence among successful freetrade
73candidates in 1887 was definitely low.'- This marked contrast would 
indicate that Parkes’s concept of a clear fiscal polarisation 
creating two permanent and solid political parties, successfully 
executed in its initial stages in 1886 and 1887, was by 1889 
showing signs of disintegration. Between 1887 and 1889 the plan 
had gone awry, and it is not difficult to discover v/hy.
Parkes's fiscal campaign of 1886 represented a radical 
departure from the prevailing inchoate state of politics, and, 
in the initial wave of enthusiasm for the new political direct­
ion and certainty, the normal declarations of independence were 
replaced by a willingness on the part of both ’old' and 'new' 
politicians to make a definite commitment either for or against 
Parkes, his ministry and, in particular, his 'policy' and 'pro- 
gramme'. ^But, as has been seen, Parkes's 'programme' was almost 
entirely based on the emotion of fiscal conflict, most other 
issues being deliberately left vague, or ignored, in order to 
avoid possible dissension. Bruce Smith pointed to the danger 
of this approach in 1889 when he stated that "...the subject 
of Free Trade, alone, is not sufficiently comprehensive to en­
list, for any length of time, and for purposes of sustained in-
75tellectual attention, any large number" of persons. Although
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Parkes correctly believed that a commitment on one issue only 
was certain to ere te at least a nominal group unity, it was 
unrealistic to believe that this could be maintained on such 
a narrow basis, or on the basis of the equation of a commitment 
to freetrade with total personal allegiance to himself. The 
commitment in 1887 of many men to Parkes and freetrade was in 
terms of a ’programme’ that seemed to foreshadow action on 
issues other than freetrade. Although the ’programme’ was desc­
ribed at the time as vague, °it was generally thought it would 
be elaborated and implemented through legislation. Parkes’s 
failure to do either served to dilute group solidarity to the 
extent that MsLA felt bound to the party on the fiscal issue 
only, and free to act independently on others. In addition, a 
commitment to freetrade or protection on the part of many men 
in 1887 necessarily implied a much broader commitment, their 
chosen fiscal doctrine representing only one important element 
in an overall political philosophy whose implementation they en­
visaged. The varying political philosophies represented in 
both parties reacted rather differently to the diffidence to 
venture beyond the narrow bounds of the fiscal issue: such in­
action suited the defensive laissez-faire conservatives, but 
not the radicals, and it v/as the latter's unsuccessful attempts 
to force both parties to grapple with issues both implied by, 
and outside the realms of, the fiscal issue that resulted in 
internecine conflict, disunity and rebellion.
Within the freetrade party, harmony and unity prevailed 
for most of 1887 and 1888. The overwhelming commitment to 
Parkes and freetrade in January 1887 demonstrated the hopes 
and expectations of principled freetraders, and for most of the 
following two years they awaited the fulfilment of these hopes. 
Despite the doctrinaire argument over the meaning of freetrade 
that arose during 1887 and 1888, little upset the united front 
presented by the party: the conservatives enjoyed the ministry's 
inaction, and the radicals waited, trusted and tried to persuade 
Parkes to overcome his inaction. It was this uneasy peace that 
led McMillan to refer to the 'steady and compact majority'. But 
during these two years doctrinaire concerns and principled con­
flicts became increasingly prominent, and radical tolerance gave
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way to criticism and discontent. Finally, towards the end of
1888, the radicals- and other frustrated freetraders rebelled 
and the ministry teetered towards its resignation in January
1889. It was in this rebellious situation that Parkes, both
in public and private statements, forcefully reiterated his
77views on permanent party allegiance and personal loyalty. In 
the circumstances of early 1889? however, after two years dur­
ing which the importance of political principle had been inc­
reasingly stressed, many freetraders were disinclined to acq­
uiesce in Parkes*s renewed demand of blind factional subserv­
ience. It is in this context that the freetrade vote of 16 
January rejecting Parkes’s desire to grant supply to the min­
ority Dibbs ministry should be viewed. It is also in this con­
text that Loveday and Martin perceive that principle had super­
seded "attachment to a leader" as the basic force determining:
rp  O
political allegiance.
The grounds on which various men of principle within 
the freetrade party rejected the concepts of total party alleg­
iance and factional subservience differed. Traditional indiv­
idualist liberals objected on the grounds that such a demand 
threatened the sacred right of independent action; radical lib­
erals, basically more sympathetic to the concept of party solid- 
79arity, felt the need to preserve their freedom to dissent from
majority party opinions that conflicted with their own. Whilst
80some radicals retained vestiges of traditional individualism,'"'
others who upheld party solidarity were still moved from time
to time to exhibit their dissatisfaction and frustration with
the party’s basic conservatism. John Haynes was one of these.
In December 1889? Haynes wrote to Parkes: "I am always for Party
that is I resolutely oppose what I believe would damage my
0-,
party". In May 1891s however, Haynes deserted the freetrade
82ministry in the division on a motion of censure0 on the grounds 
that "there has been a complete desertion of the principles on
83which the Government came into power".' A week later, however, 
he told Parkes that "It is almost unnecessary for me to say I 
am still with the party", ' and he denied to his constituents
that "he was what had been described as an independent candidate
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In forming his second freetrade ministry in 1889>
Parkes, the faction 'boss', was forced to recognise the rising
tide of doctrinaire conflict and principled concerns within the
party. Although the composition of the ministry reflected his
attempt to maintain superficial party unity by including both
radicals and conservatives, its overall majority revealed his
86own traditionally conservative outlook." 'But, if Parkes was to 
experience difficulty with the radical members of his ministry, 
he was also to find cause for complaint with his conservative 
liberal colleagues. His traditional liberal outlook did not 
dilute the demands he made as a faction 'boss'; classical ind­
ividualist theory, however, largely dictated the reactions of 
his doctrinaire conservative colleagues to such demands.
Parkes's insistence on total control and obedience to 
himself was no better demonstrated than in the demands he made 
upon his cabinet colleagues. During the early days of his 1887 
ministry he repeatedly emphasised his own role as absolute lead­
er, stifling independent action and demanding full knowledge of,
Onand the right to veto, every proposed ministerial scheme. 'As 
previously pointed out, Parkes's first free trade ministry, com­
posed as it was of loyal and devoted factional admirers, gave
88him little cause for complaint. °What ructions that did occur
were not the result of conflicts over principles, defiant acts
of independence or a lack of subservience to Parkes, but were
due rather to such non-political private matters a.s W.J. Foster 's
89'promise of the judgeship' feud with Parkes and the probable
90alcoholism of the Secretary for Lands, Thomas Garrett. "The
correspondence between Parkes and Garrett during 1888 over this
matter clearly demonstrates Parkes's authority and control. In
reply to a blunt stricture from Parkes in which he was told that
"the grave trouble" he was causing the government "cannot be ali­
gnowred to continue", Garrett told Parkes that he left his minist-
9 ?erial future "to be settled by yourself". “"Several weeks later, 
Parkes again wrote to Garrett, stating that "I am sure you will 
see that there is only one course open for you, which is to 
place in my hands your resignation"; ^ o n 19 July 1888, Garrett 
resigned from the ministry. Parkes's successful achievement of 
ministerial subservience between 1887 and early 1889 was pointed
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to by the Coonamb1e Tirnos which referred to the existence of
"one-horse Government, ... with the redoubtable Sir Henry as 
96c oachman".'
On the formation of his second free trade ministry in 
March 1889? Parkes virtually laid down the same conditions of
9 rministerial, subservience. The radically altered and doctrinaire 
composition of the new ministry, however, presaged a response 
in marked contrast to the uncritical servility of the old.
Some years later Parkes outlined the three main causes of his 
dissatisfaction with his 1889-189-1 ministry: ^ a  "want of dig­
nity and true conception of duty", a "want of harmony in coll- 
97ective action",' and "positive disloyalty towards myself as 
leader".
Parkes made clear what he meant by a ’true conception
98of duty’ on the formation of the ministry," and in August 1890, 
he reiterated his definition when he told McMillan: "when gentle­
men join in the formation of a Ministry they virtually pledge
themselves to do their best, ... by regular attendance in Parl-
99lament and at Executive and Cabinet Councils, ...".Prior to 
this letter, he had a3.ready had cause to complain of attendance 
at cabinet meetings,^°^and he now did so again by charging Dan­
iel O ’Connor with "neglect [of ] these very grave obligations". 
Parkes pointed to O ’Connor’s "lax attendance in Parliament", 
and his frequent "absences from Executive and Cabinet Councils", 
and he concluded that O ’Connor "ought to terminate this state 
of things by giving that attention to his public duties which 
is obligatory upon him". ^
The lack of collective harmony mentioned by Parkes was 
almost certainly due to the divergence of principled and doc­
trinaire opinion within the ministry. Such disagreements were 
occasionally revealed, as in the cases of a bitter dispute be-
102tween the conservative McMillan and the progressive Carruthers,
and the obvious dissension caused by Sydney Smith’s radical
103proposals in the Coal Mines Pvegulation Bill in 1891*
But Parkes’s most serious complaint about the ministry
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was what he described as ’disloyalty to myself as leader’, by 
which he meant both the lack of personal subservience to, and 
dependence upon, himself, and the incidence of independent act­
ion on the part of some ministers. Such complaints, elsewhere 
more emotionally described by Parkes as "the flouts I received" 
and "the personal disrespect I had to submit to”,“ ^should not, 
however, be regarded as an indication of any rebellion against 
Parkes. His position and ultimate control as leader remained 
unchallenged; he did, however, experience some difficulty in 
achieving among his doctrinaire cabinet colleagues an unquest­
ioning endorsement of the rigidly authoritarian, and at times 
pedantic, way in which he exercised his control. As a faction­
al autocrat, Parkes insisted that he know and control every op­
inion and activity of every minister, and demanded that they 
sacrifice any individual initiative and depend upon his guid­
ance and blessing to a degree that bordered on sycophancy. Am­
ong his previous factional cabinet colleagues, like James Ingiis,
105such servility prevailed, and it continued to prevail, it
would appear, in the case of J.N.Brunker, the sole survivor
106of his previous ministry.' But to expect such total personal 
dependence from men whose allegiance was to principle rather 
than personality was unrealistic.
In particular, Parkes could scarcely expect blind sub­
servience from those of his colleagues whose views on govern­
ment policy were not only determined by the tenets of political 
philosophy, but were also in marked contrast to the traditional 
conservatism that was the basis of the ’guidance' offered by 
Parkes. It was not surprising, therefore, that he should have 
found grounds for dissatisfaction with two of his more progress­
ive ministerial colleagues. He found fault with them, however, 
not on the grounds of disobedience, but on those of lack of
communication and personal estrangement. While Parkes complain-
197ed to McMillan that "Mr O'Connor does not come near me", it 
was the case involving J.H.Carruthers that was most revealing.
In April 1891? Parkes told Carruthers: "I am driven to the con­
clusion that you prefer anything to seeing me with whom you 
ought to consult before any other person whatever on all public 
matters"." uarruthers, as if to emphasise his own capacity to
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formulate views and opinions, told Parkes in reply that ”1 am
writing now before the Cabinet meeting today in order that you
may know my views as to our course of business next Session and
109my reasons for such views". He then proceeded to outline a 
positive programme of government legislation, involving such 
radical measures as a land tax and a Workshops and Factories 
Bill. ''^Independent and radical in opinion, Carruthers instinc­
tively rejected the cautious conservatism•of Parkes. Long after 
the ministry had ceased to exist, Carruthers, his ardour some­
what moderated, seemed to admit his earlier lack of brief for 
Parkes’s ideological guidance when he told his former chief that 
"As I am growing older in years and experience I recognise more 
and more the wisdom of many things which you have advised 
upon . . . ". ^ '^Despite this lack of principled rapport between the 
two men, Carruthers was at no stage an unruly or rebellious el­
ement within the ministry, and he remained obedient to the con­
trol imposed by Parkes. In April 1890, he told Parkes that, in 
the light of the latter's objections, he would "not persist" in 
bringing a proposed education bill before the Cabinet and he
then asked whether he was "at liberty" to proceed with the draft-
112ing of other bills "preparatory to submitting them to Cabinet". 
Daniel O'Connor summed up the stand taken by the progressive free­
traders when he told Parkes that "In all things where discipline
or organisation is at stake I give my loyal adhesion - when ind-
113ependent opinion is affected I must preserve my independence".
If the progressives' independence of mind caused Parkes 
to complain, it was a tendency towards independence of action in 
some other ministers that aroused his greatest anger. This tend­
ency was particularly noticeable in his conservative 'individual­
ist liberal' colleagues, Bruce Smith and William McMillan, with 
their emphasis on conscience-motivated action and their condemn- 
ation of "unqualified party obsequiousness". ^Personal servitude 
was not part of their principled code of political behaviour, and 
they acted in response to the dictates of their own principles 
and judgment without necessarily first obtaining the approval of
their 'master'. Of ail Parkes's cabinet colleagues, undoubtedly
115the most troublesome was Bruce Smith, also the most doctrin­
aire of the traditional liberals. Prior to his election to
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parliament in 1889> Smith gave notice of his non-factional,
principled code of action when he told his constituents that
"he would go into Parliament, certainly fettered as regarded
[sic] the opinions he expressed, but quite unfettered as to
116the men he supported 'On much the same basis Smith ent­
ered the ministry. Set as he was in his principled beliefs, 
it was not surprising that he found some grounds for disagree­
ment with Parkes. After the ministry's resignation in 1891?
Smith made reference to the "various differences of opinion
117that now and then divided us". Parkes himself also commented
on his disagreements with Smith, particularly over the subject
of federation; in October 1889? he irritably told the Governor
", o
of Smith's "'divergent' opinions on the question".“' °At least
on one occasion, Parkes demonstrated his annoyance at such
119"signs of dissent" from his own personal views and opinions.
Referring to a difference of opinion between himself and his
colleagues, Smith and McMillan, over a proposed city railway
scheme, Parkes mentioned to the Governor the possibility of his
retirement from the ministry, and its reconstruction "by some-
1 POone else now in office say Mr McMillan or Mr Brunken".
In general, however, the political principles of Parkes
and Smith were basically similar, and Smith recounted that
"neither in your case nor in mine were ...[ our] differences
ever allowed to interfere with the recognition of the common
121object which we had in view". Parkes, too, admitted that
122Smith "never once objected to my conduct of affairs,
As far as differences of opinion over policy were concerned,
Parkes's reaction to Smith was similar to his reaction to Carr-
uthers: he always found difficulty in adapting to a situation
in which the opinions of his colleagues were determined by
"principles which ... [they] believed to be sound, calculated
for good, and worthy of being pushed to testing point",^ “^rather
than by an uncritical acceptance of his own. Just as he complain
ed of Carruthers' self-reliance, he referred to his relations
with Smith as "distant" stating that "he never consults me
1 PLabout anything". "T
Smith, however, did not share his progressive colleague's
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adherence to the principles of solidarity and obedience; he
held tc the classical belief that a man’s actions should be as
independent and free from restraint as his thoughts. It was
Smith's application of this principle that led to Parkes ’s more
vehement denunciations and charges of disloyalty. It is in
this context that the assessment that "Parkes ’controlled' his
125ministers with difficulty" "is valid, although it should again 
be emphasised that difficulty arose only'in terms of Parkes’s 
own personal concept cf control ~ the concept of a factional 
"dictator and autocrat"“" ""that was becoming increasingly unreal­
istic in the changing circumstances cf politics. In terras of 
his own view of ministerial loyalty. Parkes continually regard­
ed Smith’s independence and individual initiative as a denial 
of his leadership, and, as a man who "brooked no rivals near 
his throne", ' he reacted accordingly. In October 1889? he 
told Lord Carrington that Smith "obviously accepted office from 
me without accepting my leadership", and he stated that "he may
have to leave the Ministry, for I am not disposed to put up
128with much more of his thinly disguised offensiveness".
Motivated by a doctrinaire belief in individual init­
iative and a strong attachment to principle, Smith's independ­
ence was certainly not rebellious in intent; Parkes, however, 
somewhat neurotically insisted on viewing it as both a denial 
of, and a challenge to, his own leadership. His sensitivity
to such occurrences was not lessened by the great strain he
129was suffering as a result of family matters, and by the broken
leg which he sustained in Kay 1890 and which confined him for
some months to bed at his home in Balmain, away from the centre
150of political activity. Parkes himself later wrote of the
"disorganising effects" of his accident,x^^and claimed that as
a consequence he "lost command of the ship and thereafter all 
152were Captains". His outright repudiation of McMillan's ina-
ependent assumption of authority during the maritime strike in 
155September 1890, however, left no doubt that he still possess­
ed ultimate control; it was McMillan, not Parkes, who was hum-
] ?'iliated to the point of tendering his resignation.“ The type of 
action that, in Parkes's terms, amounted to a repudiation of 
his authority was demonstrated several times during 1891 by
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Bruce Smith; each instance, however, brought forth from Parkes
135a reassertion of his "imperious command", ''"again revealing that 
not yet had he lost command of his ship.
In February 1891> In reply to Smith's request "to give 
an instance of certain conduct of which ... [he ] complained", 
Parkes referred to an advertisement in the press that described 
a forthcoming speech by Smith as the "first strictly Ministerial1Xgpublic utterance since the prorogation of Parliament". ‘ ^  "'Parkes 
had presumably jumped to the hasty conclusion that Smith had, 
of his own accord, assumed the role of ministerial spokesman, 
and he bluntly told Smith that "you cannot at your meeting to­
night say one word on the policy of my_ Government. The Govern­
ment is mine - not Mr Bruce Smith’s; and I am primarily respons-
137ible for its whole conduct". ' This incident clearly revealed 
both Parkes’s insistence on misconstruing any independent action 
as rebellion, and the difficulty of measuring up to his total­
itarian standards. He told both Smith and McMillan that he
138should have been consulted about the meeting, and he complain­
ed to McMillan that Smith's "mind is so crammed with notions
about himself that apparently it has no room for the consid-
13Qeration of the claims and relations of others". '""Smith himself 
exposed Parkes's hasty over-reaction by pointing out to him that 
"all your observations are based upon an unfounded assumption - 
viz. that I inspired the paragraph" that appeared in the press, 
and he concluded that "You need not fear my doing anything ind­
iscree t". ^ ^ I n  August 1891, Smith again caused Parkes to remind 
him that "there cannot, be a second Leader of the Government, or 
a second Prime Minister", when, as Treasurer, he claimed the 
right to deal directly and independently with the Argent General 
in London. Parkes then insisted that "the financial business 
of the Colony should’ without impairing the independent judgment 
of the Treasurer be settled in consultation with the Head of 
the Government".
Although Parkes's overbearing insistence on ministerial
servility inevitably produced some friction between himself and
his doctrinaire ministers, his colleagues "submitted more or
192less to his domination", and basically continued to rely on
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Parkes to supply the direction and firmness so essential for
ministerial unity and survival. William McMillan, for example,
described by Deakin as "independent though deferential to his
It 1exacting and sometimes inconsiderate chief",' "told Parkes in 
May 1891 that "We are coming into times in which we will need 
all your guidance to prevent the slightest blunder in our ad­
ministration ;
The essential preservation of ministerial unity and sol­
idarity in the face of its obvious diversity was Parkes1s great 
achievement between 1889 and 1891* His success in keeping the 
constant threat of serious doctrinaire dissension and divisive 
independence in check 'was recognised by Bruce Smith who recalled 
in October 1891 that "amid all ... [the] action and reaction of
different and differing views and sentiments we always presented
1 45an united front to the outside world . . .11. Only in October 
1891 was Parkes's firm hold over his colleagues broken; Sydney 
Smith's independent action, in the cause of radical reform, re­
leased the forces of dissension that had been threatening the 
unity of the ministry for nearly three years, and forthwith 
the ministry resigned.
Parkes's insistence upon the concept of total party 
allegiance was clearly unacceptable to a large number of col­
onial politicians, particularly after late-1888 when principle 
was invoked to rival the claims of uncritical personal loyalty 
as the basis of party faith. Those wedded to the cause of ad­
vanced liberalism and radical reform, despite their principled 
sympathy with the solidarity concept, exercised their right of 
dissent as a means of attempting to bind their parties to pro­
gressive policy; these who held to the theory of individualist 
liberalism insisted on their rights to act according to their 
c onscienc e. ^ ^ ^ 11 was in the light of these reactions that Parkes 
was branded as "the greatest dictator and autocrat in New South 
Wales".^+°By 18895 however, it was clear that, in order to mould 
and maintain effective party solidarity, a party needed to poss­
ess an accepted and effective disciplinary system. The Herald 
rather uncharacteristically confirmed this conclusion when it 
stated that party members "must see the need for drill and
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1 j_. Qdiscipline, and cordially accept the conditions". H~It was in 
the attempt after 1339 to construct a system of party discipline, 
especially among the protectionists, that the dynamic processes 
of political change were again revealed. The attempt in itself 
provided evidence of the gradual evolution towards the regimented 
nature of the modern political party; the strong forces of resis­
tance, however, further demonstrated the difficulty of achieving 
rapid and radical change.
By 1889j neither fiscal party possessed a formal system
of discipline; discipline, as such, was vested almost entirely 
in the person of the 'party’ leader. In the face of rebellious 
parliamentary behaviour, Parkes employed the only form of disc­
ipline available to him: the personal weapons of chastisement 
and rejection. In December 1388, the freetrade MLA, F.Jago 
Smith protested to Parkes about "the language you saw fit to
use ... to those of your supporters who had expressed their in-
1 sotention of voting against the Tramway Resolutions".' 'y In the 
light of Smith’s own ’treachery’, Parkes demonstrated his meth­
od of rejection when he told the rebel freetrader that "you are 
of course perfectly free to take whatever course you deem best, 
but you must not complain if I exercise a similar freedom. I
have erred in hitherto considering you a political friend. I151can only now apologise for my error". Of the rebel, Alfred 
Allen, Parkes told the Assembly that "I want to have no convers-
1 5 2ation with him; ... I will have nothing to do with him".*^ De­
flating as they may have been, vituperation and invective imp­
osed no concrete sanction, and as such could effectively be dis­
regarded. In terms of party unity, such disciplinary frailty 
was even more damaging in the atmosphere of indignant doctrin­
aire independence that was aroused during, and maintained after, 
January 1889* This heightened emphasis on independence had the 
effect of making the control exercised by the faction ’bosses’ 
even more vulnerable.
The leaders of the protectionist party at no stage ex­
ercised total control over their followers. The "dictatorial 
methods" of the first leader, J.P.A.bbott, "alienated" many pro­
tectionists and led to a "revolt against his rule". As a result
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of his "failure to lead the wild elements of the Opposition in 
the ways of Parliamentary order, decorum and decency", Abbott 
resigned from the leadership.^'^The temporary resignation of 
Dibbs from the leadership in Kay 1888 was also attributed to 
his failure to control the forces he was "supposed to lead"."' T 
The view of the majority of protectionists was expressed in Dec­
ember 1889 by Henry Copeland, when he stated that "The leader of 
a political party does not, and should not, occupy the position
of the Grand Turk, whose word is law, which the slaves, his foil-
155owers are expected without question to obey". During the same 
month, a number of protectionist MsLA demonstrated their agree­
ment with Copeland’s sentiments.
On 26 November 1889j the first day of a new session of
parliament, a "caucus meeting of the Opposition" was held, at
which it was proposed by Dibbs that a vote of censure be moved
156against the government. Objections to Dibbs's proposed course
157of action were expressed, and one protectionist shortly after­
wards expressed the opinion to Daniel O'Connor that, were Dibbs
1 c O
to move the censure motion, the party "would sit on him".'"'''"'
Despite the objections, Dibbs was successfully 'urged* by other
protectionists to move the censure, whereupon he was directly
warned by one objector that "if such a course were taken the
159party would not probably [sic] vote together ...". In purs­
uing his desired course, Dibbs put his personal control and auth­
ority to the test, and the objectors were dared to vote against
160the motion or to refrain from voting at all in the division.
To emphasise his authority, Dibbs apparently issued what was
l6ldescribed as a "'toe the mark' circular", ""but, although this 
must have had a general effect in tightening the ranks, when 
the division on the censure motion took place on 12 December,
"no less than nine Protectionists ... [Tailed to ] record their 
votes".' w^The abstention of at least five of these men, hence­
forth referred to by the Star as the 'Cocktail Party', was quite 
165deliberate, and one of them, W.E.Abbott, supplied as his reas­
on the fact that "members were coerced into supporting a course
1 (Z Lwhich they did not approve" .“"' The incident, therefore, directly 
raised the question of the degree of control possessed by a 
party leader, and two diametrically opposed points of view were
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expressed. While W.E.Abbott denied the right of a leader to
issue instructions., and the obligation of a party member "to
165to what he is told1'.' 'others maintained that "when a party- 
elec ts one of their number to be their leader their duty is to 
give him loyal support on party questions".
What, however, was most significant about the whole 
episode was the degree to which the new and increasingly doc­
trinaire tone of politics had created both confusion and diss­
ension over the issue of party solidarity and discipline. What 
could basically be termed traditional and radical opinions on 
the issue were voiced during the crisis. Adopting an individ­
ualist approach, Henry Copeland argued that if "individual mem­
bers are to be allowed even the smallest modicum of independent 
judgment you must allow them to exercise that judgment in their
votes, for it is useless to allow a man to think which is the
1 r  r?wiser course if you compel him to go the opposite way".' 'The
radical view, expressed most forcefully by Alexander Hutchison,
praised those who "sacrificed their own interests, and through
a sense of duty ... stood true to their ’guns’, their ’leader’
and the cause, which they had pledged themselves at all hazards
168not only to maintain, but advance".
Hutchison’s statement revealed the rock on which his 
concept of solidarity was based in the developing doctrinaire 
environment of politics: the idea of the pledge. In a situat­
ion wrhere faction-type personal authority and leadership still 
prevailed, Hutchison’s radical reasoning is clear: commitment 
to protection amounted to a pledge to the cause, which in turn 
amounted to a pledge to follow and obey the highest human emb­
odiment of the cause, the party leader. Employing a similarly 
non-factional argument, Copeland claimed, however, that the 
simple fact that members had pledged themselves to a cause
rather than a man meant that "they were not pledged to support
16°any particular person as leader of the party; ...". ''Their
pledge "intelligently [to ] support the cause", moreover, did
170not impair the exercise of their individual judgment. Des­
pite these references to ’the pledge’, the concept was at no 
stage institutionalised nor made formally binding on KsLA by
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*1 r) 1either fiscal party.1, "The vague and non-political nature of 
both parties' platforms, and the parliamentary parties’ blat­
ant disregard of their contents meant that MsLA could not be 
held to be pledged to specific party policy on virtually any 
political issue. All that could be done was to extract a pledge 
to one of the two rival fiscal doctrines, but even this seems 
to have been ineffective. The fundamental differences within 
both parties over the specific meaning of their fiscal creed, 
and the doctrinaire divisions over the implications of the 
pledge throw doubt on Miller’s view that the two fiscal parties
"had been able to apply it successfully", if only to the one
172issue on which they were nominally united.
But, even had a meaningful and formal pledge existed, 
there still remained the problem of enforcing it. Towards the 
end of 1889} a number of protectionist MsLA, particularly the 
protectionist radicals, began to agitate for the need to over­
come the lack of an operative system of formal party discipline. 
Regarding the ’pledge’ as a commitment to party solidarity, rad­
icals like Hutchison viewed rebellious behaviour, like that of
the ’Cocktail Party', as a major breach of faith, for which the
173offenders ought to be repudiated and ignored. In party terms 
this repudiation would take the form of expulsion from the 
councils of the parliamentary party, the protectionist caucus.
The Star trusted "that none of those gentlemen ... will take 
any future part in the Opposition councils. If their own sense 
of decency does not suggest the necessity of their remaining 
away from caucus meetings in future it is to be hoped that a 
distinct intimation from the Protectionist leaders will do so 
in a manner which cannot be mistaken".^ ^
175The usage of the English political term 'caucus’ to 
denote meetings of the members of parliamentary groups and part­
ies, and the notion of discipline by expulsion from the parliam­
entary ’caucus’ seem to have been peculiarly Australian prior to 
1900. The more common British and European usage of 'caucus’ re­
ferred specifically to permanent local extra-parliamentary org­
anisations, designed to manage and organise local election cam-
- | r) CL
paigns on behalf of a parliamentary party. ' )In Britain after
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1 8 6 7 j t h e  number o f  t h e s e  l o c a l  c a u c u s e s  g rew ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y
among the L i b e r a l s  w i th  the fo rm a t io n  o f  l o c a l  L i b e r a l  A ss o c -  
1 7 r-;i a t i o n s .  But th e  modern c o n n o t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  t e rm  ’c a u c u s '  d i d  
n o t  emerge u n t i l  1876 .  Then, u n d e r  th e  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  t h e  r a d ­
i c a l  J o s e p h  C h a m b e r l a in  and h i s  Birmingham L i b e r a l  A s s o c i a t i o n ,
1 n O  I C Q
nicknamed the  'Birmingham Caucus 1 °and ' J o e ’s Caucus ’ , "' ;;an
a t t e m p t  was made t o  a l t e r  t h e  power  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  L i b e r a l
3 go
p a r ty  i n  the cause  o f  d e m o c r a t i s a t i o n . " The l o c a l  c a u c u s e s ,
e s t a b l i s h e d  p r i o r  t o  1876,  had been  f i r m l y  u n d e r  th e  c o n t r o l  o f
t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  p a r t y ,  ^'but i n  1877 C h a m b e r l a in  p rom oted  a
scheme t o  c r e a t e  ’’c o n t r o l  by t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c y  p a r t i e s  [ c a u c u s e s ]
182o f  t h e i r  e l e c t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s " , '  "and t o  make p a r l i a m e n t a r y
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p a r t y  l e a d e r s  and members s u b j e c t  t o  s t r i c t  d i s c i p l i n e  ■'and
a c c o u n t a b l e  t o  th e  r a n k - a n d - f i l e  o f  t h e  p a r t y  o u t s i d e  p a r l i a m e n t .
The f i r s t  move i n  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n  was C h a m b e r l a i n ’s c r e a t i o n  o f
a c e n t r a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  f o r  t h e  l o c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  t h e  N a t i o n a l
L i b e r a l  F e d e r a t i o n « ^ ° ‘+The c a u c u s  now a t t e m p t e d  t o  w i e l d  c o n t r o l
3 86by demanding  t h a t  MPs " s u b m i t  t o  i t s  d e c i s i o n s " ,  ' ' t h u s  f o r c i n g
l86them t o  v o t e  " b l i n d l y  and o b e d i e n t l y " ;  °by  a s su m in g  t h e  power
-1 O n
o f  n o m i n a t i n g  and a d o p t i n g  c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  e l e c t i o n  r and r e f u s ­
i n g  t o  r e n o m i n a t e  MPs i f  t h e y  d i d  n o t  confo rm  to  c a u c u s  d i s c i p -  
188l i n e ;  "and  by e x e r t i n g  i t s  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  
189p a r t y  p o l i c y .  Founded on th e  r a d i c a l  c o n c e p t  o f  d e m o c r a t i c  
r a n k - a n d - f i l e  i n f l u e n c e  and c o n t r o l ,  t h e  c a u c u s  was h o s t i l e  t o  
t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  l i b e r a l  n o t i o n s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i s m  and i n d e p e n d ­
en ce  , ^ ^ a n d  i t  s t r o v e  t o  im pose  i t s  r a d i c a l  o p i n i o n s  on th e  L i b ­
e r a l  p a r t y .  P r i o r  t o  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  Lab o u r  p a r t y ,  
t h i s  e x e r c i s e  o f  ’c a u c u s  c o n t r o l ’ a c h i e v e d  i t s  g r e a t e s t  s u c c e s s  
i n  B r i t a i n  d u r i n g  th e  l 8 8 0 s ‘I J "1 '
A l th o u g h  the .  t e rm  ’c a u c u s ’ a c q u i r e d  th e  same d i s c i p l i n ­
a r y  c o n n o t a t i o n s  i n  A u s t r a l i a ,  i t  was p r o b a b l y  t h e  a b s e n c e  p r i o r  
t o  th e  I 8 9 OS o f  p o w e r f u l  and p e r m a n e n t  e x t r a - p a r l i a m e n t a r y  o r g ­
a n i s a t i o n s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  g r o u p s  t h a t  l e d  t h e  p a r l ­
i a m e n t a r y  g r o u p s  t h e m s e l v e s  t o  assume b o t h  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  and 
t h e  t i t l e  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  ’c a u c u s ’ « I n  i t s  o r i g i n a l  A u s t r a l i a n  
u s a g e ,  ’c a u c u s ’ r e f e r r e d  t o  no more th a n  a m e e t in g  o f  th e  mem­
b e r s  o f  a p a r l i a m e n t a r y  g r o u p ,  and i n  New S o u th  Wales  th e  te rm  
was u s e d  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  a s  e a r l y  as  1 8 7 7 /  Held  i r r e g u l a r l y
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1 a 3and infrequently, ^the purpose of such meetings was generally
to decide upon a course of collective action during a minister-
194 1Q5ial crisis, or to consider parliamentary tactics, '^The rad­
ical connotations of discipline and control did not intrude 
until after i860, and then first in Victoria.^^These radical 
overtones, however, only really emerged in New South Wales dur­
ing the period of fiscal politics after 1888 as one aspect of 
emerging radical pressure for change within both fiscal parties.
The movement away from the politics of personalities 
toward politics of principle, unintentionally initiated by 
Parkes in 1886, had taken the colony by surprise. What, in 
particular, was absent from the political system were the firmly 
established and influential radical organisations and associat­
ions that, in Britain, had played such an important role in the 
gradual emergence of principled politics, and the development 
of the concept of party discipline. The extra-parliamentary 
fiscal organisations were not only dominated by forces anxious 
to inhibit radical change, but the party functions they performed 
were confined to the organisation of elections and the formulat­
ion of party policy; at no stage prior to 1891 did they attempt 
to force MsLA to submit to standards of parliamentary conduct 
and a system of discipline that were devised and imposed by 
themselves. This lack of radical-dominated extra-parliamentary 
’caucuses’ therefore forced the radicals to promote the idea that 
the parliamentary parties should exert ’caucus control’ over
their members. The disciplinary measures envisaged would be
19?used against party rebels during elections, 'and would also 
operate within the parliamentary party itself. The surviving 
faction ’bosses’, Parkes and Dibbs, although basically conservat­
ive in their political philosophy, were also desirous of party 
solidarity, and found ground for agreement with the radicals on 
the subject of discipline and control.
In endeavouring to promote the concept of 'caucus con­
trol' at the end of 1889, however, the radical protectionists 
met with powerful opposition from traditional individualist lib­
erals. Replying to the radical appeals of Hutchison and the £tar 
for disciplinary action against the 'Cocktail Party' rebels, Henry
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Copeland reiterated the sanctity of the "independent judgment
of men” and concluded that "a silken cord will bind a party
198stronger than a hempen rope". ' The whole concept of the caucus 
and its disciplinary implications grossly offended the individ­
ualists, and their most doctrinaire spokesman, Bruce Smith, 
was merciless in his condemnation. Writing in 1887} Smith 
slated the British Liberal party for its "intolerance for ind­
ependence of political thought", and agreed with the view that 
the "arbitrary power" of the caucus was "contrary to all the
]  O Qinstincts and the very faith of the Liberal party". Finally, 
he declared that the effect of "that terrible engine of despot­
ism - the caucus, is to reduce parliamentary representatives to 
mere puppets or automata, '"'°In the face of such implicit
and explicit arguments, Dibbs resisted radical pressure to dis­
cipline the 'Cocktail Party', probably on the grounds that such 
action could well provoke an even more serious party rebellion.
Instead he capitulated, and publicly forgave at least two of 
201the rebels. Such leniency, however, only emphasised the vul­
nerability of his authority and further encouraged rebellious 
independence. Finally, Dibbs was forced to act. Less than a 
year after the appearance of the 'Cocktail Party', Dibbs sub­
mitted to radical pressure.
On 15 October 1890, George Dibbs informed the Assembly 
that, "in view of the desire to have party lines more closely 
drawn", a meeting of the opposition had been held that day to 
deal with "certain members of the Opposition party, who persis-
20tently sit on the Opposition and vote for the Government,
At the meeting, therefore, a resolution was moved and passed
expelling one such offending protectionist, O.O.Dangar, from 
205the opposition. A further meeting of "the caucus of the Opp­
osition" was held two days later at which a further expulsion, 
that of W.S.Dowel, was unanimously decided upon/' "Although it
was reported that the caucus "did not hesitate to take emphatic 
209action", there is little doubt that Dibbs had long been hesit­
ant in consenting to its use as a means of party discipline. 
Despite the treachery of the 'Cocktail Party' in December 1889
and subsequent rebellious activity,'it was not until O.O.Dangar
207became its "first victim"" that the caucus was put to work as
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a disciplinary weapon« Dangar pointed to the previous appreh­
ension to resort to formal discipline in the face of unruly 
independence; this hesitancy, he suggested, was largely due to
the probability that any resort to 'caucus' discipline would
208result in a full-scale party rebellion. That those who admin­
istered the expulsions belonged almost exclusively to the rad­
ical minority in the party and were not supported by a large 
proportion of its members was evidenced during the parliament­
ary debate on Dangar's expulsion.
The Herald noted that, at the caucus meeting which ex­
pelled Dowel, "there was not a large attendance of the members
20 Qwho sit to the left of Mr Speaker", and the implication that 
the 'disciplinarians' of the party were in a minority was re­
inforced by Dangar's analysis of those responsible for his own
expulsion. Whilst Dangar's uncontested statement named twenty-
21 0eight protectionists who did not attend the caucus meeting,
statement and admission could produce the names of only ten
protectionists, six of whom were pronounced radicals, who either
211attended the meeting or upheld its decision. ' In view of the 
lack of unanimity about the use of disciplinary measures, the 
effect of their employment in creating party solidarity was 
negligible; in fact, they had the reverse effect of tending to 
split the protectionists in two. Although Dangar did announce 
his intention of conforming with the caucus decision by quitt­
ing protectionist ranks and in future sitting "on the Govern-
212ment side of the Assembly", Dowel simply moved to the opposit­
ion cross-benches^""''’and joined those who already made up an 
active rebel ' cave '.r It would appear, moreover, that the sym­
pathies of the majority of the party rested with the rebels 
rather than the disciplinarians; traditional attitudes died hard. 
This had several significant consequences. In such a situation, 
the victims of caucus discipline could treat their expulsion 
with scorn, and it was reported that, upon being informed of 
his expulsion, Dowel did "not appear to attach much importance
215.to the action of his former confreres". Furthermore, majority 
rejection of party discipline virtually forced the abandonment 
of the caucus. By June 1891, Dowel must have had his expulsion
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cancelled, for in that month he was made a member of the party’s 
central electoral executive, which also included a number of 
those who only eight months earlier had been responsible for 
his expulsion from the party. r~" 0
A further means of trying to ensure party solidarity 
and impose a degree of party obligation was the use of party 
’whips’. It was their task to muster party support on import­
ant divisions, round up ’stray’ party members and bring influence
217to bear on members ”to make them vote * straight1 It was sig­
nificant, although scarcely surprising, that by 1891 the whips
of both parties and their assistants were all fiscal radicals:
218 21QAlfred Allen and Frank Farnell ""'for the freetraders; J.P.
Howe and his assistants, E.W.O’Sullivan and W.N.Willis, for the 
protectionists.^"' The activities of the whips were given part­
icular attention in May 1891> when the freetrade ministry faced
a vote of censure, and survived it only on the casting vote 
221of the speaker. Prior to the division, Howe and his assist­
ants canvassed protectionist support for the censure, and ”arg-
222ued with those who were inclined to go over to the Government’*.
Their lack of real influence, however, was demonstrated by the
fact that, although only two protectionists ’’declared straight
223out” that they would vote with the ministry five, in fact,
did so and saved the government.^ 4The same fate befell the
229government whip, Farnell, and Parkes afterwards alluded to 
the’Unreliable” state of parties in the Assembly and regretted 
’’the state of things when the Government cannot rely upon what 
men say, .. . ”. Parkes indicated his desire for party solidar­
ity in expressing the view that ”it is very desirable that we
should be able to rely upon our friends as well as know our opp- 
227onents”. " Howe ’ s radical belief in solidarity and. discipline 
was more forcibly expressed in his ’’opinion that party men 
should have voted for their parties ...; and that those who 
did not vote could hardly expect confidence to be reposed in 
them for the future”.
Thus, it would appear that, in spite of their efforts 
”to have party lines more closely drawn”, the fiscal radicals 
made but little effective headway by 1891« ^  4-8:1 > the views
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expressed by O.O.Dangar were still generally upheld: "It ...
[is] of little importance to me whether parties are offended
or not, as long as I feel that I have done my duty to my con-
229 2 "50stituency,. to my own conscience, and to the country", '
Even so, the years between 188? and. 1891 did offer a challenge 
to the dominance of traditional individualism and, although 
the results were unspectacular, individualism was certainly on 
the defensive. It was the very existence of a strong challenge 
that aroused the sleeping advocates of individualism to a most- 
indignant defence of their principles, and this stout defence 
of an entrenched tradition meant that the conflict continued 
well on into the 1390s. It was this conflict that was dcubt- 
less responsible for the continuing failure of the non-Labor 
parties to construct effective and integrated disciplinary sys­
tems. Only in the 1891 Labor party, with its trade union trad­
ition of majority rule and discipline, did the necessary unan­
imity exist to create such a system. Even with its complement­
ary tradition, the Labor party experienced problems in achieving 
solidarity; it was so much more difficult for its rivals. But 
the challenges to individualism between 1887 and 1891 again 
demonstrated the degree to which those years were a period of 
transition, largely the work of progressive radical elements 
challenging assumed traditions.
CHAPTER 7
ELECTIONS AND ENDORSEMENTS: Parliam- 
tary Electoral Organisation and Disc­
ipline.
I. 1839.
"Between free trade [and] 
protectionist ... rings we are 
being rapidly provided with 
political conscience-keepers, 
self-elected and autocratic".
(SMH, 26 January 1889? p.7).
The fiscal parties’ activities during the general elec 
tion of 1889 constituted an important aspect of the process of 
political change after 1885: both the changing nature of colon 
ial politics and the difficulties encountered in transforming 
the political system were clearly revealed.
It was at election times that the two fiscal parties 
temporarily shelved their disruptive internal conflicts and 
put on their most convincing display of collective harmony. 
Real principled intra-party conflict gave way to a demonstrat­
ion of artificial and emotion-charged unity as both parties 
strove to entice the electorate to vote them into power on
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the strength of the emotion generated by the fiscal issue.
In the efforts of both parties to win political power by org­
anising their forces to the best advantage within the elector­
ate, the more conspicuous aspects of the evolution of modern 
political forms were revealed. In 18895 however, there was a 
great contrast between the freetraders and the protectionists 
in the employment of modern methods of electoral organisation 
and management. This contrast was, in itself, an index of the 
changes taking place. The freetraders, comfortably ensconced 
in power since 1887? had done little to develop their methods 
and means of electoral organisation, their 1889 organisation 
remaining as embryonic and insubstantial as that of 1887. The 
protectionists, on the other hand, had made considerable pro­
gress, and in 1889 they displayed some of the attributes of 
the efficient modern electoral machine. Pesidual antipathy 
to party regimentation, dictation and management, still, how­
ever, acted as a check to such innovations. Problems engen­
dered by inexperience and the lack of an effective and co­
ordinated organisational network further inhibited success. 
These, however, were problems that only time, experience end 
further effort could eliminate. It was the difficulty of ach­
ieving total and rapid change that made the period of fiscal 
politics one of evolution, rather than revolution.
It is in this context that the claim that the fiscal 
parties "achieved their highest state of organization in the 
election of 1389"^'deserves considerationc The implications 
of this statement are that fiscal electoral organisation suff­
ered a decline elfter 1889> and that, during the election of 
1891, it was less obvious and effective than in 1889» A.W. 
Martin argues that in 1891 "the Freetrade campaign ... appears 
to have been less organized than that even of 1807".“ Close 
analysis, however, would suggest that fiscal electoral org­
anisation in 1891 was superior to that in both preceding gen­
eral elections. Certainly organisation in 1889 appeared more 
complete; extra-parliamentary organisations in union with the 
parliamentary parties organised the campaign, and the use of 
electoral discipline received much publicity. By 1891? the
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extra-parliamentary bodies had disappeared; but, despite a
number of inhibiting factors, the fiscal parties, especially
the freetraders, did more and achieved, more in 1891 than they 
xhad in 1889*" The process of change and evolution continued 
after 1889*
One means of gauging the increased effectiveness of 
electoral organisation from 1889 to 1891 is offered by an 
analysis of the results achieved, by both parties* use of off­
icial endorsement as a weapon of both electoral management and 
disciplineo The concept of party endorsement, hinted at by 
the PU’s abortive list of ’supported* candidates in 1887, was 
first developed by the protectionists in 1889? and emulated 
by the freetraders in 1891* The use of official party endor­
sement was another aspect of the attempt, initiated in the 
main by fiscal radicals, to apply the concept of ’caucus con­
trol’ to the politics of New South Wales. Furthermore, many 
prominent fiscal MsLA found the use of ‘caucus’ methods less 
offensive during elections than in parliament: during elect­
ions they could aid in the achievement of optimum electoral 
results, while in parliament, such methods appeared only to 
inhibit the members’ own freedom of action. As a result, the 
use of new ’caucus’ methods was greater in electoral politics 
than in parliamentary politics.
Party endorsement in 1889 served the sole purpose of 
electoral management and discipline. The basic task of elec­
toral management was to ensure that the number of party can­
didates in each electorate did not exceed the number of avail­
able seats. If a party could eliminate the incidence of vote­
splitting, its chances of electoral success would be materially 
improved«,^ In the process of eliminating vote-splitting, the 
selection and endorsement of candidates played an important 
role by making clear the party’s choice, and by putting press­
ure on unendorsed candidates to retire from the contest. If 
unendorsed candidates persisted in pressing their claims, the 
central electoral organisations could intervene directly to sec­
ure their retirement either by persuasion or by threat of 
disciplinary action. As such, the whole procedure was regarded
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as being basic to ’’the ’caucus’ system”, since it operated ”to
curtail the free choice of free electors”, and to subject "the5individual to its own particular ’disciplinef ' The use of 
party endorsement was, in 1891* extended into the sphere of 
parliamentary discipline. In the absence of effective parl­
iamentary discipline, party disciplinarians in 1891 first util­
ised party endorsement as a means of punishing party rebels; 
by denying rebel MsLA the party’s stamp of approval, they 
hoped to induce the colony’s electors to reject such unworthy 
party members/"
* * * * *
As soon as it had been made clear on 16 January 1889 
that a general election was necessary to resolve the politic-
7al crisis, the parliamentary protectionists lost no time in 
preparing for the contest. Again it was the radicals who 
were in the vanguard, and on 17 January Ninian Melville and 
and E.W.O’Sullivan were appointed secretaries of the parliam-
o
entary party for the election campaign. Special offices were
9obtained by the parliamentarians, and they set about foster­
ing links with the extra-parliamentary protectionist organ­
isations by inviting delegates from suburban leagues to att-
10end their deliberations. "The response was instantaneous, and 
the meeting on 18 January, attended by "about 100 gentlemen" 
representing a mixture of parliamentarians and non-parliament­
arians, "was organised into a central committee", uniting both 
wings of the party.'
This integration, however, was far from harmonious; 
it was, in fact, integration only created cut of necessity and 
the demands imposed by a general election, and it involved 
more rivalry and suspicion than goodwill. The 1339 general 
election provided the opportunity for wealthy extra-
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parliamentary interests, mainly manufacturers, to renew their 
struggle with the.protectionist MsLA for control of the organ­
isation of the protection movement, particularly in the area of 
electoral organisation. “L'"“The manufacturers were indispensable 
during general elections because of their financial resources, 
and it was the dependence of the entire movement upon their re­
sources that made them such powerful adversaries in any struggle 
within the movement for power or control. The indispensability 
of the manufacturers at the 1889 general election was later 
described by a delegate at the NPA4 conference: "They had 
stepped into the field, and occupied it at a time when they 
were greatly wanted* They came forward when such affluent gent­
lemen were needed, and they [the party ~j would not have met with 
such success if it had not been for them". Indeed, once the 
manufacturers had ’stepped into the field’, they lost no time 
in fully occupying it. As soon as Melville and O ’Sullivan had 
called upon the extra-parliamentary forces for assistance, rope
manufacturer, Archibald Forsyth, hastily reconvened the fading
ISforces of the PU, and prepared them for the takeover. '
As the size of the integrated central electoral comm­
ittee grew, bthe need was felt for a smaller working executive;
this was formed on 21 January, again comprising representatives
17from both wings of the party. But as the size of the central
committee increased, so too did the influence of its extra-
parliamentary members to the exclusion of the parliamentarians,
and the committee soon came under the dominating influence of
Forsyth and his CM and PU colleagues, L.F.Heydon, J.P.Wright 
3 Pand A.W.Gilles. JForsyth also assumed the chairmanship of the 
executive committee.^ T h e  transfer of influence from the parl­
iamentary to the extra-parliamentary ranks was further demon­
strated by the changes in the title given to the protectionist
electoral ’machine’: from the obviously parliamentary-dominated
20"meeting of the Parliamentary Protectionist Party"“ and "cent-
21ral committee of the protectionist party" to the non-parliam-
entary-sounding "central committee of the Protectionist Assoc- 
22 . 23 iation", and "National Protection Association" (NPA3)j the
new name initiated by Forsyth, probably in an attempt to dis­
pel the hostility and suspicion aroused by the mention of the
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’Protection Union', and the title which came to be generally 
applied to the electoral organisation. The takeover was 
completed by the appointment of three extra-parliamentary del­
egates as committee secretaries "in consequence of Messrs Mel­
ville and O'Sullivan having to leave for their electorates, 
m  25
« •  *  e
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Despite the extra-parliamentary takeover, the radical
parliamentarians and the conservative manufacturers both agreed
on the need for energetic organisation, and the NPA3 displayed
no lack of zeal in performing the tasks first conceived, by the
parliamentary committee. The parliamentary party had laid the
foundation for central organisation by requesting all local
protectionist leagues to forward "at once" to the party the
names of desirable candidates and by asking all "intending can-
2hdidates" to register their names with the party. "Forsyth des­
cribed the specific function of the central organisation as aid­
ing electorates without any local organisation to find "suitable
candidates", and as"select[ing ] the best" when too many had off-
27ered themselves. At first, it was the selection of candidates
that occupied most of the NPA's attention, and it issued a set
2 8of rules governing candidate selection/ The rules emphasised 
the selection work of local associations, and stated that the 
choices of the local leagues would "be accepted as the Candidates 
of the party" /
In practice, however, it soon became obvious that the 
NPA executive was forced to bear the brunt of selection and en­
dorsement, mainly because of the tardiness of most local assoc­
iations in selecting their candidates. On 18 January, the loc­
al leagues had been asked to communicate with the central org­
anisation "at once";'^a week later it was obvious that the exec­
utive was being seriously hampered in its work by the failure of 
the local leagues to co-operate, it being reported that "the 
views of the local leagues remain ...still to be obtained","" 
and that the executive's work was incomplete "owing to the neg­
otiations with local leagues being still unconcluded in many 
cases"/ Under pressure from the central committee to get on
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33w i t h  i t s  t a s k  o f  s e l e c t i o n  and e n d o r s e m e n t ,  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  had ,  
on 22 J a n u a r y ,  i s s u e d  i t s  f i r s t  l i s t  o f  e n d o r s e d  c a n d i d a t e s ;  i n
p o s s e s s i o n  o f  th e  s e l e c t i o n s  o f  l o c a l  l e a g u e s  i n ,  a t  m o s t ,  o n ly
3 ■e i g h t  e l e c t o r a t e s ,  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  had announced  e n d o r s e m e n t s  
f o r  a t o t a l  o f  t h i r t y - o n e  e l e c t o r a t e s . " ' ' ' A l l  t h e  l o c a l  s e l e c t i o n s  
t o  hand were o f f i c i a l l y  e n d o r s e d  by th e  e x e c u t i v e ;  th e  r e s t  ap p ­
e a r  to  have  been  e n d o r s e m e n t s  made s o l e l y  on th e  i n i t i a t i v e  o f  
t h e  e x e c u t i v e .
The c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  t h e  NPA e x e c u t i v e ' s  h a s t y  i n t r u s i o n  
i n t o  t h e  a f f a i r s  o f  th e  e l e c t o r a t e s ,  u n i n v i t e d  and b e f o r e  th e  
c o m p l e t i o n  o f  a l l  l o c a l  l e a g u e  a c t i v i t y ,  was a c h a l l e n g e  t o  i t s  
a u t h o r i t y .  D e s p i t e  i t s  p r o f e s s e d  e m p h a s i s  on l o c a l  s e l e c t i o n  
a c t i v i t y ,  t h e  NPA now was v i r t u a l l y  a s k i n g  l o c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  
t o  s e t  a s i d e  t h e i r  r i g h t s  o f  s e l e c t i o n  and a b i d e  by th e  e x e c ­
u t i v e ' s  d e c i s i o n s .  In  a number o f  c a s e s ,  how ever ,  l o c a l  l e a g ­
u e s  ch o se  t o  i g n o r e  t h i s  i m p l i e d  r e q u e s t .  Even i n  two o f  th e  
e l e c t o r a t e s  where c a n d i d a t e s  had been  s e l e c t e d  l o c a l l y  p r i o r  t o  
c e n t r a l  e n d o r s e m e n t ,  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r o s e 0 The c a u s e  was e i t h e r  
a c o m m u n ic a t io n s  breakdown o r ,  more p r o b a b l y ,  i n t e n s e  l o c a l  
r i v a l r y .  The p ro b le m  was t h e  e x i s t e n c e  i n  a number o f  c o u n t r y  
e l e c t o r a t e s  o f  more th a n  one l o c a l  p r o t e c t i o n  l e a g u e .  The e x ­
e c u t i v e  had r e c e i v e d  on or b e f o r e  22 J a n u a r y  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  
one l e a g u e ,  and had e n d o r s e d  i t ;  a n o t h e r  l o c a l  l e a g u e  i n  t h e  
same e l e c t o r a t e  t h e n  s e l e c t e d  a d i f f e r e n t  c a n d i d a t e .  In  Namoi,
W .F.Buchanan had been  s e l e c t e d  by t h e  N a r r a b r i  and W a l g e t t  P r o -
3 6t e c t i o n  L e a g u e s ,  and t h e i r  c h o i c e  was c o n f i r m e d  by th e  e x e c -  
37u t i v e ;  on 26 J a n u a r y ,  how ever ,  i t  was announced  t h a t  th e  Coon-
amble P r o t e c t i o n  League was s u p p o r t i n g  TcH u n g e r f o r d , and was
38s e e k i n g  NPA s u p p o r t  f o r  i t s  c a n d i d a t e .  On 21 J a n u a r y ,  t h e
p r o t e c t i o n  l e a g u e  i n  Cootamundra  chose  J . F . B a r n e s  as  i t s  c a n d i d -
39a t e  f o r  t h e  s i n g l e - s e a t  e l e c t o r a t e  o f  G u n d a g a i ,  and th e  NPA 
d u l y  e n d o r s e d  i t s  c h o i c e 0^ T h e  l o c a l  l e a g u e  i n  G undagai  had ,  
h o w ev er ,  n o t  y e t  met t o  make i t s  c h o i c e ,  a nd ,  when, on 24 J a n ­
u a r y .  i t  d i d  s o ,  i t s  members c l e a r l y  p r e f e r r e d  J .W .B enson  to
if  1
B ar n es  a s  t h e i r  c h o se n  c a n d i d a t e .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  when i t  was 
p r o p o s e d  by some p a r t y  l o y a l i s t s  t h a t  a c o n f e r e n c e  o f  th e  v a r ­
i o u s  l o c a l  l e a g u e s  be h e l d  t o  d e c i d e  f i n a l l y  be tw een  th e  two 
r i v a l s ,  Benson s t a t e d  t h a t  " a f t e r  ehe v o t e  t h a t  n i g h t ,  he d id
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not feel disposed to submit to a decision by the conference". 42
A more straightforward assertion of local autonomy was 
evident in other electorates where the executive had made endorse­
ments prior to any local advice. Included in the executive’s
original list of endorsees were two protectionist candidates 
kxfor Bourke, "the sitting member, Thomas Waddell, and a local 
pastoralist, W.N.Willis.^'‘Prior to this announcement, the local 
league, rather grandly named the Central Australian Protection 
Union,'4""was making preparations to select its candidates, 3and 
the executive’s intrusion did nothing to deter it. The local 
Bourke league’s original two selections, announced on 29 Jan­
uary, included Willis, and added the town’s mayor and league 
vice-president,^Av.H.Daniell, to the exclusion of Waddell. ^ T o
make matters worse, the league some time later added a third
49selection, another local man, O ’Grady. 'In spite of, and poss­
ibly unaware of, the problems being created, the NPA blithely
50pushed ahead with its central endorsement lists. The final 
list was published on 9 February, by which time the executive
had given its blessing to protectionist candidates in up to
51sixty-three out of the seventy-four electorates.
In proceeding so diligently with its endorsement pro­
gramme, however-, the NPA both encountered and created further 
problems. Those of its own making were again largely due to 
its impatience with the local protection leagues, and the leag­
ues' insistence on their selection rights. On 23 January,
while the NPA was approving the candidature of R.C.Luscombe
52for one of the two seats at Carcoar, the electorate's local
protection league was in the process of selecting A.R.Fremlin
53and B.C.Donnelly as its candidates. On 1 February it was ann­
ounced that a Newcastle solicitor, George Wallace, had been
54chosen by the NPA to contest West M a i t l a n d 1 and the executive 
sent a special communication to a meeting of local protection­
ists that same evening "recommending ... ’Wallace as a suitable 
55candidate". At the meeting, however, Wallace was narrowly de­
feated for local selection by James Pritchard, the chairman of
56the local protection union. In the two-member electorate of 
Glen Innes, Alexander Hutchison was selected as the candidate
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of the local league despite the candidature of the two NPA en-g 7
dorsees, F.A.Wright and W.J.Fergusson.":
In Young, three factors - rather hasty NPA in­
volvement, insistence on local autonomy, and a lar ;e measure of 
local rivalry - combined to create a complex problem that de­
fied resolution. The immediate response in the electorate to 
the executive’s call for local league activity was an immediate 
communication from the local league in the town of Young to 
"the leading protectionists in different parts of the elector­
ate, impressing upon them the necessity of organising their 
58forces The communication had the desired effect, and
other local protectionist bodies sprang to life throughout the
electorate : at Temora," "'Harden , " "/Marengo, b J'Murrumbur r ah and
63Cootamundra. "By 25 January, it would appear that the NPA ex­
ecutive was in possession of the selections of the local leag­
ues at Young and Harden, and on that basis they made their en­
dorsements for the two-member electorate. The league at Young
6fhad decided to support the town's ironmonger, J.G.Gough, ‘"‘and
the sitting MLA, J.A.Mackinnon, to the exclusion of a third
65contender, J.J.Miller, ar auctioneer from Cootamund"a, at the
other end of the electorate.^°The league at Harden, however,
made only one selection: Miller. 'The NPA executive resolved
the conflict by granting its endorsement to one nominee of each
league; Gough and Miller were announced as its chosen candidates.
The executive's initial decision did not, however, prevent the
other local leagues from proceeding with their own selections,
and those at Marengo, Murrumburrah and Cootamundra sprang to the
defence of the excluded sitting member, Mackinnon, all three
69selecting him in association with Gough." The Ternora league
only added to the confusion by endorsing the executive's choice
70of Miller and Gough, and by sending a deputation to Mackinnon
asking him to retire in favour of Miller, a request that was
refused by Mackinnon on the grounds that he had been "elected
71to stand by the Young Protection League".1 The hasty action of 
the NPA and the "dissension ... [between] the various protect­
ion unions" had clearly created an undesirable situation as a
result of which the protection "vote ... [would 1 be much cut 
72 " L J
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In addition to the problems of central-local selection 
conflicts, the NPA encountered further difficulties as the re­
sult of an endorsement system that tended to place speed before 
care; sometimes a candidate would be endorsed prior to his con­
sent being received. In endorsing 2.Reuse for Mudgee and J.C. 
McLachlan for Orange, "the executive was undoubtedly endorsing
rc j
the selections of each electorate's local league, ""despite the
fact that neither had apparently made their selections prior to
7Sobtaining the necessary consent from the candidates. Less than 
a day after the announcement of their central endorsement, both 
men declined to contest the electorates for which they had been 
chosenneither vacancy was filled by the central executive.
Occasionally the executive's chosen candidate was an
outsider, unknown to, and unfamiliar with, the electorate for
which he was selected; further, he often seems to have been
chosen without any consultation between the executive and local
protectionists as to his acceptability or chances of success.
The candidate's subsequent discovery of such information was
often very discouraging, and led to his retirement. In such
cases, however, a more suitable candidate writh increased chances
of success was usually offering, and the gap was quickly plugged
For Wilcannia, the NPA imported F.S.Bloxham from Bourke, and on
7726 January endorsed him as the official party candidate.1 On 
learning of the endorsement, a local protectionist telegraphed 
the executive that Bloxham stood no chance against a local pro-
rp O
tectionist, E. B.L.Dickens, .’/hereupon 31oxhara retired and the
79NPA altered its endorsement to Dickens. In West Maitland, the
NPA's imported endorsee, George Wallace, did not pursue hisSOcandidature after the lukewarm local response he received.
The executive replaqed him with another outsider, Wilfred Black-
Siet, a Sydney barrister and defeated protectionist candidate in
82the suburban electorate of Canterbury. Blacket positively con-
O  ~z
firmed his candidature, •"’but when he arrived in 'West Maitland 
on 7 February he was confronted by a well-known local candid­
ate, T. Hunger ford, and "gave v/ay to ... i~him]as having more 
local influence".^ The executive again altered its endorsement.'' 
The same procedure took place in Woliombi, where the original 
endorsee, Hutchins, retired early in the campaign because "he
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86was not acceptable to the local men”, and was replaced bygoA.Love. 'On 29 January, it was announced that the popular sitt­
ing member, Richard Stevenson, had undergone conversion to pro- 
88tection. 'whereupon Love retired and the NPA again readjusted
89its endorsement. The NPA's hasty action and lack of control,
and the absence of co-ordinated organisation, although largely
90confined to country electorates, did not augur well for the 
success of the executive's task of inducing all unendorsed pro­
tectionist candidates to retire.
The task was outlined by the Herald when it pointed to 
the number of electorates "for which the aspirants for political 
honours are far too numerous. To equalise these matters will
91be the task of the central organisations for some days to come".
In some electorates, the NPA executive was not required to in­
tervene at all in the cause of 'equalising these matters'. In 
a number of electorates where central endorsement had created 
no conflict with local leagues and where there was no local ant­
agonism toward the endorsee, the endorsement's implied oblig­
ation on unendorsed candidates to retire was accepted and com- 
Q2plied with. Even in several electorates where premature NPA in­
volvement had caused local-central endorsement conflicts, a will­
ingness to compromise and co-operate was demonstrated. In 
Namoi, for instance, the candidate selected by the local league 
at Coonamble in opposition to the executive's endorsee withdrew 
and contested another electorate.
In another three electorates where the executive inter­
vened to induce retirement, or to secure the settlement of riv­
al claims prior to retirement, intervention bore fruit. In 
Durham, the NPA made no official endorsement, being unable to 
choose between T.Donnelly sind J.Wade, but it appears to have 
urged that one candidate retire in the interests of the party. 
Donnelly told the executive that "the question of the retire­
ment of himself or Mr Wade ... [would] be decided by a mutual
Q 1political f r i e n d " a n d  on 11 February Donnelly gave way to 
Wade. In support of its nominee for Braidwood, the NPA asked
"other protectionist candidates ... to withdraw in his favour","95
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96a request that was immediately complied with." Oi the two un­
endorsed protectionists announced for Hartley, one acceded to
P?the executive’s request to withdraw from the contest. Such
actions led the Herald to comment some time later that the
protectionists’ election campaign was marked by a willingness
to sacrifice ’’personal feeling ... to the general interests ofogthe party".
Elsewhere, however, and particularly where the exec­
utive had helped create conflicts and difficulties, further NPA 
intervention was not so successful, breeding not a willingness 
to compromise, but resentment and intransigence. In two cases, 
it even jeopardised its own credibility as a controlling and 
organising body by performing several volte-face of doubtful 
distinction. Upon learning of the clash between its own endor­
sees for Bourke, Willis and Waddell, and the selections of the
99local league in the electorate, Willis, Daniell and 0 ’Grady,
the executive decided to alter its endorsement in an attempt
to effect a compromise. On 31 January, it became known in
Bourke that Waddell had been discarded, and that the NPA was
100now supporting Willis and Daniell.*" The move had no practical 
effect: Waddell, as sitting member, was most unlikely to retire, 
and all four contending protectionists, as well as a recent add­
ition, W.W.Davis, were nominated to contest the three available 
seats. "Uj~This being so, the executive made a further change. In 
Machiavellian fashion, it now discarded Daniell, and endorsed 
the three candidates it thought had the best chances of elect­
ion, reinstating Waddell, retaining Willis and adding the new­
comer, Davis. At the same time, it requested Daniell and 0 ’Grady 
102to retire. Not surprisingly, neither agreed to withdraw,
Daniell "stoutly” refusing to do so, especially, as he pointed
out, "after having keen nominated by the Bourke union, and their
10 5action having been endorsed by the Sydney people".
The executive's methods for attempting to solve the im- 
101passe reached in Young " were equally questionable. Its orig­
inal endorsement had excluded the sitting protectionist member,
J.A.Mackinnon, in favour of J.Gough and J.Miller. On becoming 
aware of Mackinnon's local popularity, however, it decided on
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30 January to discard Miller and replace him with Mackinnon as
the party's second candidate, and to "advise" Miller to retire 
105in his favour. Within the electorate, the executive’s action
was viewed "with disgust", "^characterised as displaying "want
of discretion"1'2 ,7and. "emphatically condemned" .J "'^Despite "a
109mass of telegrams" from the central body' 'and offers to pay 
all his expenses if he retired, '^"Miller stoutly refused to do
In Gundagai and Glen Innes, the other two electorates 
where NPA endorsement had created conflict with local protect­
ionists, further executive interference also proved futile.
After local attempts at conciliation ^and direct NPA inter-
115vention to secure a retirement, the unendorsed protectionist 
in Gundagai, J.W. Benson, did. withdraw. His action, however, 
did not solve, but exacerbated, the conflict, for he retired 
not in favour of the endorsed Barnes, but in order to nominate 
in his ov/n stead a prominent Sydney protectionist, J.McLaughlin, 
specially imported by "several local gentlemen", presumably in 
the interests of securing the defeat of Barnes.^ 22A1though mem­
bers of the protectionist ministry had apparently attempted to
117dissuade McLaughlin from going to Gundagai, once he had done 
so, the executive gave up in frustration and "resolved not to 
interfere, as both Mr McLaughlin and Mr Barnes have declared11 o
in favour of protection", and fortunately no opposition free-
trade candidate was nominated to take advantage of the conflict.
Although George Dibbs intervened personally in Glen Innes "with
119a view to adjusting matters", he had no success. The executive, 
however, did not confine its operations to electorates where it 
had contributed to the difficulties, and during late January 
and early February, the NPA intervened directly in the elector­
ates of New England,120Albury,l2lMorpeth,122Wellington12^and
Hartley22'fin attempts to secure protectionist retirements; in
125all cases it was singularly unsuccessful.
Despite the obvious shortcomings in its operations, 
some of which positively prohibited success, the entire system 
of central endorsements and executive intervention was clearly 
an attempt to impose the ’caucus system' on the conduct of a
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general election. As one critic expressed it, "no one is to 
be regarded as a fit and proper person to ... become a candid­
ate for a constituency who does not bear the hall-mark of an 
association; and further, that constituencies are to be limited
in their choice of candidates to those whom the association may
126see fit to select for them". It was, however, this task of 
limiting the electors’ 'choice of candidates’ that proved most 
difficult; but the executive did not give up. In view of the 
failure of request and persuasion to induce retirements, the 
NPA in early February began to adopt a harder line and to in­
sist "upon subjecting the individual to its own particular 'dis- 
127cipline'”. The movement towards the use of discipline was first
revealed in Gundagai, where the executive, trying to resolve
the conflict between Barnes and Benson, sent a sharply worded
letter to both candidates telling them that, if a settlement
1 Ppwas not reached, they would be "boycotted by this union".  ^
Compliance with such disciplinary dictates depended, as in the 
parliamentary context, on both the existence of a general con­
sensus on the need for, and desirability of, discipline, and 
the presence of an effective sanction to compel compliance; 
both were absent.
The threat of being ’boycotted’ by the NPA was hollow, 
since unendorsed candidates had already been shunned and, fur­
ther, since the material benefits that accompanied party end-
129orsement appear to have been negligible. Searching for a 
more effective penalty, the executive came up with two new 
ideas, announced in the press on 7 February. Where a "cand­
idate has refused to accede to the request of the committee, ... 
a black list £will ] be started to contain the names of such 
mutineers, who shall be rendered ineligible as candidates for 
any seat in future". Further, and more significantly, "it 
shall be published ... that such refractory candidate is a 
rebel against discipline, and is not to be supported by pro­
tectionists;
In addition to its threats of disciplinary action, the 
executive 's approach to superfluous candidates now became more 
authoritarian. It was reported that "the Central Protection
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League ... ordered" and "called upon" the unwilling W.Wiley to131withdraw from the contest for Illawarra. " By this time, a num­
ber of parliamentary protectionists had returned to Sydney and
13phad become involved in the NPA's electoral campaign. "''George 
Dibbs, already seen as anxious to construct a formal system of 
order and discipline, became particularly associated with the 
executive's disciplinarian approach to its organising task, and 
in Sturt he personally intervened, "urging" the recalcitrant
1 xgprotectionist to retire in favour of the endorsed candidate.
The reaction to this new approach was one of horror and
resentment. Reference was made to "the unblushing effronteryI34... of some clique of wirepullers", " whose "autocratic" tend­
encies were likened to those of Bismarck and "such places as 
133Russia". What, in particular, was condemned was once again
the implied attack on the freedom of any individual to become
a parliamentary candidate, and "the rights of ... electors ...
to vote for any candidate ... [they ] may prefer, without taking
136orders" from any organisation. The reaction in the elector­
ates seems to have been similar, the executive's dictatorial
137interference being "strongly resented" in Illawarra, and the 
endorsed protectionist in Sturt specifically denying any affil­
iation with Dibbs and the executive in order to avoid any ad- 
verse electoral reaction. ^°The important point was, however, 
that the threatened penalties for disobedience were not immed­
iate, and only the final election results would tell whether 
protectionist electors had heeded the executive’s call to ig­
nore and repudiate the ’rebels’ who went to the poll. As a re­
sult, the threats put little pressure on the rebels to retire, 
and none did so. As a consequence, there went to the poll too
many protectionist candidates for the available seats in eleven
139electorates that were also contested by freetraders, and in
1A0six electorates uncontested by freetraders. After the elect­
ion, the chairman of the NPA executive, Archibald Forsyth, 
pointed to the detrimental effects of such vote-splitting when 
he claimed that in five electorates, "in all of which the pro­
tectionists had a majority of votes, six seats were lost 
through the number of protectionist candidates exceeding the
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number of seats”.UI
Although the NPA3 and its endorsement had only marg­
inal success in reducing the number of protectionist candid­
ates, the supreme test of endorsement was its success in in­
fluencing the election of its recipients, and in preventing 
that of those who ignored it. The importance of this result 
for the future use of endorsement as a disciplinary weapon 
with which to punish parliamentary protectionist rebels, and 
as an effective means of eliminating vote-splitting, was ob­
vious to the executive, and it specifically implored protect­
ionists to "use the full power of [their] ... vote by voting 
for all selected candidates” and "not to endanger the success 
of the election by voting for unrecognised candidates”.^^In 
this respect the KPA3 and its endorsement achieved a signif­
icant measure of success; in all electorates where endorsed 
and unendorsed protectionists went to the poll in competition 
with one another, the endorsed candidates achieved noticeably 
better results, both in terms of the number of seats won and 
the average number of votes per candidate. Even after ded­
ucting the number of sitting MsLA who were seeking re-elect­
ion and whose chances of success were high whether endorsed 
or not, the apparent advantage of endorsement remained consid­
erable o
Just as they were shortly to do in the parliamentary 
arena, a number of protectionists had, in early 18893 recog­
nised the need for, and desirability of, organisation and dis­
cipline, and they had proceeded to act upon their perceptions 
with vigour. But, as in the parliamentary context, the ach­
ievement of total and immediate success was impeded by mis­
takes caused by haste and inexperience, a v/idespread refusal 
to accept the values of the 'caucus system', the continuing 
addiction to the principles of individualism, and the lack of 
effective disciplinary sanctions, as well as the additional 
factors of local rivalry and an insistence on local autonomy. 
Despite the problems and failures, however, progress had been 
made, and what the election of 1889 emphasised was that changes 
were taking place. New forms and methods of electoral
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organisation were evolving to replace the old, but the trans­
ition was neither painless nor swift. Only the next general 
election would tell whether lessons had been learned, and 
successes consolidated and capitalised upon; only that elect­
ion would tell, in fact, whether the political transition had 
retained its momentum«
In comparison with protectionist energy, freetrade 
organisation during the 1889 general election was weak and in­
effectual o The Herald acutely highlighted the contrast when it 
stated that "the protectionist battle was planned with more 
judgment, and fought with more singleness and directness of 
purpose". l(;/rAlthough the NPA3 takeover of the protectionists’ 
electoral machine had probably not been envisaged, the integ­
ration of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary forces in one 
central body of direction was planned, and the judgment evident 
in this decision paid dividends. No such integration of forces 
was either contemplated or attempted by the freetraders, and the 
two bodies charged with directing their campaign lumbered into 
separate existence, and maintained their separate identities 
throughout the campaign. The first to act was the extra- 
parliamentary FTA, the council of which demonstrated its polit­
ical acumen in anticipating a general election by appointing at
145an early date its own election committee, and by calling on 
the parliamentary party "to take active steps to prepare for 
such contest",^^The FTA's election committee sprang quickly 
into action, first meeting on 16 January,' +'enlarging its num­
bers on 18 January, ^ /arranging to meet twice daily at 11 am
and 8 pm from 21 January-1^  ^ and setting itself up in the FTA’s
] 50central offices in Moore Street.
Despite the FTA’s call for early action, the parliam­
entary freetraders did not meet until 18 January to form their
151electoral organising body. The thirty-two freetrade MsLA 
152present were all formed into "a general committee", from
153 154which "a strong executive" of either seven or nine "prom-
155inent freetrade members" was constituted. The executive then
156decided to secure its own central offices, resolved to appoint
157 158a paid secretary, and arranged to meet daily at 10 am.
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Clearly, then, both freetrade bodies maintained a distinct and 
separate identity, formal integration being non-existent. In 
view of this duality, the direction and co-ordination of elect­
oral activity posed an immediate problem, On 21 January, it was 
announced that, unlike two years previously, "On this occasion
the Parliamentary party will assume the chief direction of aff- 
159airs", 'although it was also stated that "arrangements have 
been made" and "steps .«. taken" to ensure "concerted action", 
"complete harmony" and the prevention of friction between the 
two bodies,”" What, however, constituted the 'affairs' to be 
directed, and the 'action’ to be concerted still remained un­
clear, Unlike the radical protectionist MsLA, Melville and 
O'Sullivan, who had obviously planned in advance their approach 
to their organising task, the freetraders seemed at first to 
lack any real sense of purpose and any specific ideas as to 
how to go about their tasks.
It seems that the two freetrade bodies saw their initial
task as being the provision of assistance to "city and country
constituencies to secure suitable men", the overall aim being
"to provide well-established men holding free trade views for all
1 b 1the constituencies", "' But the allocation and co-ordination of 
specific tasks between the two bodies remained somewhat vague.
In view of its supposed network of local branches and the comm-1 gp
encement it had already made on its organising activities,
it seems to have been decided that the FTA should largely carry
on from 1887 by supervising and arranging the actual provision
163of candidates to various electorates. Initially, therefore,
the parliamentary executive was seen as merely "doing much toI6istrengthen the hands of the parent association"; ras to its
own specific role, there existed much uncertainty and confusion.
The reports of its meetings emphasise this. There was fairly
165constant reference to "initial duties" and "purely preparat­
ory work",~ö^emphasis on the fact that "nothing definite was 
167decided upon", and, as if to conceal their confusion, "the 
nature of thp proceedings [at one meeting] were not allowed to 
transpire". Finally, it seems that, in addition to sharing 
with the FTA the task of providing candidates when asked to do
169so, the parliamentary executive assumed the previously untried
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r o l e ,  p o s s i b l y  i n  e m u l a t i o n  o f  th e  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s ,  o f  g r a n t ­
i n g  o f f i c i a l  a p p r o v a l  o r  e n d o r s e m e n t  t o  s e l e c t e d  c a n d i d a t e s .  '
I n  g e n e r a l ,  i t  would a p p e a r  t h a t  th e  FTA, when r e q u e s t e d  to  
p r o v i d e  a c a n d i d a t e ,  would make a s e l e c t i o n  " o u t  o f  a p r o f u s ­
i o n  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n s "  and would th e n  s u b m i t  t h e i r  c h o i c e  t o  th e
171p a r l i a m e n t a r y  e x e c u t i v e  f o r  a p p r o v a l .
I n  o r d e r  to  make th e  FTA’s t a s k  o f  p r o v i d i n g  c a n d i d ­
a t e s  t o  empty  e l e c t o r a t e s  a p p e a r  r e a l i s t i c  and c a p a b l e  of  com­
p l e t i o n ,  i t  was e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  an a c t i v e  l o c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  
s h o u l d  e x i s t  i n  a l a r g e  number o f  e l e c t o r a t e s ,  i n  o r d e r  to  
l i g h t e n  t h e  FTA’s b u rd en  by s e l e c t i n g  c a n d i d a t e s  and recomm­
e n d i n g  t h e i r  o f f i c i a l  e n d o r s e m e n t .  On 23 J a n u a r y  i t  was r e ­
p o r t e d  t h a t  th e  c e n t r a l  b o d i e s  " a p p e a r  t o  be w e l l  backed  up by th e  
b r a n c h  a s s o c i a t i o n s  i n  th e  s u b u r b s  and c o u n t r y ,  In
r e g a r d  t o  t h e  tw e lv e  c i t y  and s u b u r b a n  e l e c t o r a t e s ,  t h e r e  was 
some t r u t h  i n  th e  r e p o r t ,  f o r  by 25 J a n u a r y  b r a n c h e s  o f  th e  FTA
i n  f i v e  o f  t h o s e  e l e c t o r a t e s  had met and s e l e c t e d  t h e i r  c a n d i d -  
173a t e s ,  and th e  b r a n c h  i n  one f u r t h e r  e l e c t o r a t e  was s h o r t l y  to
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f o l l o w  s u i t .  ( +B ut ,  d e s p i t e  t h i s  a c t i v i t y ,  t h e  l a c k  o f  a pe rm an­
e n t  b r a n c h  n e t w o r k  and p o s i t i v e  l o c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  was s t i l l  ob­
v i o u s .  A c t i o n  i n  P a r r a m a t t a  and  C e n t r a l  Cumberland was s o l e l y
due t o  t h e  c o n c e r t e d  a c t i o n  o f  l o c a l  f r e e t r a d e r s  i n  " r e o r g a n i s -
175i n g "  t h e i r  f o r c e s ,  and i n  p l a n n i n g  and a c h i e v i n g  t h e  f o r m a t ­
i o n  o f  a l o c a l  FTA s p e c i a l l y  t o  " c o n s i d e r  and p l a n  f o r  th e  e l e c -  
t i o n s " 0 DJo h n  S u t h e r l a n d  r e v e a l e d  th e  i n a d e q u a t e  s i t u a t i o n  i n
R e d f e r n  when he s t a t e d  t h a t  " t h e r e  was no o r g a n i s a t i o n  a t  a l l  on
177t h e  s i d e  o f  t h e  f r e e t r a d e r s " ;  d e s p i t e  e x h o r t a t i o n s  t o  form "a
1 n O
s t r o n g  o r g a n i s a t i o n " , '  n o t h i n g  a t  a l l  was d one .  A f r e e t r a d e r  i n
P a d d i n g t o n  a l s o  w ro te  t o  th e  H e r a l d  u r g i n g  a c o n c e r t e d  l o c a l  e f f -
179o r t  t o  s e l e c t  c a n d i d a t e s ,  b u t  a g a i n  no heed  was p a i d .
I n  c o m p a r i s o n  to  t h e  c o u n t r y  e l e c t o r a t e s ,  how ever ,  l o c a l  
f r e e t r a d e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  i n  Sydney a p p e a r e d  c o m p l e t e .  By 25 J a n ­
u a r y ,  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  c a n d i d a t e s  by l o c a l  f r e e t r a d e  l e a g u e s  had
180t a k e n  p l a c e  i n  j u s t  f o u r  o u t  o f  s i x t y - t w o  c o u n t r y  e l e c t o r a t e s ,  
and  o n ly  one o t h e r  was t o  be added  a f t e r  t h a t  d a t e .  Sometimes 
th e  l a c k  o f  f o r m a l  l o c a l  b r a n c h e s  was c o m p en s a ted  f o r  by a c t i v e  
p e r s o n a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  In  G o u lb u r n ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  th e  p r i v a t e
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committee of the sitting freetrader, William Teece, not only 
managed the campaign of its candidate, but also that of the 
freetraders in the surrounding electorate of Argyle. The comm­
ittee distributed circulars throughout Argyle urging free trade
electors to use their vote, and arranged for Parkes and McMill-
1 8?an to visit Goulburn in support of the freetrade candidates;' 
its vigour was such that not only were the freetrade candidates 
for Goulburn and Argyle all returned, but the freetraders were 
also stimulated to form a local Goulburn branch of the FTA after
I 07
the election. '^Even such active personal organisation, however, 
seems to have been lacking in most country electorates. In 
Kiama, the suggestion that a local committee be appointed "to 
select or recommend a candidate" was rejected out of hand.^1 
The general consequence of such local inactivity seems undoubt­
edly to have been the loss of freetrade seats. The freetraders
185in Young did nothing at all, apart from making the extraord­
inary move of trying to induce a freetrade candidate to retire186in favour of a protectionist, and a seat was lost; a freetrade 
candidate for Camden later maintained that "one seat in the elec 
torate was lost owing to the lack of organisation among the free 
traders". ^
It was this vast organisational vacuum that the FTA was 
expected to fill by the speedy provision and despatch of candid­
ates. By 25 January, the central FTA had taken definite and 
positive action in seven country electorates, and had possibly
done the same in a further six. )0The freetraders in Tumut re-
189quested the FTA to send a candidate, and it seems certain that
190W.HoVivian, who had offered his services to the party and who
appeared on the FTA’s list "as a probable candidate for a coun-
191try constituency", was despatched by the Association to Tumut.
Having selected the sitting freetrader, W.Clarke, as one of its
candidates, the local freetrade association in Orange asked the
192FTA to provide "an able man to contest the second seat", and
195it appears that its request was grantedo In other electorates 
the FTA did not wait to be requested to arrange freetrade can­
didates. The Association specifically requested prominent loc-
199 195al freetraders in Bathurst and Bogan to come forward as 
freetrade candidates, and in both cases their consent was
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forthcoming,J Murrumbidgee, favourable reports "indicat-
1 97ive of a development of the strength of their party" induced
the FTA to send two strong freetraders from outside the elec-
1°8torate as candidates,  ^ Likewise, the Association sent the
199radically-minded Alexander Riddell of North Sydney yyas its 
candidate to Inverell, and its own council member and electoral 
organiser, N. B, Downing, to Edeiic/"0^
It was at this point that the parliamentary executive
intruded into the organisational limelight by publishing, on
25 January, its first list of officially endorsed freetrade 
201candidates.'“ Compared to the protectionists’ initial list, it 
was not only two days behind, but was also almost exactly half 
the size, for it contained approvals for only sixteen elector­
ates, thirteen of which were country constituencies. To a 
large degree, the list was based, naturally enough, on the 
’provision’ work of the FTA, since the endorsees in five of the
country electorates were candidates definitely arranged by the 
202FTA. Of the remaining eight country electorates, it is poss­
ible that the FTA had been involved in six, although there is
205no conclusive evidence to confirm this. The executive also
gave official approval to the selections of three out of the
nine local leagues which had, by the time of publication, met
to choose their candidates,^ °4having previously given its bless-
205ing to the selected candidates of a further branch.
The executive’s ’approval’ list was in itself a re­
flection of both the size of the task that faced the central 
freetrade bodies, and the minimal progress they had made in 
tackling it. In an attempt to save some face, it was announced 
the following day that "the list of candidates approved of by 
the executive committee of the Parliamentary freetrade party, 
in conjunction with the Freetrade Association" would be comp- 
leted within four days. Such a list, however, was never forth­
coming. It would appear that the formidable task of trying to 
fill an organisational vacuum by undertaking the basic work of 
finding willing candidates to contest country electorates pro­
vided sufficient reason for the executive to abandon the
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sophisticated exercise of formally endorsing or 'approving' 
them; their mere presence, regardless of quality or quantity, 
became the chief objective. In only two further country elec­
torates was there anything that even resembled an endorsement
provided, and, in Camden, this was provided by the FTA only
°07after a specific request for it to do so/ r
The executive, still in conjunction with the FTA, now
confined its endorsement activities to the Sydney suburban
electorates. In its original list, the executive had included
four Sydney electorates, confirming the selections of local
leagues in two, and independently granting endorsements in an- 
2 0 8other two. °As they appeared in the Telegraph, the endorsements
in both these latter two electorates were incomplete,' but it
was not long before the executive had taken effective steps to
210overcome the shortages. "'The executive also arranged and en-
211dorsed four freetraders for Paddington, and, in conjunction
212with the FTA, did the same for Central Cumberland "and Parra- 
213matta, finally issuing on 1 February a comprehensive list of
2inendorsements for nine out of the twelve suburban electorates.“'1 ' 
This final list, however, reveals the purposeless freetrade app­
roach to the process of endorsement, particularly when compared 
to that of the protectionists. The protectionists undoubtedly 
regarded the process of official endorsement as a vital element 
in their scheme of electoral management, and it was probably for 
this reason that they tended to make the mistake of granting it 
too hastily. They clearly regarded official party endorsement 
as a means of applying pressure on rejected candidates to re­
tire, and they strove to make it an important factor in a can-
219didate's chances of electoral success, thereby first foster­
ing what has since become a formidable weapon of electoral con­
trol and party discipline. It was largely in response to this 
approach that one correspondent remarked that "this is a system 
of government, not by the people through their chosen represent- 
atives, but by a political organisation through its nominees"."" 
No such claim, however, could justifiably be made about the 
freetraders. Their lack of purpose in the use of endorsements 
v/as revealed by the fact that the one reasonably comprehensive 
list of endorsees for the Sydney electorates was published only
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after the nomination of candidates in all the electorates listed, 
thus too late to induce any necessary retirements, and only one 
day in advance of election day for all listed electorates, 
scarcely adequate time to influence the decision of many elect­
ors .
Meanwhile, the FTA continued its efforts to cope with 
the problem of the country electorates. 'It despatched candid-
pj n P13 P1 Qates to Northumberland'1'~ “and Albury,1'"' upon requests to do so;
it announced that a second freetrade candidate would be nomin- 
2P0aued in Murray; ~ it made arrangements to run the sitting free-
221trade KLA for Bourke, A.Wilson, in Wiicannia; and was probably
responsible for one of its most prominent members sallying forth
222to contest Bourke. Even the FTA's efforts in those few elect­
orates it was able to attend to were, however, often futile.
The state of local freetrade organisation in a number of elect­
orates to which FTA candidates had been despatched was so poor 
that electoral success was virtually out of the question. The 
candidate sent to contest Albury withdrew almost as soon as he 
arrived in the electorate, explaining that "the freetraders 
[there] ... not being an organised body, it was impossible ... 
to properly canvass the electorate with the hope of any success, 
In Inverell, the local freetraders were described as 
being at "sixes and sevens", ^ ^and it was later reported that
they were even unable "to form a working committee" to aid the 
225FTA candidate; Riddell was not deterred, but was badly defeat­
ed .
In other electorates, what the Bathurst Times describ-
226ed as "dilatoriness in sending the candidate into the field" 
had disastrous results. The FTA candidate for Albury arrived 
just three days prior to nomination day, the two for Murrumb- 
idgee no more than two days prior, and one of the Association's 
two candidates for Murray was announced just two days prior to 
nomination; as a result, only one bothered to submit to the in­
evitability of a heavy electoral defeat. Furthermore, there 
seems to have been in some electorates a good deal of local an­
tagonism towards FTA interference, and especially the Assoc­
iation's importation into electorates of outside candidates.
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The Kiarn.a Indexendont advised the FTA to "leave us to our free 
choice", while the Newcastle Evenire Call hoped that "no att­
empt will be made to get candidates from outside", declaring 
that such candidates "would be offensive to the general feel-
ing in the locality" . ' Faced with general hostility and uop-
228ular local candidates, '''"several candidates denied their affil-
229iation with the Association, while a number of imported FTA
230candidates simply retired from the contest, sometimes in fav-
231our of the local man," '"even if no freetrader remained in the 
field.2'5"
In yet other electorates in which the FTA attempted to
233make satisfactory free trade arrangements, it either failed ^  
or made serious blunders. Apparently unaware that the well- 
known local freetrader, G.H.Greene, had announced himself as a 
candidate for Grenfell, the FTA despatched its own candidate,
23kE. B. Woodhouse, to Grenfell to contest the one available seat. '
Subsequently asked to retire "in order not to endanger the pros-
235pects of the cause", "" Woodhouse, it was reported, was "disin-
p ~z C
dined" to do so. J Early in the campaign, the FTA seems to
have approved of its prominent council member, N.B.Downing,
237announcing himself as a candidate for West Macquarie. Several 
days later, however, with the nominations for the protectionist 
stronghold of Eden shortly due and no freetrade candidate yet 
in the field, the Association requested Downing to withdraw
p ^ o
from West Macquarie and head south to contest Eden. >0Downing
23 Qobediently complied, -^but in doing so gave himself less than 
a week, compared to the three weeks at his disposal in West 
Macquarie, in which to mount his campaign, and as a result he 
suffered a crushing defeat. Presumably assuming that they had 
plenty of time to fill the vacancy in V/est Macquarie, 2~2the FTA 
let the electorate slip from its attention.
Obviously there was a considerable number of elector­
ates in which the FTA took no action at all, despite, in some
291cases, its stated intention of doing so. As a result, twenty
protectionists in fifteen electorates were elected to the new2k2parliament unopposed by a freetrader. The FTA was strongmy
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criticised and held responsible for this disastrous result, 
and freetraders in a number of the uncontested electorates ex-
PL 1pressed their dissatisfaction with the Association’s inaction.
The obvious consequence was that the freetraders in these el-
pngectorates were "disfranchised", “and in Gundagai they were for­
ced into the position of supporting a protectionist, with the
extrordinary aim of bringing aboutMa coalition of the two parties, 
243'It was little wonder, then, that'at the end of January 
a member of the parliamentary executive wrote to its chairman 
that "the lack of interest which appears to have been shown by 
our party with regard to country electorates causes me some 
concern" . : ^
It was only early in February that the FTA and the parl­
iamentary executive, particularly the now active Parkes, seem to 
have joined forces effectively in a last minute attempt to pro­
vide solutions to those failures and mistakes of the FTA still 
capable of solution. These activities also reveal the reticence 
of the freetraders to make use of discipline in their electoral 
arrangements, and throw further light on the nature of freetrade 
organisation in 18895 demonstrating the continued reliance on 
Parkes 's own personal electoral network in the absence of an 
efficient and widespread formal netv/ork of local associations.
The freetraders' approach to the use of electoral disc­
ipline, both to induce the retirement of superfluous candidates 
and to punish party rebels, was one of leniency; as was explain­
ed by the parliamentary executive, "the idea ... rwas“l not to
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act in any dictatorial manner".  ^ k case in point was that of 
the sitting freetrade MLA for Gundagai, J.H.Want, a consistent 
personal opponent of Parkes, and one of the men largely respons-
* p ; O
ible for the ministry's resignation on 10 January 1889* ' respite
V/ant's own refusal to recognise or consult with the executive
249about his electoral intentions, he was still included as one
250of the executive's four endorsees for Paddington. Of the
eleven radical freetrade rebels who helped bring about the fall
251of Parkes's ministry in January, four defended thei^ suburban 
252seats in I889> and were thereby subject to the executive's 
possible refusal to grant them endorsement. Despite a veiled
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253threat by Parkes to repudiate them at the election and a call
by one free trade correspondent to punish "such renegades","'''4
the executive blithely granted all but one its endorsement.
The one exception was J.C.Neild, to whom the FTA, and therefore
the executive, specifically denied its support, not on the
grounds of his rebellious parliamentary actions, but because of
255his heretical utterances during the campaign.
The same 1 non-dictutorial1 approach was adopted by the
freetrade bodies in their attempts to prevent vote-splitting.
Rather than making disciplinary threats to induce retirements,
the freetraders employed what almost amounted to a system of
reward or compensation to secure withdrawals; it was a case of the
freetrade ’carrot’ as opposed to the protectionist ’stick’. In
the four-member electorate of Central Cumberland, five freetraders
were announced as candidates, the unendorsed David Dale "emphat-
256ically declaring that he would not retire". On 29 January, how­
ever, a meeting took place between the recalcitrant Dale, three
members of the local FTA branch and three members of the parl-
257iamentary executive, and Dale was finally induced to retire
"on the understanding that he would be supported for the first
258eligible vacancy". A similar approach was employed in Glebe,
where two unendorsed freetraders, J.Meeks and F.Walsh, both re-
259fused to retire in favour of the executive's endorsees, one
even flatly rejecting the executive's first timid suggestion of
260conciliation on 29 January. Despite their intransigence, it
was quite suddenly announced on 31 January that both "had mag-
261nanimously retired". 0 Events subsequent to their retirement,
however, strongly suggest that their compliance had only been
obtained by an assurance to provide them both with alternative
electorates to contest in the freetrade interest, particularly
as it v/as openly reported that the executive had "strongly urged"
Meeks to contest another constituency. ^The FTA probably used
a similar method in Grenfell to induce the retirement of E. B.
263Woodhouse, ■'whom it had mistakenly sent to that electorate and
26hwho v/as at first reluctant to withdraw. As evidenced in Glouc­
ester, however, executive persuasion to retire v/ithout compen­
sation was flatly rejected. ^ ^Despite their success in 1889? 2°^ .vhen 
the freetraders v/ere finally forced to face the realities of
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electoral discipline, the precedents set during the election 
did nothing to encourage later acceptance of, or compliance 
with, a true system of discipline.
Whatever the disadvantages of the 'compensation scheme', 
the FTA and the executive now had a small reserve supply of can­
didates to use in solving their provision problems, and, in res-
267ponse to a request from Wollombi, they probably despatched
one of the Glebe duo, F.Walsh, to contest the seat against the
268lapsed freetrader, Richard Stevenson. A major problem facing 
the freetrade bodies, however, was a serious shortage of con­
tacts in country areas, due to the dearth of local branches; it 
was in this respect that Parkes was able to provide a partial 
solution. On 26 January, it was reported that the freetraders
in Glen Innes "are anxious that the Sydney association should
269nominate two strong men"; nearly a week later still nothing
270 271had been done. In the meantime Parkes again contacted his
electoral agent in Tenterfield and enquired about the situat­
ion in Glen Innes, apparently asking for the name of a local
272freetrader "to communicate with". Upon receipt of this inforrn- 
273ation, communications with Glen Innes were presumably begun, 
and it would appear that the executive and the FTA combined to 
honour their obligation to the 'magnanimous' Meeks from Glebe 
and to give the defeated FTA candidate in Tumut, V/.H.Vivian, 
a second chance; both men were soon after announced as freetrade
o n  I
candidates for Glen Innes. ^Parkes also seems to have helped
create another opportunity for freetrade involvement, this time
in Macleay. In receipt of a request "to send forward a free-
2.75trade candidate for this district", ‘ Parkes probably handed the 
matter over to his executive colleagues and the FTA; within two 
days it was announced that the unwanted FTA nominee for Gren-
p rp /"
fell, Woodhouse, and a sitting freetrade MLA, C.E.Jeanneret,
277would contest the electorate, and the executive issued a lett­
er to the electors of Macleay eulogising the candidates and seek-
pnQ.ing support for them. °In the 'forgotten' electorate of West 
279Macquarie, y Parkes alone was largely responsible for the pres-
280ence of any freetrade candidate at all. Despite these efforts, 
none of the solutions was satisfactory: all the arrangements 2 8
were effected far too late to have brought the desired results,
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and Meeks, in Glen Innes, this time voluntarily retired from 
the election, "recognising ... that as the free-trade candid­
ates were so late in the field there might be some difficulty inpg 2electing both representatives . .
Despite some outlandish protectionist statements to
2 83the contrary, it would appear that FTA financial assistance 
to its arranged candidates was negligible. Although the Assoc­
iation’s candidate in Northumberland was consistently charged
pRi:with having received £25 from the FTA in payment of his expenses, 
W.H.Vivian was probably more accurate when he later described 
the personal "expense and trouble" he had suffered in his trav­
els from Turnut to Glen Innes, and he explained that the FTA had
285"no fund to pay these expenses". In support of the overall 
freetrade cause, however, the FTA did mount another extensive 
propaganda campaign. Early in the campaign it was decided "to 
issue a million leaflets on the advantages of free trade as ag­
ainst protection", and additional office accommodation was sec-p or
ured "to arrange for the distribution of the literature".
Despatch of the leaflets to various constituencies for distrib-
p O n
ution at public meetings was begun on 24 January^" 'at the rate 
of between 100,000' ^ and 200, OOO^^per day, and within a week 
"about half a million leaflets" had been issued. ^ ^The FTA and 
parliamentary executive both seem to have also tried to offset 
their organisational failures by providing freetrade candidates 
in country electorates with large amounts of moral, if not fin­
ancial, support. The FTA appears to have paid particular att­
ention to the candidates .specially provided for country elec­
torates, sending its official "lecturer" to Wollombi in support 
291of F.Walsh, and arranging further country forays by "freetrade
29 2speakers". The executive appears to have concentrated on the
295provision of support for its sitting country MsLA. In receipt
of a request for support from the freetrade member for Durham,
H.H.Brown, the executive’s secretary told Parkes that Daniel
O'Connor was being sent to his aid and that "we hope Brunker
2 94and Gillies are with him now ...". ' Parkes also obligingly used
his own personal influence to aid his parliamentary colleagues.
In response to a request from his close friend, James Inglis,
295for "help ... by letter or otherwise", Parkes duly wrote a
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l e t t e r  s t a t i n g  t h a t  I n g ' l i s  " s t i l l  r e t a i n e d  Iris f u l l e s t  c o n f i d ­
e n c e 1' ,  and t h i s  was r e a d  by I n g l i s  a t  one o f  h i s  p u b l i c  m ee t -
296i n g s  i n  New E n g l a n d . “ ""
In  t h e  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s ,  h o w ev er ,  f r e e  t r a d e  e l e c t o r a l  
o r g a n i s a t i o n  d u r i n g  th e  1889 g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  was b o t h  in co m ­
p l e t e  and i r r e s o l u t e ,  and i t  was g e n e r a l l y  f e l t  t h a t  th e  d e c ­
l i n e  i n  t h e  f r e e t r a d e r s ’ p a r l i a m e n t a r y  m a j o r i t y  from t h i r t y -
297s i x  t o  f i v e  s e a t s  was t h e  o b v i o u s  c o n se q u e n c e  0 One f r e e t r a . d e  
c o r r e s p o n d e n t  s u c c i n c t l y  e x p r e s s e d  t h i s  v iew  when he w r o te  t h a t  
" i t  i s  an u n d e n i a b l e  f a c t  t h a t  had th e  f r e e t r a d e r s  been  b e t t e r  
o r g a n i s e d  t h e  r e s u l t  would have been  a f a r  s t r o n g e r  m a j o r i t y
i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  P a r l i a m e n t ” 298 The b a s i c  c r i t i c i s m  was t h a t  th e  
299 .f r e e t r a d e r s  were " n o t  . . .  e n e r g e t i c  e n o u g h ” , p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  
t h e  c o u n t r y  d i s t r i c t s . "  ‘" I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  P a r k e s  h i m s e l f  p o i n t e d  
o u t  t h a t  "we a r e  l a b o u r i n g  most i n  th e  s a f e s t  f i e l d s ” , and t h a t  
”We o u g h t  t o  d i r e c t  s p e c i a l  a t t e n t i o n ” t o  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  c o u n t r y  
s t r o n g h o l d s  « ^ ^ S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  ho w ev er ,  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  t r a n s i t ­
i o n  t a k i n g  p l a c e  i n  p o l i t i c s ,  f r e e t r a d e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  was s ee n  
a s  weak and l e t h a r g i c ,  l a r g e l y  by way o f  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  t h e  
v i g o r o u s  e f f o r t s  o f  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s .  The f r e e t r a d e r s '  l o s s e s
were  o f t e n  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  by th e  f a c t  t h a t  " t h e y  were n o t  so  w e l l
302o r g a n i s e d  as  a p a r t y  a s  th e  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s ' w e r e ” , t h i s  i t s e l f
509b e i n g  e x p l a i n e d  by th e  f r e e t r a d e r s '  "w an t  o f  p e r c e p t i o n ”" and 
a p a t h y  i n  k e e p i n g  pace  w i t h  t h e  t r e n d - s e t t i n g  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s :  
"The men i n  p o s s e s s i o n  were a lw ay s  a p a t h e t i c ,  and w h i l e  t h e  
f r e e t r a d e r s  had been  s l e e p i n g  th e  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s  had been  work­
i n g ” . ^ 04 •
S p e c i f i c  c r i t i c i s m s  f o c u s s e d  upon th e  i n a d e q u a c i e s  o f  
t h e  ad hoc and u n i n t e g r a t e d  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  c e n t r a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n ­
a l  s t r u c t u r e .  J . N . B r u r k e r  t o l d  McMil lan  t h a t  ” 0 u r  a r r a n g e m e n t s
were  b a se d  on th e  e x i g e n c i e s  o f  t h e  moment and I  a g r e e  w i t h  you
905o u g h t  n o t  to  a p p l y  t o  ou r  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  f u t u r e " .  The FTA 
was a l s o  s i n g l e d  o u t  f o r  s p e c i a l  c r i t i c i s m ,  b e i n g  d e s c r i b e d  as
- ' 0 (
" i n a d e q u a t e  . . .  t o  work an e f f i c i e n t  e l e c t i o n e e r i n g  c am p a ig n ” ." '  v
The p r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  A s s o c i a t i o n  l a t e r  a d m i t t e d  i t s  i n a d e q u a c i e s ,
d e c l a r i n g  t h a t  t h e  FTA had o r i g i n a l l y  been  formeid " a s  an e d u c a t -
3 0 ?i o n a l  medium r a t h e r  t h a n  a s  a p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n ” and t h a t
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it had been forced to undertake tasks that were "foreirr to 
the purposes for which *, [ it had been J established".'Even 
more particularly, however, it was the absence of a permanent 
and. widespread network of local free trade organisations that 
was seen as most damaging. One freetrade correspondent pointed 
out the dearth of local freetrade associations throughout the 
colony, and declared that "In every electorate there should be 
an association affiliated to the central body in Sydney”; he 
concluded by stating that ’’there must be better organisation”, 
and he urged the FTA to ’’organise on the lines I have laid 
down” ^
In view of the awareness of the weakness of freetrade
organisation in 1889? there emerged, then, a general recognition
of the absolute necessity for the freetraders to "thoroughly re-
310organise their forces”.-^' Not only were the freetraders urged
to take action, but they were also determined to do so. Parkes
undertook to guarantee that "The freetraders would organise
311with ten-fold more effect at the next election”, and J.H.Carr-
uthers prophesied that freetrade "organisation and discipline”
312would destroy protection at the following election.' Parkes
himself pointed the way when he wrote that "Success depends upon
sound knowledge of local feeling and conditions, and upon contin-
313uous and well-informed preparation".'
Important for the protectionists as an initial test of 
new methods and techniques of electoral organisation, the 1889 
general election was equally important for the freetraders as 
a painful demonstration that they could no longer ignore the 
changes in electoral management produced by radical ideas and 
vigorous activity; no longer could electoral success be left 
to chanceo Adjustment, careful planning and purposeful enter­
prise was clearly the task confronting the freetraders. How 
well that task was performed could only really be judged at the 
following general election« Parkes was fully aware that "Every-
314thing ..« depends on the next Election”.
CHAPTER 8
MERCHANTS AND MANUFACTURERS: Extra- 
Parliamentary Fiscal Organisations.
II Zenith and Nadir,
1889-1891.
I
The damaging electoral result of February lS89} largely 
a result of their apathy in matters of electoral organisation, 
stung the freetraders into determined post-election activity 
in an attempt to narrow the gap that existed between their lev­
el of organisation and that of the protectionists. The almost 
total absence of local freetrade organisation during the elect­
ion v/as the most obvious matter that demanded attention, and the 
FTA was soon at work in an effort to repair the damage its in­
activity had caused. The degree to which local FTA branches 
had fallen into disrepair was demonstrated by the situation at 
Bathurst. Commended by the central FTA for its efficient org­
anisation during the 1887 general election and held up as a 
model of well organised, energetically conducted branches
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the Bathurst FTA had become moribund by 1889 and had made no 
contribution to the organisation of the 1889 election. Not 
surprisingly, however, it was one of the first to be resus­
citated as part of the FTA1s campaign to revive and extend its 
local branch network. On 21 February, it was reported that a 
meeting had been held in Bathurst the previous day for the
ppurpose of "reorganising «... the Freetrade Association here".“'
By the end of February, other branches had been revived,^ sev­
eral had been formed,and it was reported that a considerable
5number were in the process of "being formed". As part of its 
vigorous campaign the FTA also "decided to print a special set 
of rules for the use and guidance of branches", and it instruct­
ed its secretary, Pulsford, "to draw up a paper containing sugg- 
estions for the forming and working of branch associations".
Both pamphlets were published soon after, and were widely cir-7culated.
Early in March, the FTA was joined by a new freetrade 
organisation in the work of revitalising the movement through­
out the colony. As the Herald was to point out, the 1889 elect­
ion had revealed just "how inadequate was the free-trade assoc-o
iation to work an efficient electioneering campaign", and, des­
pite the excuse that such work was "foreign to the purposes"
ofor which the Association was formed, secretary Puisford was 
forced to admit "with regret that the work that ... [was] done 
... [ was] far below either the merits of our great cause or the 
actual requirements of the time, . ..".^It was largely for this 
reason that the freetrade MsLA, aware that "the time had come 
for an active organisation",‘^ entered the organisational field 
in a concerted effort to create it.
It was the parliamentary freetrade election executive
that gave the impetus *co this move by the freetrade MsLA; as a
result of its planning and guidance, a new freetrade organisat-
12ion, the LPA, was founded.a Although the parliamentary free­
traders were responsible for the LPA's creation, the Association 
was formally inaugurated on 1 March at a large meeting of both 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary freetraders. ^The LPA 
assumed two basic tasks: the management and organisation of the
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f r e e  t r a d e  p a r t y ;  arid t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  a p a r t y  p l a t f o r m .
W hi le  t h e  t a s k  o f  d e v i s i n g  t h e  r u l e s ,  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  d e t a i l s  
and  p l a t f o r m  o f  t h e  new body was p e r f o r m e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  by th e  
A s s o c i a t i o n ' s  s m a l l  e x e c u t i v e  o r  o r g a n i s i n g  c o m m i t t e e  o f  s e v e n  
MsLA, ",~H t h e  t a s k  o f  e x t e n d i n g  f r e e t r a . d e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  t h r o u g h o u t  
t h e  c o l o n y  was e n t r u s t e d  t o  t h e  a s s e m b ly  o f  b o t h  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  
and  e x t r a - p a r l i a m e n t a r y  f r e e t r a d e r s  t h a t  i n a u g u r a t e d  t h e  LPA.
As a r e s u l t ,  t h e  m e e t i n g  on 1 March d i s c u s s e d  " t h e  b e s t  means 
t o  a d o p t  f o r  o r g a n i s a t i o n  p u r p o s e s " ,  and i t  f i n a l l y  a p p o i n t e d  
a  c o m m i t t e e  o f  "B e tw een  20 and 30 members o f  t h e  A ssem bly ,  r e ­
p r e s e n t i n g  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  o f  t h e  c o l o n y ,  , t o [ g e t h e n ] w i t h  
a s i m i l a r  number who w i l l  be a p p o i n t e d  a s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  
l o c a l  c e n t r e s " .  The c o m m i t t e e ' s  i m m e d ia t e  t a s k  was " a s  soon 
a s  p o s s i b l e  t o  form b r a n c h  a s s o c i a t i o n s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  o f  
t h e  c o u n t r y " . '  "'
The d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  f r e e t r a d e r s  t o  u n d e r ­
t a k e  t h e  work o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  l o c a l  f r e e t r a d e  b r a n c h e s  was u n ­
d o u b t e d l y  b a s e d  on t h e i r  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  v a l u e  o f  sound o r g ­
a n i s a t i o n ,  a s  d i s p l a y e d  by t h e  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s  d u r i n g  t h e  1889 
e l e c t i o n ,  and t h e i r  a w a r e n e s s  o f  th e  w eak n ess  o f  e x i s t i n g  f r e e -  
t r a d e  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  The t h i n k i n g  o f  th e  MsLA was w e l l  summar­
i s e d  by one o f  t h e i r  m os t  a c t i v e  o r g a n i s e r s ,  W i l l i a m  M cM il lan ,  
who s t a t e d  t h a t ,  once  i t  was r e a l i s e d  t h a t  " n o t h i n g  b u t  o r g a n ­
i s a t i o n "  would  r e s t o r e  f r e e t r a d e  su p rem acy  i n  p a r l i a m e n t ,  " a
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  was made t o  found b r a n c h e s  o f  s e c u r i t y  i n  e v e r y
16p o p u l a t e d  c e n t r e " .  As a r e s u l t ,  t h e  e a r l i e s t  p l a n  f o r  t h e  fo rm­
a t i o n  o f  t h e  LPA i n s i s t e d  t h a t  " B ra n c h  A s s o c i a t i o n s  be formed
17i m m e d i a t e l y  . . .  w h e r e v e r  p o s s i b l e  i n  th e  C o lo n y " ,  and a t t e n t i o n
t o  l o c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  was a l s o  s t r e s s e d  i n  th e  A s s o c i a t i o n ' s
1 8o f f i c i a l  r u l e s ,  r a t i - f i e d  on 26 M arch . '
D e s p i t e  t h e  d e c l a r a t i o n  t h a t  th e  LPA would "work i n
19harmony w i t h  t h e  F r e e  T rade  A s s o c i a t i o n " ,  th e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  
r i v a l r y  be tw een  t h e  two b o d i e s  was c l e a r l y  p r e s e n t .  No su ch  
c o n f l i c t ,  h o w ev er ,  seems t o  have e v e n t u a t e d ,  and from e a r l y  
March ,  t h e  two o r g a n i s a t i o n s  seem t o  have  c o - o p e r a t e d  c l o s e l y  
i n  f o s t e r i n g  the  e x t e n s i o n  o f  f r e e t r a d e r  o r g a n i s a t i o n . The 
ad d ed  i m p e t u s  and i n f l u e n c e  g i v e n  t o  th e  work o f  o r g a n i s a t i o n
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by the active involvement of a substantial number of free trade
MsLA soon, however, became apparent. It was reported that in
the fortnight after the formation of the LPA "nearly fifty new
20branches” were established," 'and in early April it was estimated
that "Since the close of the elections about 100 branches have 21been formed”* Formed throughout the readily accessible suburban
2 pdistricts of Sydney, "branches were also established in such 
country centres as Gundaroo,^Wollongong^and St Marysf /and even 
as far afield as Cobar, ^ nyngarF ' and Kempsey.‘“°A1 though most new 
branches were formed as branches of the FTA, the name assumed 
by some new branches demonstrated the effective co-operation be­
tween the FTA and the LPA in the work of fostering freetrade 
organisation. Three new branches in the electorate of Canter­
bury, for instance, adopted the title, 'Liberal and Free Trade
2 Q
Association’, ;and another in the same electorate was formed as 
na branch of the Free Trade and Liberal Association”.^0
The demise between 1887 and 1889 of the FTA1s most act­
ive branch, that at Bathurst, made the freetraders realise that 
the simple creation of branches was not enough in itself to en­
sure the permanency of their new organisational network. To era­
sure permanency they emphasised the need for unremitting activ­
ity and unflagging effort. On behalf of the FTA, B.R.Wise had 
sent his congratulations to the freetraders of Cobar upon the 
formation of a local branch, but had also apparently warned them 
of the dangers of complacency; in reply, a leading member of the
branch assured Wise that "we have no intention of letting matters 
31flag”. The LPA insisted that its branches meet at least four 
times a year, and it took the precaution of granting itself the 
power to effect "the resuscitation of any branch associations
82which may be inactive from want of support or proper interest".
The most significant feature of all this freetrade act­
ivity in February-April 1889 5 however, remained the active in­
volvement and participation of the bulk of the freetrade parliam­
entary party. At least forty-five freetrade MsLA were involved, 
to some degree at least, in the creation and organisation of the 
LPA and in the process of establishing local freetrade branches. 
Many MsLA actively co-operated with the FTA-LPA in the extension
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of local organisation, especially in their own or neighbouring
y. 7 7 y.
electorates""^but also further afield.-"“""Up to twenty-one MsLA
seem to have been involved in the management of the LPA,"^and a
further thirteen revealed their interest in the Association
and its work by attending its meetings.’'"'Not the least active
participant in this revitalised freetrade activity was Parkes
himself. Although he does not seem to have been involved in
the formation of the LPA, he was kept well informed of its pro-
37ceedings« and it would appear that he became a member of the
twenty-six-man LPA Organising Committee when it was expanded
38from the original seven-member organising executive.' Certainly
Parkes was aware of the need for organisation and “continuous
39and well-informed preparation”, and he seems to have taken an 
active part in the extension of local freetrade organisation.
On 13 March, his apologies were read to a meeting at Newtown 
which was held to inaugurate a branch of the FTA, and which he 
"had fully intended” to attend.40Invited on the following day 
to attend and address the inaugural meeting of the Manly FTA, 
Parkes accepted. In his address to the meeting, he further 
expressed his opinion that “they had to organise”, and he reit­
erated his belief in the need for "strict and binding discipl-
/ Oine”/T The old faction 'boss’ was not floundering in the wake 
of political change, but had shrewdly sensed the advantages of 
the new developments and, like Dibbs,^sought to utilise them 
in the cause of party solidarity and discipline.
Although the organising efforts of the parliamentary 
freetraders, mainly through the LPA, harmonised with the act­
ivity of the revitalised FTA, no formal union existed between 
the two bodies, and there was still a "fear that [the] two ass» 
ociations might clash with each other”. ‘,fThis fear was finally 
removed early in May by the amalgamation of the LPA and the FTA 
to form "the Freetrade and Liberal Association of New South 
Wales” (FTLA). r"The question ofamalagamation was first raised 
in early April, and on 3 April the FTA Council appointed a dep­
utation of seven of its members to attend "a conference with an 
equal number of representatives of the Liberal Political Assoc­
iation on the subject of the future working of the tv/o assoc- 
iations”. ' The conference was held on 10 April, and the fourteen
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h 1delegates all agreed that a "fusion would be of benefit", and
they "undertook to convey the expression of opinion to their
48respective councils"* '"Further progress was made on 24 April
when a general meeting of the FTA resolved that amalgamation
was "desirable", and it instructed the Council "to take steps
L Qwith a view to such amalgamation". A further conference be­
tween the two associations took place on 30 April 9 and it was
reported that "arrangements were almost finally completed for
bOthe amalgamation The initial stage in the creation of
the FTLA was the fusion of the FTA Council "of about 60 memb-
^iers" and the LFA Organising Committee "numbering about 26".' 
Further, "For the government of the new association the cons­
titution and rules of the Free Trade Association have been ad­
opted, [along with] the platform arranged by the Liberal
Association".
The creation of the FTLA represented the final stage 
in the achievement of the "permanent co-ordination" and "reg­
ular connections" between the parliamentary party and the extra- 
parliamentary organisation, an integration basic to the exist- 
ence of "a true political party". The fusion of the exclusively 
parliamentary LPA Organising Committee and the FTA Council, 
itself containing a sprinkling of MsLA, to form the FTLA Council
created that 'permanent co-ordination', and resulted in "a
5 4unified party structure". This co-ordination was further form­
alised at the FTLA's annual general meeting in July 1889 when 
a new Council was elec ted. ^ O f  the seventy-five Council members 
elected at that meeting, twenty-two, or almost one-third, were 
freetrade MsLA at some time between 188? and 1891; of the twenty 
two, eighteen were MsLA at the time of their election to the
Council, and only eight had been members of the old FTA Counc-
56 " 57il. The following general meeting in July 1890 further increas
ed the number of MsLA on the Council to twenty-six, twenty-one
er P
of whom were MsLA at the time of their election. °
Whether or not Parkes regarded the Association as a 
threat to his dominance of the party, he certainly became an 
active participant in its activities. As a member of the inter­
im Council between May and July 18895 he took a prominent part
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in the Association’s organisation of a by-election in Centralo 9Cumberland in June.*'" Elec ted to the new Councils in July 1839 
60and 1890," he continued his involvement in the work of the FTLA,
61taking part in the Association’s conference in August 1889"
and aiding in the establishment of further local branches of
6?the Association. ‘It is probably fair to conclude that Parkes 
was neither the initiator nor the master of the political changes 
represented by the creation of the FTLA, but he was not their 
slave. Although he was, to a degree, carried along by the mom­
entum of change, he was still too powerful and influential to be 
disregarded and discarded, and too shrewd to be unable to adjust 
to the new situation. Had the FTLA become a permanent and unif­
ied party nucleus attending to party management and policy, 
Parkes’s days as the leader whose charisma and influence held 
the party together may well have been numbered; but the FTLA did 
not become a permanent centre of party activity, and its rapid 
demise after 1889 only accentuated Parkes’s importance and ind- 
ispensability as party leader in a climate of bitter internal 
party conflict.
Not only was the new Association "of a more comprehensive 
character” than the old FTA, but it was also seen as being "more 
potent for good”. For the first time a freetrade association 
was seen as being unfettered by "certain embarrassments” in the 
task of managing elections and "securing the return to Parliam­
ent of men who were considered capable of carrying out the princ­
iples'* held by the Association. No longer did the freetrade org­
anisation feel obliged "to refrain from interference with polit- 
ics”. It was largely for the purpose of improving electoral man­
agement and securing "the better organisation of the party" that 
the idea of "a conference of delegates from every [ freetrade] 
association" was first mooted in March 1889« ^ The forward-looking 
LPA responded to the idea, and included in its rules a clause 
stating that a conference of delegates from each branch assoc­
iation would be held annually in November to discuss "the best
65means of furthering the objects of the association". In July,
the FTLA announced that it had proceeded with the idea, and that
66such a conference would be held the following month.0 Each local 
branch was invited to send two of its members as delegates, or to
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appoint its local MoLA or two members of the central Association 
to represent it. In addition, the central FTLA would appoint67two of its own delegates/ and on 16 August, B.R.Wise and 
R.Teece were elected "as the delegates of the parent associat­
ion" . ^ ^During July, a Conference Committee was appointed, ° "'and 
by the end of the month it had drawn up a programme of confer-
n r\
ence proceedings and associated public meetings.1'
As a member of the FTLA Council, Parkes was involved in
the conference arrangements, the proposed programme being sub-
71mitted to him for his "consideration". His agreement with and
participation in the conference seems to have been taken so much
for granted that, instead of a formal invitation, the secretary
of the Conference Committee told him that "we have taken the
liberty of putting your name down for an address, on the even-
72ing of Friday, August 30th, on ’True Liberalism’"; their assump­
tion of Parkes’s co-operation was not ill-founded, and he address­
ed "the greatest meeting of the week" on the appointed night on
73the nominated subject. ^
The day before the conference began, the Herald remarked
that "There is no doubt ... that the organisation is [now] more
74extensive and stronger than at any previous period"; the confer­
ence bore this out. In all,seventy-eight local freetrade branch­
es, from forty electorates, were represented at the conference.
Of the seventy-eight, twenty-six were suburban branches, repres­
enting ten electorates, and the remaining fifty-two were from
75country districts, representing thirty electorates. One indic­
ation of the genuine interest and participation of the country 
branches was that, in response to Pulsford’s desire that "even 
the most distant branches ... send ... their own members as del- 
egates rather than appoint delegates from the Sydney district", 
the delegates of only seventeen of the fifty-two branches lived 
in Sydney. A further ten branches sent one of their own memb­
ers, and appointed someone in Sydney, often one of their own 
MsLA, as their second delegate, but the delegates of the re­
maining twenty-five were all from the country district they rep- 
77resented. In addition, thirty current freetrade MsLA, and a 
further four past or future MsLA, actively participated in the
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conference; some were actively involved in the organisation and
n o
conduct of the conference,' a considerable number took part in
79the public meetings of the conference, and at least one-third
of the parliamentary party participated in the conference del-
80iberations as official delegates. 0
One of the major items for discussion at the conference
was that of electoral organisation and management. Still smart-
81ing under the "reverse [that'] had been met with",L freetraders 
thought it desirable that the conference should lay down formal 
lines of procedure "as to what ought to be done for the purp- 
oses of organisation", ;^ and the whole of the first day was dev­
oted to doing so. What emerged were a number of separate res­
olutions which, when integrated, constituted a reasonably comp­
rehensive blueprint for effective electoral management. It was 
initially decided that "every electorate should have at least
83one branch of the Association", and the FTLA Council was ins­
tructed "to take steps to establish branches and organize prev­
ious to the next election" in "any electorate where branches are
84not yet established, That decided, the question of cand­
idate selection prior to a general election wras then discussed. 
The suggestion that "the local branch or branches in every ...
electorate confer with the parent Association prior to the sel-
83ection of ... candidates" was immediately rejected, and the
desirability that "the local parties should have the selection
86of candidates in their own hands" was unanimously affirmed.
The generally agreed process of local selection was that "in el­
ectorates where.there are two or more branches ..., they should
Q rn
arrange for working together",° ' and that, before announcing
themselves, all intending candidates in any electorate "should
submit their names ... for selection by the delegates of the
* 88v/hole of the branches therein".
Particularly in view of the resolution that "every
89protectionist seat be contested", it was felt that not every 
electorate might be able to supply its own candidates, and that 
resort to the central body might be necessary. In such a sit­
uation, FTLA secretary, Pulsford, declared "the Association 
should try to bring out a candidate", and it was resolved that,
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’’when requested", the Association would provide the candidate
90"at as early a date as possible".-' The most controversial asp­
ect of the arrangements was the appointment of "a board of app­
eal to determine any difficulty submitted by the local ...
branches, ... which threatens the unity of the party, especially91in connection with elections". In a situation that threatened
vote-splitting, it was envisaged that the board's role would be
92to "determine which candidate had to retire". Although describ­
ed as "a final resort - something to turn to when all local eff-
93ort had failed", the appeal executive aroused hostility.
This hostility, especially prevalent among the ‘liberal’
freetraders, represented the residual and traditional antipathy
to any proposal that seemed to introduce the 'caucus system'
and interfere with the rights of the individual. One delegate
pointed to the offence that would be given should "the executive
committee ... [appear to] dictate to the different electorates";
another claimed that they "had no power to give the committee
95the powers it was proposed to clothe them with"; ' the delegate 
from Wollongong maintained that "It was a very delicate matter 
to interfere [sic] with the electors in their choice", and ob­
jected to the word 'determine' on the grounds that "great off-
96ence might be given" to the electors; and even the FTLA pres­
ident "admitted that the word 'determine' had rather an ugly 
97look, It was the slow death of attitudes such as these,
Q Q
powerful in parliament~°and still very evident during the 1891 
election, that effectively slowed the transition towards the 
modern regimented political party.
Soon after the conference, the FTLA, in accordance with
the conference resolutions, again devoted its attention to the
99consolidation and further establishment of local branches. In
addition to the formation of several new branches,^ ^one of
which was in the protectionist stronghold of Queanbeyan and was
officially inaugurated by Parkes, the Association appointed a
special sub-committee to examine and report on the best means
100of consolidating the branch network. On the basis of its rep­
ort, the Council appointed a permanent Branches Committee whose 
duties were "to correspond regularly" with all branches, to 
present regular reports to the Council on "the position of the
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branches”, and to "endeavour to open further branches in elect­
ionorates ... where none at present e x i s t " . B y  the end of 1889? 
therefore, all seemed to augur well for an effective and effic­
ient freetrade campaign during the next general election. The 
freetraders had made much progress during 1889*
During 1890 and 1891? however, the FTLA disintegrated; 
the promise of an efficient, integrated party 'machine1 faded.
The basic cause of the Association's demise represented perhaps 
the most potent single factor preventing the emergence of a 'true' 
and permanent freetrade political 'party' prior to 1894-95: the 
absence of basic principled cohesion among the forces advocating 
freetrade. The parliamentary party, FTA, LPA and FTLA all suffer­
ed from internal disharmony that prevented cohesion and threatened 
their destruction. But the FTLA differed from the rest in one 
vital respect. Within the parliamentary party, FTA and LPA, 
the forces of conservatism were dominant; as a result, issues of 
principle likely to arouse conflict and controversy could be 
avoided, radical pressure for change could be contained, and any 
full-scale and destructive ideological conflict could be averted. 
Despite the absence of internal cohesion, all three bodies were 
able to maintain a precarious, but steady, existence. The sit­
uation within the FTLA was different; not only was the integrat­
ion of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary elements finally 
achieved within the FTLA, but the contending forces of free- 
trade conservatism and radicalism were, for the first time, rep­
resented almost equally in a freetrade organisation. In fact, 
the radicals were able to assert a slender control over the 
Association. In such a situation, vital matters of principle 
could no longer be shelved, and the stage was set for an un­
remitting ideological conflict.
The internal struggle within the FTLA between 1889 and 
1891 was, in fact, a prelude to the full-scale conflict that 
engulfed the parliamentary party after 1891» The basis of that 
conflict was the same as that within the FTLA, but prior to the 
end of 1891 its overt eruption had been averted within the parl­
iamentary party; the radical victory within the FTLA helped to 
foster its undisguised emergence amongst the freetrade parliam­
entarians. Although, in terms of the evolution of a true
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political party, the events of 1890-91 seemed to produce a set­
back with the demise of the FTLA, in another sense they marked 
continued progress. What was highlighted in the destruction 
of the Association was the continued absence of principled 
free trade cohesion, a factor without which all other progress 
and change could not be consolidated. Such disunity required 
eradication, and the open friction that brought down the FTLA 
represented the first stage in the struggle to eradicate the 
weakness caused by the absence of principled unity. At the end 
of 1891> the parliamentary party took up the still unresolved 
struggle; clearly either the radicals or the conservatives had 
to leave the party, but it was only in 1894-95 that the result 
was finalised.
The conflict within the FTLA was one of principle, bas­
ic fiscal principle. Within the parliamentary party a basic 
conflict between conservative 'revenue tariffists' who opposed 
direct taxation and progressive or radical 'pure freetraders' 
who regarded direct taxation as a matter of vital social reform. 
This basic conflict was even more sharply drawn within the FTLA; 
the conservatives in the Association were basically the vested- 
interest merchants of the old FTA and the radical forces were 
dominantly radical 'single taxers', who were more aggressive 
than their kindred radical spirits within the parliamentary 
party.
In January 1890, it was stated in the annual report of 
the Single Tax League (STL) that "A new and very important de­
parture has been taken by ... the League during the past year,
and that was to enter the political arena as supporters, and
104enthusiastic supporters, of Free-trade TThis 'entrance'
took the form of a marked infiltration by the single taxers of
the existing extra-parliamentary freetrade organisations, and by
January 1890, the League could fairly claim that both the FTLA's
"central Council and country branches are largely permeated with
the spirit of the new re form" This infiltration process first
became noticeable in the substantial addition of single taxers
and other radical land taxers to the dominantly conservative
10cFTA Council in March and April 1889, and their presence was
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i 07also evident at tin: meetings of the LPA in April. In June,
the leading single taxer and proprietor of the single tax organ,
i 08The Aus trafian S tand ard, John Farrell, 'told Parkes that the
FTLA had "a strong element in it favouring us, and there is in
every Freetrade body in the Colony some of our party - in sev-
109eral of them a majority".
Farrell's observations were nothing short of the truth; 
of the non-parliamentary members of the FTLA Council elected in 
July, land and single taxers seem to have been at least close 
to a majority and, when added to their progressive parliament­
ary allies on the Council, they had probably obtained a narrow 
110majority. Farrell seems also to have accurately reported the 
situation in the local branches. The future freetrade MLA, 
William Affleck, later recalled that the branch of the FTA he 
had formed early in 1889 at Gundaroo, soon after "adopted the 
principle of the Single Tax League and v/e worked under the bann­
er of the two combined, for really land value taxation means 
free trade". ^ "^Furthermore, at least eleven of the local bran­
ches represented at the FTLA conference in August 1889 sent
112delegates who were well-known non-parliamentary land taxers.
The permeation process continued during 1890, and was,
in fact, transformed under the influence of Henry George from
a wish to influence freetrade policy to "a desire to dominate
118the side of freetrade"; in the words of one critic, "Tne 
single-tax section, or tail, claimed to wag the body of the 
big freetrade dog". "l1"'Certainly single tax influence withinpi Rthe FTLA was not lessened during 1890."
In explaining "why the league has thrown in its adher-
• p  p  g
ence with the existing Free Trade and Liberal Association", 
the single taxers quoted their hero, Henry George. In Protect­
ion or Free Trade, George had written that it was the duty of 
single taxers to support the freetraders, "and to urge them on, 
no matter how soon they propiose to stop; and the freetraders
themselves, when once started and borne on by the impulse of
117controversy, will go further than they now dreamed of".
Clearly, then, the generation of conflict and controversy over
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the nature of freetrade policy was very much part of the single
taxers' plan of operation, and the ground for such conflict was
clearly present in the FTA-LPA-FTLA. As one observer pointed
out, the "pure and simple" freetraders had become involved with
"revenue tariffists, the object of ... [their1 strongest denunc- 118iation". Conflict was inevitable.
The 'controversy' injected into the proceedings of the 
freetrade organisations was first revealed during the debate on 
1 April 1889 over the proposed LPA platform. The proposed plat­
form, as amended by the LPA Organising Committee and first made
11°public on 28 March prior to ratification, " "'contained a clause
specifying "direct tax, including a tax on the unimproved value
120of the freehold in land, ' At. a meeting of the STL comm­
ittee two days later, the proposed platform was discussed and
"an opinion was expressed in favour of the general tenor of its 
121provisions". When, however, at the full meeting of the LPA 
to ratify the platform, the conservative MLA, J.F.Burns, succ­
essfully proposed the elimination of the words specifying a 
land tax, the vociferous land and single tax section vehemently
expressed its disapproval; already disruptive conflict had be- 
122come evident. " The conservative tactic of avoiding debate on 
specific fiscal principles was successful within the LPA for 
the basic reason that the conservatives had control of the Ass­
ociation, The lesson to the radicals was obvious, and by vigorous 
permeation into the FTLA, their minority representation had been 
rectified by the end of July. The time to test their newly-won 
influence in the Association came in August during the FTLA 
c onference.
Immediately*after the LPA debate, one perceptive free- 
trade correspondent to the Herald ruminated on the potential 
result of the conflict between the conservative refusal to deal 
specifically with matters of principle and the radical insist­
ence on doing so. "It is", he commented, "essential that the 
basis of the various [ proposed ] reforms should be made clear,
otherwise internal dissensions may hereafter arise which will
123lead to dismemberment". Certainly the conservatives' re-1nsal 
to specify issues such as 'direct taxation' raised doubts as to
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whether they desired such 'reforms’ at all. By .August 1889 > 
however, with their newly-won power, the radicals were determ­
ined that no longer were they "going to be humbugged or hood- 
winked by resolutions that meant nothing", and, in the face 
of further conservative equivocation, they used their confer­
ence majority to specify that "a form of taxation on land
• j  2  5values, irrespective of improvements, should be imposed . .'
This now became, in the words of B.R.Wise, "the declared policy
126of the freetrade party"* Such specification certainly repres­
ented some progress for the adherents of direct taxation, but 
it did little to eliminate conflict and tension within the FTLA. 
It was, in fact, the very specification of a land tax as party 
policy, rather than continued vagueness and avoidance of the 
subject, that led directly to the ’dismemberment1 of the FTLA*
It is in this context that Parkes’s Federation moves of
1889 deserve some attention, for they contributed in no small
measure to the extinction of the FTLA. Parkes’s motives for
127initiating in June 1.889 a movement for the federation of the 
colonies have been variously interpreted as: the satisfaction 
of his ego and the desire for a crowning climax to his politic-
1 p 8al career;" the exploitation of an auspicious moment to create
129a popular movement for federation; "an attempt to stave off a 
threatened freetrade defeat at the hands of the advancing forces 
of protection through " ’the confusion of his opponents by a new 
issue1 ^ and the attempt to prevent the rival colony, Victor­
ia, from establishing undisputed leadership of the federal move­
ment in a year that provided grounds for further progress in the
131cause.
A.V/.Martin presents a further interpretation that dem­
ands closer attention. Martin argues that the political changes 
represented in the formation of the LPA and FTLA - the reorg­
anisation of the party "under the direction of younger men",
18?like McMillan - left Parkes out in the cold, "fumbling to mam-
133tain his position among . .* [ the"] new men and methods". Parkes,
maintains Martin, "remained aloof" from the new freetrade org-13 uanisation, ^ 1 and was distinctly threatened by it. It is in 
this context that he views Parkes’s Federation moves: "he
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l a u n c h e d  h i s  F e d e r a t i o n  Movement j u s t  when th e  new p o l i t i c i a n s
1 Vg
w e 2' e r e  o r  g an i  s  i  n g t  h e p a r  t y " ,  " t  he c h i  e f  pu r  p o s  e b e i  n g t o  e f f ­
e c t  i t s  d i s i n t e g r a t i o n  by c a u s i n g  " d i v i s i o n  w i t h i n  i t s  ranks", '" ' - ' '"
t h e r e b y  r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g  h i s  l e a d e r s h i p  "on new p o l i t i c a l  fo u n d -  
137a t i o n s " .  " F o r  s e v e r a l  r e a s o n s ,  h o w ev er ,  t h i s  d o es  n o t  a p p e a r  
an e n t i r e l y  a d e q u a t e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  P a r k e s  d id  n o t  r e m a in  
a l o o f  from t h e  new f r e e t r a d e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  b u t  a c t i v e l y  p a r t i c ­
i p a t e d  i n  t h e  LPA and FTLA and h i s  l e a d e r s h i p ,  i n  f a c t ,  does  
n o t  seem to  have  b e en  c h a l l e n g e d  by t h e  p a r t y .  F u r t h e r ,  he 
d o e s  n o t  seem t o  have  been  a t  odds  w i t h  M cM il lan ;  t h e  two a p p e a r  
t o  have  had much i n  common, and P a r k e s  was o f  c o n s i d e r a b l e  im p­
o r t a n c e  t o  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  s u c c e s s  o f  M cM il lan  and h i s  f e l l o w  c o n ­
s e r v a t i v e s  i n  d o m i n a t i n g  t h e  a f f a i r s  o f  t h e  p a r t y .  M a r t i n ’s 
i m p l i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  F e d e r a l  i s s u e  was d e s i g n e d  t o  c a u s e  i n t e r n ­
a l  p a r t y  d i s s e n s i o n  a l s o  seems q u e s t i o n a b l e  s i n c e  c o n f l i c t  a l ­
r e a d y  e x i s t e d  w i t h i n  f r e e t r a d e  r a n k s .
i
I f  P a r k e s ’s F e d e r a t i o n  moves were  d i c t a t e d  a t  a l l  by 
d o m e s t i c  p o l i t i c s ,  H . V . E v a t t  a p p e a r s  t o  p r e s e n t  a  more l i k e l y  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  when he s t a t e s  t h a t  P a r k e s  "was u s i n g  t h e  new 
c r y  t o  r e s i s t  t h e  w i d e s p r e a d  demand f o r  im m e d ia t e  s o c i a l  r e -
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fo r m " . "  _;0As f a r  a s  i n t e r n a l  f r e e t r a d e  p o l i t i c s  were  c o n c e r n e d ,
139" t h e  g r e a t  f e d e r a t i o n  p o t h e r  o f  l 8 8 9 - 9 1 n ' seems t o  have  b e en ,  
and was c e r t a i n l y  r e g a r d e d  by t h e  FTLA r a d i c a l s  a s ,  a  c o n s e r v ­
a t i v e  c o n s p i r a c y  t o  p r e s e n t  a v i a b l e  e x c u s e  f o r  f a i l u r e  t o  imp­
l e m e n t  t h e  p a r t y ’s ’d e c l a r e d  p o l i c y ’ o f  d i r e c t  l a n d  t a x a t i o n .  
R a d i c a l  p r e s s u r e ‘ from w i t h i n  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  p a r t y  f o r  a 
’p u r e ’ f r e e t r a d e  t a r i f f  and t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n  
had  f o r c e d  P a r k e s  and  t h e  1 8 8 7 -8 9  m i n i s t r y  t o  i n t r o d u c e  t h e i r  
sham t a x a t i o n  p r o p o s a l s  o f  1 8 8 8 , b u t  t h e  r a d i c a l s  were  riot 
d e c e i v e d . ^ ^ ' U n t i l  1889 r a d i c a l  f r e e t r a d e  p r e s s u r e  from o u t s i d e  
p a r l i a m e n t  s c a r c e l y  e x i s t e d .  B eing  l a r g e l y  composed o f  w e a l t h y  
m e r c h a n t s ,  t h e  FTA s o u g h t  no change  i n  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  p o l i c y  o f  
’r e v e n u e  t a r i f f i s m ’ , n o r  d i d  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t i l l  c o n s e r v ­
a t i v e - d o m i n a t e d  LPA im pose  any r e a l  p r e s s u r e  on t h e  new m i n i s t ­
r y  t o  a l t e r  i t s  f i s c a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s .  From A p r i l  1889) how ever ,  
t h e  p r e s s u r e  on th e  m i n i s t r y  t o  s u b s t i t u t e  d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n  f o r  
i n d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n  g r a d u a l l y  m oun ted .
A l t h o u g h ,  i n  A p r i l ,  T r e a s u r e r  McMil lan  was f o r c e d  by
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the protectionists to pledge the removal of the anomalies in
" I / Othe tariff, ” k' it was the increasing clamourings of the FTLA 
radicals that posed the greatest threat to continued conserv­
ative inaction. In July, radical FTLA urgings that the minist­
ry carry out its pledges of tariff simplification were strongly 
1 / ,  3voiced," :yand were reiterated at the FTLA conference in August. 
It was, however, the declaration of land taxation as party pol­
icy that put the conservative-dominated ministry in a very awk­
ward situation. More sham taxation proposals were clearly out 
of the question, but a plausible excuse to postpone the unpal­
atable prospect of direct taxation 'was needed: Federation pro­
vided that excuse.
If Parkes, shrewd and perceptive, sensed the need for
a ’delaying issue’ as early as June (and as a member of the
FTLA Council there is no reason why he would not have done so),
145he made his concerted move in October "- as Martin points out,
1  /■ ghis "timing is surely of significance". ’ In November, Parkes 
told Edmund Barton that "The fiscal contention must be left for
1 I n
settlement on a Federal basis hereafter", ( and "from the first
in all places and at all times" he publicly expressed the same
opinion. In fact, Parkes became "a federalist first and a
149freetrader second",' being more than content to be able to
shelve the fiscal issue, thereby precluding any interference
with existing fiscal arrangements. Rather than opposing this
convenient escape route from the obligation to implement'pure 
150freetrade', William McMillan declared his support for a 
"breathing time" for the fiscal issue, "so that the people 
might be afforded an opportunity of reviewing the whole matter 
from a national instead of a local standpoint", and he dec­
lared that "He would go with Sir Henry Parkes that ... they
must trust the federal dominion Parliament with the adjust-
151ment of this matter of tariffs, ...". '
The question of Federation and its fiscal implications, 
however, brought into the open the fundamental and destructive 
conflict that split the FTLA in two. The Association's consid­
eration of "the question of free trade in its relation to Aus-
152tralian federation" extended over four nights during February
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1890; the debate on the subject clearly revealed a definite 
cleavage between the pro-Federation conservatives, anxious to 
forestall fiscal change, and the anti~Fede.ra.tion or ’freetrade 
first1 radicals. The traditional conservative liberal and 
president of the FTLA, Andrew Garran, opened the debate by 
delivering a long address in which was exposed the conservative 
support for Federation as an escape route from freetrade oblig­
ations. Basing his argument on the philosophical contention 
that provincialism was not consistent with true liberalism,
Garran concluded that, as liberals, freetraders must agree that 
federation was "of more importance to the general interests of 
Australia” than freetrade; as such, freetrade must be sacrificed 
to the cause of national unity. He then went on to specify that 
"we can be no parties to foreclosing any question of taxation, 
on which it would be the duty of the Dominion Parliament to pro­
nounce”. And if that was an insufficient revelation of his basic 
attitude to 1pure freetrade1, his view that ”a moderate free- 
trade tariff” would provide the federal government with ”all,
and more than all”, the revenue it required, was a distinct in-
153timation of his preference for ’revenue tariffism’. To Garran, 
at least, it seems that Federation was a means of preserving his 
preferred system of taxation in Hew South Wales.
The same could probably have been said of Parkes, and,
in their angry response to Garran’s address, the FTLA radicals
certainly implied it. The single taxer and Council member,
J.A.Dobbie, stated his belief that ”Sir Henry Parkes’s scheme
151had all the appearance of a dazzling political job”. By now,
however, the radicals would not be fobbed off, and J.C.Neild’s
motion that the FTLA Council ’’deprecates any form of Australian
federation calculated to imperil the free trade policy of New 
15c; ' 156South Wales” yywas carried 20/10. ' In supporting the motion,
N.B.Downing spoke for all his radical colleagues when he stated
that they must ’’accept the challenge thrown out in the presid-
157ident’s address”, and he urged the Association to continue
1 SBits "war against all taxation”, save land taxation. Among
the other radicals who agreed 'with Downing were Frank Cotton,160W.E.Johnson and E.W.Foxall, Foxall concluded that Garran's
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address "was characterised by statements which no true free­
trader could possibly endorse", and he too exhorted the Assoc­
iation »»to spare no effort»» to secure the implementation of 
s true freetrade*.. !
In reply to this radical onslaught, the FTLA»s conserv­
atives, G.N.Griffiths, Edward Pulsford, Sydney Burdekin and 
Richard Teece, fought a defensive rearguard. Teece taunted 
Downing that »»he was only putting in a word for the single­
tax party»», and stated that the introduction of the subject of
162taxation was »»improper". Both Teece and Griffiths tried to win
the support of the Council for amendments that the FTLA give its
163blessing and support to the Federation movement. 'Teece also
tried to preserve the illusion of unity by denying »’that there
1 6Fwas any disaffection amongst the party»»;" by now, however, the 
radicals had gained control, and they did not shirk or avoid 
c onflict.
Towards the end of 1890 conflict again erupted within 
the FTLA over the ministry’s continued refusal to carry out the 
party's ’declared policy». At a special meeting of the STL ex­
ecutive council on IF October, it was stated that the "Single 
Tax party ... have allied their forces with those of the Free- 
trade and Liberal party, in the expectation that the Govern­
ment would be guided in their financial proposals by the resol­
utions passed at the [FTLA.] conference", and it was resolved to 
convey to the government the view of the STL that "the repeated 
delays in bringing forward the promised scheme for the readjust­
ment of the tariff have aroused suspicion „0* as to the sincer-
165ity of the Government's intentions", ''At a meeting of the FTLA 
Council some weeks later, the fiery and outspoken single taxer, 
Alexander Riddell, moved what the Herald described as "practic­
ally a censure on the Government’’0^ °^Riddell moved that the Coun­
cil "deprecates the postponement of the financial proposals by 
the Government, and urges the Ministry to fulfil its pledges, 
to introduce a freetrade policy»». J " 'The rather more tactful 
radical, E.W.Foxall, immediately moved an amendment which took
"the edge off the original resolution" and bore "the marks of
168a compromise", but which nevertheless stated that the Council's
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"duty" was to ensure the implementation of the party’s policy,
and which "urged" the ministry "to submit such a policy to the
16QHouse at the earJlest possible moment"* ''The adoption of this 
still critical, but rather more diplomatic, amendment still led 
the Herald, to remark on "the strength of the single-tax party 
in the Council" „a 1
Clearly, however, opinion within the FTLA was far from
unanimous, and Riddell referred disparagingly to the "more con­
i'7!servative section of the association".' '' The culmination of this
internecine conflict came in January 1891? when, ostensibly on
the grounds that the fiscal controversy was "practically ended",
the Association’s long-serving secretary, Edward Pulsford, ann-
'] 7 ?ounced his resignation. " That radical pressure and antagonism 
also probably contributed to Puls ford's decision was suggested 
soon after by yet another outburst by the outspoken Riddell. 
Riddell publicly described Pulsford as a ’revenue tariffist’ 
and an opponent of land taxation, and stated that, like the sec­
retary of the protectionists’ old extra-parliamentary organis­
ation, H.T.Donaldson, he was "in favour of intercolonial free 
trade and protection against the world" by the imposition of a 
high revenue tariff. Riddell concluded by caustically suggest­
ing that, if the FTLA wanted to replace Pulsford with another
173anti-direct taxation conservative, it should appoint Donaldson.
At a special meeting of the FTLA, called to consider 
Pulsford’s resignation, further conflict arose. At a meeting 
of the single tax-dominated Paddington branch of the FTLA in 
November 1890? a resolution was passed condemning the possible 
imposition of a property tax, instead of a land tax as specif- 
ied by the FTLA conference. '4In February 1891? this resolution 
came before the central FTLA Council for consideration. Before 
debate on the resolution had even begun, however, the Associat­
ion's president, j.H.Goodlet, revived the old conservative tac­
tic of avoiding and delaying consideration of the question, de­
claring that "it was inexpedient for them to take up those quest­
ions, as if they did so their action in that respect would have
175the effect of dividing the association". y The conservative MLA
1 i-p r
and Council member, J.F.Cullen,' 'supported the president, and
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contended that should they attempt "to give any final deliver-
2 n £ance" on the matter, “they would disintegrate their forces’*« 
Thereupon the meeting terminated, as did the FTLA; the Council 
was never reconvened, and nobody was appointed to replace Puls-
ford. In June it was reported that "For some months the assoc
iation has been moribund 177The FTLA's final epitaph app­
eared in the Herald at the end of 1891: "The freetraders have 
been weakened by division of opinion as to single-tax, through 
which their association partially collapsed, 1/0
The consistent refusal of the majority conservatives 
within the freetrade party, both in and out of parliament, ever 
to specify or implement a policy of real freetrade naturally 
caused internal party tension. Even on the one issue on which 
the party was based, there was no agreement. It was this int­
ernal party conflict that undermined every other development to­
wards a permanent, integrated and disciplined freetrade party; 
only its solution could ensure irreversible progress.
II
The development of protectionist organisation prior to 
1889 had been largely determined by a three-sided struggle for 
control between the movement's non-parliamentary conservative 
manufacturers, non-parliamentary radicals and parliamentary 
party. Despite radical urgings for unity and integration, at 
no stage had this been achieved. For most of 18875 protection­
ist organisation had been dominated by the conservative manuf-179acturers who controlled the PU; yin October of that year, how­
ever, their authority had been broken by the combined attack of 
the extra-parliamentary radicals and protectionist MsLA, as a
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result of which the parliamentarians had established their
Sosupremacy over the direction of the movement* The 1889 veri­
er al election, however, had provided an opportunity for the 
wealthy conservative manufacturers to stage a come-back. Their 
indispensability during costly election campaigns had been ex­
ploited by ex-PU vice president and CM president, Archibald 
Forsyth, to revitalise the old forces of the PU into a ’new *
organisation, the NPA3? and to take over -the protectionist el-
1 8jectoral organisation created by the MsLA."- J It was this power- 
play and contention between three distinct forces for control 
over, or equal representation in, the direction of the protection 
movement that, after February 1889» continued to characterise 
the development of protectionist organisation, and to inhibit 
the creation of a fully integrated and unified party structure.
It was not until mid-1890 that all three contending parties were 
prepared to join forces on a basis of relative equality to create 
an integrated party organisation.
This basic three-way rivalry and struggle for control 
was, however, complicated after 188? by the fact that no one 
rival party was powerful, representative or influential enough 
to assert permanent and total dominion over the organisation of 
the movement. Until the end of 1887 the indispensable wealth 
of the manufacturers had enabled them to dominate, but then the 
MsLA and radicals had united to break that dominance. For two 
reasons, however, the alliance between the radicals and the 
parliamentarians was shaky: most MsLA were conservative by ins­
tinct, and protectionist electoral success still relied heavily 
on the resources of the manufacturers. Thus, by the time of the 
1889 general election, the parliamentary party again needed the 
manufacturers’ effluence, and the latter utilised this depend­
ence to regain their influence. Having done so, they were 
shrewd enough to realise that, should they fail to consolidate 
their regained control, conservative dominion would be short­
lived once the elections were over. To prevent a repetition of 
their humiliation in October 1887, the manufacturers came to 
two major conclusions. First, they realised than !o shun the 
parliamentary party, and deny it any influence in the organ­
isation of the movement outside parliament, only courted disaster;
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hence, they saw the necessity of forming a lasting alliance 
with the protectionist MsLA. But, in order to ensure that the 
MsLA remained a contributing, rather than a dominating influence, 
it was also realised that the forces of non-parilamentary con­
servatism needed strengthening by the inclusion of other con­
servative interests beyond those merely of the CM; hence, a 
scheme was hatched to create a new and enlarged extra-parliam­
entary organisation to represent the conservative interests of 
not just the manufacturers, but those also of conservative 
pastoralist, professional and commercial protectionists.
While organising and managing the protectionists1 1889 
electoral campaign, Forsyth and his NPA3 colleagues undertook 
the creation of a comprehensive conservative association into 
which the NPA3 would merge at the conclusion of the elections.
On 21 January 1889 > a private circular was sent to well over 
200 protectionists throughout the colony inviting their attend­
ance at a meeting to be held a week later "for the purpose of 
considering the advisability of forming a Political and Social 
Club, comprised of those believing in the necessity for Fiscal
1 O pReform based upon Protective Principles . . r"The stated int­
ention was to make the '’proposed organisation . . . one of real 
and permanent power”, and to achieve this it was emphasised that 
"a large body of supporters is of necessity required, .« . ”. "
That the new organisation was planned and initiated by the man­
ufacturer-led NPA3 was borne out by the fact that, of the three 
"Hon. Secs” in whose names the invitation was issued, one,
C.B.Lowe, was a secretary of the NPA3 electoral committee,'"""1
185and another, W.H.Armstrong, was a member of the CM, Wywas prob­
ably also involved in the NPA35 and had certainly been a member 
of the PU Council in 1886-87.186
The proposed meeting was duly held on the appointed day, 
and, under the chairmanship of the wealthy and influential past-
i O n
oralist, William Macleay,“ rit brought into existence a club, 
based "on purely Protectionist principles” and christened the
•j gg
’National Club' (NC)0 Of the 103 "gentlemen who joined the189’National Club’ on the occasion of the first meeting", the 
well-known names clearly reveal the character of the organisation
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manufacturer-inspired, but a comprehensive expression of con­
servative protectionist opinion. The CM was powerfully rep-
190 191resented, as was the NPA3 executive and extinct PU Counc-
192ile '"The list also included such wealthy pastoralists as 
W.Lamb, W.E.Abbott, F.B.Suttor, V/. Alison and H. C. White ; ± "^num­
erous men of commerce, including B.B.Nicoll, M.McRae, G.S.
19LArthur and J.de V. Lamb; " and the conservative protectionist 
barrister, Edmund Barton« Not one identifiable protectionist 
radical was included in the Clubfs initial membership. By 
October 1889? the Club's membership had risen to 229? the over­
whelming majority of whom were either manufacturers or past­
oralists, or were engaged in trade, commerce or the profess- 
i 95ions. ''The invitation to the inaugural meeting stated that
the "Entrance Fee and Annual Subscription will be arranged at 
196the Meeting" ' and, as one angry radical later pointed out, 
the fact that it was decided to accept as members only those who 
were "prepared to plonk down £S as entrance fee, and pay the 
same amount as subscription" further revealed that the Club197was "established on purely conservative principles".
On 23 February, the NC's formation was widely advert­
ised, and it was reported that a "strong committee" had been 
appointed, with William Macleay as president, and the past­
oralists, J.P.Abbott, W.Lamb and H.C.White, and Edmund Barton
198as vice presidents. Into the NC there now merged the NFA3; 
on 2? March, NPA executive chairman, Archibald Forsyth, moved 
that the NPA3? "having concluded its duties re general elect­
ion, surrender its trust and hand over all books, documents,199and effects" to the NC. Forsyth also urged the Club to adopt
200the title of NPA,“' v but this suggestion was rejected; thus, the
life of yet another NPA had expired0 By the end of March, the
NC had also made contact with, and secured the co-operation of,
the parliamentary party. The first formal contact seems to
have occurred in mid-March when "members of the new National
Club" aided the "Parliamentary section of the National Party"
to resume the work of "organising", the abandonment of which
had been forced on the MsLA by the necessity to return to their
201electorates during the general election.""'
Tne ’aid' offered by the NC was surely a sign of the
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conservatives’ desire to forge a working alliance with
parliamentarians, mainly for the purpose of securing their own
position at the head of the movement* Such an alliance was
formalised on 19 March when a meeting of the NC appointed a
Political Committee of fifteen members, five of whom were MsLA
"representing the Parliamentary party”, the remaining ten "re-
202presenting the Club generally".1 "Some weeks later a sixteenth
member, H.Tennent Donaldson, was added to the Committee as a
203permanent secretary. It was this sixteen-man executive that 
was seen by the NC as "the body which is in future to take ch­
arge of the organisation of the Protectionist forces” / ' "The 
active participation of the leading protectionist MsLA seemed 
to justify such a confident prediction.
The creation of the Political Committee seemed finally 
to have bridged the gulf between the parliamentary party and 
the protectionists' operative extra-parliamentary organisation, 
and to have fulfilled Duverger's conditions for "a true polit­
ical party”: the establishment of "some permanent co-ordinat-
203ion” between the two wings.~ Despite this development, how­
ever, the protectionist forces remained splintered, and deeply 
divided over their attitude to the new self-appointed leader 
of the movement. The reason seems clear. Although Duverger's 
formal conditions had been fulfilled, the fact remained that 
the protectionist movement was composed of a number of diff­
erent and rival interests and opinions, and the new organis­
ation and its executive, unlike the freetraders' FTLA, was any­
thing but representative of the movement it claimed to control. 
In fact, the NC's Political Committee was little more than a 
thoroughly conservative clique; of its ten non-parliamentary 
members, four had been members of the old exclusive PU Council,
four at least had been members of the manufacturer-dominated
2 of.NPA3 executive, and five were members of the CM,- and the 
wealthy and conservative Macleay, Barton and Lamb filled the 
remaining positions. The Club's ten members of the executive 
were certainly an accurate reflection of 'the Club generally', 
but certainly not of the entire protectionist movement. As 
one radical protectionist aptly pointed out, the Club's execut­
ive "may represent the one cr two hundred members, but not the
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P07great body of the people,
Furthermore, the participation of the parliamentary 
party in the NC was also limited by the nature and outlook of 
the Club, The MsLA were restricted to five of the fifteen pos­
itions on the Political Committee, and none of those appointed 
directly represented the views of the party's significant rad­
ical wing. Lyne, Dibbs and J.P.Abbott were anything but pro­
gressive in outlook and, although Edmunds and Chanter were not 
entirely illiberal, they were certainly not convinced radicals. 
In the same way as the Club's exclusive character precluded the 
involvement of non-parliamentary radicals, it also acted to re­
strict the involvement of the more liberal members of the parl­
iamentary party. Of the EC's 229 members in October 1889, only 
twenty-eight were MsLA, of whom only three held firmly progress- 
ive views."Integration, then, was more imaginary than real.
The parliamentary party was clearly intended to play a subsid­
iary role, and only its conservative members were made welcome.
In the final analysis, it seems that the new and supreme 
protectionist executive was little more than a perpetuation of 
the conservative, exclusive and unpopular PU, bolstered by the 
participation of other sympathetic conservative interests and 
given some assurance of permanency and influence by the inv­
olvement of the leaders of the parliamentary party. It was, 
however, scarcely to be expected that the radical elements of 
the movement, both in and out of parliament, would willingly 
submit to the dictates of such a body. And, further, just how 
long the parliamentary party would tolerate its minor role in 
the 'integrated* organisation tended also to cast some doubt on 
the permanency of the arrangements arrived at by the end of 
March 1889.
Antagonism between the extra-parliamentary radicals 
and the EC first arose soon after the Club’s formal inaugurat­
ion. From the very start, negotiations between the radical 
PPRL and the NC to create a fully integrated party structure 
were doomed; while the radicals demanded an equal representat­
ion in the united organisation, the conservatives by 1889 were
8/264
able to negotiate from a position of strength, and they cont­
inually refused to concede equal representation. In March, the 
NC declared its desire to enter "into alliance with all Protect­
ion organisations", thereby acting "to unite all in one compact 
body, prepared to act in unison, and by this means put an end
to the antagonistic actions and views" that had previously kept
209-the movement divided.- 'it was particularly hoped that the PPRL 
would "see the wisdom of dissolving or entering into alliance
PI owith the National Political Committee of the National Club",' 
and at a conference of the PPRL in May such a course was specif­
ically proposed. Referring to the disunity caused by the exist­
ence of "two organisations, each claiming supremacy", the deleg­
ate from Bathurst, P.V.Ryan, "considered that the interests of 
protection were.not well served by having divided authority in
the cause", and he argued that "There should be one responsible
211head to be recognised by all leagues".
Ryan's reference to the local leagues was occasioned by 
a struggle that had arisen between the PPRL and the NC for con­
trol of the branch network. As early as mid-March the PPRL had
begun planning for their "conference of delegates of branch
21 2protection leagues from all parts of the colony", but these
plans were upset by the intervention of the NC. Early in April,
the Club requested all local leagues "to at once place themselves
213in communication" with the Political Committee, and soon after
the Committee began to despatch "circulars to the various leag-
ues in the country, requesting them to affiliate", "'^ and appar-
21 5ently seeking to discredit the PPRL. It was in this situation 
of open conflict that Ryan sought to persuade the PPRL to "aff­
iliate with the ’National Protection Committee’, ... [to] which
216the greater influence was attached". Under the circumstances, 
however, the PPRL would not hear of it. Past PPRL president, 
William Richardson, stoutly refused to countenance the suggest­
ion, declaring that the League "Piad laboured unceasingly for 
nine years, and now a fresh party came into the field to sweep
them away, and take the credit of all they had done in the
„ 217 cause".
By early June, however, the PPRL had somewhat modified
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its attitude, and it discussed a proposal to "communicate //it! 
the club to arrange for a basis for united action, in order that
pi Q
protection interests may be .justly conserved”. '"'"^ After further
consideration, the . ea t.. appointed a sub-committee to open ser-
210lous negotiations with the Political Committee. "The League's 
condition for amalgamation, however, was clearly defined; it 
positively refused to "accept a subordinate or co-ordinate pos­
ition unless it is intended that all'existing protection
organisations shall have an equal voice in drawing up rules and
p of)appointing executive officers" in any combined organisation. 
Although the Political Committee reported that the League'spp-
overtures would be considered, "“"one of its members, Forsyth, 
had already made the Club's position quite clear. On the grounds 
that "the club was in a position that the league could not occ­
upy", because of its ability "to command funds", Forsyth denied 
that the PPRL was able to "direct the cause of Protection", and
he suggested that the PPRL agree that the NC "take the lead . . . ,
222with the league participating in the council". 'Equal repres­
entation was clearly not envisaged for the PPRL, nor was it 
granted; the bodies remained at odds, and maintained their sep­
arate identities. Integration had yet again proved impossible.
Despite its battle with the PPRL, the Political Committee 
pressed on with its work of re-organising the protectionists' 
local branch network, displaying considerable energy and achiev­
ing considerable success. The NC's campaign to place all branch­
es under its aegis, despite the claims of the PPRL, seems to have 
been particularly successful. This was made clear as early as 
May. Despite the PPRL's claim to control a network of sixty 
branches, only eleven sent delegates to its conference, and 
the NC was represented as "the reason ... [for] the small att­
endance" . ^ ^Furthermore, one of the PPRL's branches represented 
at the conference declared that it was "not prepared to be sub­
ject to it any longer", clearly stating its intention to transfer
PPLits allegiance to the NC. ‘ The affiliation of local branches
proceeded rapidly, and at each of the Political Committee’s
weekly meetings correspondence was consistently tabl :d from a
2 2Clarge number of affiliated branches. ''"Finally, in August, it 
v/as reported that "... all the Protection associations in the 
metropolitan district had now become affiliated with the political
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c ommittee" 226
In addition to securing the affiliation of existing 
branches, the Committee also undertook the extension of its 
branch network through the formation of new branches. In this 
regard it also acted with vigour, it being reported during 
July that ’’during the week associations had been established 
at Canowindraj Cudgegong, Goolagong, Mount McDonald, Walli, 
and Woodstock”. Finally, in October, a composite list of 201- 
local protection associations ”in affiliation with the Political
p p Q
Protection Committee of the National Club” was published; as
the Committee’s secretary pointed out, the impressive number of
branches certainly testified to ’’The growth that the Party has
made since the last general election especially when it is
remembered that they have nearly all been brought into existence
229since the establishment of the National Club . ..". Like the 
freetraders, the protectionists also held a conference of del­
egates from their various local branches during 1889- Held in
250October, the NPA4 conference, like the earlier FTLA confer­
ence, provided concrete evidence of the organising activity of 
1889» In all, 106 local protectionist branches were represented
at the conference, and of these, seventy-six were country branches
251and the rest metropolitan leagues. All seemed to augur well 
for an efficient and comprehensive protectionist campaign during 
the next general election.
With the next general election in mind, the conference 
gave its attention to the specification of a formal system of 
electoral organisation and management. Along the same lines as 
those agreed upon by the FTLA conference, the protectionists' 
proposals were formally set out in a list of eight "rules and 
conditions" submitted by the Political Committee. The basis of 
the system was the selection work of the local associations, 
and in electorates "having more than one association such ass­
ociations shall jointly agree on the selection of candidates".
It was stated that the candidates selected by the local branches 
"shall be accepted as the candidates of the party", but, mindful 
of the mistakes of 1889, it was emphasised that "to secure the 
recognition", or official endorsement, of selected candidates,
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the branches should "promptly notify” the central executive of 
their choices. Naturally enough the Political Committee was 
specified as the supreme executive body, and, in addition to its 
power to endorse candidates, it undertook to "select ... candid­
ates if requested”, and assumed the right to recommend and nom­
inate candidates in electorates where local organisation was
either missing or "unable to find a suitable candidate or cand- 
212idates, 'Strangely enough, however, in view of the pro­
tectionists * methods during the 1889 election, no consideration 
was given to any prescribed techniques of eliminating vote­
splitting or disciplining refractory and intransigent candidates. 
The protectionists, however, did pay special attention to the
financial aspect of electoral management, particularly the dis-
211pensection of "pecuniary assistance" to certain candidates; in 
this respect, they provide further evidence of the progress be­
ing made towards the creation of a sophisticated ’machine’ for 
the management and control of electoral activity.
Basic to any effective system of electoral management, 
however, was the presence of a permanent and respected central 
electoral executive to co-ordinate party activity, to control, 
endorse and despatch candidates, and to act as the final arbiter 
in any disputes. While the rules submitted to the conference 
assumed that the Political Committee of the MC would constitute 
such an executive body at any future elections, a significant 
proportion of those in attendance did not. The presence at the
conference of the parliamentary party’s significant radical
2!h 211wing, at least seven members of the PPRL and two TLC prot-p7 r
ectionists, J?Dled to a resumption of the assault on the PC’s 
conservative and exclusive character, and to renewed efforts to 
make the party's central organisation, especially its executive 
committee, more representative of the movement as a whole.
It seems, however, that the conservative Political 
Committee, and in particular its most active ’wirepuller’, 
Archibald Forsyth, had shrewdly anticipated radical moves to 
force the Committee to broaden its base. Forsyth came to the 
conference armed with a number of prepared resolutions, designed 
to give the appearance of the Committee's willingness to become
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more representative, but in real i postponing any basic ch n ;< 
and retaining firm conservative control of the executive. In 
projecting his proposals to counter radical moves, Forsyth 
waged a clever tactical campaign, and again convincingly 
’dished' his radical adversaries.
On the third day of the conference, a country delegate 
innocently raised the subject of the ’’Organisation of the Nat­
ional Party", by moving that "it is necessary to impress on the 
delegates the necessity for reorganisation in their districts 
"Before any discussion took place, however, Forsyth in­
tervened and moved his series of prepared resolutions as an 
amendment to the original motion. J At once, he had severely 
limited the scope of any radical assault on the NC, an assault 
that was bound to be launched during the discussion on organ­
isation. Forsyth first proposed that, in the interests of uni­
formity, the NC change its name to "the National Protection Ass­
ociation of New South Wales" (NPA4) , ^ ^to conform to the title 
adopted by the local branches.'4 This proposal aroused no ob­
jections, and was duly carried without dissent.
Forsyth's second proposal, concerning the composition
of "the Executive Committee of such National Association",^'^
however, was the cause of animated debate. Representing his
proposal as "a recommendation to the political committee to
2A3widen its basis", Forsyth moved that the NPA4 executive com­
prise "the Political Committee of the National Club, ..., toget­
her with not less than eight, nor more than ten, representatives, 
to be nominated by such of the chief metropolitan and suburban 
associations as may be called upon for the purpose by the Pol­
itical Committee, ...".^4^ The specification that the executive's 
additional members were to be drawn from only those branches 
nominated by the Political Committee clearly meant that the ex­
ecutive's composition would remain firmly under the control of 
the conservative Committee. Needless to say, the radicals were 
anything but enthusiastic about such a proposal and, led by PPPL 
stalwart, William Richardson, they undertook to change it in an 
attempt to break conservative dominion. It was the Political 
Committee's virtual power to dictate the appointment of the
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executive's additional members that Richardson found object­
ionable; the power of appointment, he maintained, "should not2 h 5come from the Club, but from the Conference",
Stating that "his chief object was to assert the 
principle ... that all appointments in connection with the ass­
ociation should be made by election", Richardson finally moved 
as an amendment that the Political Committee, "together with
fifteen gentlemen to be now elected by ballot, do constitute2 P gthe executive committee of such National Association".1 This 
would clearly open the way for radical representation on the 
executive, and the amendment "excited considerable discussion, 
the representatives of the Political Protection and Reform 
League supporting it while members of the National Club ... 
opposed it". ^'The conservatives certainly did oppose the amend­
ment: one delegate described it as "offensive to the National 
Club"; 1 °Edmund Barton stated that if it "was agreed to he, for 
one, would decline to sit on the committee"; r" L ' ^ and Forsyth ass­
ured. the conference that "those who were opposing the National 
Club on the ground that it was not sufficiently representative 
were doing it wrongfully". A committee of thirty, he maintained,
would be "altogether unworkable", and he appealed to the del-
250 251egates to reject the amendment. Again he had his way; " again 
the conservatives had met the radical challenge, and emerged 
victorious. The next challenge, hov/ever, was not so easily 
disposed of.
That Forsyth's proposals to make the NC "more represent-
252ative in a practical manner" were merely designed to win the 
sympathy of the conference to counter an anticipated radical 
attack seems to be revealed by the fact that the NPA4 and its 
'enlarged' executive failed to materialise after the conference. 
Yet another NPA faded into oblivion. Having weathered the con­
ference storm, the NC and its Political Committee began its sec-
255ond year of existence, still completely unrepresentative and 
far from willing to become so. In March 1890, however, a new 
and more formidable challenge was issued to the cliquish domin­
ance of the conservatives. To men like Forsyth, the particip­
ation of the protectionist MsLA in the Political Committee was
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only important in order to prevent th< * pov, Lsm;
it had never been nvie that ay more th n a
subsidiary role in the affairs of the Committee, and the prop­
osed ftPA4 executive would have even further reduced their in­
fluence. By March 1890, however, the parliamentary party was 
no longer prepared to tolerate its minor role in the management 
of tile forces of protection; nor, it seems, was it any longer 
prepared to see the whole movement governed by a conservative and 
exclusive clique.
On 21 March, therefore, a "vigilance committee of the
254Parliamentary Opposition", comprising fourteen MsLA, was app-
255ointed "to specially safeguard the interests of the party" 
and to provide "protectionist members of Parliament ... with a 
habitat outside the walls of the National Club". °The broader 
object of this move was revealed later in the month when a meet­
ing of the 'vigilance committee' resolved that "the political 
committee of the National Club should be invited to meet the 
vigilance committee ... for the purpose of associating more
closely these bodies with the various protectionist organis- 
257ations, ...". Two such meetings took place, and at both "Matt­
ers affecting the organisation of the protectionist party were
258discussed at considerable length". It was finally arranged to 
hold a conference of all existing protectionist associations 
for the purpose of, yet again, undertaking the reorganisation 
of the party.
If Forsyth and the NC had manipulated the October 1889 
conference, the MsLA and non-parliamertary radicals did no less 
an effective job of dominating the conference held at the end 
of April 1890. Fifty-three local protectionist associations 
v/ere represented by forty-nine delegates, among whom were six 
MsLA, PPPL president, R.Scott Ross, the TLC radicals, John Nor­
ton and J.R.Talbot, and the future or past radical MsLA, K.C. 
Hoyle, R. A. Price, K. McKinnon and P. M. Vaughn. ^ ^The PPRL was 
itself forcefully represented by its fearless past president, 
William Richardson, and outspoken secretary, R.C.Luccombe. A 
further ten MsLA were in attendance, seven as representatives
p / A
of the parliamentary party" vand three as members of the PC's
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2 61Political Committee. Of the sixteen MsLA in attendance, six
2 £)vie re convinced radicalsk Only four n on-parliamentary members
pCxof the Political Committee bothered to be present; "'their days 
of unshared dominance were clearly numbered.
During 1889} one frustrated radical had called on "the 
liberal members of the party ... [to] step forward and assist 
in connecting the disunited ranks" of the movement; "'now, al­
most twelve months later and under the leadership of the parl­
iamentary party, that task was being tackled. It is clear from
26bthe proceedings of the conference "that the ’vigilance committ­
ee’ had forced the Political Committee to agree to broaden the 
base of the organisation it had so effectively monopolised and, 
as the result of this compliance, E.W.0 ’Sullivan moved that "an 
executive committee be appointed for the control of the Nation­
al Party consisting of 45 members, viz., 15 from the political 
committee of the National Club, 15 members to be elected by the 
Opposition, and 15 members to be elected at this meeting".
Dibbs, as leader of the parliamentary party, was nominated as 
chairman of the executive.' ;CNinian Melville, however, moved 
an even more liberal amendment that, in addition to the thirty 
MsLA and members of the NC, the executive also contain "one
p g rp
representative from each electorate in New South Wales". v After 
a lengthy discussion, Melville's amendment was carried.
As the Telegraph remarked, "The meeting was neither 
enthusiastic nor united in tone, and the discussion at times was
pro
heated in the extreme".""°Clearly, however, the NC was outnumb­
ered, and the futility of resistance to the integration move­
ment v/as revealed by the almost pathetic remark of one of the 
Political Committee’-s original members that "he had always ad­
vocated a larger representation on the National Party Committ- 
ee"/ ~In many respects the April 1890 conference was a repet- 
ition of the conservatives’ humiliation in October 1887; once 
again the parliamentary party and the non-parliamentary radicals 
had combined to break the sectional dominance of the conserv­
atives over the organisation of the movement. The way was now 
clear for the emergence of a unified and representative party 
structure.
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Finally, after four years of frustration, there emerged 
an integrated and unified protectionist party structure in which 
was represented all the diverse elements that went to make up 
the protectionist movement - parliamentary and non-parliamentary, 
radical and conservative, city and country. It was only fitting 
that the new organisation should be named ’’the National Protect­
ion Association of New South Wales” (NPA5) and, after an interim
period during which the new executive was styled the National
27] ?72Protection Council, the well-worn title was adopted.' On 13
May, the parliamentary party elected its fifteen representatives
275to sit on the executive, and less than a week later the Polit­
ical Committee of the NC was actively attending ”to the appoint­
ment of representatives from electorates to the executive comm­
ittee, ^  On 23 June, the new NPA3 executive held its first
meeting; the draft rules of the new Association were drawn up,
various sub-committees were appointed, and ’’other matters of an
275initial character were dealt with”. In August, II.Tennent Don-
276aldson was appointed secretary to the Association and, in Sep­
tember, detailed recommendations for the thorough organisation
277of the new Association were received.
The one sour note in the emergence of the new body was 
the continued refusal of the PPRL to co-operate. Previously the 
League had kept alive the movement of radical dissatisfaction 
with the cliquish NC; but now, in the face of the party’s liberal 
reorganisation, its continued objection that ’’the principle of
p n O
equal representation is denied” seemed selfish peevishness.
The new NPA5 executive was, in fact, thoroughly representative.
279It contained twenty parliamentary representatives, five of
O  ki
whom were confirmed radicals«/"0 Of the fifteen non-parliamentary
members who attended the executive’s early meetings, four were
members of the old Political Committee^ xand eleven were the
first of the representatives from the electorates, among whom
282were four recognisable radicals.
At the very moment, however, that the ’’machinery of the
283party” was in sight of being ”as complete as possible”, it 
faltered and faded into oblivion. In September, the executive 
decided that its regular monthly meetings would in future be
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p 8'lheld on the last Monday of each month; 'the first and last 
of these ’regular* meetings was held in November.' -'Unlike the 
explosive disintegration of the FTLA, the NPA5 quietly "passed 
out of sight and hearing”. Although the reasons for the rapid 
demise of the NPA5 are not obvious, the shreds of available ev­
idence would suggest that the effective and harmonious integ­
ration of interests and opinions so diverse as those within 
the protectionist movement proved impossible. Integration had 
not been achieved in an atmosphere of harmony and enthusiasm; 
the PPRL remained aloof and the NC, it seems, after a year of 
exclusive dominion, was virtually forced to surrender its power 
monopoly. As a result, it would have been surprising had ten­
sion and resentment not been present within the NPA. The pres­
ence of such tension, it would appear, accounted for the coll­
apse of the NPA5*
On 15 September, the executive received the report of its
”sub-committee for organisation”, but its recommendations were
not ratified; rather ”it was resolved that they should be con-o sTsidered at a meeting specially convened for that purpose”.'"'
Such a decision would seem to suggest that the executive it­
self was deeply divided over the subject. Although the ’spec­
ial meeting’ was never held, it is probably not unreasonable to 
suggest that the sub-committee’s recommendations were unpalat­
able to the conservatives on the executive, for on 26 November 
it was reported that two of the executive's prominent conserv­
ative members, MLA, T.HoHassall, and manufacturer and original
member of the NC's Political Committee, Alexander Martin, had
288resigned. ~ If their resignations constituted the beginning of 
a conservative exodus from the executive, the NPA’s effective 
days were clearly numbered. The conservatives' refusal to co­
operate with the MsLA and radicals in October 1887 deprived the 
protectionists' organisational machinery of unity, funds, energy 
and experience; it would have done the same in November 1890. 
After October 1887 5 the parliamentarians were forced to carry 
the burden of organisation alone; they were probably obliged 
to do likewise after November 1890. The 1891 general election, 
however, loomed as the acid test of their ability to apply the 
principles of electoral management formulated during the less
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troubled days of the protectionist party.
* * * * *
The experience of both fiscal parties during 1889 
and 1890 demonstrated that the creation of an integrated and 
representative party ’machine', although difficult enough in 
itself, was simple in contrast to the task of maintaining it as 
a permanent and efficient director of party affairs« The ach­
ievements of both parties after the 1889 general election pro­
vided incontrovertible evidence of a political system in the 
process of transformation: the creation of widespread organis­
ational networks, the attention to the modern techniques, soph­
istications and formalities of electoral management, and the 
promotion of unified party structures were all trends in the 
evolution of modern political forms and methods. But, as with­
in the parliamentary parties, one basic factor continually op­
erated to prevent the permanent consolidation of these achieve­
ments: the variety of interests and opinions within both fiscal 
movements bred sectionalism and dissension that positively pre­
cluded the principled unity and collective harmony so essential 
to the completion of an evolution that had as its goal the em­
ergence of two integrated, principled and permanent political 
parties.
CHAPTER 9
ELECTIONS AND ENDORSEMENTS: Parl­
iamentary Electoral Organisation 
and Disciplinee
II 1891
"It is doubtful if a general- 
election has been so satis­
factorily managed previously; 
certainly there is a great 
contrast observable between 
the.proceedings on the last 
occasion and these at the 
present election”.
(DT, 12 June 1891, p.5).
The general election of 1891 was precipitated by the 
action of George Dibbs, leader of the protectionist opposition, 
on 28 May. On that day, Dibbs moved in the Legislative Assembly 
that the "Government no longer possesses the confidence of this 
House or of the country".^ 'The censure was lost, but only on the 
casting vote of the Speaker who, himself a protectionist, ex­
plained his vote by reference to the precedent which stated that 
it was not the Speaker's "'duty to throw his weight into the
scale in such a way as to manifest party predilection, or to
2precipitate the result aimed at.'" ' Clearly, however, the posit­
ion of the Parkes ministry was untenable, and, on 1 June, Parkes
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3requested and was granted a dissolution of parliament"to allow 
for a general election in which »the country [would be]
asked to declare which it would prefer - government by the Min­
istry now in charge of its affairs, or government by a Ministry 
constructed by the leaders of the late Opposition1'*H‘
The hasty preparations of both parties for the unex­
pected election clearly revealed the disrepair into which their 
sophisticated party structures of 1889-90 had fallen. The form­
al relationship between both parliamentary parties and - their 
respective extra-parliamentary bodies had simply disappeared, 
and the task of re-constructing party ‘machinery* able to man­
age and organise the election devolved entirely upon the parl­
iamentarians of both parties. On 3 June, a meeting of the pro­
tectionist parliamentary party appointed an »organising committ-
3ee!l or executive of nine MsLA "with full power to make all arr­
angements for a general election".0
While the MsLA were taking positive steps to create an 
organising executive, efforts were being made to revive the dis­
integrated protectionist forces outside parliament. On 1 June, 
it was reported that "A meeting of manufacturers and others int­
erested in protection will shortly be held to form a committee
7to work the elections", and, on 3 June, it was again stated that 
"A meeting of manufacturers is to be held in a few days, the ob-g
ject being to form a league in the interests of protection". 
Certainly the regular occurrence of general elections provided 
the non-parliamentary manufacturers with regular opportunities 
to regain the influence over the protection movement that they 
invariably lost in the interval between elections; the depend­
ence of the entire party upon them for funds on such important 
occasions automatically re-opened the door to power and influence. 
During the 1889 general election, the manufacturers, under the 
leadership of Forsyth, had re-asserted their diminished influence 
through the NPA3} and had laid the foundations for their control 
of the movement throughout 1889 by creating the NC„ The creat­
ion of the NPA5 shook this control, and the Association *s coll-
Qapse in early 1891 completely eliminated what remained of the 
manufacturers' influence.
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The advent of a general election, however, revitalised
the manufacturers, and they immediately played their trump card.
On 3 June, it was reported that ’'Subscriptions have already been
10received from manufacturers in aid of the coming fight”, and the 
parliamentarians were again obliged to invite the representation 
of wealthy non-parliamentary interests on the election executive. 
The manufacturers, it would appear, successfully resuscitated, 
if only temporarily, the extinct political executive of the NC, 
for, on 9 June, it was reported that the parliamentary executive 
had been enlarged to include representatives from ”the political 
committee of the National Club”. L_LUnlike the electoral arrange­
ments of 1889s however, it would appear that in 1891 the parl­
iamentary party retained firm control of the executive; in con­
trast to its representation of eleven MsLA, the number of non­
parliamentary protectionists on the executive, or the ’’National, ppProtection Party Elections Committee" (NPPEC; ‘as it became known,2 3at no stage exceeded four. _'0f the four, Alexander Martin, Arch­
ibald Forsyth and J.T.Toohey, all manufacturers and members of
1 Ithe CMj'diad been foundation members of the NC's Political Comm-
1 r 1_ittee,' yand its permanent secretary, H.Tennent Donaldson,1 was
17appointed secretary to the NPPEC. The chairmanship of the exec­
utive, however, was firmly retained by the parliamentary leader,
18George Dibbs, and, despite the fact that a number of its parl­
iamentary members were forced to leave Sydney to defend their 
19seats, the NPPEC at no stage became the exclusive preserve of 
the manufacturers. Ad hoc and dominated by MsLA, the NPPEC pro­
vided little evidence of the sophisticated and integrated party 
structure of 1890,
The weakness of extra-parliamentary organisation and 
the disappearance of the integrated party structures by mid- 
1891 v/ere even more apparent among the freetraders. The comp­
lete lack of any established freetrade organisation by June 1891 
was revealed in the Herald’s comment that "The lines upon which 
the campaign is to be conducted, and the body which will be
20charged with executive ... duties, have yet to be determined".
21Although the FTLA had been "moribund" for some months, efforts
were made in early June "to infuse new life into the association"22in an attempt to fill the organisational vacuum. Meetings of
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the re-convened FTLA council were held on 3 and 8 June to dis-
23cuss the resuscitation of the Association, and at the latter 
meeting, a resolution was carried pledging the members of the 
council "to use all their efforts during the coming campaign
♦p j
in support of the Government".~4It was finally reported, how­
ever, that the "endeavour to resuscitate" the FTLA was a fail­
ure, and that the Association was "obliged from weakness to
23withdraw from active participation in the contest".
The freetrade parliamentary party was, therefore, ob­
liged to undertake the creation of an ad hoc body to manage the 
party’s electoral campaign. On 3 June, a caucus meeting of 
fifty-one members of the parliamentary party- was held for the
purpose of formulating "plans with a view to getting the elect-
27ioneering machinery into operation". In reply to a suggestion
O
that "it would be a good thing to appoint a Committee", °it was
announced that the members of the ministry had "constituted
29themselves a central organization", and one of its members,
Bruce Smith, suggested to the party’s "private members" that
they "appoint six of [their] number to co-operate with us
50as part of a Central Committee".' Taking heed of Smith's sens­
ible comment that "it would be wise to select gentlemen who are
likely to be in Sydney",y the meeting appointed a committee of 
32seven MsLA which joined the ministerial committee to form the
33central "Freetrade and Federation Committee" (FTFC)'^to "under­
take the organising which the conflict entails".'^Under the
33chairmanship of J.H.Carruthers, the FTFC prepared to embark 
on its task of securing a freetrade electoral victory by ob­
taining offices for its headquarters^and by appointing J.M.
37Conroy as its paid secretary.
The extinction of the central unified party structures 
of 1889-90 did not, however, mean that all the plans and ideas 
for the efficient management of a general election, formulated 
during those fruitful years,4Jhad been forgotten. In fact, 
many of the lessons painfully learned during the election of 
1889, much of the work done during 1889 to remedy previous 
shortcomings, and many of the ideas for successful electoral
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management expounded during 1889 > were applied and bore fruit 
during the general election of 1891» This continued progress 
was well demonstrated in the most fundamental aspect of succ­
essful electoral management, the scope and nature of local 
organisation.
With the decline of the parent body, many local bran-
5°dies of the FTLA also became extinct to'such an extent that,
on its formation, the FTFC saw the need to begin afresh and it
resolved to appoint its own local branch committees "in all
40the important country districts” for the purpose of local org­
anisation and candidate selection. The NPPEC was similarly 
pessimistic about what remained of the protectionists’ efforts 
to establish a widespread, network of local branches in 1889«/" 
It, too, was obliged tc state that the work of candidate sel­
ection "will, as far as possible, be left to the local comm-
I
ittees which are to be appointed, ...".““Both executives, how­
ever, adhered to the decisions of their 1889 conferences in 
maintaining that "as far as possible the selection of candid­
ates in the city and country should be left to the local comm- 
43ittees". On the basis of such a resolution, therefore, it must 
have gratified both executives to witness the rapid resuscitat­
ion of a number of previously moribund branches. The revival 
of the "inactive" Mudgee Protectionist League^ \vas shortly
followed by the resuscitation of the Taree Protection League,"7'“
4 fthe "non-existent" Balmain Protectionist Association, "“and the 
"defunct" Orange FTA. ^
In addition to this rapid resuscitation of branches, 
other local ad hoc committees, including a branch of the FTFCI o
at Queanbeyan,T°were hurriedly created to undertake the work
49of local organisation. When the suburban electorates in which 
still-active local branches existed were added to the elect­
orates in which the work of resuscitating old branches and 
creating new local committees was being pursued, the potential 
for effective local organisation was certainly greater than it 
had beer; in 1889/ In contrast to their total of only eleven 
electorates in 18893 the freetraders in 1891 possessed local
organisations capable of selection work in nineteen electorates; 51
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and the protectionists in 1891 possessed local branches in the 
same number of electorates as had contained active protectionist 
branches in 1889*^~
It was, however, the way in which the tasks of local 
organisation and selection were tackled that provided the clear­
est evidence of the continuing progress being made in the evol­
ution of modern electoral techniques. A number of local branch­
es that did not become moribund after 1839 displayed in 1890 
and 1891 foresight and judgment in preparing for an unexpected 
general election by selecting their candidates well in advance 
of such an eventuality. During April 1 8 9 0 , for instance, the 
Redfern FTA held a series of meetings at which four candidates 
nfor ehe Redfern electorate at the next elections” were chosen." 
Early in May 1 8 9 1 ? the local protectionist league at Cootamundra
also met and chose its candidates to contest the electorates of
54Gundagai and Young in the event of an election.'
Even more important than the timing of candidate select­
ion was the method of that selection within electorates having 
more than one local association. The previous general election
had afforded examples of intense rivalry and conflict between
msbranches in the one electcrate,yyas a result of which, effective 
electoral management was made virtually impossible. In an att­
empt to eliminate such undesirable occurrences, both the FTLA 
and NPA4 conferences had declared in 1889 that, where there was
more than one branch in any electorate, those branches "should
56arrange for working together in the matter of elections" and
57should "jointly agree on the selection of candidates".^  The gen­
eral election of 1891 provided the first examples during the 
period of fiscal politics of such co-ordinated electoral activ­
ity on the local level. Perhaps the outstanding example took 
place in the two-member electorate of Argyle, where the local 
protectionists combined the virtue of action well in advance of 
the unexpected election with the efficiency of complete co­
ordination .
On 15 April, well prior to the election, a meeting of 
the Crookwell Protectionist Association decided "to take steps
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to select a candidate to contest Argyle with T.Pose” . The
meeting decided »‘to invite persons willing to contest the el-
58ection to send in choir names by 21 May”. Both local protect­
ionist bodies in the Argyle electorate, the Crookwell branch 
and the Gon1burn PU, worked in close harmony, and it was 
jointly decided that a conference be held in Goulburn to make 
the final selection. On 11 May, the Crookwell body chose its 
delegates,''^and the Goulburn Union did likewise on 13 May.' ^
The joint conference of ’’Argyle protectionist delegates” was 
held on 8 June, thirty being present. Seven names were sub­
mitted, and ’’the final ballot was between Messrs Graham and
61Brrner, the former being chosen by a majority of ten”. The 
protectionists of Argyle, then, were well prepared tc cope with 
the unexpected election of June 1891* Such efficient local 
organisation was of great benefit to the protectionists’ over­
all organisational efforts, and it certainly meide the task of 
the central executive much easier: the process of central end­
orsement was an uncomplicated formality, and, in such a situat­
ion of certainty, no further protectionist candidates entered 
the field to threaten to split the protectionist vote. A sim­
ilar lack of complications was also evident in two further el­
ectorates - Hastings and Manning, and Balmain - where the prot­
ectionist branches met in conference and decided jointly upon
/I p
their candidates. "
Prompt co-ordinated action between the local leagues 
in an electorate, in fact, provided no opportunity for super­
fluous candidates to justify their refusal to retire; the pop­
ular arguments of intransigent superfluous candidates that they 
were either ’first in the field’ or the nominees of one of two 
rival leagues became untenable. The effect of efficient co­
ordinated local organisation in reducing the incidence of vote­
splitting was demonstrated in several electorates. The Armi- 
dale branch of the New England Protectionist League met on 2 
June, and arranged to hold a meeting of delegates from the
other branches in the electorate on 8 June ”to arrange a plan
63of campaign”. At this meeting of delegates, “it was agreed to 
take a general protection ballot” on 11 June to decide the 
three protectionist candidates to contest the electorate. The
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report of the conference went on to state that all the candid­
ates "agreed to abide by this ballot, being the only way to
r j
avoid having too many candidates”." ‘The ballot resulted in the
selection of H.Copeland, W.Proctor and C.Wilson, and the two
69unsuccessful nominees retired as promised. "
Protectionist organisation in the electorate of Padd­
ington got under way when the executive committee of the Padd-
66ington Protection Association, 'comprising delegates from the 
Wcollahra, Randwick, Paddington and Waverley branches, met on
rn
9 June to consider the selection of candidates.At the final
selection meeting of the committee on 11 June, it was decided
68to run only three candidates, ' and a decision had therefore to
69be made from the four names submitted. When the decision was 
finally made, the unsuccessful candidate declared "his satis­
faction with the result", retired graciously and stated that 
"he would assist the successful candidates through the campaign".
The fact, however, that such sophisticated and effect­
ive methods of electoral organisation were still in the evol­
utionary stage was also demonstrated during the general elect­
ion of 1891- A number of unsuccessful attempts at efficient 
and co-ordinated local organisation revealed the formidable 
obstacles to success created by inexperience, incompetence and 
apathy; these obstacles could only be removed by perseverance 
and experience. Early in 1890, delegates from the numerous 
local free trade branches in Canterbury met and formed a rep­
resentative and co-ordinated executive body, the Canterbury El­
ective Council, to which was given the responsibility of guard-
71ing "the security of the freetrade cause during elections"
72and "the duty of selecting candidates". By June 1891? however,
the Council had fallen into disrepair, and was replaced by a
73hurriedly appointed local committee which selected four can-
rp j f
didates and recommended their endorsement to the FTFC.f~This 
informal procedure, however, forced on the freetraders by lack 
of effort in sustaining the Elective Council, gave one unsucc­
essful nominee for selection the opportunity of justifying his 
refusal to retire on the grounds that the selection by an al hoc 
committee was invalid since it violated the constitution of the
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E l e c t i v e  C o u n c i l . '  ■
The e a s e  w i t h  which  a t t e m p t s  a t  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  came to  
g r i e f  was d e m o n s t r a t e d  by l o c a l  f r e e  t r a d e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  i n  th e  
two-member e l e c t o r a t e  o f  I l l a w a r r a .  On 10 J u n e ,  a m e e t in g  o f  
t h e  B u l l !  FTA was h e l d  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  s e l e c t i n g  two c a n d i d ­
a t e s .  These  p l a n s ,  how ever ,  were  s e t  a s i d e  when s e v e r a l  d e l e g ­
a t e s  from t h e  Wollongong b r a n c h  o f  t h e  A s s o c i a t i o n  p r o p o s e d  t h a t  
t h e  two b r a n c h e s  a v o i d  c o n f l i c t  by c o - o r d i n a t i n g  t h e i r  s e l e c t ­
i o n  work: t h e  Wollongong d e l e g a t e s  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e i r  b r a n c h  
would  s u p p o r t  a B u l l !  n o m in e e ,  i f  th e  B u l l i  b r a n c h  r e c i p r o c a t e d .  
A f t e r  some d i s c u s s i o n ,  t h i s  p l a n  was a g r e e d  t o ,  and th e  m e e t in g  
o f  t h e  B u l l i  b r a n c h  t o  s e l e c t  i t s  c a n d i d a t e  was a r r a n g e d  f o r  
13 J u n e . r ° T h i s  m e e t i n g  t o o k  p l a c e  a s  p l a n n e d ,  and t h e  B u l l i  FTA
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c h o s e  a s  i t s  c a n d i d a t e  a l o c a l  man, T . B i s s e t t .  'The  Wollongong 
b r a n c h ,  h o w e v e r ,  was n o t  so  p rom pt  o r  e f f i c i e n t ,  and i t  was r e ­
p o r t e d  on 19 June  t h a t  th e  B u l l i  b r a n c h  was "much hampered  by 
W ol longong  n o t  y e t  h a v i n g  c h o se n  a  nominee  t o  r u n  w i t h  t h e  l o c -
78a l  man",  B i s s e t t .  The B u l l i  b r a n c h ,  t h e r e u p o n ,  t o o k  m a t t e r s
i n t o  i t s  own h a n d s ,  and s e n t  a d e p u t a t i o n  t o  th e  s i t t i n g  f r e e -
t r a d e  MLA, F.Woodward, u r g i n g  him t o  r e - c o n s i d e r  h i s  d e c i s i o n
n o t  t o  r e - c o n t e s t  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e ,  and f i n a l l y  s e c u r i n g  h i s  ag -
79r e e m e n t  t o  become i t s  seco n d  n o m in e e .  I t  a l s o  made e f f o r t s  t o  
i n d u c e  two s u p e r f l u o u s  f r e e t r a d e  c a n d i d a t e s ,  A .C am pbe l l  and F.
80F r a n k l i n ,  t o  r e t i r e  i n  o r d e r  t o  a v o i d  v o t e - s p l i t t i n g .  At i t s  
n e x t  m e e t i n g  on 19 J u n e ,  how ever ,  t h e  c o n f u s i o n  r e a c h e d  a c l i m ­
ax when d e l e g a t e s  from t h e  W ollongong FTA announced  t h a t  th e  
’ s u p e r f l u o u s 1 F . F r a n k l i n  had been c h o se n  a s  i t s  n o m in ee ,  t h u s  
e m b a r r a s s i n g  t h e  B u l l i  b r a n c h ,  wh ich  was th e n  f o r c e d  t o  a c c e p t  
Woodward’ s r e s i g n a t i o n  from th e  c o n t e s t .  The r e p o r t  o f  t h i s  
m e e t i n g  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  " F r e e t r a d e r s  g e n e r a l l y  . . .  a r e  by no 
means u n i t e d  i n  t h e  o f f i c i a l  c h o i c e  [ o f  F r a n k l i n  and B i s s e t t ] ,
and  t h e r e f o r e  i t  i s  f e a r e d  t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  s t a u n c h  f r e e t r a d e
81c a n d i d a t e s  w i l l  be c o n s i d e r a b l y  j e o p a r d i s e d " .  T h e i r  f e a r s  
were  c o m p l e t e l y  j u s t i f i e d ;  t h e  i n e p t i t u d e  o f  l o c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  
d i d  n o t h i n g  t o  i n d u c e  t h e  r e t i r e m e n t  o f  C am p b e l l ,  and ,  w i t h  th e  
v o t e  s p l i t ,  t h e  f r e e t r a d e r s  l o s t  b o t h  t h e  s e a t s  t h e y  had won i n
1889 .
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The considerable progress in the development of elect­
oral organisation, represented even by these unsuccessful and 
inept attempts at co-ordinated local electoral management, was 
off-set by the damaging effects of unabated local rivalry and 
conflict, apathy and inaction, and the residual influence of
i
attitudes that positively prohibited the success of local org­
anisation in preventing vote-splitting. The instances of con­
flict between branches in the one electorate remained not un­
common, and such conflict negated the effectiveness of local 
organisation. In April 1890, the Waverley and Woollahra bran­
ches of the FTLA held a joint meeting to choose their candid­
ates to contest the four-member electorate of Paddington in the 
event of an unexpected general election. ^Although such action 
displayed admirable foresight, it became the source of apparent 
conflict in June 1891* One of the chosen candidates in April 
1890 was, not unnaturally, the president of the participating
85Woollahra branch, J.C.Neild. When, however, the anticipated 
election became a reality in mid-1891? branches of the Assoc­
iation in Paddington again met to consider the selection of 
candidates, but this time the Woollahra branch was excluded from
O f
the conference, Mand J.C.Neild was excluded from the list of
85selected candidates, being replaced by C.Helmrich. Presumably 
the Woollahra branch entered a strong protest, for it was re­
ported some days later that Mit was considered advisable to
86call another meeting ... to reconsider the matter", and at the
re-convened meeting, it was decided to "invite" Helmrich to re-
87tire from the contest in favour of Neild. 'This was a case of
inept co-ordination causing conflict which in turn resulted in
vacillation and irresolution; Helmrich could be little blamed
for his refusal to accept the 'invitation* to retire, and hence
the vote was split.. Similar vote-splitting occurred in Central
Cumberland where the two local freetrade associations staunchly
88refused to compromise on a selection disagreement, seven free­
traders going to the poll to contest the four available seats.
In other electorates, it was a blatant refusal on the 
part of unsuccessful nominees to accept the decision of the loc­
al branch that completely undermined the potential effectiveness
*
of local organisation, and left the local branch powerless to
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control the party's campaign. On 6 June, it was announced
that a meeting of the Goulburn FTLA for the purpose of taking
"a progressive Ballot for a Candidate to represent Goulburn"
would be held on 9 June, and "Candidates willing to abide by
the result of the ballot" were requested to submit their names
89to the secretary. "At the meeting it was announced that eleven
90candidates had sent their names forward, but "it was under­
stood from the beginning" that Dr Hollis, Mr Walker and Cap-
91tain Rossi "would not hold themselves bound by the decision"."'
When it had been decided that F.Furner, L.Hollis and Howard
should go to the final ballot, "Mr Furner announced that as
Mr Hollis had not declared himself willing to abide by the dec-
92ision, he himself would go to the poll". No ballot was taken,
93"and the meeting broke up in some confusion". ■ All that the 
local branch could then do was make an arbitrary decision as to
Qhits nominee, and this it did on 10 June, choosing Furner. This
93decision, which "caused intense dissatisfaction", simply re­
vealed the inability of branches to counter intransigence, ob­
liged nobody to retire, and left the solution of the dispute 
as to who should go to the poll up to the individuals concerned 
or to the intervention of the central executive in Sydney. The 
individual contestants had made a mockery of the organisation, 
and they now attempted to resolve the conflict themselves. On 
11 June, Captain F.R.Rossi wrote to Parkes, enclosing a copy of 
a letter he had sent to Dr Hollis and Mr Furner. This letter 
stated: "I address you in the hope that you will acquiesce with 
me that the three candidates should unitedly concur in some plan 
which will obviate the impending danger. This might be arrived 
at by casting or drawing lots or by other convenient process.
Upon this the two unsuccessful competitors would retire in fav-
96our of the successful one". Rossi's suggestion did not seem
to meet with a favourable response, and most of his letter to
Parkes was spent providing information "in verification of the
97healthiness of my position in the constituency".'" Not until the 
central executive intervened v/as there anything approaching ord­
er in the freetraders' electoral organisation in Goulburn.
The most serious problems, however, remained apathy and 
the widespread failure to put the new techniques of local party
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organisation to the test. It was reported on 6 June that in
Argyle "No movement has been made locally on the part of the
°8freetraders, who appear careless about matters",-' and the pro­
tectionists in Camden were similarly lethargic, "allowing matt­
ers to take their own course, no committees having been formed,
99and each candidate running on his own merits". Even in elec­
torates containing local party branches, their activities were 
characterised by indecision, irresolution and lethargy. Des­
pite a meeting of the Wollongong PU at which it was decided "to 
take steps for organising the national party",^^nothing furth­
er was ever done. Protectionist laxity in Bogan was revealed 
at the one and only meeting of the local league; the report of 
the meeting stated that "nothing particular was done, but a lot 
of useless talk indulged in. Not one candidate was even spoken
The freetraders in Murrumbidgee displayed even greater
apathy and irresolution. At a meeting of the Wagga FTA early
in June it was decided that the choice of candidates would be
left to the Association’s committee of twelve.^ ^Nothing was
done, however, until 19 June when a telegram was sent to Daniel
O ’Connor, already defeated at West Sydney, urging him to contest
Murrumbidgee.' ^ O  ’ Connor, however, refused and went to Monaro.
Next a telegram was sent to J.F.Burns, defeated at St.Leonards,
asking him to contest the electorate, but he too declined.^1
Nothing in the way of local selection was attempted, and what
was done was left far too late to be of any value. Showing a
marked lack of joint effort, the Narrandera FTA met on 11 June
105"to discuss the situation in the Murrumbidgee electorate", 
and decided "to write to the Wagga branch asking it to bring 
out a freetrade candidate".^ uThe sluggishness of both bodies 
resulted in no local selection being made at all for the elec­
torate, and the freetrade candidate who contested the election, 
stood unendorsed by either the local or central bodies.
Although there was some improvement on 1889> the final
total of only twenty-eight electorates in which local branches
] 0 r(made selections of candidates - freetrade branches j^gfifteen 
and protectionist branches in twenty-one electorates -
9/287
demonstrated the continuing inadequacy of party electoral org­
anisation. As in .1889? the weakness of local organisation placed 
a great strain on the energy and resources of each party’s cen­
tral executive.
The basic object of both central party executives was
to "exercise control over the hosts of candidates" in the int-
10Qerests of securing electoral victory. 'In their attempts to 
exercise this control, the FTFC and NPPEC undertook three spec­
ific tasks: the selection and endorsement of party candidates; 
the provision of candidates to uncontested electorates; and 
the prevention of vote-splitting by ensuring that the number 
of candidates in each electorate did not exceed the number of 
available seats.
A major objective of party endorsement was "to make 
the strongest candidates in every electorate the first favour­
ites in the coming fight", 1 ^ and each executive's decisions were 
revealed by the publication of a "list of candidates whom it
will support" ,^^or who were said to have received "the sanct-
112ion of the party". The means employed to select "the bestn 3from so many suitable men" was "a weeding-out process", in 
which the "Local associations and party organisations" played 
an important role.1 ^ E f  ficient local organisation was, in fact, 
regarded as the very basis of the process of central endorsement. 
It was specified at both the FTLA and NPA4 conferences in 1889 
that "the candidates selected by the association or majority of 
associations in an electorate shall be accepted as the candid-113ates of the party", and it was envisaged that central endor­
sement would be little more than a formal confirmation of the 
local branches' choices.‘1°This central confirmation, or offic­
ial recognition of selected candidates, was, however, an ess­
ential part of the proposed system of electoral management,
and branches were required to "promptly notify" the central ex-
117ecutive of their selections.
The protectionists had groped towards this potentially 
efficient system of electoral management during the general 
election of l889j but the hasty and impetuous endorsement of
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candidates by the central NPA3 executive had given the local
associations no time to complete their selection deliberations,
ll8and ha.d caused collisions and confusions." The protectionists, 
however, had been well in advance of the freetraders, whose el­
ectoral organisation had been in such chaos that any thought of
119central endorsements had had to be abandoned. A blueprint for 
efficient electoral management had, however, been formulated at 
both conferences during 1889? and, despite the extinction of 
the ’permanent’ organisational 'machinery' of both parties, the 
ad hoc parliamentary executives seem to have made a real effort 
to put it into operation during the 1891 election. Shortly after 
the dissolution, the NPPEC sent to all local protectionist 
leagues ”a communication instructing ... [ them] to select
i p 0candidates and forward their names to Sydney" for ratification;"' 
"organisation between the Opposition headquarters and the coun­
try branches" formed the basis of the NPPEC's endorsement work."““
Contact between the FTFC and "the country branches" was also 
122made, and the freetrade executive also emphasised to the loc­
al branches "the necessity to keep in telegraphic ... touch with 
123headquarters". Furthermore, and probably in recognition of the
mistakes of 1889? both executives delayed the publication of their
first comprehensive lists of endorsed candidates until IP June,
almost a fortnight after the announcement of a general election
121and only three days before the first nominations took place." '
In marked contrast to 1889? this delay gave local branches ample 
time to complete selection work and submit choices to their re­
spective executives for confirmation.
As far as was possible, therefore, the endorsement lists 
of the two central executives were based on the selection work 
of local branches. The NPPEC's initial list contained endorse­
ments for forty-four electorates, in thirteen of which local 
branches had selected candidates; the subsequent addition of 
endorsees for a further seventeen electorates included candid­
ates locally selected in five electorates. In ten of the forty- 
five electorates on the FTFC's initial list, local selections 
had been made, as they had been in two of the nine electorates 
subsequently added to the list. That the proportion was not 
higher was due entirely to the failure of over 60% of the
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seventy-four electorates to provide locally selected candid­
ates. The inability of both fiscal parties to sustain wide­
spread networks of active local branches between elections re­
tarded the progress they had made in so many other aspects of 
electoral man ag e ment.
The efficiency of the electoral management system de­
pended, however, not just on the quantity of local organisation, 
but also on its quality. Where the tasks of local selection 
were efficiently, equitably and promptly performed, the system
operated smoothly and central endorsement was, in fact, merely125a confirmation of the work done by the local leagues. The 
fact, however, that there was a large number of variations be­
tween the endorsements of the central executives and the sel­
ections of the local organisations testifies to a break-down 
in the system of electoral management, formulated in 1889 and 
first applied in 1891* One of these deviations was due to cir­
cumstances beyond the control of either the local league in-
1 P rvolved or the NPPEC, 'out the responsibility for almost all 
of the others must be borne by the weakness and inefficiency 
of party organisation on the local or ’grass roots' level. In 
several cases, simple ineptness was responsible for the deviat­
ions between the local bodies and the central executives. In 
the four-member electorate of Central Cumberland, the local
protectionist league selected only one candidate to represent 
127the cause, ' and the NPPEC was obliged to add a second protect­
ionist to its list to secure adequate representation in the 
c on tes t. a t~°The local free trade leagues in Newtown and West 
Sydney and the local protectionist branch in Newtown, all had 
their initial selections confirmed by their respective central 
executives; all, however, had initially selected fewer candid­
ates than the number of seats to be contested, and they only 
bestirred themselves to choose additional candidates when it 
was too late to obtain central executive endorsement of their 
c hole es.
In three other instances, it would appear that local 
rivalry dictated the selections of local leagues and led to con­
flict with the central executives. In the formulation of the
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principles of electoral management during 1839, it was under-
standably specified that sitting MsLA "have a prior claim over
new candidates to be recognised as the candidates of the ...
1-1party", " and this was reiterated during the early days of the
1 Pcampaign. "Several local leagues, however, ignored their sitt- 
ing MsLA and, for reasons of local dissension, se1ected rival 
candidates: the Liverpool FTA insisted on selecting its presid­
ent, T. W.Taylor, as one of the four free trade candidates for 
Central Cumberland at the expense of the sitting MLA, D.Dale;~u"'" 
the Cootamundra Protectionist Union chose its vice-president,
J.J.Miller, to the exclusion of one of the sitting MsLA for 1 3 LYoung; " and the Braidwood Protection League blatantly ignored 
the sitting protectionist MLA, A.Pyrie, preferring the local
1  ~7 Cl
man, A. Chapman. In all three cases, the central executives
136endorsed the excluded MsLA, " and in two of the three electorates
1 37the party vote was split. Conflict within the local protect­
ionist league seems to have been responsible for the friction 
between the NPPEC and its branch in Balranald. Called upon to 
choose its candidates, the local protectionist association in 
two-member Balranald held a ballot in which sitting MLA, A.Lake-
man, and local cai'rier, J.Newton, defeated A.L.Cameron and J.
138Shropshire. Soon after, however, "a split" between the candid-
139ates and within the association developed, "probably as a res­
ult of Newton’s declaration that he regarded himself as a labor 
candidate. ^ ^To the disgust of the local association’s secretary,"41 
the NPPEC refused to endorse Newton, 4 "and it even sent Newton
a telegram "strongly recommending him to withdraw" in favour of
143the unsuccessful A.L.Cameron.
In only one instance does the central executive appear
to have been unquestionably responsible for the conflict between
its endorsement and the choice of a local league. On 3 June,
the local FTA pledged itself to support the candidature of C.
Boyd for West Macquarie, and on 12 June, Boyd seems to have
been encouraged by the FTFC to persevere in his intention to
143contest the electorate. 'A day later, however, the FTFC ann­
ounced that it had endorsed a rival freetrader, A.F.Twine, to
contest the single seat in West Macqu a r i e , d e c i s i o n  that
147evoked surprise and annoyance among the 1.ocai freetraders.
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Boyd understandably refused to retire, and only Twine's volunt­
ary wit idrawal prevented the splitting of the freetrade vote*
Six electorates in which local branches selected candid­
ates were ignored altogether by the central executives in the 
compilation of their endorsement lists; the reasons for the 
omission of four of these emphasises the impossibility of ach­
ieving effective electoral management without efficient and 
responsible local organisation. The local protectionist leagues 
in Balmain .and the local FTA in Molong took so long over their 
selections that these were only finalised when it was too late
” i  j Q
to obtain central executive confirmation;‘"’'r uhe local protect­
ionist league in Hawkesbury for some obscure reason selected a] l< qas iti ;ar ite; and the caprice and irresolution
i Rnof the freetraders in Paddington“"''left the FTFC no choice but
to declare that it "could not see ... fits'! way clear to 'bunch1
191candidates for the Paddington electorate". Despite the local
19?freetraders 1 selections for the electorate of Illawarra, the 
FTFC clearly was dissatisfied with the chosen candidates, con­
sidering them to be far from the strongest of those who had off- 
ered themselves for selection,'‘"'and it therefore refused end­
orsement., Only in Careoar, where the NPPEC failed to endorse 
the selections of the local league, was there a hint of executive 
incompetence,
The real achievement of both central executives in 1891 
was that, despite the inadequacy of local organisation, they 
persevered with their work of endorsing candidates, and their 
final lists represented a marked advance on the endorsement eff­
orts of 1889* In contrast with their abandonment of endorsement
in 1889 > the freetraders1 FTFC endorsed ninety candidates for
19/'fifty-four out of the seventy-four electorates in 1891* In 
1889s the NPA3 positively listed endorsements for only forty- 
eight electorates, although endorsements were implied in a fur­
ther fifteen;“^ ^in 1891? the NPPEC dispelled all uncertainty by 
positively announcing the endorsement of ninety-five protection­
ist candidates in sixty-one electorates. It was this "close 
attention and systematic scrutiny of names" that led the Telegraph 
to conclude that ,rlt is doubtful if a general election has been
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so satisfactorily managed previously” 157
For the most part, however, both executives were forced 
to undertake the work of endorsements without the benefit of 
sound local organisation, and it was in these circumstances that 
the active participation of Parkes in the deliberations of the 
FTFC was of particular benefit to the freetraders’ organisation. 
Father than shying a*ay from the new methods of electoral manage­
ment, Parkes seems to have been genuinely interested and act­
ively involved in the advancement of freetrade electoral org-15ganisation during 1889 and 1890.' During these two years, he
and J.H.Carruthers seem to have been the two MsLA most actively
15°involved in the freetrade organisation of by-elections, and
their pre-eminence in freetrade electoral management continued
into 1891* In March 1891 > Carruthers went on a tour of country
electorates and, on his return, gave Parkes a general assessment
of freetrade electoral prospects in the event of an election
and made detailed suggestions about certain steps that should
be taken to win such electorates as Gundagai, Gunnedah and 
1 hONamoi." Further, as soon as it became clear at the end of May
that a general election was inevitable, Parkes sent McMillan,
with instructions to ’’Consult Carruthers”, a list of ’’the seats
16lwhere, . we must carry the war”. It was not surprising,
lipthen, that Carruthers, as chairman,~^and Parkes formed the act­
ive nucleus of the FTFC.
Carruthers soon demonstrated his influence in the dec­
isions of the FTFC; with reference to the seat of Gundagai, he 
had told Parkes that ”A decent fellow sent by us would win that 
seat”, and the executive lost no time in despatching H.M.Deakin
of Sydney to the electorate, suggesting his local selection,
160granting him endorsement' and promising to send several prom­
inent MsLA to support him0"*'^ In the absence of efficient and 
widespread local organisation, however, it was on Parkes that the 
success of the FTFC’s efforts most depended* With his vast know­
ledge and experience of electoral manipulation, his personal 
network of electoral agents, 'and his undiminished influence 
still attracting the pleas, complaints and reports of numerous 
candidates, oUParkes provided much of the information on which
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the executive based its decisions. The executive’s dependence 
on Parkes was revealed in its efforts to endorse a suitable 
freetrader for Albury. On 9 June, Bruce Smith was ’’deputed” by 
”the Election Committee” to ask Parkes "two or three questions:
1. Whether you have rec’d [sic] an answer from Mr 
Davies re Bourke election.
2. Whether you had any word from Pain or Chapman re 
Braidwood.
3« Whether you had any word from Gulston [ sic] re 
169Albury”. ' As it happened, Parkes had an electoral agent,
James McLean, working in the Riverina, and that same day McLean
wrote to Parkes stating that he was ’’much impressed with Mr
Gulson ’s c.. sound honesty of purpose on each of your leading 
"> 70planks”. Probably on the basis of this information, Gulson was
171included in the FTFC’s initial list of endorsements. 1 Parkes
also, it would appear, used his influence to try to woo promin-
172ent freetraders into the field for various electorates; this 
he would almost certainly have done on behalf of the FTFC.
Without efficient networks of local branches, however, 
both executives were vulnerable to the errors and problems that 
were bound to arise without a comprehensive first-hand knowledge 
of the situation in each electorate. Further, many of their 
endorsements were necessarily ’blind’ endorsements, their end­
orsees often being unknown to them and not necessarily being the 
strongest or most popular candidate. As a result, problems arose 
and mistakes were made. The situation that unfolded in Wollombi 
illustrated the difficulties encountered by the executives in 
seeking to ’place matters upon a sound footing’ in electorates 
with no local organisation to inform and advise them. In the 
single-member electorate, the FTFC was faced with the choice of 
one endorsee from three intending freetrade candidates, G.Watt,
H.Mahon and J.Gorrick. The executive finally decided in favour 
173of Mahon, but its decision was greeted with indignation and
contempt. Watt complained to Parkes that ’’the Election Committee
to whom I wired on Monday and again yesterday for information
about what had been done” had deliberately ignored his overtures
in favour of "a rabid protectionist”, and he asked Parkes "if
174anything can be done” to alter the situation. Whatever Parkes
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wrote in reply, Watt was loyal enough to retire. Not so the
179other freetrader, Gorrick; despite motions "deprecating”' and
176viewing his candidature "with great disfavour", he staunchly
refused to retire. From the executive’s point of view, this
led to the unfortunate situation in which its own endorsee,
Mahon, was forced to withdraw in order to prevent a split vote
and FTFC chairman, Carruthers, expressed his appreciation of
1 78Mahon’s "open, candid and honorable" conduct in the face of 
Gorrick’s intransigence.
177
181
Endorsing candidates ’on trust’ and in virtual ignorance
of their views also created the possibility of endorsing a clearly
unsuitable man, and this appears to have occurred in Hume. The
initial FTCFC endorsement for Hume was published on 12 June, and
179was accompanied by the statement: "another to be chosen". The
1 O a
second endorsee, added to the list the following day, had, 
however, been a delegate to the NPA3 conference in October 1889 
and a member of the NC, u and had made no apparent conversion to 
free trade in the meantime. Far from declaring his conversion to 
freetrade, Sydney Lindeman plainly declared his adherence to 
protection and stated that he would "reserve the right to vote 
as a protectionist against any Administration on the fiscal 
question". ^The ’blind’ endorsement of candidates without, app­
arently, first procuring their consent made the endorsement vul­
nerable to rejection, and seven ’blind’ FTFC or NPPEC endorsees
1 ft/refused to be nominated, 0 ^ 'although two of them voluntarily with­
drew from the contest in the face of the refusal of unendorsed
candidates to do so 185These denials of endorsement and candid­
ature, however, allowed two protectionists and one Labor candid-
186ate to be elected unopposed.
At both the FTLA and NPAJ conferences in 1889? it was
generally agreed that no electorate should be left uncontested
at any future election, *and it was resolved that "should any
electorate be unable to find a suitable candidate", the central
organisation would either "recommend" one or would "select a
l88candidate ... if requested"/" The ambitious sentiments to con­
test every electorate were reiterated by both executives at the
1 O n
outset of the 1891 campaign. 'It is in the light of these
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statements that both executives' achievements in the provision 
of candidates to uncontested electorates must be viewed. The 
FTFC resolved "to ensure that every electorate has a suitable
] 90freetrade candidate"; and Parkes was even more outspoken on 
the subject: " fWe shall oppose the member for Clarence and the
191member for Grafton. Not a single man will have a walk over'".
Despite Parkes's claims, however, no freetrader was
provided or endorsed to contest Clarence, the FTFC endorsee for
Grafton did not go to the poll, and the protectionists in both
these electorates were allowed into parliament unopposed by a
freetrader; a further ten protectionists in another seven elect-
192orates were accorded the same luxury. In one of these, the
three-member electorate of Richmond, however, it would appear
that the freetraders' oversight was deliberate. The three
MsLA, T.Ewing, J.S.Perry and B.B.Nicoll, were all protectionist
193'rebels’; two were members of the rebel ’Cocktail Party', and 
all three had voted with Parkes in the division on Dibbs's cen­
sure in May.J/fIn March 1891? Carruthers had advised that the 
freetraders "conciliate those inclined to change their sides
and ... strongly support those who have stood by us in the past
195including men like Ewing, ..., Perry etc.". Further, Parkes
included only Nicoll on his list of MsLA to be opposed, and
either McMillan or Carruthers objected to his inclusion, comm-
196enting that he was "all right".' It would seem reasonable to 
assume, therefore, that the FTFC’s failure to provide candidates 
in Richmond was a gesture of support to its protectionist ’all­
ies'; the number of protectionists returned unopposed on account 
of FTFC weakness may thus be reduced to nine in eight electorates. 
Although this did not conform to their stated intentions, the 
freetraders had materially improved upon the disaster in 1889
197when they allowed twenty protectionists to be elected unopposed. "
The NPPEC in 1891 did neither better nor worse than the
NPA3 had done in the matter of preventing ’walk overs’; on both
occasions, only two electorates were left unopposed by a protect- 
198icnist. The NPPEC did, however, at least in one case, positively 
and efficiently undertake the provision of an officially endorsed 
candidate to an electorate where a local protectionist could not
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be obtained* On 10 June, i.n the electorate of Patrick's 
Plains, a meeting of protectionists was held at which it was 
announced that communications had been established "with the 
electoral committee during the past three days with the view of 
running a suitable candidate . .. The party is anxiously await­
ing the news of the central committee”.'^On 11 June, it was 
reported that "a strong candidate will, be announced to­
day. He will be a Sydney man”.rVUOn 12 June, the Protection­
ist executive officially endorsed W.Blackburn to contest Pat- 
lick's Plains, but his withdrawal the next day necessitated 
a further selection, which was duly made, endorsement being 
given to Alfred de Lissa, a Sydney solicitor.‘^ I n  almost every 
phase of electoral management and organisation, the freetraders 
made great, and the protectionists gradual, advances on their 
respective achievements in 1889.
Tne granting of financial assistance to selected can­
didates seems to have been no exception to this general pattern 
of pi ogres..;, at least as far as the freetraders were concerned, 
fho freetiaders' use of finance during the previous two general 
elections remains relatively obscure, but it seems that on neith­
er occasion did the amount spent exceed £?0020^and that almost 
all the money was devoted to the publication and distribution of 
propaganda rather than to the provision of assistance to candid- 
ates. TIn 1891, although unable to call upon the financial re­
serves of the FTA, the FTFC paid more attention to the use of 
finance "to help some impecunious candidates in their contest", 
leaving "little ... available for advertising and propagandist 
\< ork". ] he question of a freetrade electoral fund was first
raised oy FTtC chairman, Carruthers, at a caucus meeting of 
the parliamentary party on 3 June. Referring to the operation 
of the freetrade "central machinery", Carruthers stated that "we 
want our^supporters to give us their assistance and provide some 
funds”.-0 The final total of the FTFC fund came to £380, almost 
all of which was subscribed by freetrade MsLA and a small amount 
of which represented the last reserves of the defunct FTLA.^^^ 
tx^C secretary, Conroy, later commented xhat the amount avail­
able to the executive showed "how little interest the commercial 
community took in public affairs";20Sin contrast to its willingness
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to contribute in 1887, the SCC seems to have made no contrib­
ution at all towards the fund.
Well over half the money in the fund, it would appear, 
was used to defray candidates' expenses. Details of the ex­
penditure of £242 have survived, and of this amount, £136 was 
spent in payment of candidates’ expenses. Of this money, over 
£60 was channelled into the electorate of South Sydney as "part 
contribution towards the expenses of Mr Wise’s Election"; £25 
was despatched to Hume to aid FTFC endorsee, W.A.Harper; £40 
was advanced to pay the nomination fee of James Curley in New­
castle; and R.W.Thompson received £12 to aid his campaign in 
West Maitland. The method of distribution was through either 
the candidate’s committee secretary or Parkes’s electoral agent 
in the electorate concerned. Parkes’s agent in the Riverina,
200James McLean, acted as electoral manager for W.A.Harper in Hume;
it would appear that he paid any necessary expenses out of his
210pocket, and was later reimbursed by the FTFC.
The protectionists’ use of finance in aid of their en­
dorsed candidates in 1891 remains as obscure as at previous
general elections, although their payment of the occasional
2] 1candidate's nomination fee seems to have continued. ' According
to J.N.Brunker, his protectionist opponent in East Maitland had
been told by the NPPEC that "his expenses and deposit would be 
212paid". Apart, however, from the occasional reference to NPPEC
21 '5meetings that dealt "chiefly v/ith ... candidates and finances", 
no further details of the NPPEC's financial arrangements appear 
to have survived.
The one major aspect of electoral management in which 
both central executives encountered great difficulty in achiev­
ing success was the task of reducing the number of candidates 
in order to prevent the splitting of votes. Early in the cam­
paign it was reported that "Anything like splitting of votes will 
be discountenanced by both sides", 'and the NPPEC was reported
to have devised "plans for limiting the number of protectionist
215candidates offering in each of the electorates". The diffic­
ulty of achieving the retirement of unendorsed candidates was,
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however, pointed out by the Herald; "human nature is only hum­
an nature", it remarked, "and many a candidate declines to off- 
er himself up as a sacrifice to his party". t~J' The task in 1891? 
however, was even more difficult than it had been previously, 
for it was "the first general election since the Payment of 
Members Bill came into force", and intending candidates had no 
longer to be "certain that they would be able to stand the ex­
pense incident on the honourable position of member of Pari- 
?17lament". ' As a result, the Herald concluded, "there is an un-
218usual plethora of candidates for the coming contest",1 one
early estimate putting the number at 420 for the 1J1 available 
219seats. It was to the task of reducing this figure that the 
executives were obliged to attend, and the Herald again lacon­
ically commented that "it would appear that full occupation will
220be provided for the central executive bodies".
Not the least effective weapon possessed by the exec­
utives to induce retirement was their endorsement. Simple ex­
clusion from the list of endorsed candidates imposed an indirect 
obligation to retire, and it was stated that candidates "who find
themselves unsupported by the party to wrhich they belong may
221shortly be expected to retire". Reports soon began to appear
in the press praising the "considerable amount of self-sacrifice"
shown by various candidates, and "the general tendency ... to
22:>waive personal feelings in favour of party welfare". ‘“William 
Affleck later recalled that he had travelled to Albury to con­
test the seat, but finding an endorsed freetrader already in
the field, "without further delay I retired, as I said I would
228be no party to splitting the freetrade vote". In the elector­
ate of Tumut, as soon as E.G.Brown received official FTFC en­
dorsement, the other intending freetrade candidate withdrew in 
his favour, ^ '^stating that he would assist Brown’s candidature.
In the two-member electorate of Monaro, J.W.Johnston withdrew 
in favour of Parkes’s Post-Master-General, Daniel O'Connor, v.no 
had already been defeated in West Sydney and who came to Monaro 
presumably still carrying his official endorsement. Johnston 
stated that he retired because "he was convinced that the free­
traders of Monaro were not strong enough to return two candid­
ates, and ... he had come to the conclusion that, as a strong
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supporter of the Government, it was his duty to retirett#^2b
*^ i^e /1 graciously commented that "he deserves the thanks of
the party".22 ^
Not all unendorsed candidates, however, responded sc 
magnanimously. Numerous candidates, like the freetrader, E.M. 
Clark, in St Leonards, "failed to comprehend why ... [they] 
should be elbowed out of the contest",^2^and other unendorsed 
candidates resorted to such arguments as being "first in the 
i meld" to justify their refusal to re tire. 2r_2In the face of re- 
iusals to retire voluntarily, the executives resorted to direct 
intervention and disciplinary threats in an effort to induce 
retirements. Executive threats to 'boycott’ intransigent can­
didates and to call on the electors to repudiate such ’rebels' 
had been employed by the protectionists in l889,2j>°and they 
were again used in 1891, rather less vehemently, by the exec­
utives of both parties. Further, direct executive intervent­
ion in any electorate had been sanctioned at the FTLA confer­
ence in 1889 as "a last resort" when "all local effort had failed 
to bring about the desired unity"."'"'
By mid-June, such a situation had developed in Goulburn.2^2 
—1—1 i fail?.outlined the problem: "... there are several free- 
tiaders, and rival claims for preference cannot be adjusted 
readily while no one candidate seems to be prepared to withdraw".
To clear up the confusion, the FTFC decided to intervene, and on 
12 June, the three rival freetraders, Furner, Hollis and Rossi, 
each received a telegram from the executive stating "that after 
consultation with the Premier it has been decided to invite the 
candidates to submit their claims" to the central body for im­
partial consideration.2y1 It was further stated that "if anv can­
didate refuses to do this, no support will be accorded him, but 
the freetrade leaders will call upon the electors to support the 
candidates who are most reasonable".22 ^ Dr Hollis, the official 
Labor candidate, refused to be a party to this ultimatum, but 
Captain Rossi and Mr Furner travelled to Sydney to meet with 
the executive. As a result, an advertisement was published on 
19 June stating that Captain Rossi had retired in favour of 
Furner, ^°"who telegraphs that he is now the accepted candidate
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o f  t h e  p a r t y » ' ,  - I n t e r v e n t i o n  had  been  s u c c e s s f u l ,  and t h e  v o t e  
was n o t  s p l i t .  The NPPEC u s e d  a s i m i l a r  a p p r o a c h ,  and a l s o  met 
w i t h  some s u c c e s s *  On 23 J u n e ,  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  d e s p a t c h e d  t o  t h e  
e l e c t i o n  co m m it tee  o f  i t s  two e n d o r s e e s  and s i t t i n g  MsLA f o r  
Young a t e l e g r a m  which  s t a t e d :  "My c o m m i t t e e  s t r o n g l y  u r g e s  t h e  
P r o t e c t i o n i s t s  o f  Young E l e c t o r a t e  t o  VOTE STRAIGHT f o r  Gough 
and M ack innon ,  and n o t  t o  j e o p a r d i s e  t h e  s e a t  t h r o u g h  v o t i n g  
f o r  M i l l e r .  A d v e r t i s e  t h i s  i n  a l l  l o c a l  p a p e r s .  ( S i g n e d )  
H .T e n n e n t  D o n a ld so n ,  S e c r e t a r y  P r o t e c t i o n  E l e c t i o n  Com m it tee ,
p ~Z O
S y d n e y » ' T h o u g h  a l i t t l e  l a t e ,  t h e  t e l e g r a m  had t h e  d e s i r e d
e f f e c t  when J . J . M i l l e r ,  t h e  i n t r a n s i g e n t  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  c a n d i d -
-39a t e ,  r e t i r e d  from t h e  e l e c t i o n  a t  t h e  N o m i n a t i o n s  on 24 J u n e .  ""
I n  many c a s e s ,  how ever ,  d i r e c t  e x e c u t i v e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
was n o t  s u c c e s s f u l ,  and th e  p a r t y Ts v o t e  was a c c o r d i n g l y  s p l i t ,  
o f t e n  w i t h  d i s a s t r o u s  r e s u l t s .  The NPPEC, i t  was r e j j o r t e d  cn 
16 J u n e ,  was e x p e r i e n c i n g  »»much t r o u b l e  . . .  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  some 
c a n d i d a t e s ,  who send  p o i n t  b l a n k  r e f u s a l s  t o  s t a n d  o u t  i n  f a v o r  
o f  o t h e r  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s  whom t h e  c o m m i t t e e  b e l i e v e  a r e  more l i k e l y  
t o  p o l l  well»», and t h e  e x e c u t i v e  was s a i d  to  be s p e n d i n g  ’’A good 
d e a l  o f  money . . .  i n  t e l e g r a m s ,  b u t  o f t e n  t o  l i t t l e  p u r p o s e ’».' :
A c a s e  i n  p o i n t  was i n  th e  two-member e l e c t o r a t e  o f  O range ,  
w here  t h r e e  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s ,  two o f  whom were  t h e  s i t t i n g  MsLA 
and p a r t y  e n d o r s e e s ,  d e c l a r e d  t h e i r  i n t e n t i o n s  o f  c o n t e s t i n g  
t h e  e l e c t i o n .  A s p l i t  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  v o t e  was t h u s  t h r e a t e n e d ,  
and i n  an e f f o r t  t o  p r e v e n t  t h i s  i t  was r e p o r t e d  t h a t  »’Mr Dibbs  
h a s  w r i t t e n  t o  Mr Burke [ th e  u n e n d o r s e d  p r o t e c t i o n i s t j  . . . .  s a y ­
i n g  t h a t  i t  would be w ise  i f  he would  r e t i r e ,  and t h a t  M ess r s  
D a l t o n  and Torpy  [ t h e  two s i t t i n g  MsLAl had a lw a y s  g i v e n  th e  
O p p o s i t i o n  f i r m  s u p p o r  t»». r >! LB u r k e , h o w ev er ,  r e f u s e d  t o  r e t i r e ,  
and t h e  s p l i t  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  v o t e  r e s u l t e d  i n  th e  r e t u r n  o f  th e  
f r e e t r a d e - L a b o r  c a n d i d a t e ,  H.W.Nevrman. Had Burke r e t i r e d  and
a l l  h i s  v o t e s  been  d i v i d e d  e q u a l l y  b e tw ee n  D a l t o n  and To rp y ,
242b o t h  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s  would have  been  r e t u r n e d .
I n  t h e  s i n g l e - m e m b e r  e l e c t o r a t e  o f  H u n t e r ,  two p r o t e c t ­
i o n i s t s  an nounced  t h a t  t h e y  would b o t h  c o n t e s t  t h e  e l e c t i o n  a g ­
a i n s t  th e  one f r e e t r a d e r  and s i t t i n g  MLA, R .G c o b ie .  A l th o u g h  
one o f  th e  p r o t e c t i o n i s t s ,  J . P r i t c h a r d ,  r e c e i v e d  o f f i c i a l  NPPEC
237
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e n d o r s e m e n t ,  t h e  o t h e r  p r o t e c t i o n i s t ,  J . C o n n o l l y ,  t o l d  t h e  e l e c t -
pi, 3
o r s  t h a t  " t h e y  m igh t  r e l y  upon him g o i n g  t o  t h e  p o l l " . '  "On 13 
J u n e ,  C o n n o l l y  " r e c e i v e d  a l e t t e r  from t h e  P r o t e c t i o n  League in  
Sydney | ~ i . e .  t h e  HPPEC j s u g g e s t i n g  h i s  w i t h d r a w a l  from t h e  co n ­
t e s t " ,  b u t  t h e  r e p o r t  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  "B o th  men a r e  d e t e r m i n e d  to
pM,
go t o  t h e  p o l l " .  Once a g a i n ,  had th e  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  v o t e  n o t  
been  s p l i t ,  t h e  f r e e t r a d e r  would  have b een  b e a t e n . " '  ' ^ D e s p i t e  a
pi, g
g r a d u a l  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  number o f  c a n d i d a t e s ,  ' v' t h e  ’u n u s u a l  
p l e t h o r a  o f  c a n d i d a t e s ’ and c o n t i n u e d  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  e x e c u t i v e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  combined i n  l 3 9 i  t o  p ro d u c e  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  number 
o f  i n s t a n c e s  o f  v o t e - s p l i t t i n g .  E i t h e r  t h e  f r e e t r a d e  o r  p r o ­
t e c t i o n i s t  v o t e  was s p l i t  i n  t w e n t y - s e v e n  e l e c t o r a t e s ,  and i n  a
oh n
f u r t h e r  t h r e e  e l e c t o r a t e s  th e  v o t e  o f  b o t h  p a r t i e s  was s p l i t . ' " 11
What was r e g a r d e d  a s  most o f f e n s i v e  a b o u t  t h e  i n t e r v e n t ­
i o n  o f  t h e  e x e c u t i v e s  t o  i n d u c e  r e t i r e m e n t s  was,  a s  i n  1 8 8 9 , ^ ^  
t h e i r  s u p p o s e d  a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m  and d e n i a l  o f  f r e e  and i n d i v i d ­
u a l  c h o i c e .  Again  t h e  by-now f a m i l i a r  p h r a s e s  were  p ro d u c e d  t o  
denounce  them: L . H o l l i s  i n  G o u lb u rn  condemned " t h e  i n f l u e n c e  
b r o u g h t  t o  b e a r  i n  Sydney ,  and denounced  w i r e - p u l l i n g  e m a n a t in g
p i ,Q
from a n y w h e r e " ,  and T.W. T a y l o r  t o l d  t h e  e l e c t o r s  o f  C e n t r a l  
Cum ber land  t h a t  t h e y  " s h o u l d  s e t  t h e i r  f o o t  a g a i n s t  any c l i q u e  
s e t t i n g  up t h o s e  who s h o u l d  be r e t u r n e d " .  y But d e s p i t e  a c o n ­
t i n u i n g  e m p h a s i s  on t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  l i b e r a l  c o n c e p t s  o f  f reedom  
and i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  t h e  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  o f f i c i a l  e n d o r s e m e n t  seems 
t o  have  had a c o n s i d e r a b l e  b e a r i n g  on a c a n d i d a t e ' s  c h a n c e s  o f  
s u c c e s s .  A l th o u g h  s e v e r a l  u n e n d o r s e d  c a n d i d a t e s  were r e t u r n e d ,  
i n  a l m o s t  e v e r y  e l e c t o r a t e  i n  which  o f f i c i a l l y  e n d o r s e d  c a n d i d ­
a t e s  and ' r e b e l l i o u s '  u n e n d o r s e d  c a n d i d a t e s  c o n f r o n t e d  ord a n o t h -
251e r ,  t h e  e n d o r s e d  c a n d i d a t e s ,  a s  th e y  had i n  1889 ,  a c h i e v e d
252n o t i c e a b l y  b e t t e r  r e s u l t s .
P e r h a p s  t h e  most s i g n i f i c a n t  a d v an c e  made by b o t h  p a r t ­
i e s  s i n c e  1889 was ,  h o w ev er ,  t h e i r  w i l l i n g n e s s  i n  1891 t o  employ 
t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  and t e c h n i q u e s  o f  e l e c t o r a l  management t o  d i s c ­
i p l i n e  r e b e l l i o u s  MsLA. The p r o t e c t i o n i s t s  f i r s t  seem co have 
c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  u s e  o f  e l e c t o r a l  d i s c i p l i n e  t o  r i d  t h e m s e l v e s  o f
p a r t y  r e n e g a d e s  a t  t h e  end o f  1889 when t h e  r e b e l  ' C o c k t a i l
253P a r t y *  made i t s  f i r s t  a p p e a r a n c e .   ^ When, i n  O c t o b e r  1890,
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2 9 A0.0.Dangar was expelled from the protectionist caucus, ' ref­
erences to electoral discipline were again made. A''though 
no overt threat was made, it was confidently predicted that
Dangar would '»find that there are many of his constituents in
poothe country who will indorse the action of the Opposition", " 
and that he would "find out to' his cost at the next election"
podthe "serious blunder" he had made in deserting his party. -
The mutinous behaviour of the 'Cocktail Party' contin­
ued. in spite of these implied threats, and culminated on 2.8 
May 1891 'when three of its members, T.Ewing, J.S.Perry andOOHW.W,Davis, 1 the 'expelled' 0.0.Dangar and a new rebel, B.B.
Nie oil, all deserted the protectionists to help Parkes barely
p f O
survive Dibbs's censure which brought about the 1891 election. ' '
pooA further member of the rebel party, W,E.Abbott,"""was not pres­
ent for the division, but the ministerial whip later declared
that,had he been in attendance, "I have good authority for
p d nstating that he would have voted for the Government".r~J One 
further protectionist MLA had also become liable to disciplin­
ary action. Throughout 1890, Thomas Waddell had "incurred the 
odium" of the protectionist leaders, and, just over a week 
prior to the crucial censure motion, he had openly repudiated 
the concept of party solidarity in a speech in the Assembly.
"As far as parties are concerned", he had declared, "they can 
go to Hongkong or elsewhere. I may as well be candid with hon­
ourable members, and tell them that I do not intend to stick to 
26pany party"0 ‘“Following this speech, Waddell was deemed to have
263placed himself among the ranks of the 'Cocktail Party'.
Interviewed shortly after the censure vote, George 
Dibbs reiterated the view that the electors of the colony would 
teach such rebels "a lesson that will be a warning to all others
pCLwho may be inclined to go and do likewise"." The means by which 
the renegades were to be disciplined by the NPPEC and the elect­
ors invited to repudiate them were outlined soon after: "All 
the members of the late Parliament who voted 'straight' with 
the Opposition will have their candidature sanctioned and en­
dorsed by the committee, but other members of the Opposition who
265voted against their party will be either ignored or opposed".
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For this reason, Waddell, who had voted with Dibbs on 23 May,
q  £ <
was granted official NPPEC endorsement, at least initially/ 'v'
The other six rebels were all denied, official endorsement.
Waddell, however, soon joined his rejected fellow rebels. Grant-
? (' 7ed without either his ’’knowledge or solicitation”, the party’s
official endorsement was scorned by Waddell, arid the NPPEC con-
768sequently cancelled its support for him.'
Although the NPPEC’s refusal to grant endorsement to 
the members of the ’Cocktail Party’ was a definite and deliber­
ate attempt to discipline the disloyal members of the party, 
only two of the repudiated MsLA were actually opposed by NPPEC- 
endorsed protectionists. In Bourke, the executive endorsed the 
protectionist-labor candidate, H.Langweil, to oppose V/.W. Davis,
and officially approved the candidature of J.P.Howe to oppose 
?69Waddell. The executive’s ultimate lack of disciplinary res­
olution was revealed in its attitude to the three rebel members 
for Richmond, Ewing, Perry and Nicoll. Although it deprived 
them of endorsement, it was accurately reported that ”it is 
questionable if anything will be done in opposition to the
present members", “ ‘ and it was left to the militant PPRL to
271send its president, R.C.Luscombe, to tackle the renegades.
It was, however, on the provision of officially endorsed candid­
ates to oppose the rebels that the success of the NPPEC's dis­
ciplinary intentions ultimately depended. Confronted with en-
272dorsed opponents, both Waddell and Davis were defeated; " the 
other five rebels, without serious opposition, were all return­
ed. Further progress had been made, and a further lesson learned.
The freetrade party showed a similar resolve in 1891 
to impose disciplinary sanctions on its rebel and non-conform­
ist MsLA. In the division on Dibbs's censure motion, four-
freetraders, G.H.Reid, J.Haynes, J.C.Seaver and J.H.Want, had
273voted with the opposition, and it was later reported that the
FTFC "has determined to contest the seat of every member who
voted with Mr Dibbs". 2 fact, in his list of seats to which
"we must carry the war", Parkes specified those of Haynes, Reid 
275and Seaver. Although the FTFC denied all four rebels its 
endorsement, it did not succeed in supplying a strong and
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officially endorsed opponent for any of them, despite an appar­
ent attempt to do so, For the four-member electorate of East
Sydney, Parkes had suggested the official endorsement of "a
2 7 gbunch of t" freetradc candi iates to oppose Reid. Only two
candidates, however, were endorsed by the FTFC for the elect- 277orate,“ and one of them, Varney Parkes, apparently rejected
pnO
out of hand the idea of being ' bunched '. *“1 '"Although Reid express-
20 qed his indignation at being repudiated by the executive, his 
re-election was not prevented. It would, in fact, have been 
surprising had he not been elected; in the staunchest of all 
free trade electorates, Reid was one of .four free trade candidates 
vying for four seats. Jonathan Seaver did the executive's work 
for it by abandoning his old electorate of Gloucester and mov­
ing to the three-member constituency of St Leonards to tackle 
three endorsed freetrade MsLA, one of whom was Parkes. Seaver's 
resounding defeat was hardly attributable to the disciplinary 
zeal of the FTFC. Although Want and Haynes were denied endorse­
ment by the FTFC, so was any other freetrade candidate in their 
respective electorates of Paddington and Mudgee, and both were 
convincingly returned. The FTFC's disciplinary attempts were 
far less convincing than those of the NPPEC; nevertheless, what 
little it did represented another stage in the evolution of 
sophisticated and modern electoral management.
The general election of 1 8 9 1 ? in fact, clearly demon­
strated how much progress had been made in the formulation and 
application of the principles and techniques of modern electoral 
management since 1 8 8 ?. In 1 8 9 1 ? the work of both central exec­
utives was characterised by the existence of formal and coherent 
organisational guidelines, a clear conception of the possibilit­
ies and objectives of electoral management, and the use of a 
comprehensive range of organisational and disciplinary devices, 
including official party endorsement and financial aid to can­
didates; all three characteristics had been barely perceptible 
in 1 8 8 7 * Despite this progress, mistakes had been made and 
shortcomings still remained. What particularly required rectif­
ication was the continued failure of both parties to construct a 
permanent and widespread network of local party organisations.
That shortcomings still remained, was best revealed by the fact
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that as the 1891 election ended, the perennial cries of "the 
necessity for organisation" and the need for "strong branch
ogQassociations" began.
/
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CONCLUSION
The emergence, after 1883, of the fiscal issue as the 
dominant issue in the politics of New South Wales was largely 
due to the desire of Sir Henry Parkes to resuscitate a politic­
al system that was based on personalised unprincipled factions 
and was in the process of disintegration and decay. Until 
raised by Parkes, the fiscal issue had played a minor role in 
the politics of the 1880s, and it would not of itself have be­
come any more prominent. The issue, however, did possess a 
potential for two-sided emotional conflict and political pol­
arisation that could be used by an astute politician anxious 
"to prop up an outmoded system”.' Such a politician was Parkes, 
and it was he who was chiefly responsible for the immense 
political and parliamentary prominence of the fiscal issue after 
1885* He invoked the fiscal issue for its emotive and polaris­
ing potential, rather than for its potential as an issue of 
political principleo He envisaged the perpetuation of ‘old 
order’ factionalism, albeit refurbished, based on personality 
rather than principle.
The emergence during 1886 of the fiscal issue as the 
dominant political issue of the day did not represent in its­
elf any fundamental change in the political system of the col­
ony. In fact, had the politics of New South Wales after 1886 
remained wholly dominated by surviving arch-factionalists like 
Parkes and Dibbs, the only real change in the system would have 
been its increased stability. As it was, the conflict be tween 
the two fiscal parties appeared to be little more than a strugg­
le for power between the rival 'syndicates' of Parkes and Dibbs. 
To the 'old order' factionalists, the fiscal issue represented
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nothing more than a means of giving the faction system a new 
lease of life, and enough factionalists survived after 1837 to 
inhibit the swift transition from politics of personalities to 
politics of principle. Prior to 1892, the conflict I:cJ : o t ic
two parties scarcely transcended the unprincipled concerns of 
power pragmatism; it was vrithin both parties that the transit­
ion to principled politics took place.
Parkes’s manipulation of an issue of principle for a 
distinctly unprincipled purpose, had the effect of attracting 
to politics in 1887 men to whom the principled implications of 
the fiscal issue were of basic importance. These men were re­
sponsible for the basic changes in the political system that 
took place after 1886. Their ever-increasing representation 
in both fiscal parties after 1886 was responsible for the one 
basic and permanent change in the colony's political system 
during the period of fiscal politics prior to 1892: the repl­
acement of personal prejudice and preference by genuine con­
cern for principle as the dominating determinant of political 
allegiance and behaviour. The degree to which 'principle' had 
replaced 'personality' was constantly revealed after 1888, and 
it forced the surviving factionalists to adapt to the new pol­
itical climate.
Such a fundamental change in the political system could 
have been expected to produce radical and lasting changes. In 
particular, the new concern for principle should have resulted 
in the creation of cohesive principled parties, and lasting and 
fully integrated party structures with powerful extra-parliam­
entary organisations, the formulation of clear and relevant 
party platforms and the formalisation of operative systems of 
party and electoral discipline. Certainly considerable progress 
was made in these specific aspects of the transition towards 
modern political parties, but much of the progress that had been 
made by the end of 1891 was neither comprehensive nor permanent.
The most basic reason for the relatively slow and un­
steady pace of change in the new era of principled politics was 
the lack of real principled cohesion within both the parliament-
308
ary and extra-parliamentary wings of each fiscal party. Al­
though adherence to ‘principle’ largely replaced adherence to 
‘personality1, neither party had a defined and specified set 
of principles to which all its members collectively adhered.
The emphasis on the fiscal issue as an emotional polarising 
issue, rather than an issue of defined and principled relevance, 
was initially responsible for this lack of principled cohesion. 
Within both fiscal parties, men were deeply divided over the 
specific meaning and economic implications of their chosen fis­
cal doctrine. Within each party, the basic division was between 
‘pure* fiscalists, and ’moderate‘ or ’compromising‘ fiscalists. 
This division went beyond a mere’difference of fiscal opinion; 
it had social, economic and philosophical implications that 
kept both parties permanently splintered until well after 1891»
The ‘compromising’ fiscalists were those who basically 
wished to preserve a system of indirect taxation based on cus­
toms revenue. This desire was usually based on one of three 
factors: the preservation of economic privilege, a basic con­
servative tendency, or a lack of any real principled interest 
in the economic meaning and implications of fiscal doctrine.
The ’pure’ fiscalists were those who desired to alter the tax­
ation system by replacing indirect taxation with direct taxat­
ion, thereby taxing each citizen according to his ability to 
pay. The economic motive of eliminating the privileges of the 
wealthy and easing the tax burdens of the poor was basic to 
this desire. In social terms, this conflict within each fisc­
al party represented an embryonic class conflict between capit­
al and labour.
In philosophical terms, it was a conflict between de­
fensive conservatism and aggressive radicalism; between the 
defenders of a hierarchical and privileged status quo and the 
spokesmen of the rights of the common man to equality and to 
protection against exploitation. This conflict was philosoph­
ically expressed in the varying meanings given to the nineteenth- 
century British doctrine of Liberalism. Classical laissez- 
faire liberalism emphasised individualism, independence, the 
neutrality and non-interference of the state in social and
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economic affairs, and non-parti sail chip in politics* This 
creed, which did not inhibit the creation and maintenance of 
social and economic privilege, was, by the mid-lBBOs, the 
creed of colonial conservatives« Advanced or radical liberal­
ism stressed the need for the active participation of the state 
to eradicate inequalities and to create a just social order; 
it was the creed of the radicals and the champions of labour. 
This conflict of philosophies and principles profoundly affect­
ed the nature and scope of the changes in the political system 
of New South Wales during the period of fiscal politics between 
1887 and 1891.
Each fiscal party after 1886 was composed, of three 
distinct elements: (1) surviving factional politicians,
(2) classical or conservative liberals, and (3) radical or 
advanced liberals* It was in this new atmosphere of principled 
politics that the 5 old order1 unprincipled factionalists were 
virtually forced to make a ’principled' commitment to one or 
other of the two rival principled groups within each party.
These 'old order’ politicians were not, however, entirely sub­
merged by the rising tide of doctrinaire politics. They re­
mained powerful and influential; they retained the leadership 
of both parties; and they were sufficiently numerous to hold 
a peculiar balance of power between the classical liberals and 
radical liberals. The rival principled groups within each party 
needed the support and alliance of the ’old order' factionalists 
to secure the supremacy of their ’principled* concerns« The 
scope, nature and speed of political change in the new era of 
principled politics was largely determined by the interactions 
and alliances formed within each fiscal party between its three 
distinct elements. It was this process that either resulted 
in, or prevented, basic change in various aspects of political 
life.
The most likely alliance was that between the surviving 
factionalists and the classical liberals. Although not holding 
to the personalised loyalties of factionalism, the classical 
liberals shared the basic traditional conservative instincts of 
most of the surviving ’old order’ factionalists. On matters of
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policy, therefore, these liberals combined with the faction­
al! sts in both parties to stave off the radical challenge for 
progressive, principled party policy and reform. They were 
happy to acquiesce in the factionalists1 unprincipled refusal 
to come to terms with pressure for social and economic change 
and reform; in the face of radical demands, such important 
issues as industrial relations, direct taxation and electoral 
reform were shelved and ignored. The mere presence of party 
platforms was evidence of radical pressure, but their substance 
was proof of the factionalist-classical liberal domination of 
both parties; the absence of specific party policy and the 
avoidance of the pressing social and economic issues of such 
concern to the radicals demonstrated the successful resistance 
to change. As a result, both parties adopted virtually the 
same vague and irrelevant party platforms, thus accentuating
the "absence of any political division f between the two parties]
2based on deeper social and economic issues, .
On the subject of party discipline, however, a diff­
erent combination of forces within the two fiscal parties 
emerged. This new arrangement of forces acted not to restrict 
change, but to promote it. Implicit in radical liberalism was 
a belief in party discipline and the caucus system; basic to 
classical liberalism was the sanctity of independence and ind­
ividualism. In their desire for party unity and political 
order, the pragmatic factional leaders actively united with 
the radicals in an attempt to construct an effective system of 
party discipline. Resistance was strong and success doubtful, 
but the attempt constituted a fundamental change to the polit­
ical system and marked clear progress to the creation of ord­
ered and disciplined political parties.
Only in the area of electoral organisation and manage­
ment did the three distinct and rival groups in both fiscal 
parties work in harmony. With the prospect of winning power, 
the members of both parties discarded the traditional contempt 
for formal organisation, and devised and employed comprehensive 
schemes of electoral management. Under the leadership of their 
radical elements, both parties after 1887 steadily developed and
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improved their methods and techniques of organising a general 
election until, by 1891, fiscal electoral management displayed 
many of the characteristics of the modern electoral ’machine'.
The steady growth of local 'grass roots’ party organisation, 
the use of official party endorsement and the attempts at el­
ectoral discipline were the most sophisticated of these char­
acteristics. It was in the rapid development of modern meth­
ods of electoral organisation that the arrival of the new era 
of principled politics was most dramatically revealed. The 
swift and lasting progress made in the evolution of modern el­
ectoral management also demonstrated the progress that could 
be made when internal party unity and harmony prevailed.
Even when basic changes to the political system were 
wrought and promoted, however, their consolidation was slow 
and their acceptance far from automatic. One basic factor in­
hibiting the easy transition to modern, formal and regimented 
political methods was the continuing emphasis on the classical 
liberal tenets of individualism and independence. These res­
idual attitudes prevented the immediate acceptance and success 
of such modern or ’radical’ concepts as 'the caucus system', 
and made their consolidation as permanent features of the pol­
itical system slow and tortuous.
The serious internal conflicts within both fiscal part­
ies were, however, chiefly responsible for the failure to con­
solidate basic changes that took place. For instance, as long 
as the fiscalists ' extra-parliamentary organisations remained 
dominated by one sectional or economic interest, they were 
stable and potentially long-lasting entities. When, however, 
they were transformed into fully integrated party organisations, 
in which were represented the main rival interests and political 
philosophies within each fiscal movement, conflict and dissens­
ion became apparent and quickly resulted in their disintegration.
The political system of New South Wales between 188? and 
the end of 1891 was not an unprincipled, personalised faction 
system. The transition from politics based on personal prejud­
ice to politics based on political principle had been accomplished
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by 1889« The lack of principled cohesion and unity within 
each fiscal movement, however, prevented the clear emergence 
of cohesive, principled political parties, and continually 
thwarted and retarded the efforts of the 'new' men of princ­
iple to transform the political system into one based on mod­
ern and sophisticated foundations - integrated party struct­
ures, the ’caucus system’, specific party policies and plat­
forms, formal party discipline and organisation. In the final- 
analysis, the fiscal issue itself must be held responsible for 
the disunity in principle and confusion in doctrine that re­
tarded the growth of political change. Fiscalism was basically 
irrelevant to the needs and demands of colonial society; it 
was artificially and emotionally invoked for unprincipled ends 
and, as such, it fostered nc fundamental division of political 
principle or philosophy between the two rival parties. The 
vital divisions of principle were present only within both 
fiscal parties, and this presence prevented the cohesion ess­
ential to a true political party. Only the eradication of 
such principled disunity could finally produce cohesive and 
principled political parties. The transition from personal­
ised factions to principled parties, begun after 1886, was far 
from complete by the end of 1891*
